VAN RITH

 

 

 

Interview with Van Rith

in Khpop commune, S'ang district, Kandal province

20 February 2003

by Youk Chhang

 

 

            "The DK leaders had their own crystal clear principles regarding who was to know what and what someone was not to know. This is a very important part of the story. It was not the case that everything was generally known. There was somebody who was leader at each and every level." Rith asserted he only learned of the size and composition of the Central and Standing Committees when he read about it in Indradevi magazine.

 

Rith was an avid reader starting from around age 17 or 18, when he was a student at Lycee Sisowath, devouring both newspapers and books, including the works of Tes Savut, a returnee from France, while participating in demonstrations against oppression of all kinds, having been impressed by the anti-colonialism of Prince Yutevong and Sok Bun Sav, and such men's foundation of various associations. Among the demonstration leaders were Ieng Sary, Son Sen and Iem Ret. The assassination of Iev Koeus shocked him deeply, making him realize how things really were, stoking his nationalism and his attraction to democracy and liberalism, as espoused in Iev Keous' song about democracy being like a torrent of water flowing down from a mountain, i.e., unstoppable. He was deeply influenced by the nationalist sentiments of the era, including the official nationalism taught in the schools, which stressed the avariciousness of the Thai and Vietnamese. Meanwhile, he listened to the radio, including VOA, eventually buying his own radio to do so in 1956.

 

Rith was imprisoned in Posat in July 1952, after he participated in the demonstrations that year. Following the demonstrations, he and other participants had fled to Kampung Chhnang, where Rith had an uncle who worked for the cadastral service and was a member of the Democrat Party. Rith was in particular trouble because he had criticized the fact that Monique had won a beauty contest in which she was the only contestant, and Sihanouk was angry at him personally, especially since Sihanouk also heard the students had been gossiping about the fact that the King did dancing cheek to cheek with Monique, critical gossip that was deemed lese majesty. Rith was turned in by followers of Lon Nol's Neang Kun Hing party, being arrested on 10 July 1952. Under police interrogation, he admitted talking about the beauty contest and the dancing. He was taken to Kampung Chhnang and tried by the court there, sentenced to five years, with three years reduction because he was a minor, although five or six others tried for the same offense got the full five years. He was transferred to Phnom Penh, where Democratic Party lawyers intervened on his behalf, while has parents went to get help from Chuon Nat because one of those convicted as his student, and Rith was released. Chuon Nat explained to Rith that he himself had almost been imprisoned in connection with the liberal arts affair, admonishing him to pay attention to his studies and not get involved in the opposition.

 

He was involved with the Democratic Party during the 1955 elections, and was aggrieved by the repression of it in connection with the electoral campaign. Although it lost, it did not cease activities, instead creating various organizations and movements – in which Rith participated as a student -- to support policies of peace, independence and neutrality. He continued to follow things into the 1960s, including Sihanouk's "invitation" to the 34 to form a government, to which Ieng Sary responded with a petition vowing loyalty to Sihanouk's policies of peace, independence and neutrality, declaring that there was no need to form any government other than that appointed by the Prince.

 

By this time, Rith had become a reserve 2nd lieutenant in the army, serving under Um Savut, who used him to spy on the progressives, attending meetings and reporting back. He joined the Sangkum and was also a member of the Red Cross.

 

According to Rith, Ieng Sary's father was a Chinese businessman, his mother a Vietnamese, so Sary had never known hardship, having subsequently lived only in Phnom Penh and France. When Sary went into the jungle in 1963, it was very difficult for him, and he immediately fell very ill, unable to do much. He was older and more theoretically sophisticated than Pol Pot, but Pol Pot had already established a much stronger base of support among the veterans, including Sao Pheum, creating a front among veteran and other elements, unifying them under his line.

 

After being arrested, Tou Samut was detained at Um Savut's Banteay Sloek, to which Rith was attached, after which he was transferred to another location, where he was killed. Rith presumed this was on Lon Nol's orders. Um Savut warned Rith that he needed to be careful

 

Later, Rith worked for the Ministry of Finance, but also had a friend teaching at Kampucheabot, with whom he had political discussions and who was a lawyer for a political prisoner, who complained of being dunked in water during interrogation, as a result of which he had made false confessions.

 

In 1968, Rith was imprisoned for the second time. He was severely beaten and tortured with mock drowning during interrogation and convinced that – like others – he would never be released. One prisoner detained before him had jumped out of window to kill himself. Many others were tortured even more severely, including the wives of prisoners who refused to confess, with one of these women later becoming a military cadre in Sector 33. Rith insisted that Khmer Rouge torture was no different from – indeed a continuation of – Sangkum-era torture, with techniques such as immersion in water and use of plastic bags being adopted from Sangkum-era practices.

 

Democrat Party ideas stuck with him right through to 1970, reemerging after the coup, amidst the several social and political contradictions that boiled up after the coup.

