Reconciliation – whether as a goal or as a process – makes high demands. In the philosophical and religious tradition we understand by this term the fourth phase of a process, preceded, firstly, by honest reflection on or examination of one’s own conduct, secondly, by remorse over wrong conduct and a firm resolve to change one’s ways, or not to repeat what one has done, and, thirdly, by atonement or at least the attempt to make good one’s faults. In the Latin terminology these steps are designated “contritio cordis” (which is to say, contraction of the heart), “confessio oris” (which means speaking out by the mouth, i.e. confessing that one has behaved in a certain way) and finally “satisfactio operis” (i.e., making good by one’s deeds). In general, reconciliation is understood, in the first place, as a process taking place between individuals, between specific victims and perpetrators, or between perpetrators and God, and therefore does not refer in its full sense to collective entities.

If, however, the concept is applied to societies or peoples, what is generally meant is that these societies or peoples, in each case identifying themselves with a collective form of conduct in the past or at least assuming responsibility for it, recall factual circumstances belonging to this past time, reconstruct the past as precisely as possible and in so doing above all let justice prevail. In the review of their own value and moral position that always forms a part of such remembrance, they respect the perspective of the other party in their case.

If what is involved is a fundamentally moral assessment of the past and hence preparation for a process of realisation, confession, remorse, atonement and reconciliation, this encounter between different experiences and points of view – and in any society, there are never just two perspectives, there are a great variety of points of view – ultimately leads to the attempt to find a common standard for evaluating the different modes of conduct, i.e. something on which those who were not reconciled with one another can agree, something with which they can jointly identify. The common standard that has hitherto applied empirically has been the acknowledgement of human and civil rights.

In the reconstruction, by remembrance, of the past, which, as stated, always involves an – often unconscious – estimation of their own value by individuals and groups or collectives, it is particularly important both in theory and, as all experience confirms, in practice that perpetrators do not take refuge in the role of victim. This is what quite commonly happens, as we are aware from post-war West German history (in this regard, empirical studies of East German history have not yet come so far). Until the 1960s, most West Germans (encouraged by official government statements – though by no means by the honest admonitions very early voiced, for example, in the speeches of President Heuss) understood themselves to be victims, not perpetrators: victims of a seduction practised by a small group of National Socialist leaders and victims of the war. The varying extents to which they themselves in their everyday lives participated in the terrible acts of National Socialist persecution has only gradually been elaborated by historical scholarship, and this process of discovery, often dreadful discovery, is still continuing at the present day. It is important to note that the reflex, after incurring substantial guilt during a certain phase, to escape feelings of guilt by declaring oneself a victim is a very common occurrence: we can also observe it, for example, in south-eastern Europe and more generally among perpetrators who are unwilling or unable to confront their guilt. Selfdefinition as merely a victim (at least on the part of perpetrators) and the assumption of responsibility and hence preparation for reconciliation are mutually exclusive. Among victims adherence to the idea of one’s own responsibility also plays a major role, as we know from the history of Jews coming to grips with their conduct in the Third Reich. The considerable self-reproaches at having let oneself be led as a victim to the slaughtering block show that here too, the problem of assumption of responsibility, among those defining themselves exclusively as victims, is a virulent phenomenon.

What makes the situation still more complicated in reality is that being a victim and being a perpetrator are not necessarily mutually exclusive and victims can certainly also be perpetrators, either simultaneously in some other respect or subsequently in response to their victimhood. One context in which this problem manifests itself is the newly opened discussion and assessment of population displacements in the course of the Second World War – though my colleague Mr Borodziej is much better informed on this issue than I. In this remembrance in the service of reconciliation, it is crucial that individuals and collectives clearly recognise the necessity of disassociating remembrance from a naïve confirmation of the feeling of their own value and, as far as possible, practice and become used to seeing the situation through the eyes of the other.
Second: The role of education in reconciliation

Here a number of different dimensions should be distinguished: if reconciliation is not merely an intellectual but also an emotional process (contrition cordis), then a major role in making reconciliation between peoples possible, in generating a capacity for reconciliation, will be played by the education of attitudes, or what used to be known by the old-fashioned term “cultivation of the heart”. Naturally the intellect and judgement also participate in remembrance, but the emotional dimension of empathy, which enables us to incorporate other people’s perceptions, to see the experience with their eyes, plays a key role. How far it is possible for education to nurture this capacity to share in the feelings of others – which is not simply a matter of sympathy – is an open question. Certainly, we can assume that these basic attitudes and the education or nurture that produce them belong to a very early phase of life, occurring mostly in the family or in the primary groups in which children spend their first few years. Moreover, this upbringing often has no explicit orientation or intention, but rather occurs in the form of socialisation through an unconscious process of alignment to the modes of conduct that small children perceive in and absorb from their surroundings. Yet it seems to me that this early and very powerfully emotional phase of education is of outstanding importance for the attitude towards and readiness for reconciliation. On the whole, scholarly analysis in recent decades has been marked by a reluctance to go into these issues because of the methodological difficulty of arriving at any answers. Socialisation research, which was pursued in the United States, for example, in the 1950s and 1960s, in reaction to the Holocaust, has been dormant for decades, though recently some renewed interest in this problem has been observable.

