Mr Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

One could hardly imagine less favorable conditions for the reconciliation of two nations – both in the political and psychological respect – than the situation of Poles and Germans after World War II. The victorious Allies confirmed at the Potsdam Conference in summer of 1945 that Poland’s eastern territories, occupied by the Soviet Union in 1939, would remain in Moscow’s hands. As compensation, Poland was granted former German territories up to the Oder-Neisse line. The Potsdam protocols also envisaged the so-called transfer of the German population from Poland. Differing interpretations of the Potsdam provisions and ”cold war” tensions fuelled Polish-German controversies and burdened bilateral relations for the next forty years.

The shifting of Poland’s borders westward not only perpetuated Polish-German antagonism, but also made Poland dependent on the USSR. The communist government, installed by Stalin in Poland, claimed to be the guarantor of the western Polish border. Furthermore, attempts were made to replace the absence of public legitimacy of the government by invoking the spectre of German revisionism.

There were psychological inhibitions on both sides. From the German perspective, Poland seemed almost a beneficiary of the war. Because of the sensitive nature of the border issue, postwar Germany’s war frustrations were channeled, to some extent, in the direction of Poland. In the case of Poland we should take into account a kind of ”double scarring” of the society. The war in Poland had been experienced as a humiliation of national feeling. And after the war the Poles, again, were subjected to an ”anti-nationalist-therapy”. Stalin´s crusade was directed against the national heritage and cultural roots. Thus, having been hurt twice, Poles developed a tendency to glorify their past. This was the Polish version of a phenomenon which in relation to themselves the Germans call Verdrängung – selective memory. While dealing with one’s own injuries and unhealed wounds, within an opressive system, one needs more time to open up for the wounds of others.

So, for many years, there was no dialogue in Polish–German relations. Instead, there were two monologues, conducted in isolation and, very often, distant from the historic truth. There were those for whom history ended in 1945, and those – for whom it was just beginning in 1945. Should anyone want to write a textbook on antagonised nations, he has it. It would be easy to find all necessary constituents here, including favourable external conditions and fervent proponents of perpetuating the antagonism.
From our experience in the sixties, we can say that truly important and emotionally charged issues should not be left only to lawyers or politicians. Instead, public facts should be created, even if they go against the tide of widely held views. It was the Churches and some journalists that prepared the climate and language of reconciliation.
I would like to recall here the German Protestant theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, executed during the war for his part in a plot against Hitler. Quite unexpectedly, publications by our Catholic writers about his life and work evoked during the seventies an important debate in some opposition circles. Bonhoeffer was fascinating as a new kind of hero. Normally, struggle against the enemy is morally unambiguous, an ethical choice by an individual gains the collective support of the nation or the Church. But Bonhoeffer could not count on such backing; everyone was against him, even his own Church collaborated with the authorities.Thus, being isolated in his attitude, he represented in our eyes an extreme model of heroism. Furthermore, Bonhoeffer writings served as inspiration for opposition activity in Poland during the seventies, the aim of which was not to assume power, and which was based on civic courage. It was his writings that gave birth to the concepts of antipolitics, self-limitation or civic society. Thirdly, and this is my point here, it meant for us an illuminating contact with a “private fate” of a German – something not without significance, considering the heavily burdened Polish–German relations. The clearly ethical dimension of the reflection on German issues was something new.

To come back to our main subject: Reconciliation isn’t a purpose in itself, like the eternal harmony cannot be a realistic goal. Reconciliation should much more provide the language and cooperative framework for the management of diversity. It wouldn´t be a desirable scenario in which bilateral dialogue was limited to the past and to never-ending rituals of reconciliation. It happens, politicians proudly announce that they feel reconciled and are surprised that anyone expects anything more of them!

In order for such a scenario not to be acted out, both Warsaw and Berlin should be aware of common interests and tasks to be solved jointly. They need rather a future-oriented programme. But, such a programme would not have sufficient foundations if Poland were to concentrate on testing Germany´s memory every month or if Germany were to focus mainly on averting the influx of labour force from the East. Much more is at stake. The bringing together of disjoined Europe and overcoming its division into East and West seems to be a particular challenge for these two countries.

Poland can hardly be suspected of a short historic memory. For that reason it can be more persuasive in asserting that the bigger Germany, the Berlin republic, offers a chance for Europe, rather than becomes an element of uncertainty. And also Germany could be quite convincing in asserting that Poland´s accession to the EU offers a chance for Europe and not a threat.

Looking back at the Polish–German relations since 1989, I would risk a forecast. There might always be – somewhere in Europe – a “club of skeptics” in relation to Germany, but Poland is not likely to join it. Today, this would in general contradict the logic of political development in Poland the last 12 years. This would undermine the results of that period in which the building of a new democratic state was unseparably accompanied by the building of new relations with Germany.

And this in itself is a sign of the times.
Of better times.