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S-21 Prisoner

Photographs by the Documentation Center of Cambodia and Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum.

The English translation edited by
Youk Chhang and Wynne Cougill
Proofread by Julio A. Jeldres and Rich Arant.

Contributors: David Chandler, Alex Hinton, Alex Boraine, Paul van Zyl, Vannak Huy, Nean Yin, Rasy Pheng Pong, Ky Lim, Sokhym Em, Dany Long, Kannitha Keo Kim, Meng-Try Ea, Visal Mony Khuoy. **Staff Writers:** Sophal Ly, Sayana Ser, Kalyan Sann. **Assistant English Editor-in-chief:** Kok-Thay Eng. **English Editor-in-chief:** Bunsou Sour. **Editor-in-chief and Publisher:** Youk Chhang. **Graphic Designer:** Sopheak Sim. **Distributor:** Bunthann Meas.

Letter :

No Prosperity Without Law

At their past consultative group meetings, donor countries have raised the issue of finding justice for the victims of the Khmer Rouge—but only marginally. Donors should pay more attention to it this week, especially in light of the UN's refusal to continue negotiations with the government of Cambodia on a mixed tribunal.

In principle, the World Bank does not involve itself in political issues. But that does not mean it is unable to understand that a wide range of political issues can have a negative impact on a country's development. In Cambodia, it is absolutely clear that the almost complete absence of rule of law and the partiality of the judiciary are serious impediments to economic and social progress. Some donors have expressed this concern time and time again.

The problem of impunity in Cambodia is directly linked to the absence of Khmer Rouge prosecutions. People do not trust a judiciary that metes out harsh punishments to petty criminals, but leaves those responsible for the deaths of nearly two million people untouched.

Many Cambodians now prefer to take the law into their own hands, as the increasing incidence of mob justice shows.

Unfortunately, many donors choose not to address this problem. But the negative effect that the absence of a reliable judicial system has had on the economy is very clear, as shown by Cambodia's limited growth, the frightening levels of corruption, the absence of trade and investment, and the high unemployment rate.

Youk Chhang
Editor-in-chief and Publisher

The Confession of an S-21 Interrogator

Sophal Ly


Nop Nuon

Nop Nuon (revolutionary name Nuon) volunteered to join the Khmer Rouge army in 1973. He was later stationed at S-21 (Tuol Sleng Prison), where he worked in the interrogation group. He was arrested along with several of his co-workers and "smashed" on July 27, 1977. This article presents a summary of his confession.

Nop Nuon, age 21 in 1977, was a native of Srey Chey village, Boeng Tranh subdistrict, District 54, Region 33, Takeo province. His father's name was Tit Nop and his deceased mother's name was Dy Tem. Nuon had two sisters.

On February 12, 1973 Nuon became a subdistrict militiaman under the supervision of Sarin, called Koy, the chief of Boeng Tranh subdistrict. He later moved to Battalion 116, where he worked until Phnom Penh was liberated in April 1975. In May of that year, Nuon contacted a former Lon Nol soldier named Chhin. After getting to know each other quite well, the two men went everywhere together. Chhin gave Nuon much advice about the difficulties their socialist society was facing. Chhin compared the standards of living, dressing, eating and freedom of movement between the current and old regimes. Eventually, Nuon came to see that life was better under the old regime, and decided to follow Chhin. Chhin shared with Nuon his plots to destroy the revolution. Nuon and Chhin carried out their plan to demolish Banteay Dap Chhuon fort by throwing several of Angkar's weapons into a pond west of Boeng Trabek.

On May 15, 1975 Angkar assigned Nuon to take a military technical training course in Division 703 instead of working in the messenger unit. No matter where he was taken, he still kept in touch with Chhin, and they continued to plot.

On December 29, 1975 Nuon was ordered to become an interrogator at S-21 under Hor and Noeun. There, Nuon met Noeun, his co-worker. Later on, they became very friendly and developed a common interest in fighting against the revolution.

