Until recently, racism has not been a central concern for West European academics and governments. However, during the last ten or so years a series of developments has brought racism on to centre stage. These encompass four specific areas of change. Firstly, there has been the electoral rise of anti-immigrant parties, linked to evidence that such voting cannot simply be dismissed as a form of passing protest against mainstream elites.2 Secondly, Europe has witnessed an erratic, but apparently mounting wave of harassment and outbursts of violence aimed at asylum seekers and ethnic minorities (other extreme right targets include ‘anti-racists’ and the gay community).3 Thirdly, there are signs of that ethnic minorities are increasingly asserting a sense of their own identity and/or feeling significant alienation from the political system (the latter can lead to violent behaviour within ethnic communities).4 Finally, there is an acceptance among economic and political elites that ‘immigrants’ are here to stay 5 – even that further immigration may be an economic necessity in the face of declining West European birth rates and pressures to cut production costs in the face of global competition.6

 

 

My underlying argument today is that there has not been sufficient cross-fertilisation between what I will call the ‘theorists’ and the ‘policy makers’ who have responded to these developments. Put another way, there has been a tendency to produce policy-lesstheory and theory-less-policy. More specifically, I want to argue there has been a tendency for the policy makers to engage in piecemeal and short-term programmes, often related to high profile localised racial violence. There has been an unwillingness to link racism to wider trends, including the decline of social solidarity and growing challenges to the legitimacy of mainstream political leaders and democracy itself. Localities are unquestionably an important arena for understanding the dynamics of racism, and for undertaking specific programmes of action. But in many ways we need to take on board broader theories of political and social change, which point to the enormous challenges which confront Europe – and beyond. In many ways we need, adopting a Green metaphor, ‘to act locally but think globally’.

Theorists

Theorists are almost entirely to be found in the academic community. Of most direct concern are those who work specifically on racism. However, it is important to note that when I talk of the neglect of theory, I refer to a much wider body of social science research. My point about the importance, but also policy-blindness, of much theory can be illustrated by considering modernisation approaches, which in the guise of globalisation theory is currently very much in vogue. Globalisation has been related to the revival of racism through two broad arguments. The first approach holds that it marks a period of Hyper-change, which is rapidly undermining social identities (especially ones relating to social class and religion). Against this background, individuals suffer a sense of anomie, which leads many to seek ideologies and movements which promise to re-forge a sense of community. Reborn radical nationalism, linked to a demonisation of the ‘Other’ (the outsider), is the typical result. The second relevant strand in globalisation theory stresses economic rationality rather than affective sentiments. This holds that individuals working in sectors of the economy which are threatened by the growing internationalisation of trade are those most likely to be attracted to the new extremist politics. The point is not necessarily whether an individual becomes unemployed, or even fears unemployment. It is also linked to the self-esteem of those who seem most threatened – namely, less skilled males. ‘Knicker jobs’ (i.e. ones perceived as female) may pay the bills, but they do not satisfy the macho ego.

Globalisation theory undoubtedly has many insights. It helps explain the fact that in most Western European countries racism is on the increase among a section of society (although not among the more cosmopolitan strata, who see opportunities in hyper change and who are happy with multiple identities). However, globalisation theory also has significant weaknesses.

One concerns its tendency to be deterministic, portraying a remorseless process which condemns societies to pass through a period of growing racism among an important part of the population. It is an example of the tendency to stress ‘structuralist’ interpretations, which leave little or no room for individual or policy initiative. In fact, there are important intervening factors which must be examined before we can move from such sweeping theories of change to more concrete manifestations of racism.
An important insight into these can by examining the notable local variations which can be found in extreme right voting and violence. For instance, the French Front National (FN) made it first major electoral breakthrough in the town of Dreux during 1982-3. It is easy to list factors which helped it, including a rapidly rising ‘Arab’ population, rapid socio-economic change, and weak civil society. But only a few miles away, in Evreux, such factors did not produce significant FN voting at this time. Similarly, one can find Swedish communities undergoing socio-structural change, such as Klippan, which have been the scene of much-publicised extremist violence. But other relatively similar localities have not been plagued by such troubles.

