Questions and Theses on a Large Gap in Research on Right-Wing Extremism

1. The State of Research on Right-Wing Extremism in Youth

In recent years, research on right-wing extremism in youth has generated a wealth of publications. These are, first of all, diverse descriptions of the variants of extreme right-wing organization and subculture together with their ideologies. Second, there are numerous documentations of violent activities in recent years, particularly in eastern Germany. Third, scientific analyses can be found that have addressed causes in the macrostructures of society, for example, in the form of rapid social change, and suspect that the sources of violence are to be found in economic problems or in the transformations of eastern German society.

Fourth, scientific studies should be emphasized that assign responsibility to social relations within families and milieus as well as difficulties in securing status through school qualifications. Fifth, biographical and psychological approaches play an important role in enabling at least a major part of the adoption of extreme right-wing orientations accompanying violent behavior to be explained through biographical problems. Sixth, discourse analyses have been proposed in order to analyze trends through the public discussion in the media and among elites. Finally, election analyses play a role in clarifying the attractiveness of extreme right-wing political parties.

All these approaches have generated important findings that help identify factors favoring extreme right-wing violence from structural, group-related, and biographical perspectives. These findings are particularly valuable when they are also embedded in a theory. However, this is not very widespread in research on right-wing extremism.
At the same time, a serious deficit in research can be identified that has become most evident in the trends to be observed in cities and communities in eastern Germany. This is a lack of analyses of the political interaction context of local actors in cities and communities and its role in the normalization of extreme right-wing violence.

Hence, from the perspective of multilevel analyses, we can now draw on numerous findings on both macrostructural and microsocial levels. However, there is a lack of differentiated analyses on the mesolevel, that is, addressing the intermediary actors located between structural developments in society and individual situations.
This is surprising from a historical perspective. In the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), the "street" was already a central battlefield. This has been lost to view, at least in the analyses of right-wing extremism carried out in western German society, because the "street" has become a location for public demonstrations over specific events. In this sense, this form of activity has not differed from those presentations also favored by other political movements.

It is only since the unification of the two German societies into one nation that a trend in eastern Germany has come to light that makes it necessary to focus scientific interest more strongly on the sociospatial aspects of extreme right-wing violence.
In a period when interest has concentrated on the modernizations of right-wing extremism through new media like the Internet or on the ideological changes in the so-called "new right," it may seem anachronistic to emphasize such forms of activity. This seems to be even more the case when the dominant discourse in the social and political sciences focuses on global processes in which local events appear to make hardly any contribution.

However, this is a serious mistake, as confirmed most convincingly in the urban "laboratories" of extreme right-wing politics in the cities governed by the Front National in southern France. The frequently underestimated "localness of politics" may well increase in importance as the debate on globalization becomes more widespread and inevitable. This applies particularly to persons and societies that perceive such topics as a threat, in other words, in which there is a delay in modernization or where self-concepts have been shaken severely.

2. The Need for a Broader Research Approach:

 

The Net of Interactions Among Local Actors and the Normalization of Extreme Right-Wing Violence in Urban Areas The main conclusion from this brief overview is the need for a shift in research interests to overcome a serious deficit. This shift calls for a particular focus on the urban context. Indeed, this choice is supported by the strategy statements of right-wing extremists themselves:

We must create spaces in which we exercise the real power, in which we can impose sanctions, that is, punish deviants and enemies, support comrades in the struggle . . . . The system, the state and its henchmen, becomes of secondary importance in the concrete life plans of political activists. (taken from the extreme right-wing "Thule Network" as cited in Fahr, 1998, pp. 4-5, translated) This is why Schröder's (1997) book title Ostdeutsche Städte in Angst (East German cities in a state of fear) is not arbitrary. The mostly daunting descriptions of conditions in various eastern German cities portray a form of violence with which traditional research can no longer cope. The continuous documentation of extreme right-wing violence in eastern Germany by the Zentrum Demokratische Kultur (Center for democratic culture) in Berlin and the Verfassungsschutz (bodies responsible for defending the constitution) in the new German states round off the image of a problematic trend that is also further reinforced through successes in local government elections in, for example, Sachsen-Anhalt.