Nuon and Noeun agreed to carry out activities at S-21 without complying with Angkar's orders, without listening to their superiors, and by sleeping during interrogations. While their interrogations were long, their results were unacceptable. In addition, Nuon enticed and recruited two people, Ny and Ban (prison officials noted on Nuon's confession that these two had already been arrested). Nuon contacted Tuy, Linh, Kong and Koy (their names, too, were marked

as "already arrested"). Noeun also convinced his new recruits—Say, Sokh, Nhet, Rat, Kan, Chea and Noeun —to join in his activities.

In December 1976 Noeun assigned Nuon to complete four tasks: 1) kill interrogators in an attempt to obstruct the interrogation process; 2) kill Duch and Hor (secretly); 3) persuade interrogators to kill enemies one after another; and 4) to mix nails, barbed wire and sand with the cooked rice and soup.

During the end of April and early May 1976, Nuon came to Tuol Svay Prey to carry out his traitorous activities. Less than a month later, all messengers were sent off to do farm work. Nuon and Tuy initiated meetings with them and outlined an assassination plan that was to be carried out during farming operations at Prey Sar. The people to be involved included Ny, Ban, Tuy, Linh, Kong and Koy. The plot was to 1) reveal the secrets of Angkar during farming operations; 2) kill Hor and Huy, and 3) prolong the farming period. Since then, Nuon continued making contacts with his networks and talked indiscreetly until the secret plot was leaked.

On May 13, 1976 Angkar told Nuon to guard a prisoner named Chak Krei, commander of Division 170 of the Eastern Zone. Nuon was sent back to interrogate prisoners after being assigned to watch Chak Krei for six days. In October and November 1976, all of Nuon's partisans were take from the farming unit. This gave them another chance to re-connect with their contacts and vandalize Angkar's equipment, including watches.

In January 1977 Nuon managed to entice Kong, Khom, Ngorn Ly and Orn, all of whom worked in the same interrogation group, to join him. He instructed them to beat prisoners to death when circumstances were difficult and to lure them, if possible, to join his forces in order to interrupt the revolutionary movement.

In February and March 1977 after a fire, Noeun, Nhenh, Rat, Sokh, Say, Kan, Cha and Noeun (of the economic support unit) were arrested, thereby cutting off several of their networks. Those who were still in touch included Ban, Kong, Orn, Khom and Ny. Nuon again made contact with Teng, who worked in the "hot" interrogation unit. In April Nuon enticed a prison guard named Phal to make trouble in his group, including releasing prisoners when it was difficult to get answers from them. One day Teng had a prisoner from the military staff killed, while Nuon beat So Lang to death when Angkar was busy attacking Group 152 (the military staff's regiment in charge of telephones, artillery, logistics, and ship installations). Kong also beat a prisoner to death. Later on he interrogated a prisoner from Division 170. When he could not get answers from one of the prisoners, he burned him alive. The prisoner died without leaving a confession. In addition, Nuon often compared the negative and positive characteristics of certain individuals in an attempt to provoke conflicts among the cadres, saying, "this cadre is strict, while that one is easygoing."

In June-July 1977 Ngorn Ly, a combatant in the S-21 interrogation unit, asked Nuon to go to Vietnam to escape Angkar's plan to arrest traitors. Ngorn Ly was the first to flee; he left at night, surprising all of his co-workers. Later Angkar arrested him. Nuon had also planned to escape, but failed and was arrested on July 6, 1977 and interrogated on July 10, 1977.

Sophal Ly is a staff-writer of the Searching for the Truth magazine.

Please send letters or articles to
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)
P.O. Box 1110, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: (855) 23-211-875
Fax: (855) 23-210-358
Email: dccam@online.com.kh
Homepage: www.dccam.org

The Killing Fields in Pursat Province

Rasy Pheng Pong

Located in northwestern Cambodia, 165 km from the capital city of Phnom Penh along National Road 5, Pursat province is bordered on the east by Kampong Chhnang, on the west by Battambang, on the north by Tonle Sap Lake, and on the south by the provinces of Kampong Speu and Koh Kong. Pursat had 5 districts during the Democratic Kampuchea regime—Kandieng, Pursat, Bakan, Krako, and Kravanh—44 subdistricts and 464 villages. The large majority of the population are farmers and traders. The province covers an area of 1,160,900 hectares, comprising 879,900 hectares of forest, 114,200 hectares of cultivated land, 2,100 hectares of farmland, and 164,700 hectares of uncultivated land.