 

Thus, Rith was an intellectual who joined the revolution from the city, doing so in the context of the turmoil and recriminations after Sihanouk was disposed. Both he and his wife feared imprisonment and were responding to Sihanouk's earlier appeal. Prominent intellectuals like Chuon Cheuan were fleeing, and so Rith did, too, in 1971. He asked around about the route out, talking especially to other old friends from Democrat Party days. He considered himself a patriot, like the others who were fleeing. He finally made to the liberated zones in May 1972. Upon arrival, he was not greatly trusted, being considered a johny-come-lately intellectual, with a bad class background. He began as a Front cadre, who had entered the liberated zones because he had lots of friends there.

 

Meanwhile, his own parents had fled the liberated zones to come to Phnom Penh, in part because they had displayed a photograph of him in his 2nd lieutenant's uniform, but also because all his relatives were teachers and so many people in his village were civil servants, so the Vietnamese accused the whole village of being Lon Nol and killed almost everybody.

 

            Sector 25 bordered on Viet Nam and was economically very well-endowed. During the first Indochina War, much of it had been occupied by the Viet Minh with a view to exploiting it for its richness in fish, as well as for strategic reasons: to prevent the French navy from attacking down the Tonle Bassak. Rith had seen all this as a child. After the 1970 coup, the Vietnamese again came in everywhere, presenting themselves first as the Sihanouk Front army, and then the Khieu Samphan army, as Khieu Samphan had a good name in what was his old constituency. They were all over this sector and much of the Southwest in 1970-1971, organizing the army in the Southwest. In Rith's sector, the Vietnamese set up a sector army committee comprising Seng Pum, a Vietnamese; Huot Se, who was a neutral figure but had previously served in the Vietnamese army; and Sok But Chamraoen, who had not previously been involved in the struggle, who had been a real hooligan. But Chamraoen had come down from Phnom Penh in 1970 and ingratiated himself to the Vietnamese, who appointed him committee member in charge of economy, which primarily meant the fishing grounds, so that they could get whatever fish they needed from him. But Chamraoen had a fridge full of booze and lots of women.and lots of women.

 

            Rith recalled having seen photographs distributed by Sihanouk, showing Non Suon in the pre-1954 period dressed in Vietnamese garb, and Rith believed that Suon had been completely under Vietnamese direction.

 

            The CPK policy was to fight on two fronts, "the battlefield fighting the Americans and Lon Nol, and also the battlefield to get away from the Yuon," so that no one could accuse the CPK of being a Vietnamese lackey. The documents were absolutely clear on this, so the policy was to create an army of its own. This was done in 1972, when Rith was already in the liberated zone and had met back up with all his old Democrat Party friends, including Von Vet, who was one of them, someone whom Rith had met during the 1955 elections. Von Vet was very pleased to see Rith and said he had reported to the higher levels about his arrival, and the higher levels said they remembered Rith, too. In July 1972, the higher levels instructed that he be assigned to go down into the districts, but before that he was sent for military training north of Phnom Penh, training in fact to become a political commissar. Rith told Von Vet he was afraid he couldn't handle combat, but Von Vet said he shouldn't worry. As an intellectual, Rith was adept at being a political commissar, which involved the presentation of documents to those who weren't very well educated, and he was praised for his loyalty to the party. So when the Special Zone was organized, he was considered the only one who could sort things out in Sector 25, which was chaotic because of the presence of so many Vietnamese. The place had pioneered by Non Suon, who was there first and was well acquainted with Sao Pheum, but because Rith was locally well known – and his name had appeared as number 90 in the list of 91 intellectuals in the liberated zones, he was well-received by the population and welcomed by Non Suon, who treated him well. For his part, Rith respected Non Suon. Rith spoke at rallies, and – being a well-spoken intellectual – was much applauded by the masses.

 

            As a result, the masses came to Rith, complaining that the sector cadre were corrupt and lackeys of the Vietnamese, who were picking the fruit off the trees, which infuriated the masses. Rith concluded that unless Cambodians conducted a struggle completely on their own, they would end up as lackeys of the Vietnamese, telling the people that if they wanted to avoid this, they should join the army and fight.

 

            Sihanouk's original appeal for people to join the maquis had created the foundation for the liberation army. Without it, people would not have joined the army in large numbers, as the did in response to his appeal. This made it possible for Khmer to do things on their own.  So a concentration of sector forces was begun, with the help of a battalion sent down by the higher ups, led by Nat, who was a native of the sector (from Prek Ampil). Nat, who had been in the liberated zones since maybe 1968, was a knowledgeable veteran of guerilla warfare. As part of the process of the organization of sector forces, Rith was assigned chairman of the sector military office. This meant setting up venues for study sessions, ensuring there was enough food for those attending. Indeed, Rith was responsible for all logistics, as well as documentation. Von Vet was impressed with his work and protected him once when it was suggested he should be arrested, saying he was doing a good job, that although he was only a Front cadre, he was key to the expansion of the army. As it advanced with each Lon Nol defeat, Rith moved his office forward. Soon, it was at Tonle Bati. The FANK Division 7 under Un Kauv was defeated, and 105mm howitzers were captured.

