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A
ROLE FOR ASEAN IN THE FORTHCOMING
KHMER
ROUGE TRIBUNAL
Youk Chhang
Director, Documentation
Center of Cambodia
dccam@online.com.kh
Presented at
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
Singapore, July 1, 2005
www.iseas.edu.sg
 The
quarter of Cambodia’s population killed by the Khmer Rouge constitutes the
largest death toll in percentage terms of all the genocides in modern history.
It has been more than 25 years since the Khmer Rouge regime was overthrown, yet
not a single credible trial of its leaders has been held.
Cambodians’
expectations and questions for the upcoming tribunal – which is anticipated to
begin in 2006 –differ widely. It is doubtful that everyone’s expectations for
justice can be realized, but there will nevertheless be tangible benefits to
holding trails. While ASEAN’s member states have not made financial
contributions to the tribunal, they can still play important non-monetary
roles.
 On April 17, 1975 the
Khmer Rouge, which had controlled most of Cambodia’s rural areas for several
years, entered Phnom Penh and completed their takeover of the country. Cambodia
had been embroiled in a civil war since 1970, so the capital’s citizens welcomed
the new regime, thinking they would at last find peace for their country. But
their elation was short-lived. Within a few days, the Khmer Rouge evacuated
Cambodia’s cities and towns, and forced over 3 million people into the
countryside to labor in the fields and carry out the vision of a completely
agrarian society for Democratic Kampuchea.
All schools
and universities, pagodas and mosques, banks and businesses were forced to
close. Freedom of religion, press, private property, speech and movement were
eliminated by the Maoist-inspired Khmer Rouge. And with the emptying of the
cities came the first wave of killings. Those associated with the previous Lon
Nol regime were the first to die. Next came the Khmer Rouge’s perceived enemies:
supposed members or associates of the US CIA, Russia’s KGB, and the Vietnamese.
Later, the regime turned on itself, seeing enemies everywhere within its own
ranks and killing many of its own.
Over the next four
years, the Communist Party of Kampuchea was directly or indirectly responsible
for the deaths of at least 1.7 million Cambodians from starvation, disease,
overwork, and outright execution. Throughout history, other governments have
killed large numbers of their own people but none has approached the almost
unimaginable toll exacted by the Khmer Rouge. The Nazis, for example, killed
about 6% of the people in the parts of Europe they occupied, and Rwandans
butchered 14% of their people in 1994. In contrast, the Khmer Rouge were
responsible for the deaths of between a quarter and a third of Cambodia’s
population.
Another
distinguishing feature of this period of Cambodian history is that not a single
credible trial of its former leaders has ever been held. Members of Hitler’s
Nazi regime were brought to justice in the late 1940s, and more recently,
international tribunals have been held about
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
East Timor,
and elsewhere. But with the exception of what have been widely regarded as
“absentia trials” held by the successor government
to the Khmer Rouge in the late 1970s and a few cases where villagers took
justice into their own hands after
the regime fell in 1979, none of the regime’s leaders has been brought to trial.
Pol Pot and the Vietnamese
Delegations (1975-79).
During the
quarter-century since the Khmer Rouge regime was overthrown, some of its leaders
have died, including “Brother Number One” Pol Pot, who succumbed to malaria in
the jungle in 1998 and Central Committee member Ke Pauk, who died peacefully in
his sleep in 2002. Only two cadres are languishing in jail.
The first is Duch, the
former head of the notorious Tuol Sleng (S-21) Prison, where an estimated 14,000
enemies of the state died and only about 12 inmates survived.
 The
second is Southwest Zone commander and Central Committee member Ta Mok, who
basically was jailed for refusing to join the government in the early 1990s. The
regime’s remaining leaders have thus far enjoyed lives of relative ease, but are
ageing rapidly. Most are now in their 70s.