During the Democratic Kampuchea regime, Pursat's population increased sharply after the Khmer Rouge forced the population to relocate. Many also died en route from disease and starvation. A number of detention and execution centers were housed in this province.

1) Kandieng District

Kbal Cheu Puk Security Office

Geographic Code: 150202

North Latitude: 12º39'21"

East Longitude: 104º01'21"

Most of evacuees from the city of Phnom Penh and the provinces of Takeo and Svay Rieng died in Kbal Cheu Puk village, Sya subdistrict, Kandieng district.

Nhoek Pann, 53, a resident of Boeng Chak village, Sya subdistrict, asserted that although the degree of torture varied, many victims died at this security office: over 800 people were executed here in the space of one day.

Nhoek Pann's niece Mok Ny was beaten with a wooden bar and thrown into one of the killing pits that held several corpses. Although she had a large head wound and was bleeding heavily, she survived "by pretending to be dead after a heavy blow." She fell unconscious for a period of time, and had difficulty removing herself from the heap of dead bodies. Nhoek Phan remembered that, "I was surprised to see her crawling toward my hut at midnight." Today, she lives in Phnom Penh.

According to Nhoek Pann, killings at this site usually took place at night. The killing pit was ten meters long, ten meters wide and three meters deep. Victims killed here were brought from Office S-8 (a detention center) in Kbal Cheu Puk village. Nhoek Pann knew three security guards: Chheang, today a resident of Kandieng district; Pao, a fierce murderer, (deceased); and Mi, who was detained and later released by during the People's Republic of Kampuchea regime.

Tuol Ta Pev Execution and Security Center (Office 07)

Geographic Code: 150203

North Latitude: 12º34'50"

A research teams interviewing informants at Wat Kandal, a former Khmer Rouge prison.

East Longitude: 103º55'58"

Located in Pothivong village, Pothivong subdistrict, Office 07 was designated for thieves, those who came to work late, and those who pretended to be sick. The office was supervised by Hoy (deceased), and Pel and Ngorn (now living in Kandieng district). Hem Cheang, 43, was the chief of a Khmer Rouge plowing unit. He witnessed the Khmer Rouge either walking prisoners to work or forcing them to dig pits that would later become their own graves. He asserted that this execution site consisted of 30 pits with more than 300 prisoners who were later killed.

Tuol Pochrey Execution Center
Geographic Code: 150201
North Latitude: 12º41'33:94"
East Longitude: 103º58'12:85"

Situated 15 km from Kandieng district in Pring Kpuos village, Sre Sdok subdistrict, Tuol Pochrey is a 600 by 800 meter mound located in the barracks of the Pursat battalion. Built in 1970 by residents of Pring village, it was surrounded by four 2-4 meter fences. Between 1975 and 1978, it was used as a security office and execution center. Tuol Pochrey was one of the province's major execution sites. A huge pond on its premises became a burial site. Most of the victims killed here were provincial governors, high-ranking military officers, commandos, and civil servants, including teachers and students.

Seng Srun said that in the first phase of killing (1975), approximately 6,000 people were executed here. In 1976 the Khmer Rouge began gathering policemen and government employees from Phnom Penh and the province itself for execution. These people were killed immediately after they arrived at the center. From 1977 to 1978 another 1,000 people from the Eastern Zone were killed at the site after being accused of

Hak Sophal and a witness named Hem Chea standing in front of mass graves at Tuol Tapev, Kandieng district.

being involved in a sao phim (traitorous) plan. Ten trucks were used to bring Eastern Zone Khmer Rouge cadres to this extermination camp. Seng Srun concluded that more than 10,000 people were killed at this site. He described how the Khmer Rouge guards shot the victims, who fell into a pit, and then bulldozed soil over them. During the regime, the pit was 20 meters wide and 3 meters deep, and was eventually filled with corpses. Due to natural causes, the pit is now a small shallow pond during the rainy season.