 

            So from 1972, there was no Vietnamese involvement in the Sector 25 military, the chairman of which was Sok. The legend about the existence of a Vietnamese special forces unit at Kah Khael that intervened in various battles was not true. It just ripped off the local economy and brought bombing down on the people there, which Rith as convinced the Vietnamese did on purpose. Soon the people knew that Rith was in favour of having the Sector troops drive the Vietnamese out, and they were mustered to do so, driving the Vietnamese right down to the border. This was in accordance with political instructions from Von Vet, who was mostly north of Phnom Penh, only occasionally coming south for visits. All the instruction materials came from there, insisting on the principle of independence, self-reliance and being the master of one's own destiny, which meant not relying on foreigners, otherwise one day one would end up as debt slaves to them. So all the fighting was done without foreign training, on the basis of learning lessons from combat itself. Ammunition, weapons and food had to be captured from the enemy. And the reality was that in almost every battle, the FANK soldiers broke and fled. Lessons were learned and war booty captured in every battle. Experience was the teacher. The troops themselves invented flying mines, field radio systems and secret codes, without Vietnamese or Chinese help.

 

From listening to FANK radio communications it was learned that a major cause of low FANK morale was that although there was a pay system, the commanders took all the money, leaving the ordinary soldiers with nothing to spend. By contrast, the peasant combatants of the liberation army fought even if they had nothing to eat and nowhere to sleep, eating what they could find and sleeping on the ground. They joined the army from 12 years up, starting out carrying rice and graduating into combat. And they truly believed that unless they did the fighting themselves, somebody else would take over. They were taught to turn their grievances into anger, and – like the people – they were very angry at US imperialism because of the bombing, the indiscriminate B52 strikes, and at the constant shelling. Although nobody wanted communism, people hated imperialism and the rich, so they supported the Khmer Rouge. The rich whose houses were destroyed by the bombing and shelling also supported the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge leadership was also good: some being quite well educated. Von Vet had attended lycee in Batdambang. (Nat?) was also a lycee student who had then worked for the electricity service. And it was precisely because the leadership was Khmer that the people supported it. The principle of independence/self-reliance meant no foreign leadership. If there had been foreign leadership, there would have been no support. There was support because the Khmer Rouge were against the Americans, Lon Nol and the Vietnamese. So when the time came to attack Phnom Penh, the people were really revved up, and two divisions had been formed: Division 11 and Division 12, plus a regiment for Sector 25. There was also a Division 13 north of Phnom Penh. After 17 April, Division 703 was formed from the south, and Division 801 from the north.

 

            Before the attack on Phnom Penh, a battlefield committee was formed to coordinate everything. Previously, the zone and the sectors had functioned separately, and the sector forces were jealous of the zone forces, which fought better and were more prestigious. To transcend this, a Special Zone South of Phnom Penh Battlefield Committee was formed with Von Vet as Chairman, Non Suon as Vice-Chairman, division secretaries Nat and Sok as members, with Rith as a member in charge of the Office. They worked out a clear-cut strategy to cut off supplies to Phnom Penh so it could be liberated, the capture of Kah Peam Reang being the key, so it was a main objective for 1 January 1975. Troops from river districts who knew how to swim were used for this attack. The permanent cutting of the river was achieved with mines supplied from the Special Zone headquarters north of Phnom Penh. With the East Zone in control of the east bank of the Mekong and the Special Zone in control of the west, the mines were deployed across the river to block it completely. The East and Special Zones then cooperated in the attack on Neak Leuang, which was commanded by a former governor of Svay Rieng with whom Rith had studied at Lycee Sisowath.

 

            East and Special Zone troops then moved upriver to attack Phnom Penh, the Special Zone units capturing 155mm and 105mm howitzers on the way. They wanted to use these to shell Phnom Penh, but orders came down from above not to do this, so that the people would not be killed.

 

            On the other hand, the policy vis-a-vis enemy-held cities and towns was to dry them out economically by blocking all communications routes, the people in the liberated zones being mobilized to physically cut the roads. This was part of the people's war of a liberation army that lacked supplies and especially heavy weapons.

 

            Rith also claimed that the liberation army captured very few FANK prisoners, maintaining that as the people's army was numerically and materially weak compared to FANK, its usual tactic was to surround and besiege FANK outposts, wait until FANK contingents were hungry and tired, then attack with 105mm fire and flying mines while contacting them over the radio and telling them they would be allowed to escape if they left behind their weapons. In most battles, those FANK soldiers who were not killed simply fled. There was no policy to capture them, as there was no food with which to feed them. Sector 25 forces relied on paddy milled in Prek Lovea for its ration, and there was not any surplus to feed prisoners of war.

 

            So, according to Rith, there the military operated no prisons, either at the front or in the rear, and held no prisoners, as there was nothing to feed them with. Nor were those fleeing according to specified escape routes fired upon, as FANK soldiers were considered fellow Khmer who wanted to live.