A further dimension of education in this area occurs at schools and universities in more advanced intellectual form. Here it is always more a matter of cognitive abilities, which are required to confront subjective remembrance – frequently transmitted by the family – with historical research and objective investigation of the past. However, as we are aware from all the national historiographical traditions, historical research is not automatically oriented towards reconciliation. It is interesting in this connection that beginning some 30 years ago, historical research in Western Europe has increasingly concerned itself with remembrance and in doing so has worked with sociologists, social psychologists and political scientists. Alongside history – the French would say “histoire” – and remembrance (“mémoire”), the very confrontation of the two with one another plays a major role in the process of reconciliation between peoples.

In this connection, the valuable contributions towards a revision of history books that are characterised by a purely nationalistic perspective are of the greatest importance. As long as rising generations grow up with one-sided pictures of history, the chances of reconciliation between peoples are very slight.

Third: The opportunities presented by joint education of children, young people and students belonging to different nationalities

A particular opportunity presents itself when young people are educated together, or to be more precise, when they participate together in education. Experiments of this type do occur at multinational schools and also universities. The Europa University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) is among them. I personally have also had some experience of such education, having as a child attended the French Lycée in West Berlin, where German and French pupils took part in the same lessons, held in French, for seven years. Both this experience and subsequent experience at the European School in Luxembourg have taught me that growing up together and joint education make reconciliation, if not a reality, at least a possibility. Essentially there are two hurdles that have to be cleared: firstly, language, and secondly, socialisation in the family and in peer groups, which are nationally constituted and often erect an invisible barrier.

With regard to language, the problem is quickly seen in theory, but not easy to overcome in practice. Only when young people have easy access to a common language which flows naturally from their lips does communication, without which there can be no process of reconciliation, take place as a matter of course. But unconscious basic attitudes, partisanship, prejudices and, finally, the interests established and consolidated by peer groups can also prevent the chance of togetherness being taken in reality.

At the Europa University Viadrina I am confirmed in this experience. Of slightly more than 4000 students, a third are Poles and a further 8 per cent approximately are foreigners from other countries. In all we have 40 per cent non- German students at the university. Poles and Germans in particular study together, and sit in the same lecture halls and seminar rooms, but that in itself does not mean that they really make friends with one another, discuss differences of opinion or, where there is latent enmity, find reconciliation. The current generation is far removed from the period when ill deeds were committed, but the knowledge we have gained by now about the way in which ideas and knowledge are handed down within families and the intergenerational transmission of philosophical outlooks must alert us to the fact that we cannot assume that this distance in itself is enough to eliminate the problems. What we see at Viadrina varies. There are certainly segments of the student population who live side by side yet without contact and do not talk about problems that are significant for a process of reconciliation. On the other hand, there are very active student initiatives, and also activities on the part of junior faculty and professors, that make ample use of the opportunities for joint action. Such action need not necessarily imply remembrance, it may involve, for example, making music together, sharing responsibility for other international students, undertaking excursions and “tandem” arrangements for teaching one another each other’s language. One outstanding factor for promoting integration are the joint parties, which take place in Frankfurt (Oder) and Slubice (the neighbouring Polish city) and out of which lasting friendships grow (sometimes scenes of jealousy too).

The communicative exchange becomes much more intensive in seminars explicitly concerned with these themes, particularly seminars not just occurring on the usual weekly basis but involving joint excursions.

Here there can be real marvels of mutual discovery and new friendship, and simply to see this is enough in itself to make it worth being involved at Viadrina. In a preparatory seminar, for example, conducted by an assistant of mine, the Polish and German participants dealt with their memories over a period of several days in Kreisau. One striking observation here was that when talking about the Polish Second World War period, the Poles always spoke in the “we” form, whereas the Germans always spoke of the Germans of that time with distance. This is a small matter, on the face of it, but surely not so small in reality.

Thus, this kind of shared education only furthers the cause of reconciliation when additional initiatives stimulate and promote as intensive communication as possible. One of my plans is therefore to adopt ideas that come above all from the junior faculty and make them standard practice by urging that weekend excursions be a part of each preparatory seminar held in the first stage of undergraduate studies, either by providing financial and administrative encouragement or, perhaps, even by making such weekends an obligatory part of the curriculum. To be sure, true reconciliation requires freedom, reconciliation cannot be forced upon people, but particularly in subsequent generations it seems necessary to me to provide institutional support for such processes of reconciliation.

Where reconciliation is successful, it is generally a source of great happiness to those involved, whether they are individuals or peoples. The happiness of peoples lies in their coming to feel confidence in one another, so that they can come to terms with one another without violence even when the conditions for conflict are present. When such confidence is completely destroyed, says Machiavelli, the peoples concerned are in an unhappy state.We can observe unhappy peoples of this kind every day. I am very glad that Poles and Germans, as neighbours, no longer belong in this category.