In various publications (including the one used as a key theoretical contribution for these Stockholm International Forum Local Communities seminars),7 I have argued that these variations point to the need to place considerable explanatory emphasis on the local dimension, which I term the meso. Psychological and sociological theories tend to concentrate on the macro and micro dimensions. In other words, they have basically sought to explain systemic (world and national) and individual behaviour. More specifically, globalisation theory holds that the rise of right-wing extremism stems from:

 

i) the rapid integration of the world economy, and the resulting disruption to national economies;

ii) affective and economic motives which turn individuals to new parties and/or violence.
Focusing on the meso dimension highlights the fact the rise (and fall) of extremism owes much to political factors.

 

Take two local case studies: Dreux in 1982-3, and Millwall in the East End of London, where the British National Party (BNP) achieved its only local election victory in 1993.8 There were three crucial local political factors in the electoral rise of these manifestations of right-wing extremism. First, there was the way in which mainstream parties helped extremism. In Millwall, the main parties politicised ‘race’ issues as they fought for control in the area, often pandering to local hostility to outsiders.

In Dreux the centre-right even formed a local alliance with the FN. Secondly, in both areas the local media helped construct an agenda which helped extremism. This did not involve actually endorsing the respective parties. The point is more that they highlighted issues such as crime, drugs and other themes stressed by extremists. Thirdly, it is important also to note that in both cases the extremist parties ran relatively shrewd campaigns, seeking to broaden their support. For instance, in Millwall, the BNP often organised meetings under the name ‘Rights for Whites’, stressing grass-roots rather than extreme right mobilisation. More generally, successful local extremist campaigns have tended to portray the ‘extremists’ as the true ‘democrats’, the real representatives of the people. They have played on a growing belief among an important minority that democracy was an elite game, often fought for mainstream politician’s own benefit.

Subsequently, a crucial factor in the BNP’s electoral loss of Millwall was a national and especially local anti-fascist campaign. The BNP was successfully tagged as ‘Nazi’, as beyond the pale. Although this task was helped by the political background of many of its leaders (some of whom had been photographed wearing Nazi uniform), a noteworthy aspect of its de-legitimisation is the way in which ‘ordinary’ local people such as doctors and clergy, as well as ethnic minority groups, became involved in the campaign.

This meso approach undoubtedly has clear policy implications. It points, for example, to the need for:

i) Local (and national) parties to avoid giving any form of legitimacy to extremism.

ii) For alertness to such legitimisation among the local (and national) media.

iii) The importance of local civil society in fighting the rise of extremism, especially by taking a public line on what is right and wrong.

However, these alone cannot stem the rise of racism. As already noted, macro theories of extremism point to the fact that the revival of racism in society is related to fundamental socio-economic changes. Racist voting, or violence, is only a tip of the iceberg.

Policy Makers

By policy-makers, I largely mean people working for government agencies, or related NGOs. It is important to stress at the outset that policy developments have a strongly national dimension, especially as there are notably different conceptions of citizenship in Europe. In particular a distinction is often made between German, French and British/Dutch approaches (although in practice the distinctions are less clear-cut than they appear in their ideal types). The German tradition is based on jus sanguinis, and tends to leave immigrants as outsiders. The French tradition has been based more on jus solis, and involves a form of assimilationism which offers the prospects of becoming an ‘insider’, but which is hostile to manifestations of difference. The British and Dutch traditions also involve an ‘open’ conception of citizenship, but are more multi-cultural. These differences have produced very different policy responses. For instance, the French government in the past has tended to reject the sponsorship of separate ethnic group organisation. The Dutch, in keeping with their more generally ‘pillared’ society (formed around vertically organised groups), have actively encouraged multi-cultural organisation. They have also been more actively involved in seeking to counter the widespread discrimination which immigrants experience in fields such as employment and housing.