 

            As for errant cadre who had no fighting spirit and combatants who misbehaved, who broke the strict discipline both on and off the battlefield, there was a place for those removed from the ranks: Voat Kandal, where such liberals (serei) were sent to clear land and plant vegetables with a diet of rice and salt and re-education. They were then given the opportunity to volunteer to go back into combat, but if they made mistakes again, they would be returned and put to work at the Economy place, in Prek Lovea, where the rice mill was, at the pig-raising unit on Phnum Veang, or at the fishing grounds. Most of this ill-disciplined elements couldn't resist booze and women. Rith claimed none were executed, declaring those involved in fishing got fat because they had all the fish they could eat. According to him, this was the only way to run a people's army, because if combatants were ill-treated for just minor behaviour, the parents of peasant boys would not allow them to go into battle. For this reason, the same kind of re-education was applied to those who deserted in combat.

 

            Rith denied that there was any attempt to round up all former FANK and make them prisoners of war, asserting that there was complete chaos and that it would have been impossible to carry out comprehensive detention, given that FANK soldiers were fleeing in every direction, without looking back. Already, on 16 April, when the general officers fled, ordinary soldiers knew everything was over, and – anyway – there was nowhere to put them.

 

            However, there was agitation in the liberated zones to capture kinh, who were said to be sent to do wrecking. At every rally, victory over the CIA was proclaimed. Later, KGB and the Viet Nam-ists were added. This was generalized throughout the liberated zones. The result was that interrogations concentrated on this.

 

            After April 1975, Rith visited Viet Nam as part of a Commerce Ministry delegation, at a time when Viet Nam was provided some rice as aid. Rith went down the Mekong to Viet Nam, meeting Teu Kam there. Teu Kam also came to Phnom Penh as part of an official delegation which – among other things – wanted to recover the gold secretly hidden in Phnom Penh by Vietnamese Communist operatives before 1970. It was hidden in Tuol Svay Prey. Teu Kam had once become a Buddhist monk in Phnom Penh as part of his attempt to become as Khmer as possible.

 

            After 1975, Rith took some of his forces from Sector 25 with him to Phnom Penh, especially those who had worked in the transport corps, to work under him at state warehouses. He claimed all of them survived, as none of them were ill-treated, such that to this day, they consider Rith as being their father, grateful that he never raised his hand or his voice to them. The parents, who know how bad things were with other cadre, thank Rith for keeping their children alive.

 

            According to Rith, Meah Mut fought his from the Southwest into Phnom Penh, being put in charge of the Prey Sar prison, where a warehouse that was on an old FANK base was bombed by the US following the Mayaguez incident. Rith said that Mut was at this time a member of the General Staff, in charge of the Navy.

 

            Rith described his work as purely technical, relying on his commercial expertise, stressing that he had never held ministerial rank and that in the CPK system, no one ever worked on their own. The Party enveloped everything, but through a system of fiefdoms, with usurper kinglets (sdech kranh) ruling over each Zone and over Phnom Penh: Mok in the Southwest, Pheum in the East, Koy Thuon in the North, Nheum in the Northwest, Si in the West, each overseeing the economy, politics and executions, "enjoying total delegated authority" (mean seut tâmleak teang âh).

 

            He claimed that he only learned from his recently readings the composition of the CPK Central Committee and its Standing Committee.

 

            Rith evaluated the DK regime's good point as its nationalism, the fact that there were "no foreigners," that things were "set up independently, without relying on foreigners." Even more importantly, the regime was absolutely dedicated to preserving Cambodia's territorial integrity, absolutely opposed to any seizure of Cambodian territory by the Vietnamese and totally determined not to let anyone look down on Khmer. Rith insisted that the Vietnamese intended to swallow Cambodia and make it part of an Indochinese Federation. He maintained that Democratic Kampuchea had succeeded in frustrating the Vietnamese desire to defeat Cambodia militarily in one blow, by being able to maintain Cambodia's UN seat through military resistance after 1979, having previously foiled Vietnamese efforts to overrun Cambodia, at least in places. He further stated that Democratic Kampuchea's infliction of casualties on the Vietnamese was the main reason for the ultimate signing of the Paris Agreements.

 

However, Rith said it was a huge mistake not to have accepted any aid from the West or China after liberation. When Pol Pot went to China, he asked Mao only for 2,000,000 hoes, refusing Mao's offers of rice and other assistance, saying the people would sort this out for themselves, by farming the fields themselves.