Ta Mok and his
Chinese friends (1980’s)
Expectations for the Trials
In June
1997, co-Prime Ministers Norodom Ranariddh and Samdech Hun Sen requested
assistance from the United Nations and international community “in bringing to
justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity”
during Democratic Kampuchea. And after seven years of negotiations, in October
2004, the Royal Cambodian Government and the United Nations ratified an
agreement on the prosecution of crimes committed during Democratic Kampuchea and
amendments to the law that establishes Extraordinary Chambers for a tribunal of
the regime’s senior leaders. With these actions, the prospects for a tribunal
for the regime’s senior leaders finally came within reach.
Cambodia
and the United Nations have nearly completed the next phase of preparations for
the tribunal: raising a budget of $56 million. The UN has received pledges for a
little over $41 million of the international community’s slated contribution of
$43 million. The Cambodian government was to pay $13 million in cash and kind,
but has belatedly stated that it can only contribute $1.5 million. It has
appealed to Japan (which is the co-sponsor of the UN resolution to establish the
Khmer Rouge Tribunal) to make up the shortfall. Once Cambodia’s original pledge
is met, the trials can begin.
No one
knows for certain how many of the regime’s former leaders will be brought to
trial. Compared to other international tribunals, the budget for Cambodia’s
trials is small. With such a modest budget, only a dozen or less people are
likely to be prosecuted.
No one can
predict the tribunal’s outcome, and expectations among the public vary widely.
In principle, the former Khmer Rouge leaders can be prosecuted for a variety of
crimes under international law – including genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes – as well as for crimes under Cambodian law, and under the laws
of other states. The decision on exactly what charges will be brought against
them will be up to the prosecuting authority.
Some
members of the Cambodian public would like to see the former leaders pay for
their crimes with their lives, but Cambodia does not have the death penalty (and
the UN has been advocating against the death penalty for decades). A few other
Cambodians take a more strictly Buddhist line and advocate forgiveness. A very
small number – mainly politicians – have stated that trials should not be held
at all because Cambodians have already become reconciled. They are afraid of
“raking up the past.”
The vast
majority of Cambodia’s people want to see all of the “intellectual authors” of
the genocide jailed for their crimes. But for legal, documentary, budgetary, and
other evidentiary reasons, not all of them will be charged and brought before a
court of law. Instead, only specific charges and specific cases will be
addressed for the former leaders.
Given the
ages of many of the candidates for prosecution, the possibility that trials
could drag on for several years, the likelihood of appeals, and not least of
all, the track record of the Cambodian legal system, it is unlikely that most
Cambodians’ expectations for justice will be met.
Nevertheless, the trials will provide three very important benefits for our
country. First, they can form a backdrop for helping people answer some of the
questions they have about the tribunals and the Cambodian justice system.
Second, they can stimulate a dialogue among Cambodians on whether their legal
apparatus works and about what they want their justice system to become. And
third, just a generation after the genocide, many young Cambodians simply can’t
believe that their parents endured such hardships under the Khmer Rouge. Thus,
tribunals will help keep the memory of what happened in Cambodia alive and
inspire people to work to prevent it from happening again. Whatever the outcome,
the trials will be important for Cambodia’s future.
The
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) , other legal and human rights
non-government organizations, and to some extent, the government itself, are
working to help Cambodians become aware of the tribunal and to observe and
experience it when possible. For example, the government has
published a handbook to
inform the public about the trials. For its part, DC-Cam
has a new project under
which it
will bring village leaders from all over the
country to attend a
week of the tribunal’s
 proceedings.
They will then return
home and discuss their experience with others. The meetings will be filmed
and the films
shown in other villages nationwide
to encourage debate and
feedback. These and other efforts will help average Cambodians participate
indirectly in the trials and have a greater awareness of the workings of their
government and the international community.
Ieng Sary at the
Phnom Penh
International
Airport
–
Malaysia
Airline (1975-79).