However, looking across Western Europe it is possible to discern a set of policy developments which are common to most countries. Most typically they relate either directly or indirectly to localised violence, which has unquestionably been a major spur to action - especially when it provokes unfavourable publicity which might have adverse effects.

I will highlight four developments:

i) There has been a growth of monitoring agencies covering issues such as racial attacks and/or discrimination. The most notable example of this was the creation at the end of the 1990s of the EU’s European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, based in Vienna. More typical would be local developments, such as the notable activities of the city-based RADAR (Rotterdam Anti-Discrimination Council) programme.

ii) There has been growing emphasis on better police training, particularly in localities which have notable ethnic minorities (in some cases, for instance in the UK, this involves cooperation with ethnic communities). An example of this would be the EU Commission funded NAPAP (NGOs and Police against Prejudice) project, which encompassed nine countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the UK.

iii) There have been notable developments in education programmes, often targeted at combating white racism in specific areas and/or at improving schooling in ethnic minority areas. For example, in Sweden the Tensta High School in Stockholm, an area with a high proportion of immigrants, has received significant additional resources and pupils from all over Stockholm seek to attend it as a result of its high standards.

 

iv) There has been at attempt to develop multi-agency approaches, linking organisations such as the police, social workers, and schools. Again, these are often targeted at ‘problem’ areas. RADAR, for example, pioneered work with the police and other groups in Rotterdam. In some ways, these are all commendable developments. However, at this point I want to return to my argument about theory-less policy, and briefly consider education programmes. All too often educational approaches involve a rationalist position which holds that ‘if only people knew the true facts….’ Clearly, there is much ignorance concerning race and immigration – such as the way some people vastly over-estimate the number of asylum seekers arriving in a country, or the way in which many hold incorrectly that most immigrants live on welfare. But it is far from clear that racists are open to such re- ‘education’.

 

Firstly, cognitive dissonance theory teaches us that we do not approach problems as a tabula rasa. People's minds are not putty, they have been influenced from childhood by family, friends and other sources: we take on information which fits into existing attitudes and prejudices. Opinion from official, or anti-racist sources, is often suspect in such eyes. For instance, there is some evidence from Sweden that local campaigns to educate people about the beneficial effects of accepting asylum seekers were counter-productive. Secondly, the psychology of conspiracy theory also points to the problems of seeking to dispel views such as the belief that there is an elite conspiracy to hide the truth from people. Conspiracy theory is difficult to eradicate because it has a series of psychological appeals – it helps give people a sense that they understand complex events, that they have managed to pierce through the veil which has been woven to deceive them.

Or take the issue of multi-level agency developments. These tend to be put forward with an implicit assumption about the motives of public officials and others involved in the programmes. We can call this the 'public interest' view of behaviour: it holds that civil servants are honourable men and women working for the public good. This can be contrasted with what is frequently (and misleadingly) termed the 'public choice' theory of behaviour. This holds that public (and often NGO) officials tend to be guided less by the quest for the public good than by a desire to maximise their own 'empires'. There is thus:

i) An inherent tendency for ever-increasing budget demands from such agencies, often backed by 'evidence' that their services are really needed;

ii) A tendency for agencies to compete for resources, which means that honourable cooperation is far from guaranteed. Indeed, at times there can be a competition to get in first in terms of 'dealing' with a problem: a Swedish report on drug prevention in the late 1990s was a revealingly titled 'Arriving too late as early as possible'.

This is not to argue that the quest for multi-agency approaches is necessarily doomed to failure. The point is more for leading officials and advisers to talk through different assumptions and goals. For example, the NAPAP project based in Barcelona spent much of its first year analysing and debating the different preconceptions and goals of partners.

