Preventing Genocide: Three Agendas of Action There are three typical themes mentioned in scholarly literature and public debate when trying to understand why genocides take place, in the form and to the extent that the world has witnessed during the 20th Century. From these themes it is possible to generate three agendas for preventive actions. They relate to war, governance and ideology.

1. First, it is obvious that most genocides are connected to wartime conditions. They may occur during wars (such as the Holocaust genocide) or immediately after wars (such
as the Khmer Rouge politicide).Very rarely do they occur during stable conditions, or even in the immediate pre-war phases of conflicts. Thus, understanding genocide implies
understanding war. Indeed, one of the most telling factors in explaining genocide is also the one predicting war: the recurrence of almost identical situations.Wars have often
repeated themselves with the same actors. There is a dynamics going from one war to the next. Systematic research also points to such dynamics in genocides.Wargenocide
relations can be observed through an analysis of political change, power struggles, the use of opportunities created in the fog of war, the general brutalization that goes with war-time conditions, state failure or in the victor’s revenge against real or imagined enemies after a war. Preventing war also means preventing genocide.
Thus, the agenda of conflict prevention that has been developed during the 1990s becomes highly pertinent also when handling the threat of genocide. Enclosed are
two such formula. One is drawn from the scholarly works of Michael Lund, the other is derived from the lessons of an internationally respected diplomat, Jan Eliasson.
Many a war includes the threat of one group grasping territorial, military and economic control in order to impose dominance over, or even exterminate, adversary or neutral groups. Wars, of course, aim at upsetting and changing the existing balance of  relationships. In so doing, they may unleash factors and forces that are unintended,
but difficult to resist. Although not all wars are connected to genocide, the risks are higher. Thus, we can conclude: By not allowing wars in the first place, the chances of
reducing the likelihood of genocide increase.

2. Second, building on the first observation, clearly all actors do not wage war in the same way. The finding that has been most often quoted in peace research and international relations in the last decade is the one that democracies do not fight wars with each other. A corollary to this might be that democracies actually fight wars, but with
non-democratic regimes and possibly in different ways than non-democracies would. There are restraints on the initiation of violent actions in a democratic system. Some
scholars have even suggested that democracies do not initiate war, particularly not preventive ones. Recent history shows that this observation is not generally valid.
Democracies can become deeply concerned about their own security and may then act as any other sovereign state. However, there exist hardly any recent examples of
democracies involved in civil wars and at the same time being part of genocidal action. Most genocides have been unleashed under non- or semi-democratic regimes, be
they Western or non-Western states. This is a valid observation that is true for the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide as well as the Cambodia events of the 1970s and the
Rwandan experiences of the 1990s. Instead the debate has focused on the inaction of democracies in preventing such events, hence accusing them of being indirectly responsible. The by-stander’s culpability is, indeed, a serious moral challenge. It, of course, underpins the whole idea of the Stockholm International Forum 2004.
Developing democracy is a long-term program. The conditions for successful democracy-building remain to be ascertained. Most writers would suggest that it has to
emanate from legitimacy with the local population. It cannot be imposed or directly imported. Thus, in Germany from 1948 German leaders with democratic credentials from the pre-Hitler period were the ones who began to build a new German democracy. Without their efforts, the new, US inspired German constitution might have met difficulties. Similarly, in Japan, the traditional authority of the Emperor was important not only for Japan in accepting defeat but also for building a democratic society. Thus democracy, it seems, is a political process that develops from local conditions, although ideas, principles, even constitutions, may be brought from elsewhere and creatively adapted. The ideas of democracy are universal while practices are local.
This implies that careful promotion of democracy is an important aspect of a long-term program of genocide prevention. It encompasses reforming educational systems, separating legislative and executive functions, developing independent judiciary, forming non-governmental and independent political movements, media and sources of finance. A prerequisite is that the electorate is informed, engaged and, above all, includes the full participation of all sectors of society. Of particular significance is that gender mainstreaming is part of building democratic societies for genocide prevention.
Still, democracy may not be sufficient. Many democratic societies encounter phenomena that deprive some inhabitants of their rights: through forced population movements, obstacles to a return to ancestral lands, discriminatory practices, intolerant and biased media coverage, etc. This shows that genocide prevention ought to consist of democracy with a plus: Particular measures must be included, geared to the rights of minorities, their protection, their participation and their ability to influence society. Consequently, certain groups sometimes will have rights and access that go beyond those granted to the general citizen. These could take the form of autonomous territories (regional autonomy within a state), federalism (where some areas are federated states, others are not), affirmative action schemes (which ideally should be of temporary nature) or even reserved quotas in parliament, government and other public offices. Such measures serve to handle conflicts, but they are also useful as preventive actions, ensuring that tensions are not escalating.

3. Third, there is the issue of exclusive ideologies.A strong ‘we’-‘them’ divide is clearly a key precondition for genocide to take place. It marks an exclusion of ‘us’ as distinct from ‘the others’. This, furthermore, suggests that selfrighteousness and chauvinist attitudes are at the center of genocidal actions. This absolute division and its cementing in education, media, public life and thus also in the minds of people, could be most devastating. It may be an ultimate reason for people to agree to participate in the slaughter of their neighbours or for people to remain passive although they understand what is going on. This is more than ’the authoritarian personality’ that has been seen as a factor in genocide. If people obey authority without resistance, it does not necessarily mean they will also participate in atrocities. The authority must also inject fear, insecurity and hatred in the general public for obedience to turn into genocidal action. Not all  authoritarian forces use genocidal techniques for grasping and keeping power. But authoritarian and exclusivist conditions may assist in doing so.
The antidote to prejudice and exclusivity is tolerance. A key preventive strategy must be one of inoculating people against simple imagery, intolerance and hatred. This points
to the prevailing social ethics in a society. It means that civil forces combining in a diverse civil society is significant. It points to the independence of media as a critical
factor, but it has to be combined with media training for competence and for critical assessment.Autonomous universities are also important for foster free debate and to
build a competent and open state machinery. Cultural life transmits through art, literature, film, theatre, dance, etc. the values of a society. All this implies that society is open and accepts intrusive questioning without fear of reprisals. Indeed, the third theme of action for tolerance comes close to the requirements of democracy. It points, at the same time, to the significance of particular institutions, their independence, competence and basis in general social ethics. Genocide prevention also requires a social ethical approach of tolerance that guides decisions throughout society.

Table 1 Lund´s preventive diplomacy toolbox

I. MILITARY APPROACHES
A. Restraints on the use of armed force
B. Threat or use of armed force
II. NONMILITARY APPROACHES
A. Coercive diplomatic measures (without the use of
armed force)
B. Non coercive diplomatic measures (without armed
force or coercion)
III. DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE
APPROACHES
A. Policies to promote national economic and social
development
B. Promulgation and enforcement of human rights,
democratic, and other standards
C. National governing structures to promote peaceful
conflict resolution

Table 2 The Eliasson ladder of conflict prevention

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