2) Pursat (Sampeou Meas) District
Execution and Security Office of Wat Koh Chum
Geographic Code: 1505045
North Latitude: 12º35'23"
East Longitude: 103º53'18"

The everydayness of starvation and disappearances motivated prisoners at this detention center to work very hard in exchange for a little food to eat and their survival. Each prisoner received a daily ration of two ladles of thin porridge. This execution site consists of more than 100 pits containing over 1,000 bodies.

Buoy Ouphal, 57, a resident of Sdok Chum village, Koh Chum subdistrict, said that 10 cans of rice were provided to 380 to 400 prisoners per day. He also noted that the center's over 1,000 prisoners ate in three dining halls. She witnessed Khmer Rouge guards escorting prisoners who were chained together when transplanting and harvesting. Toward the end of 1978, the prisoners were no longer allowed to farm and were killed. Buoy Ouphal noted tearfully that her six children were among the over 1,000 prisoners at this site.

Thlang Phim, 43, a resident of Sdok Chum village, claimed that he saw young Khmer Rouge cadres, age 14 or so, tying up prisoners and walking them in lines to be executed at night. The young guards also tortured the prisoners, most of whom were evacuees or had a political connection to the Khmer Republic. Thlang Phim also recognized the face of the security chief of Wat Koh Chum, named Phan (currently at large). Phan's pseudonym was "Ta Mouk Py" (the elder with two faces). Two of the people reporting to him were Siek (dead) and Hy (now living in Bakan district).

3) Kravanh District
Execution and Security Office of Wat Kandal
Geographic Code: 1504078
North Latitude: 12º20'51"
East Longitude: 103º46'40"

Located in Tul Torting village, Santre subdistrict, the partially destroyed Wat Kandal was transformed into administrative offices and interrogation rooms during the Khmer Rouge regime. Captain Sok San of Pursat province's Fifth Bureau recounted that in 1975 he and others were forced to move from Phnom Penh to Pursat and subjected to hard labor. In 1978 Sok San was arbitrarily arrested and sent to Wat Kandal detention center, whose prisoners were of different backgrounds. Some were local people, while others were Khmer Rouge cadres, such as district chiefs and regional commercial chiefs accused of treason. Sok San mentioned that approximately 260 prisoners were tied up in pairs and taken off to be killed. But he was tied up alone. During the chaos following a counter-attack by a former Khmer Rouge district chief named Mal and a Khmer Rouge militiaman, Sok San was able to escape. He recalled the instruments used to kill people: sticks, bars, knives and bayonets. The Khmer Rouge brought prisoners to their knees at the edge of the pits and then slit their throats.

Chhim Lon, 66, is a native of Korki Thom sub-district, Kean Svay district, and currently a resident of Pursat province. He claimed that he was detained at Wat Kandal on the accusation of "looking down on Angkar." He commented that he really did not underestimate the Angkar, but was unable to complete an assignment Angkar had given him. Chhim Lon was imprisoned for one year and a half (as of January 1979). As a prisoner, he worked almost without rest. Chhim Lon also mentioned an elderly woman named Mom who was imprisoned in 1975 for picking a green papaya from her own garden without permission. He asserted that many other people were imprisoned for similar trivial causes.

Wat Kandal prison was under the control of a cadre called Lok (dead), deputy chief Chann (currently living in Kravanh district) and cadre Met as security. Lon affirmed that Met had killed more than 300 people at the extermination camp. He is dead now. He identified two other perpetrators, Chum and Pat (dead).

4) Bakan District

Security Office of Boeng Batt Kandal

Geographic Code: 150109

North Latitude: 12º37'32"

East Longitude: 103º46'48

Located about four km from Bakan district office, Boeng Batt Kandal was established in 1975 and operated until the end of 1979. It was designed for people of all categories, taken from various provinces, cities and other localities.