Similarly, the lesson about education to be drawn from the theories noted above is not to do nothing. The point is more to be aware of what theory tells us about the problems of such action. In particular, these point to the need focus more on long term programmes, especially ones designed to encourage reflection. Austria would be a good example of a country where, in its desire to portray itself as Hitler's first victim, there has been a notable dearth of self-examination in terms of the Holocaust. On the other hand, some countries, such as Sweden or the Netherlands, have put notable resources into using the Holocaust to teach the horrors of racism - and sometimes the darker side of their own histories.

Act Locally but Think Globally?

It is easy to be critical, and this session is meant to focus on 'Strategies and Actions' for the future, rather than recounting the past. So let me briefly turn to some further suggestions for policy development.

 

In this context, I'll make three broad points:

i) More emphasis is needed on long term programmes in general. Too many programmes are started after events such as much-publicised violence. Sometimes the motives are to restore a locality's reputation, they are related to public relations as much as ameliorating racism. For instance, Trollhättan was in the mid-1990s called the Swedish capital of racism. It responded to its unenviable label with a variety of policies, such as torchlit processions, and inviting in ministers to speak.

ii) These problems are compounded by the fact that there is often weak or nonexistent follow-up to ascertain what, if anything, has been achieved by more concrete action, and thus disseminate good practice. This is sometimes the case with more long-term programmes too. Thus during the 1970s and 1980s, various Swedish agencies entered the crime prevention arena, often backed with large funds. But by the turn of the 1990s, little systematic work had been done on whether they were preventing crime. When follow-up work was begun, it was discovered that some common assumptions did not apply to racist crime. In particular, there was not necessarily family and peer restraint.

 

iii) There needs to be more emphasis on community-generated programmes, rather than ones initiated by politicians, officials or NGOs. It is important to note that politicians are often seen as the 'enemy' by racists. In Austria, the main reason cited for voting FPÖ in 1999 was not immigration, but alienation from mainstream politicians (the German word for such resentment is 'Politikverdrossenheit'). Local officials and anti-racist NGOs are hardly seen any more favourably by the alienated white minority. Let me take a specific example of the type of programme which I am suggesting, namely one involving 'ordinary' local football clubs. There have been various anti-racist programmes by international bodies, such as UEFA, or major clubs like Manchester United.
Given that footballers are often cultural icons of racists, these can be powerful weapons. However, there also seems little doubt that on occasion these are good examples of organisations which want to be seen to be doing something, and they have little or no outreach into local communities. An interesting example of a less glamorous programme involves the minor British club Brentford, which in 1998 initiated a community programme aimed at primary schools and integrating children from different ethnic backgrounds. Whether this will have positive long term results (including attracting children of 'Asian' background, who tend not to play competitive football), is not clear.

 

However, this long run, communal type of action needs encouraging. It also points to the fact that such programme need at times to try to build bridges between ethnic communities. Moreover, involving the community should not simply be seen in terms of whites. Ethnic minorities need to be mobilised and involved as well. An interesting example of this type of action concerns the Rinkeby school in Stockholm, which has a large ethnic minority catchment areas. Various school-based facilities were transferred to parental control and/or parents were involved closely in decisions. Again, there needs to be more long-term research on exact effects, but the general drift of policy to community-empowerment seems worth pursuing.

2. The Nation and Beyond

However, it is important not to become overly focused on the local. There are areas where there is a vital need for action at the national level - or beyond this. Let me give some brief (as this seminar is meant to focus on the local) examples. I'll highlight three:

i) There needs to be more political leadership from the top on anti-racist issues. Mainstream politicians may be unpopular among racists, but their silence – or even worse the way in which some have picked up a watered down version of racist politics - is far more dangerous. The Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Perrson, seems a beacon of light here.