When confronted with the violent occupation of spaces in which the state monopoly on the use of force no longer holds and persons with other opinions or certain features (in terms of clothing styles, handicaps, hair color, or skin color) must go in fear, are threatened, beaten, and, under certain circumstances, even killed, it is not enough to confirm structural or individual causes of violent activity. The solutions proposed by prior research are also inadequate, and the hope nourished by science and politics a few years ago that extreme right-wing violence was only a transitional phenomenon arising from the challenges of social, political, and economic transformation now need to be abandoned in light of stable violent scenes and the way they are increasingly linked together (see Uhrlau, 1994; Wagner, 1998a).

This is why scientific interest should focus predominantly on the previously neglected mesolevel of the political interaction context in communities and less on the macrolevel of societal structures or the microlevel of individual biographies. This research focus takes account of not only the strong sociospatial orientation in extreme right-wing violence mentioned in the quotation above but also the important role of local processes in a social order that is still in the process of establishing itself. Particularly in times of social transformation, local processes are strong indicators of political culture (Neckel, 1995, p. 661). This is why an explanation of the conditions under which the local actors in some cities are unable to shape or secure social spaces so that members of different groups can live in them without danger and exercise their basic rights, is not just of great importance to the communities concerned.

In this context, the concept of "local actors" describes different groups: the police, the city council, local media, schools, youth offices, as well as other state institutions, political parties, and civil groups such as citizens' initiatives, churches, and other religious groups, civil rights and human rights groups, and trade unions. An analysis of the reactions of such institutions to right-wing extremism has already been carried out in western Germany (Heitmeyer, 1994). However, it needs to be extended in two ways: first, there is a need to concentrate on the special problems in eastern Germany; and, second, the concern is no longer separate analyses of the reactions of individual institutions but an analysis of their interaction, in other words, of the political interaction context. Figure 1 illustrates this interaction network of local actors located on the mesolevel. The macro- and microlevels together with the social influence context form the framing conditions for their activities.

Figure 1: Conditions of extreme right-wing violence in communal space

The first requirement in an analytical examination of this network of interactions is a reconstruction of the orientation patterns and action logics of the relevant local actors.
Extreme right-wing-oriented (youth) groups are the main actor in the violent occupation of spaces and the establishment of illegitimate power. However, the numerous ways in which they are organized often make it difficult for urban society to react appropriately. Although strictly organized and hierarchically structured groups are in the minority, their disciplined and planned approach makes them particularly dangerous. The first groups to be mentioned in this context are the Kameradschaften (comradeships) of neo- Nazi political parties. Central elements of these organizations are a structure of orders and obedience, personal trust, discipline, and fixed ideological beliefs.

 

There are also so-called autonomous Kameradschaften whose goals are to infiltrate youth groups and to recruit and train new members. Autonomous Kameradschaften do not belong to any neo-Nazi organizations officially, but are guided by them. Paramilitary groups are either autonomous or active in neo-Nazi contexts. For these well-organized, ideologically fixed groups, violence is no longer an end in itself, but is applied as a means. When possible, they instrumentalize persons from the broader extreme right-wing circle for such actions. Here, in turn, more or less organized groupings can be distinguished. First, there are adolescent and young adult males who meet up regularly in leisure-time centers or bars and celebrate national-socialist rituals. They should be distinguished from temporary groupings of young persons who meet together for specific events. These include, for example, extreme right-wing groupings in the hooligan scene. Finally, there are loose groupings of young persons from marginal groups, some of whom earn their living through criminal activities. Many of these young persons have no fixed extreme right-wing attitudes; nonetheless, extreme right-wing settings can trigger violence in the group (see Wagner, 1998b, pp. 39-xx).

The question now is what brings young persons with no fixed extreme right-wing ideology to engage in violence toward foreigners, left-wingers, homosexuals, or other minorities. Any plausible explanation cannot simply interpret this behavior as a reaction to experiences of deprivation, but has to proceed from the assumption that such acts of violence provide young persons with real solutions to certain problems, in other words, that they possess a positive incentive for their activities.

