Ongoing discussions on how to prevent future genocides and atrocities are aimed largely at ensuring that such portentous issues are placed on the agenda of the international community, and notably, on the agenda of such bodies/instruments as the United Nations Security Council. It is, however, also important that already operational, as well as yet to be established Peacekeeping Operations, regardless of their explicit and specific mandates, also have as an objective the stabilization of peace, so as to help ensure that incipient conflicts can be circumvented, and that new atrocities can be, as much as possible, prevented from occurring. It is therefore critical that Missions that are created to establish or maintain peace as a result of a decision by the Security Council, should be "conflict aware" and "prevention minded". This is not yet the rule.

MONUC, United Nations Organizations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was initially established in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to monitor the Lusaka Peace Agreement, an agreement entered into by a number of African countries in order to find a solution to a conflict that has had devastating consequences in the form of i.a massacres of civilian population, sexual violations, looting and destruction of homes and infrastructure as well as massive population displacements. In order to assist in stabilizing the peace at local level, it was found to be important to make MONUC “conflict prevention aware”. To this extent, a policy on local conflicts was finalized in December 2002. Its primary objective was to ensure that MONUC regional offices, particularly in the eastern part of the country, obtain an analytical understanding of the situation in their area of operation, build up a capacity to detect underlying tension and potential conflict and be prepared and able to take action hould an open, possibly armed, conflict erupt. The policy paper emphasized that MONUC did not have to be directly involved. If other actors would be better suited to find a solution, the role of MONUC was to assist and support that organization. The Offices were asked to work as a team and to involve military as well as civilian staff to accomplish its task. The necessity of gender awareness, both in regard to victims and local actors, was underlined. Since the localized conflicts normally resulted in violence, MONUC humanitarian affairs and human rights staff was important to document and address the consequences. Human rights investigations, when prevention failed, were seen, in this context, also as a means of deterrence of renewed violence, since they exposed the perpetrators.

In spite of the instructions that the MONUC offices look for local mediators and facilitators, experience showed that MONUC in most cases came to be seen as the organization best placed, and the one preferred by those involved, to find a solution to the different conflicts. On many occasions, this was done by Military Observer teams, which often constituted the only MONUC presence in smaller towns outside provincial capitals.
The policy on local conflict was followed up with a “Kivu strategy” which i.a aimed at consolidating the work done in the area of operation of the three MONUC offices in North and South Kivu; Beni, Goma and Bukavu. Its intention was also to build on achievements in order to assist in more long-term confidence building measures.

The work to make MONUC “conflict prevention aware” and able to participate in conflict resolution and confidence building has not been altogether easy. There were no general guidelines developed on how this could be done, nor were there any requirements that it should be done. Because of this, the work was received with skepticism in certain quarters, but in the regional offices it became, however, appreciated, not least since the process initiated in order to help with capacity building also served as a useful tool to create or enhance a team spirit. By focusing on how to address local conflict, the offices got a “project” in which all different sections could participate.

The work has also been hampered by a lack of staff, military as well as civilian, with knowledge of conflict resolution, negotiating skills and sufficient experience from the area of operation. While emphasis is often placed on recruiting staff with a general knowledge of how the UN runs its operations, it does not necessarily guarantee skills like knowledge of the context of the conflict and analytical capacity to understand and explain it, area knowledge, diplomatic/negotiation skills and experience of conflict resolution.

The military observers, that are essential for the work of peacekeeping missions, are chosen according to national procedures. Their area knowledge is often very limited and they also often lack necessary language skills. The military observers and staff officers are also, for obvious reasons, a group with a serious gender imbalance.

In addition to restraints regarding human resources, conflict prevention and resolution as well as confidence building measures are also hampered by a lack of financial resources. The budget of MONUC, albeit more than 600 million USD, is primarily concerned with the Mission’s logistical needs in a highly complex and challenging environment. This is not the same as financing its objective or even its mandate. The amounts available for activities are minimal.

In order to address these problems and to ensure that existing peacekeeping missions and other major engagements of the international community in conflict torn areas, conflict prevention and management as well as confidence building should be part of the Mission’s task from the outset.

The work could be facilitated by providing the Mission with a mixture of civilian non-administrative staff that would ensure that previous peacekeeping experience be combined with area experience, skills and experience in conflict management, humanitarian, child protection and human rights expertise, negotiation skills, information gathering and analytical skills etc. An appropriate gender balance and gender awareness amongst all the staff is also necessary. The possibility to cooperate with academic institutions to facilitate hiring i.a of doctorate students with specific area knowledge or conflict management background could be looked into. Systematic training programs in conflict resolution should be made part of the Missions’ operations and include both civilian and military staff.

On the military side, the capacity to be conflict prevention aware would be enhanced by ensuring that more of the observers would have a previous experience in information management. The possibility of organizing information management training that would enhance the capability of the Mission while, at the same time, ensuring that the information gathering is done in a way that is acceptable for the UN should be looked into. The capability of military staff is also often adversely affected by very short periods of service in a mission. When military components become part of a mission that has as one of its objectives to manage conflict, to assist in confidence building and to serve as the “outpost” of the mission in all its aspects, it would be highly beneficial if the minimum period of deployment for observers and staff officers would be at least one year.

With small changes as those mentioned above, with a proportionally very small budgetary increase to give MONUC some means to support activities that would contribute to stabilizing peace at the local level and with an enhanced cooperation with humanitarian NGOs and NGOs active in the field of conflict resolution at the local level, MONUC could do more to minimize the risks of renewed armed conflict and atrocities. While the primary focus of MONUC will continue to be the transitional process at national level, paying more attention to the local, community, level would contribute to stabilizing the peace and at the same time provide opportunities to assist in addressing underlying causes of conflict; causes that could, if not managed, make violent conflict start again.