 

            On the other hand, citing articles in Entratevi (issues 44 and 80), Rith also declared that the Kamping Puoy reservoir, built during 1976 and inaugerated in 1977, and the Trapeang Thmar reservoir are still in operation and appreciated by the people today, demonstrating that DK did achieve some useful things, there was good with the bad. He conceded thousands or tens of thousand of people conscripted for reservoir construction died, noting it has been alleged that this was the regime's fault because it should have used machinery. However, he asserted that relying on heavy machinery was not an option because the people could not even drive cars or motorcycles, much less operate earthmoving vehicles. He said they would have wrecked such vehicles, incurring huge repair costs or thousands or tens of thousands of dollars per vehicle. Relying on machinery would have been a very dangerous path, Rith insisted, declaring that burrowing of money to purchase expensive machinery that no one knew how to operate was the reason for the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. Therefore, Pol Pot's policy of relying on national strength and rapid construction of water works to build the country quickly to preclude a Vietnamese invasion made sense, even though this policy entailed both good and bad aspects. Rith added that this policy had been explained to the Chinese delegation that visited Cambodia in late 1977.

 

Meanwhile, handicraft production continued, as did factory production, with veteran and new workers working alongside each other, Rith declared.

 

The idea of independence/self-reliance was that the people would feed themselves by farming the fields, relying on their age-old agricultural knowledge, then proceeding to export of paddy, which would be made possible in the first instance by construction of canals, dams and reservoirs, so that production would no longer be reliant upon the weather, but there would be no immediate need for science. This, according to Rith, was based on the same assumptions as Sangkum-era construction of dams in the late 1950s.

 

            However, Rith said, the DK leadership was wrong to think only about producing and exporting paddy, and not about more lucrative and easy-to-grow export crops for which there was an established foreign demand. For example, in S'ang, the previous production of peanuts, sesame, green beans, etc, was halted, leaving the people only to farm paddy, even though people had no experience in paddy production. Similarly, the people in Loek Daek district, highly skilled at fishing and making fish sauce, were forced to learn how to grow paddy. The overemphasis on paddy production thus led to starvation. Instead of producing high value items that were simple to grow and sell, everybody had to concentrate on paddy, which requires enormous experience and skill to grow but did not fetch a good price. At the same time, local trade relations allowing specialization, such as between S'ang district of Kandal province and Bati and Prey Kabbas districts of Takaev province, were abolished, creating further hardship.

 

            So the bad aspect of the regime was that although the people were supposed to have enough to eat, they did not.

 

            Another problem with the regime was the arbitrary reality of appointments to local positions of power. In practice, the line calling for appointment of poor peasants as village, cooperative and subdistrict cadre meant that anyone of that class background was appointed, even if the reason for their poverty was that they were hooligans, people who had sold off their family inheritance to pay off gambling debts. Once in power, the ignorant poor – having no idea how to make a proper living -- were even more oppressive than their predecessors, Rith maintained. This was what led to slaughter, as a result of internal contradictions and infiltration by Vietnamese intelligence, because the Vietnamese had originally appointed most of these local cadre, who acted like overseers, not cadre. Rith said that 18-19 members of his (extended) family died because of these know-nothing cadre.

 

            The opposition to expertise was another bad point. Cadre appointed on the basis of class background meant that no one had technical expertise, the concept of which including basic skills like bookkeeping. In fact, Rith said, cadre had neither technical nor political knowledge.

 

            Rith maintained that recognition of the incapacity of cadre in technical matters led to the decision not to put money into circulation. After the money was printed in China, brought to Cambodia via Hanoi and was about to be put into circulation, it was explained in meetings that this was in fact no simple matter, requiring zone and sector cadre with banking skills and an understanding of counterfeiting. There was also concern that these cadre would take advantage of their control of money to make themselves rich by stuffing it in their pockets. So it was decided not to go ahead. The intention was originally there, but the policy was reversed.

 

In this regard, Rith said that although Democratic Kampuchea was supposed to have no rich and no poor, in fact there were super rich and super poor. The super rich emerged immediately after the war when some cadre accumulated material wealth, including by ripping off evacuees, something that happened to Rith's own older sibling, a schoolteacher, who was ultimately executed by an uneducated cadre. Such persons, Rith declared, could never have properly handled money.

 

Rith asserted that Koy Thuon was the ringleader of a traitorous plot involving money. According to Rith, Thuon was a link of Hâng Thun Hak, a Khmer Serei, and they conspired with Hing Kunthun, the director of the Khmer Commercial Bank, to get riels out of the country so that they could be spent once money was put back into circulation. Rith was told this by someone who said this plot was part of a larger plan by Koy Thuon and other North Zone elements to take power with Khmer Serei help. As evidence in support of this, Rith recalled that a false Front set up by Lon Nol had appeared at the Ministry of Information on 17 April 1975, maintaining that this implicated the North Zone forces that had seized the Ministry in such a plan.

           

            Rith attributed the CPK's wrong decisions above all to Pol Pot and other leftists in the leadership who considered everything modern as feudal-capitalist and began attacking others for being petty bourgeois and intellectuals. They were not in favour of expertise or of knowledge and know-how.