One such positive incentive is to cope with the uncertainty in personal identity that is so virulent in the youth phase. In this context, it has to be assumed that the relatively homogeneous and contradiction-free identity structure claimed to be normal by Mead (1973/1934, pp. 185-186) continues to be found nowadays only in those social contexts in which individual identities are given by ascriptive features. The rigorous exclusion of everything foreign by extreme right-wing youth and their aggressive emphasis on being German may therefore well serve a stress-reducing function in the search for identity. This is also supported by empirical findings showing that young persons with authoritarian and nationalistic orientations exhibit thoroughly positive self-concepts and even tend to overestimate themselves (see Heitmeyer, 1995, pp. 154-xxx). In addition, one's own importance may also be confirmed by the responses to violent actions: Stigmatization can be reshaped into prestige and self-confirmation (see Goffman, 1979, pp. 61-62; Tajfel, 1982, pp. 103-104). One skinhead summed this up through the simple statement, "I love the feeling of being hated" (cited in Farin, 1996, p. 23, translated).
Reinforcers that relate directly to the violent occupation of physical spaces are of particular significance within the present framework. First, it has to be assumed that acquisitions of social space are in any case very important as a (re-) acquisition of lifeworlds in the context of the development of youth cultures (see Krafeld, 1992, pp. 61-62). However, the violent occupation of social spaces that extreme right-wing youth groups pursue according to the "concept" of "foreigner-free zones" is particularly successful in terms of political socialization because it is such a highly effective "strategy." Reasons are:

1. Young persons gain power over social spaces and can thereby impose their situational definition over their use against the will of others.

2. The political activity is based on short chains of action that are easy to grasp.

3. Visible and confirmable successes are obtained, in other words, the feeling of selfefficacy is high and euphoric moods can be elicited by the accompanying music scene.

4. The activities are embedded in majority moods in the population, so that a selfsupporting motivation to engage in illicit violence is also joined by a feeling of belonging to the avantgarde (see Heitmeyer, 1994b, pp. 41-xx).

These violent attempts to occupy social spaces take various, escalating forms in which the various actors adopt different roles. These reveal the contribution to escalation or the scope for prevention in various groups of actors. One goal of the research is to expose these complex role distributions that can only be suggested with examples in the following.

Provocation gains can be obtained through challenging, provocative display, contemptuous expressions, or the demonstrative display of antidemocratic symbols. The mass media play a decisive role in these provocation gains, because the groups' claims to power and its consolidation depend on them first establishing themselves as a factor to be taken seriously. The test of whether this has been attained is the reaction of the mass media and their style of reporting. This is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to establish the extreme right-wing groups in the public sphere. It still has to be joined by a low density of control, that is, a low probability of sanctioning; civic lethargy; "empty" institutions; and that established political parties or social personalities discuss topics to which they can relate their activities. In this context, the literature shows a strong consensus over the devastating consequences of the debate on political asylum perpetrated by political actors. Even after the riots in Rostock, the political commentaries revealed far more apprehensions about the loss of face outside of Germany rather than any sympathy with the victims. Another shocking aspect of these events was the public support for the offenders in parts of the general population. As, in addition, the asylum seekers were relocated as a result of the riots, violent right-wing offenders must have gained the impression that they were simply doing what others lacked the courage to do. The final agreement on an "asylum compromise" appeared to be a direct victory for pressure from the right (see Bruner, Dannenbeck, & Zeller, 1993, p. 175).

Eviction gains can be ascertained as a further form of the confirmation of violence, for example, in connection with the actions against asylum seekers and foreigners in Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen. The strategic concept of "foreigner-free zones" expresses the particular significance of the local aspect in the politics and demonstration of power of the extreme right-wing spectrum. Initially, violent activities were directed against communally accommodated foreigners in restricted social spaces such as houses, homes, and so forth. After these eviction gains had been attained, they moved on to camp sites and youth centers. The activities of the established political parties in presenting interpretable topics ("asylum seekers") and a low control density by the police are crucial for these eviction gains.

Spatial gains as a further variant of the expansion of power concern the visibility of extreme right-wing positions and their assertion in public spaces, for example, in railroad stations and shopping malls. These spatial gains also always have a display character in order to demonstrably show what one has under one's control. This also includes extending the danger and fear zones to include "dissident" persons and groups in the indigenous German population as well. The success of this expansion of power through extending anxiety depends strongly on civic counterforces because public spaces can be occupied in a highly mobile way that is hard to counter through any stronger police presence.