 

ii) There needs to be more emphasis on anti-discrimination legislation, and the need to implement such legislation. This is largely missing in most European countries. Public sector employment in particular offers the chance to set an example in terms of seeking to achieve a workforce which reflects the whole community.
Anti-discrimination contracts in public contracts could also be extended. Legislation to encourage women’s rights did not make women equal overnight. But it helped condition a climate where this has increasingly become the norm.

 

iii) The European Union needs to put even more resources into promoting anti-racist programmes. Although a sensitive issue, it also needs to promote more work among academics on the concept of European citizenship. This cannot be based on the classic German or French models, which are impossible in present-day multi-cultural Europe. This in turn needs linking to more consideration of a European constitution. At the local level, we need to stress the need for more of what might be termed an 'input' conception of democracy - the need for more community participation. But the growth of European level governance, in spite of the rhetoric of 'subsidiarity', offers little scope for such input democracy. Here we need to think more in terms of 'output' democracy - of common European rights for minorities, etc. The issue is not 'simply' one of racism: it is related to redefining the nature of democracy in the face of populist challenges.

When Le Pen's Front National first made its breakthrough in 1982-3, it was typically seen as a 'flash party', a shooting star which would soon burn itself out. Much of the analysis of racist violence in Germany in 1991-2 tended to argue that it was a temporary phenomenon, prompted by various after-shocks of the sudden collapse of communism. Yet in 2001, whilst the pattern is complex, both racial violence and racist voting appear to be growing in Europe.

It is vital for policy makers to take note of the various bodies of theoretical literature which indicate that racism stems from complex social and economic processes: it is part of a wider problem of declining social cohesion, even democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, there is a need for more academics to come down from their ivory towers and take a more systematic interest in how 'Strategies and Action' should be developed. I very much hope that the 2001 Stockholm International Forum, which has brought together politicians, official, representatives and NGOs, journalists, academics and others can play a part in this dual process of learning.

 

 

 

1 This paper does not concern itself with concepts such as ‘racism’, ‘extreme right’, ‘populist’ etc., although these are important issues not just for academics but also for policy-makers. For example, whether Jörg Haider’s FPÖ is ‘racist’ or ‘extremist’ rather than ‘populist’ could be related to the need for the EU14 to impose sanctions after it entered coalition government with the ‘conservative’ People’s Party in early 2000.

 

2 The archetypal party was Jean-Marie Le Pen’s French Front National, but since its split in 1999, Haider’s party has been pre-eminent electorally, gaining 27 per cent of the vote in the 1999 national elections (subsequently its electoral fortunes have faltered).

 

3 Countries collect statistics in very different ways, which make it difficult to compare across borders. Even within countries, it is difficult to compare figures across areas and over time because of varying collection techniques, etc. For instance, the British Crime Survey includes racial ‘incidents’, which can include verbal harassment, whereas German statistics have mainly logged violent activities, and the French government has adopted a policy which seems designed to minimise racist activity.

 

4 For instance, from the late 1980s in particular there was a growing sense of Muslim identity within the East End of London; other groups exhibiting this pattern included Somalis. In France there is notable alienation, often manifested in violence, among young second and third generation immigrants, especially in the high rise suburbs of big cities such as Paris and Lyon.

 

5 The term ‘immigrant’ is a misnomer in many cases, especially in countries, which have long-standing patterns of immigration and where ‘immigrants’ may hold full citizenship.

 

6 For instance, whilst the Italian Lega Nord has become increasingly anti-immigrant at the turn of the new millenium, many industrialists in the north were seeking new cheap labour. In Germany too there have been notable labour shortages in some sectors, for example IT where recruits have been sought from the Indian sub-continent.

 

7 R. Eatwell, ‘Ethnocentric Party Mobilization in Europe: the Importance of the Three-Dimensional Approach’, in R. Koopmans and P. Statham (eds), Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).

 

8 For more details on these case studies see R. Eatwell, ‘The Dynamics of Extreme Right Electoral Mobilisation’, Patterns of Prejudice, No. 3 (July), Vol. 30, 1998.