What ASEAN Can Do
Some Asian
governments still view human rights as an issue that is largely Western in
orientation. Over the past few decades, however, people in many Asian countries
have progressively demonstrated their belief that these rights are universal in
nature and that due process and the rule of law are critical elements of
democracy. As Asian countries and those from ASEAN in particular, are playing
an expanded role in world politics and the international economy, it is critical
that their conduct and performance reflect the changes that have been taking
place in Asia.
While no
ASEAN member state has yet made a monetary contribution to the upcoming Khmer
Rouge trials, there are other equally valuable ways in which they can support
Cambodia’s quest for justice. Because of their cultural and historical
similarities, ASEAN members have a good understanding of how to approach
problems in other Asian countries. They will be in an excellent position to
assist Cambodia in making both the trials and the public’s experience of them a
positive one.
Some of the ways other
ASEAN countries can help are simple and inexpensive. They include:
1. Technical
assistance.
Countries like Singapore, for example, have highly trained technicians who could
help identify and exhume the over 19,000 mass graves that are spread throughout
Cambodia. Compared to bringing in Western experts, Singapore could provide
efficient and cost-effective expertise to the tribunals that would yield
critical forensic evidence.
2. Documentation.
DC-Cam
recently sent letters to
representatives of ASEAN and other nations in the hopes that governments,
diplomats, universities, and private citizens would send relevant official
documents, photographs, and other materials to Cambodia, which could serve as
evidence at the tribunals or help Cambodians to better understand their history.
Khieu Samphan and the Burmese
Delegations (1975-79).
 3. Counseling.
At present, Cambodia has only 12 trained psychiatrists, while it is estimated
that about a third of the survivors of Democratic Kampuchea – some 2 million
people – still suffer from what is called post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD.
In a project with the Transcultural Psychosocial Oganization, DC-Cam
has found
The Delegations from
East Timor
to
that
simple treatments,
such as
the Democratic
Kampuchea
(1975-79).
breathing
exercises or sleeping
medication, can go a long way toward helping those who are experiencing anger,
insomnia, and other debilitating symptoms of PTSD. We have also found that the
traditional Western ways of treating this syndrome, such as group therapy, are
not well accepted or effective in Cambodia. Because they have an innate
understanding of the Asian psyche, counselors from ASEAN could be of invaluable
assistance to the Cambodian community by providing counseling to both former
victims and perpetrators.
4. Hardware.
At least some portion of Cambodia’s contribution to the tribunals can be
in-kind. Donations of new computers for the tribunal’s administrative staff or
for university history and political science classes would be very valuable.
5. Transportation.
Travel can be a time-consuming and expensive undertaking for most rural
Cambodians. For those who would travel to Phnom Penh to attend a portion of a
trial, the costs can be prohibitive. Thus, the donation of large vans or small
buses would be a much-needed means of bringing people to the capital from the
countryside.
6. Volunteers.
DC-Cam is working with a group of nearly 200 student volunteers from throughout
Cambodia, who will go door to door before the trials begin, distribute
information, and help people learn what to expect from them. Not only will this
help average citizens to gain a clearer understanding of the trials, but it will
also assist in building a future core of citizens who are involved in their
communities. The Cambodian students would benefit from their association with
students from throughout ASEAN, who will help them broaden their knowledge of
regional history and politics, and learn different approaches to problem
solving.
 7. Radios.
While this does not seem like a very important donation, it is critical. In a
country where the average income is about a dollar a day, few villagers have
access to newspapers or television. However, radio is the main medium Cambodians
use for learning; they often hook up a radio to an old car
Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary with
battery, with villagers gathering
the Laotian Delegations (1975-79).
around to listen and discuss the news. Thus, donations of new or used transistor
or other radios would be invaluable in helping Cambodians stay abreast of
developments in the tribunal.
It is
Cambodians’ hope that other members of the ASEAN community will show their
support for human rights in Asia by providing much-needed assistance for the
Khmer Rouge tribunal.
End.
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