The concept of Sovereignty has moved centre stage since the end of the Cold War as military interventions in the affairs of nominally sovereign nations have increased. The Independent Commission on Kosovo (Chaired by Richard Goldstone) called for a revision of applicable international law to make it more congruent with an international moral consensus. In the eyes of many Western nations, this commission may represent “an important step to bridge the gap between legality and legitimacy; between strict legal positivism and a common sense of moral justice”. However, the commission takes for granted the existence of such a moral consensus. What is really needed is a better understanding of why so many UN member states cling to this legal positivism.

For many in Latin America, Africa and Asia, UN Security Council Chapter VII resolutions may be legal but they are not always legitimate. The United Nations has a split personality. The Permanent members privilege realpolitik and selectively apply national, regional or international standards while calling on other states to respect ‘internationally recognized norms’. Meanwhile the majority of the UN General Assembly hold to an overly legalistic definition of sovereignty, which is increasingly outdated in the eyes of the superpower: legalism is the only defence against unfettered imperialism. Why do they hold to this view and what can be done about it?

Lloyd Axworthy, the former Canadian Foreign Minister has captured the essence of the debate: “In this new global context, people – and not only the state – are subjects of international relations. The security and basic rights of people – not merely the absence of military conflict between states – are fundamental to world stability and peace”. He anticipates the reactions of most of the members of the UN adding: “Those who have suffered under colonialism and other outside involvement in their countries might well be skeptical. However, preventing abuse, stopping atrocities and dealing with the impact of war are also their issues, pertaining to their realities and clearly affecting stability in their backyards.”

Lloyd Axworthy is right, in the sense that security has transnational dimensions and that a less legalistic conception of sovereignty would bring many benefits to Latin America, Africa and the Asian countries.To strengthen the moral consensus and bolster support for a more flexible approach to sovereignty both the West and developing countries could do a number of things:

1. The West needs to understand it is not seen as benign
A brief reading of the Latin American history can easily explain the reasons why Latin Americans have become so attached to a legalistic definition of sovereignty and averse to foreign meddling in their internal affairs. Latin America’s sovereignty was and has been curtailed and fragmented throughout its history. According to the Cambridge History of Latin America from 1825 onwards Latin America has had 31 international wars and conflicts – including those of Nicaragua and El Salvador where the US, the Soviet Union and Cuba were involved. In addition there have been 65 major civil wars since 1810.

2. Sovereignty has to mean something first before it is negotiated away
How nations where more than half of their people live in “extreme poverty”, can call themselves sovereign must become the first priority in the sovereignty debate. The British empire accomplished control of Latin American economies as the chief foreign lender and buyer of public utilities and banks. (And they tried to enforce payment from Venezuela in 1902 by gunboat diplomacy). Latin American economies are still in thrall to the West. Unfair export and production subsidies paid to US, European, and Japanese producers is a major intervention in our economic affairs; and one that profoundly affects nations’ sovereignty: not even the Spanish nor the British Empires managed to inflict such a blow to Latin America, or such an effective check on our right to development. Where the economy and security of so many countries is fragile and tied to Western interests and western aid, bolstering economic sovereignty would help inject the concept of sovereignty with meaning.

In Latin America, sovereignty has been compromised and fragmented for so long, the legal shell offers minimal comfort these days. Ironically, the best way to increase the freedom of action of a given state is to give a little sovereignty away. Latin American nations in particular continue to cling to legalistic concepts of sovereignty, denouncing Western actions, vociferous in their support for the principles and procedures of the United Nations, which provide scant comfort. The Europeans have learnt this lesson well. Other regional groupings such as ASEAN and SADC (Southern African Development Community) are similarly pooling sovereignty in several areas, principally economic but increasingly in the areas of internal security and military cooperation such as the African Union proposals for an African peacekeeping force. The very basis of multilateralism is that sovereignty can only be reinforced by collective and selective renunciations, to the benefit of common goals and shared values.

Trying to defend a notional concept of sovereignty only to be economically shackled and impotent in one’s own backyard is not a constructive option for the countries of the region. The reality of US influence must be faced and we must negotiate. It would not be an exaggeration to paraphrase that the 'manifest destiny' of Latin America is with the United States.

3. International law should be respected before its rule is extended
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has been loosely invoked and selectively applied. In Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo creative approaches to international law have been used to justify intervention. Iraq was the ultimate irony – a war waged to enforce UN resolutions without the authority of the UN! In Bosnia the ‘international community’ promoted and blessed proposals for the intervention and partition of a UN member country and even assisted the party responsible for ethnic cleansing and genocide by not allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves – clearly violating their right to self-defense established in the Charter. The reality of intervention often compromises many of the ideals and the integrity of the institution authorizing the action.
The twin notions of 'pre-emption' and 'the mission defines the coalition' will have to change if the West wants support for a more consistent and permanent solution to the legality of interventions otherwise there is little hope that a legal solution let alone a moral consensus can emerge.

A troubling situation for the UN Security Council is that it cannot aspire to decide by itself what is legitimate and what is not. The increasing importance of the court of international opinion will make this situation more difficult. Future interventions authorized by the Security Council will be adopted-as usual-case by case and national interest of its members will continue to prevail. Chechnya for example would appear to be a similar case to Bosnia – but the policy is different. International public opinion will help to mitigate these circumstances because of the power of the media and the very active participation of the NGO’s worldwide, but it takes a long time to change policies, and even more to redesign the international architecture.

As long as the member states of the UN itself have competing understandings of the very concepts of sovereignty, intervention, and even the role of the United Nations, consensus is going to be hard to come by. My perception is that multilateralism has become uncomfortable. Pragmatism is easier and more independent. And that is a worrisome development.

Latin America must understand that the very basis of multilateralism is that sovereignty can only be reinforced by collective and selective renunciations, to the benefit of common goals and shared values. Sadly Latin America does not seem to accept such a premise. In my judgment, some retrograde and obtuse group of nationalist states are simply watching the rules change: not as might be expected, towards the recognition of new risks, to clearer definitions of responsibility and towards more committed action, but towards, selective action in a framework of committed inaction.