Chann Peng, 56, claimed that every day, he saw militiamen escorting people from Prey Veng and Svay Rieng provinces, Krako district, and Pursat district to the office. Most of the victims were high-ranking soldiers, public servants and ordinary people. Neou San was the chief of Daung village, Boeng Batt Kandal subdistrict in 1977, and was later assigned as a member of the cooperative of Prey Pdao village, Boeng Khna subdistrict. He pointed out that "Ta Khin" was a security chief at Boeng Batt Kandal and that he has never been seen again.

A mass grave at Wat Koh Chum, Sampov Meas district.

Prey Pheak Execution Ste

Geographical Code: 150110

North Latitude: 12º37'04"

East Longitude: 103º47'36"

Prey Pheak is not far from the Wat Kandal security office and its prisoners were brought here from Wat Kandal to be killed. Many pits remain at this site; they were excavated in search of jewelry in 1980.

Chann Peng said he found several pits full of swollen bodies. The killings at Prey Pheak took place in three phases from 1975 to the end of 1978. During phase one (1975) individuals with the rank of second lieutenant and higher were executed. Phase two (1976-77) included individuals who had struggled for a long period of time. The third phase (1978) saw the executions of evacuees from the Eastern Zone, such as Prey Veng and Svay Rieng.

Chann Peng stated that two of his cousins were killed because of their high military status. He said he saw Khmer Rouge militiamen escorting a group of about 60 to be killed during 1976-77, including elderly people. Chann Peng confirmed that this execution site is 1.5 kilometers in diameter. From 9,000 to 15,000 people were executed here.

Sokh Sovan asserted that Prey Pheak consists of 300 to 400 pits, while Neou San, 48, claimed that each of the pits is 3 meters wide and 2 meters deep, and held 30 to 70 bodies.

(Continued in the August 2002 issue)

Rasy Pheng Pong is the team leader of the Mapping Project of the Documentation Center of Cambodia. He is currently assisting the Center's Forensic Team.

List of Foreigners Smashed at S-21

Prepared by Nean Yin

No.	Name	Nationality	Occupation	Place of Arrest	Date of Entry	Date of Execution
1	Nang Dav (F)	Laotian	Wife of Chamreun Sou	Region 33	April 7, 1976	May 24, 1976
2	Nag Keo (F)	Laotian	Fishery section	Region 33	April 7, 1976	May 24, 1976
3	May Chamreun Soup	Laotian	Mechanic	Region 33	April 7, 1976	May 24, 1976
4	Thav Bunthary	Laotian	Plane mechanic	Region 33	April 7, 1976	May 24, 1976
5	Ke Valra	Indian	?	Region 22	?	April 8, 1976
6	Mohamad	Indian	?	Region 22	?	April 8, 1976
7	Ke Soda	Indian	?	Region 22	?	April 8, 1976
8	Ysa Sma Y	Indian	?	Takeo	April 8, 1976	April 8, 1976
9	Mogama Doyitriya	?	Curry grocer	Takeo	April 8, 1976	April 8, 1976
10	Ajihsarbibi (F)	Indian	Cow tender	Region 22	?	April 8, 1976
11	Koem Kavenyabo	Indian	?	Region 22	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
12	Hassa	Indian	Vendor	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
13	Asil Halima (F)	Indian	Vendor	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
14	Asis Saradivi (F)	Indian	Vendor	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
15	Asis Ysaskany (F)	Indian	Vendor	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
16	Gahif Karom	Indian	Balm seller	?	April 11, 1976	?
17	Ysma El	Indian	French protégé	District 56	?-?-1977	?
18	Mariyan (F)	Indian	Vendor	District 14	April 12, 1976	?
19	Kimdad	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
20	Asokhanran Brahim	Pakistani	Student	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
21	Medam	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
22	Abdullah	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
23	Asiasmatt	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
24	Sa-it	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
25	Hassan	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
26	Karim	Pakistani	Vendor	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
27	Sarapatt Vane (F)	Pakistani	Tailor	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
28	Khadiya	Pakistani	Tailor	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
29	Sarapatt Siviny (F)	Pakistani	Vendor	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
30	Disoyan (F)	Pakistani	Vendor	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
31	Noursaza (F)	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
32	Asokhan Anbrahim	Pakistani	Student	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976