 

            Rith contended that those most victimized by the regime were the petty bourgeoise, especially democrats who joined the revolution, because they wanted to exercise their freedom of expression, to put forward their views, but could not do so. Rith himself was in this category, but lasted a long time because he was seen as one united front cadre who could organize specific things with regard to foreign trade, things that only someone with education could do. However, Rith said, his days were numbered. Generally, it was the uneducated who ill-treated the educated, especially in some villages, districts, sectors and zones where those in charge declared themselves talented proletarians, making a distinction between those who knew only how to talk and those who really knew how to get things done. They had become haughty and highhanded with everybody they considered an intellectual or petty bourgoeis, no longer thinking about gathering forces like before. This, Rith declared, was what got people killed.

           

            According to Rith, one PRC delegation, led by Foreign Trade Minister Li Qiang (sp?), came to Cambodia in early 1976, signing two or three agreements, including a commercial agreement. The DK side requested a loan of 140 million Chinese yuan and $US 20 million. It was Rith's job to activate the spending of these funds, and on 4 April 1976 he went to China and Hong Kong for one week to discuss Cambodia's requirements with Chinese leaders and to explore the opening of an office in Hong Kong, where a Chinese company helped introduce him to businessmen. These funds were not aid, but loans, to be repaid, with the accounts held in a Chinese bank. The 140 million yuan were split between A and B accounts. The A funds were for purchase of Chinese goods, which were imported to Cambodia, with all the paperwork done by the Chinese. The B account was for crediting Cambodia for the purchase of initial exports: cut wood, coconuts, whatever could be gathered up and sent by boat to China. The first major import was raw materials for the Chakrei Ting cement factory, as cement production was considered essential to national reconstruction. Chinese technicians came pursuant to a technical cooperation agreement with China to get the factory up and running quickly. Other imports aimed at supporting agriculture.

 

Commerce funds were not used for the purchase of weapons. According to Rith, the story that export sales were used to finance the purchase of weapons, which in turn were used to kill people, is false. The supply of weapons was pursuant to separate agreements starting with GRUNK, which did not affect commercial transactions.

 

            Imports were done via paper transactions inside the Bank of China, orders being placed by ministries in Phnom Penh and the Cambodia paperwork being done by Rith.

 

            As for the US$20 million, the Cambodians proposed using it to purchase spares for western equipment, including tractors and vehicles, and the Chinese turned it over to Cambodia, with Rith going to Hong Kong to arrange for its use, although the Chinese introduced him to all the necessary businesses. Purchases were made via letters of credit, from the international market, from firms in the US, Australia, Japan and Africa. Rith set up the "Ren Fung (sp?)" company, buying to service the needs of the tire and other factories, while selling national produce, including rubber, on the Singapore market, using the procedures to buy engine oil.

 

            As for the 140 million yuan, this money was used to purchase lathes and the latest Chinese rice milling equipment. Imported machinery was warehoused in riverfront buildings from Voat Onnalaom to the Chroy Changvar bridge and KM6, where much of it remained due to a lack of means for transport, as the boats built at Chroy Changvar were made of wood.

 

            Rith affirmed that Sar Keum Lamut in fact knew nothing about Democratic Kampuchea finances, the only person other than Rith who handled money being Ieng Sary. According to Rith, a Chinese official (La Mengqiang?) told him in April 1976 that Sary never deposited money in a Chinese bank or accounted for expenditures, but simply stuck cash in his pocket. Ieng Sary also gave him constant grief, opposing Rith's appointment as trade representative in Hong Kong because Sary wanted to appoint one of his own cronies. Sary continued to oppose him even though he was good at his job, getting results.

 

            Rith recalled that in 1975, there had been a move to dismiss Sary was foreign minister because he was not accepted internationally, neither by the Chinese nor the Thai, and to replace him with Khieu Samphan. This did not happen, but left hard feelings, and from then on, there was a fear that Ieng Sary would try to win over some armed forces to make a coup, hard feelings that underpinned the situation that finally emerged in 1996, building on earlier conflicts, those of 1963-1964, or even those back in France, from which time Ieng Sary had wanted to be the leader.

 

           

            Sun Ti was married to Rith's cousin by birth, having joined the revolution via his uncle. So – Rith insisted – he could not have been a KGB. He was forced to "confess" this to implicate unit chiefs in the foreign ministry in order to get to Son Sen and arrest him. This was when Son Sen was in the East, and was trying to convince Pol Pot to ease tension, not to fight, not to be so aggressive, as there was no international support. He came with a memorandum, but Pol Pot refused to see him. The "confession" aimed to implicate Ni Kân and Thim, thus getting to Son Sen.

 

            Rith himself was falsely implicated in 18 documents extracted from kids working for him, but the reality was that he was considered as somebody still influenced by the Democrat Part ideas of his youth, and he had indeed joined the revolution precisely because he detested rule by a mysterious interconnected factional group. Moreover, he had discovered that the revolution had made his mother thin as a rail, being forced to eat boiled hard maize, even though she had no teeth. He met her, and she said this was the last time they would meet, because there was nothing more to eat. Upon return from seeing her, Rith informed Khieu Samphan, who was in charge of Commerce, that at least in Sector 25 there was nothing to eat, asking him why – given the sector's richness in fish, bananas, morning glory, etc – arrangements were not made for the people there to trade these items with Takeo and Kampung Speu for rice, or to allow the people there simply to go ahead and eat bananas and fish. Rith spoke extensively to Khieu Samphan about the misery of the people, revealing this hidden reality at a time when the radio was talking about a phenomenally great leap forward, proclaiming everyone was comfortable and happy, getting yields of ten to 20 tons. He pointed out that growing paddy was not the solution to everything.