Gains in normalcy arise when new patterns of interpretation (for example regarding relations to foreigners) and forms of address corresponding to the extreme right-wing view of the world assert themselves in the relevant sectors of (civil) society. Because this occurs in public space to a high degree, it can hardly be called a "cultural subversion" (Wagner, 1998b). Regarding gains in normalcy, it is difficult to ascertain which interactions and spirals of escalation are initiated by the gains in provocation, eviction, and space. The social variable of mentalities may initially provide a legitimation base (e.g., for demands for a homogenization of the population or the nation), and the various groups then demonstrate their mobilization powers through their acts, which, in turn, extends the field of legitimation as long as successes continue. The gain in normalcy confronts institutions as well as political actors in the democratic spectrum with serious problems, because things that are taken as a matter of course are very hard to question. Normalcy is mostly sealed off from criticism and interventions. For example, Schröder (1997, pp. 24-xx) reports a female teacher's response to an attack on three Italian construction workers by right-wing extremists. She told her students, "The Italians must have done something, otherwise our boys wouldn't have hit them." Established political parties and institutions are "driven" by stances and actions that now seem to be normal. For example, it has been reported that a public discussion on rightwing extremism held by the metal workers trade union (IG-Metall) in Saalfeld was followed by numerous members leaving the trade union by protest.

 

Newspapers (particularly in rural areas and small towns) are afraid of losing their readers if they take strong positions. And the "opposing powers" in civic society lose support when the relation between the majority and the minority regarding certain topics and behaviors is no longer clear. Alongside all this, the experiential quality of violent activity should also not be underestimated; in other words, violence can be fun and, at times, it can even induce a druglike state as Buford (1994) describes so clearly. He accompanied a feared group of English hooligans in their activities, thereby becoming personally more and more involved in the field of reciprocal violence. This perspective makes the appeal of extreme right-wing youth groups even clearer: As Erb (1993) has pointed out: A lot of young persons want to affiliate with the winners, the strong, the active, and the successful, and not the fearful, passive, and complaining. In this sense, the right-wing can offer more political adventure. This makes it attractive, and is an additional explanation for the continuous flow of increasingly younger sympathizers. (p. 280, translated) Violent action generates--as mentioned above--a strong feeling of self-efficacy, because visible and confirmable results are available immediately.

In summary, it can be stated that the particular importance of the political interaction context is that mentionable gains can be attained through extreme right-wing violence only when the "interaction partners" act accordingly. This is particularly clear in the example of provocation gains. These can be fully achieved only when the mass media "play along" by granting a lot of public attention to violent youth and thus lifting them out of the dreariness of everyday life (see Seidenstücker, 1993, p. 323).

 

Regarding eviction gains, in contrast, it is the authorities that have a particular responsibility: Their task as holders of the state monopoly on the use of force is to provide victims with effective protection from violent occupation. The failure of authorities leads not only to loss of confidence in them from the side of the victims but also documents for all direct and indirect participants that certain legal norms do not possess any universal validity, which finally leads to an erosion of norms. If the victims do not respond with resignation under these circumstances, they will fall back on self-help and self-justice that will not only escalate the situation but also weaken the state monopoly on the use of force. Spatial gains, in contrast, can be attained only when there is a lack of civic counterpowers. Authorities often have their hands tied here, because threatening scenarios can also be built up below legal thresholds. Finally, gains in normalcy can be prevented only through opportune interventions by all state and civic actors in society. Once extreme right- wing orientations have become the dominant outlook in a community, there are often hardly any further possibilities of countering them successfully.

What is needed here is a reconstruction of the political interaction context from the perspective of each actor to be studied, because their integration activities always occur on the basis of their own understandings and misunderstandings. These then lead to further actions and create a social reality that nobody has planned. It is necessary to clarify how this chain of actions permits or prevents the peaceful coexistence of members of different groups.

This gives rise to the following questions:
1. Which of the democratic groups try to ignore or deny the problem?

2. How do the democratic groups handle members of extreme right-wing groups?

3. Which groups cooperate with each other?

4. Which groups are in overt or covert conflict?

5. Do active members of democratic groups experience support from the population or do they feel isolated and that they are fighting a losing battle?