33	Saratpat Almathyang	Pakistani	Student	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
34	Bee Kimyan	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
35	Vapiriya	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
36	Mariem	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
37	Math Yan	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
38	Stimariem	Pakistani	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
39	Miliyop	Pakistani	Vendor	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
40	Kong Sen	Arabian	Cattle raiser	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
41	Safa	Arabian	Cattle raiser	Region 25	April 11, 1976	?-?-1976
42	Set Kanlal	Arabian	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
43	Goulie	Arabian	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
44	Salima	Arabian	Cattle raiser	?	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
45	Phiera (F)	Indian	Tire seller	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
46	Agyf	Indian	Cloth seller	Region 25	March 11, 1976	?-?-1976
47	Rova Hiena	French	Ship trader	Siem Reap	April 16, 1976	?-?-1976
48	Hara Hiena	French	Ship trader	Siem Reap	April 16, 1976	?-?-1976
49	Courtigne Dregalson	French	French embassy secretary	Siem Reap	April 16, 1976	?-?-1976
50	Chhay Rea Stry	French	Wife of Courtigne	Siem Reap	April 16, 1976	?-?-1976
51	Y Sim (F)	Chinese	?	S-21 Khor	March 25, 1976	March 25, 1977
52	Tan Hoy	Chinese	?	China	October 20, 1976	October 30, 1976
53	Su Chea Ming	Chinese	Chinese translator at Stung Hav	Kampong Som	May 12, 1978	?
54	May Kol Scottdit	American	?	?	November 26, 1978	?
55	Chim William Clark	American	CIA	Koh Wai	April 21, 1978	?
56	Johnderson Youheuk	English	?	?	November 2, 1978	?
57	Ronal Kisdin	Australian	CIA	?	November 2, 1978	?
58	David Loryscott	Australian	CIA	?	November 2, 1978	?
59	Kerry George Heman	New Zealand	CIA	?	October 13, 1978	?
60	Suom Sambin	Thai	Fisherman	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976
61	Sam Loy	Thai	Fisherman	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976
62	Kham Sirakphan	Thai	Fisherman	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976
63	Praseut Lorbkaet	Thai	Fisherman	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976

(Continued in the August 2002 issue)

Nean Yin is the team leader of the Microfilm Project of the Documentation Center of Cambodia.

Documentary Photographs

Ky Lim

The Documentation Center of Cambodia holds and is preserving Khmer Rouge documents for the purpose of historical research. Its holdings include prisoner biographies, telegrams, notebooks, petitions filed by average people, confessions, and information on killing fields, prisons, mass graves and Khmer Rouge detention centers.

These materials reveal the nature of the regime's actions against the Cambodian people generally, as well as against Khmer Rouge cadres accused of being "traitors." They take the forms of papers, books, audio tapes, maps, and photographs.

DC-Cam currently stores 9,827 documentary photos. They are held in 30 albums and catalogued by subject matter and chronology.

One collection of photographs consists of "mug shots" of the people imprisoned at S-21, the central-level prison now known as Tuol Sleng. When they entered this facility, they were registered by date, and their bodies were measured and examined for physical marks. Prisoners were then given tags containing their name and date of entry. The name tag was pinned to a shirt or scarf, or sometimes directly to the flesh.

Next, security guards took the prisoners to be photographed for documentation purposes. While some prisoners were made to stand for their photographs, most of them had their hands tied behind their backs and were made to sit. Some female prisoners were photographed along with their children and other family members. Many child prisoners were not given name tags.

The prisoners who were photographed bore different facial expressions and appearances. Some even seem happy, with no apparent realization of what was in store for them. The Khmer Rouge duped their victims, telling them that they were being taken "to learn" or "to settle down in a new village."

Some photographs show prisoners who were beaten beyond recognition, while others appear half-dead from starvation, their lips unable to cover their teeth.