 

After this, he was furiously hated and had constant problems, and thus kids working for him were beaten and duped into implicating him in their responses. However, he could not yet be arrested, because there was no one at the Ministry of Commerce who could replace him, and luckily for him, in 1979, everything fell apart and everyone fled west, putting an end to everything for the time being, at least until things could be sorted out in the west. Before the fall, an ex-school teacher from Takeo, named Lonh Sen, was placed next to him at the ministry, but he knew nothing compared to Rith, who had studied banking and commerce, having a Third Degree certificate from a two year course and done a three year course in banking, as well as having worked in the Ministry of Finance. Combined with his military experience, this made him virtually irreplaceable. Compared to him, Rith insisted, the cadre around him were like blind men, some of them literally having only one eye.

 

At the time of the Vietnamese invasion in late December 1978, a Chinese economy and trade delegation was visiting Cambodia, working with Rith on a wide variety of issues. At a soiree on 28 December, Chinese ambassador Sun Hao invited Ieng Sary and Rith to brief him on the situation. At this time the CPK was urgently strengthening its relations with Thailand to counter the Vietnamese threat, and Sun Hao conveyed a message from Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chunhawan that Thailand was prepared to allow its ports to be used to tranship any Chinese supplies Cambodia needed, and also to provide any other help. However, Sary said everything was alright, that there was no problem, and did not report the conversation to Pol Pot. The result was that there were no clear contingency plans when the Vietnamese arrived in Phnom Penh.

 

            Rith also stated that advancement at Ieng Sary's Ministry of Foreign Affairs depended on supporting and exalting Ieng Sary.

 

Rith also recalled the case of Reuan, the wife of Seua Vasy alias Deuan, maintaining that she rose to a high position because of her husband's status, which she used in a factional way to do whatever she wanted, thus provoking Laurent Picq's ire, whom Reuan mistreated because Reuan, like Deuan, was a factory worker. Rith pointed out that the only person Picq wrote positively about was Ni Kân, explaining that he treated her relatively well because he was relatively intellectual, whereas the others treated her badly, behaviour that Rith attributed to Ieng Sary.

 

As for Khieu Samphan, Rith stated that "he only knew what was going on at the summit, the theory of it, not being one of the lower downs who was actually doing things" (koat doeng tae a kâmpoul loe te, a treuhsadey vea te, dâl a cheak-sdaeng khang kraom neh, koat mean neak thoe na).

 

Pol Pot, Rith declared, thrived on flattery (si chor), reacting to it by increasing the action which caused the flattery. To tell him the truth was fatal (yok karpeut tov niyeay meun slap te). He only liked those who came with reports of phenomenal development and great leaps forward. He was furious when Rith, who had previously believed the propaganda published in Kampuchea magazine and broadcast over Democratic Kampuchea radio, reported the reality of starvation in S'ang. This was the reality the led the veterans of the Viet Minh-era struggle to oppose the regime with the slogan, "farm with rain, eat rice; farm with irrigation, eat gruel," and also led to opposition by the East Zone. The post-war line of socialist construction caused one to divide into two, a split, leading to turmoil, resulting in measures being taken against opposition, with the people being the victims of uneducated cadre.

 

In this regard, Rith cited Nate Thayer's interview with Pol Pot in asserting that the Party Secretary had executed 14,000 cadre who had wrongly implemented the line by killing Cambodia's own people, cadre who had been prohibited from doing so but disobeyed. Their victims, he explained, lived outside of Phnom Penh, in grassroots governed everywhere by the kind of cadre Rith described. Nothing worked in any of the zones. The Centre gave them instructions about the exercise of political and economic power, but implementation was up to the zones themselves, so everything depended on the kinds of persons who were in charge of the zones, because they put their links in place as subordinates in the sectors, which did the same in the districts, which did the same in the cooperatives and subdistricts. The military at the zone and sector levels similarly were links of those above them. If the Centre gave them a hard time in a way that adversely affected their interests, there could be a blow up, as in the first such case, with the North Zone when measures were taken against Koy Thuon, who refused to follow orders, who when ordered things left then right, and was a rightist especially when it came to women, song and drink.

 

Rith insisted that Koy Thuon indeed had problems with regard to such matters, noting that he had known Koy Thuon for many years, since their days as students together at Lycee Sisowath and later when Koy Thuon attended Normal School and worked as a teacher. They were like childhood friends. Rith insisted that Koy Thuon was roguish and had links to Hang Thun Hak and others of that ilk, links that continued during the 1970-1975 war and connected Koy Thuon to the Khmer Serei. He remained at the rear during the war, not accompanying his troops into battle, but going around with a troupe of teenaged songstresses, while cutting down people's trees to build wide roads. As his witness, Rith named Si, a medic in Kampung Cham.

