Preventing Genocide in Afghanistan: The Role of NGOs

In South Asia, the region covered by my ICG project, inter-state, ethnic, regional and religious tensions threaten the security of one-fifth of humanity. For the past two decades, if not more, Kashmiris, Muslims and Hindus alike, are caught in the crossfire between militants and Indian security agencies. In Nepal, Maoist insurgents and security forces are equally responsible for thousands of civilian deaths. In Pakistan, emboldened by the military government’s patronage, Sunni extremist parties and groups have killed hundreds of Shias. But it is in Afghanistan where the threat of genocidal violence is highest. While open hostilities between the various contending ethno-regional actors have been temporarily restrained by an international military presence, all-out conflict could easily resume.

From 1996 until their defeat by the US-led Coalition, the Taliban, guided by a contorted ideology of Islamic and Pashtun orthodoxy, threatened the rights of a minuscule Hindu minority, and Afghan women, regardless of religion or ethnicity, bore the main brunt of the Taliban’s oppressive laws. Although Afghanistan has yet to experience what would in legal terms be considered genocide, the predominantly Pashtun Taliban resorted to mass killings of Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. These included the summary executions of Hazara civilians in August 1998 and January 2001 and Uzbek civilians in May 2001. Tens of thousands were forcibly displaced. International NGOs, teaming up with Afghan civil society groups in exile, played a major role in focusing international attention on the Taliban’s violation of international human rights norms.

Since December 2001, following the Taliban’s ouster by the US-led Coalition, internal tensions and divisions along ethnic, regional and religious lines continue to threaten individual citizens and entire communities. International NGOs are playing an important preventive role by monitoring the situation within Afghanistan and identifying existing and potential threats of violent conflict.

Violent Conflict: Past, Present, and Future
In its latest table on “Genocides, Politicides, and Other Mass Murders Since 1945,” Genocide Watch places Afghanistan at Stage 6, or the preparatory stage of genocide. According to the table, countries at Stage 7 are currently at the mass killing stage, with active genocidal or politicidal massacres. Afghanistan is also frequently cited in the Center for the Prevention of Genocide’s early warning reports as an area of particular concern, and with good reason.

During the first phase of Afghanistan’s civil war (1978- 1996), deaths were estimated at around 1.3 million out of a population of 15 million, while 3 million or more Afghans took refuge in Pakistan and another two million in Iran.The withdrawal of Soviet troops did not end the conflict within. From 1989 onwards, as ethnic protagonists fought to gain control of the state, Pashtun militias killed tens of thousands of Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara commanders were also responsible for mass killings. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson called for an international enquiry into these massacres and other grave human rights abuses by all sides in the civil war. Afghanistan’s history of violent conflict was not that dissimilar to Burundi’s where inter-ethnic conflict was accompanied by mass killings of targeted groups. Nor has the threat of violent conflict receded after the disintegration of the Taliban regime in December 2001.

The Taliban’s downfall was accompanied by large-scale reprisal killings by ethno-regional militias, allied to the USled Coalition. They were responsible for summary executions of surrendering Taliban fighters and prisoners, particularly in the Uzbek-dominated north. Information gathering by international NGOs such as Physicians for Human Rights focused international attention on these events. Had the Coalition taken timely and effective action by investigating these incidents and holding the perpetrators accountable, the climate of impunity that has perpetuated such abuses could have been nipped in the bud.

By its inaction, the international community has failed to prevent targeted violence against northern Pashtuns. Human Rights Watch has recorded summary executions, rape, torture, looting and forced displacement of Pashtun civilians in northern Afghanistan by Hazara, Uzbek and Tajik commanders. If ethnically motivated attacks on Pashtuns are not prevented and pre-emptive action taken, the eruption of a full-scale civil war, with genocidal overtones, cannot be ruled out.

While US policy in Afghanistan is still guided by the need for local allies for its anti-terrorist operations, a climate of impunity has encouraged regional and local warlords to continue avenging past ethnic wrongs and settling ethnic scores. The end result is already evident. ICG has pointed out that the abuses of warlords, including attacks on Pashtun civilians, have helped the Taliban to regain a measure of support in the Pashtun-dominated southeast. This Taliban resurgence is, in turn, preventing the UN and international humanitarian, human rights or developmental NGOs from operating in almost a third of Afghanistan.

Could Afghanistan revert to the civil war of the 1980s and 1990s with Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and Pashtuns once again attempting to physically eliminate their ethnic and political rivals? While genocide in most cases is state-sponsored, in the context of Afghanistan, should the absence of legitimate state authority combine with ineffective international intervention, the potential for ethno-political and even genocidal conflict would greatly increase.

NGOs and Preventive Action
If genocidal conflict is to be predicted and prevented, the US-led Coalition must heed early warnings issued by NGOs. Since ethnic tensions and conflict constrain the operating space of local Afghan NGOs and civil society groups are too weak to make their presence felt, fieldbased international NGOs are better equipped, at present, to identify, monitor and analyze the nature and magnitude of threat. However, international NGOs also operate within the confines of conflict. For instance, the mobility of many humanitarian and development NGOs in southeastern Afghanistan is severely curtailed because of Taliban threats and attacks. Moreover, the US-led Coalition’s security perceptions and goals do not necessarily dovetail with the analysis and recommendations of the NGO community, foreign or local. Yet NGOs, including the International Crisis Group, can claim some successes. These include NATO’s decision to expand ISAF’s presence outside the Afghan capital, Kabul, a long-standing demand of most international human rights, humanitarian and development NGOs.
If international NGOs are to be more effective in preventive action, they must:

• Coordinate their resources to map and monitor the conflict;
• Use collaborative strategies for advocacy. ICG, CARE and IRC, for instance, have issued joint appeals for an expanded and more effective international security presence;
• Strengthen the capacity of local NGOs and civil society groups;
• Conduct sustained advocacy and share information and analysis on a regular basis with governments, international organizations and the media;
• Prioritize recommendations. NGOs should and must identify long-term solutions to prevent a potential genocide in Afghanistan but these should be accompanied by practical recommendations for immediate remedial action if preventive diplomacy is to succeed.

Finally, my organization, the International Crisis Group, like many other international NGOs believes that an effective international security presence is essential to prevent the resumption of violent conflict in Afghanistan. For any preventive strategy to succeed, however, such a security presence will have to be accompanied by collaborative international efforts to create and strengthen legitimate, inclusive, democratic institutions.