 

Then, when measures were taken against Koy Thuon, it affected his subordinates, because whenever measures were taken against a boss, it affected the lower downs. This was the case whether it was a zone or a sector, but wherever this happened, there was unrest, as those lower down concluded if they did nothing, they would be dead.

 

At the same time, Rith contended that lower level cadre believed that because Pol Pot expressed support for the Gang of Four in China, they concluded that they should do what was done during the Cultural Revolution, such as knocking down pagodas. Because the leadership was leftist, subordinates behaved in a leftist manner, taking Radio Beijing accounts of what the Gang of Four advocated as their cue. This caused splits within the ranks of which traitors took advantage, in Rith's view, to burn things to a crisp on the outside while leaving things raw in the middle, in order to open the way to a Vietnamese invasion, which the people also therefore applauded. But the root cause was leftism, manifest among other ways in indiscriminate attacks on intellectuals, including those who had given up everything for the revolution and who tended to be in favour of democracy and liberty, regardless of whether they had studied in Phnom Penh, France or the US, and spoke out, as a result of which they were grievously victimized.

 

Asked who ordered their execution, Rith reiterated that "in general terms, the upper echelons did not give a green light for killings" by the lower levels (khang loe, niyeay ruom, meun baoek aoy sâmlap te), as "they gave very clear instructions that before anyone could be killed, the decision to do so had to be made at four levels, first district and then sector, zone and centre, only after which could someone be killed" (koat mean kar nae-noam chbas nas, kar sâmlap manus mneak toal tae mean kar sâmrech 4 choan, pi srok, tâmbân, pheak, mochhoem, ban sâmlap manus mneak ban). Their policy was to "go light on killings" (aoy saoe slap) and deposit suspects with the Centre. Thus, it was supposed to "not be the case that just anybody had the right to kill" (meun maen neak-na mean seut sâmlap te), but the lower downs did so. Rith recalled that one female cadre from Kampung Tralach, Maen, who came for a study session in Phnom Penh, bragged proudly of having killed 400 people at the school she was attending. She was killing people who did not to give her their watches and gold, the same kind of thing that happened to Rith's relatives in Sector 25, where people were executed after searches found they had gold or medications. Rith stressed that "such were in fact not ordered by the higher ups, but the lower downs proceeded with them through factional links" (a-neung keu tha meun maen khang loe banhchea aoy sâmlap te, pontae khang kraom neung via tov tam pak tam puok tam khsae). Rith added that the upper echelons were aware this was going on, which was why – in 1976 -- they took the measure of requiring four levels of decision before anyone could be killed.

 

Rith explained further that in Sector 25 there was a prison – known as Office 15 – headed by Teng, a former municipal policeman who had joined the urban movement, distributing leaflets, and then was put in charge of security when he came to the countryside. Once there, he arbitrarily rounded everybody up, although a timely intervention on behalf of a relative could resolve in that person not being subjected to punishment. However, Rith said, Teng behaved according to individual whim and pride, settling grudges and taking revenge, while adding that it was the Party's leftist policies that gave him the opportunity to do so because "this was what ensued from leftism" (a-chhveng neung ao vea srâp tam neung tov). It would not have happened under a correct policy, like the previous one of gathering forces for political struggle, as a result of which everybody embraced everyone else, not wanting anyone to be killed or arrested by the enemy. However, as soon as they had power, once there were liberated zones, this kind of thing immediately began to emerge.

 

Conceding that many people, including his own relatives, said that they were denied food for their labours, even where sources of food were plentiful, as in Sector 25, Rith attributed this to the leftism of cooperative chairmen who were poor, vengeful trash, who imposed retribution on middle peasants, like Rith's relatives, categorized as such because their homes had tiled roofs, and were accused of having had enough to eat only because they exploited the labour of others. In taking revenge once they were on top, they killed people, acting outside their formal authority, but pursuant to the Party leadership's leftist line, taking their cue from Radio Beijing's accounts of the Cultural Revolution in China.

 

Rith affirmed that his account of events responded to accusations he was responsible for the deaths of relatives in S'ang because he served the revolution that killed them, but said he was did not know whether everyone found it convincing, and that some still blamed him for what had happened. He added that if he held an official position and had money, such people would be intimidated by him, but in the absence of such factors, the situation he faced remained somewhat unsettled. He also said he believed a historical debate about what had happened should not take place yet, but be delayed until 40 or 50 years after the events. He declared he would not appear on any national or international stage, including any trial, wanting only to live in peace.

 

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Ban Sarin

  ˇ

Chan Leang         

 
  ˇ

Chann Sim

 
  ˇ

Ing Vannak

 
  ˇ

Khorng Siv Lay

 
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Khvan Sichan

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Nhem Noeun

  ˇ

Srun Song

 

 

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Um Sarun

 

  ˇ Im Chem