Various methods were employed to force confessions out of the prisoners, including electric shocks, the removal of fingernails, suffocation with plastic bags, immersion, and starvation. After being tortured, prisoner were escorted to their cells in shackles. Some committed suicide, but the vast majority of the over 20,000 prisoners held at S-21 were executed. They included Huot Sambath, former minister of foreign affairs and ambassador to Romania; Chea San, ambassador to the Soviet Union; Chim Samnang, assembly representative from Takeo province; and Isoup Ganthy, ambassador to Sweden.

Thirteen prisoners are known to have survived S-21:

◆ Ung Pech, who continued to work at Tuol Sleng after 1979.

◆ Heng Nat, a painter who made portraits of Pol Pot.

◆ Ieng Sopheang and his daughter, who had been prisoners at Ta Man prison.

◆ Mom Chhot, who had been imprisoned at Bati prison.

◆ Tun La, a former prisoner at Phum Russey prison.

Ky Lim is a staff-member of the DC-Cam's Documentation Division.

Khmer Rouge Slogans

◆ Reject no-good cadre who refuse to make changes in their attitude; abolish authoritarianism, bureaucracy, feudalism, and opportunism. *(KR notebook 076 KNH)*

◆ We have to support what the enemy opposes and vice versa. *(Nhok, p.78)*

List of Prisoners Smashed at S-21 (Tuol Sleng)

Compiled by Nean Yin

(Continued from the June 2002 issue)

No.	Name	Role	Place of Arrest	Date of Entry	Date of Execution	Others
373	Aum Chhun Sreng	Engineer	Phnom Srok	??	May 23, 1976	
374	Uk Khorn	Worker	Kampong Som	??	May 23, 1976	
375	Ngy Heang	Medicine producer	Preah Netpreah	??	May 23, 1976	
376	Chour Kan	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
377	Chhim Sit	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
378	Chea Phai Mony	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
379	Tan Kim Sreng	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
380	Pen Din	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
381	Sem Hem	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
382	Suos Seng	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
383	Seng Saroeun	Soldier's wife	??	??	May 23, 1976	
384	Mao Touch	Soldier's wife	??	??	May 23, 1976	
385	Lim Thon	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
386	Chin Phal	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
387	Men Sithon	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
388	Tit Thoeung	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
389	Mak Pheng	Soldier	??	??	May 23, 1976	
390	Um Pha	Bandit's wife	??	??	May 23, 1976	
391	Um Ven	Soldier's wife	??	??	May 23, 1976	
392	Peou Sokhom	Vinel Company	Prek Po	??	May 23, 1976	
393	Theng Seu	Red Cross	Battambang	??	May 23, 1976	
394	Ngin Sa Ut	Mine engineer	Battambang	??	May 23, 1976	
395	Chhim Sovan	Villager	Glass Factory	??	May 23, 1976	
396	Kang Sok	Villager	Prek Kdam	??	May 23, 1976	
397	Thaong Reun	Villager	Casino Phnom Penh	??	May 23, 1976	
398	Ou Sao	Villager	Kap Ko market	??	May 23, 1976	
399	Prak Kim San	Villager	Muk Kampoul	??	May 23, 1976	
400	Tea Chantha	Villager	Battambang	??	May 23, 1976	
401	Chea Chham	Villager	Prek Po	??	May 23, 1976	
402	Hem Nem alias San	SW hundred-member cell	Kampong Som	??	May 23, 1976	
403	Lao Kana	First lieutenant	Region 25	??	May 23, 1976	
404	Chen Nhoep	Salt field worker	Kampong Sam	??	May 23, 1976	
405	Suon Long	Base person	Region 25	??	May 23, 1976	

406	Svet Hem	Corporal	Kampong Som	??	May 23, 1976	
407	Ty Chheat	Fisherman	Kampong Som	??	May 23, 1976	
408	Leng Dy aka Ny	Hundred-member cell	Division, Northern Zone	??	May 23, 1976	
409	Nget Ngem aka Cheu Ren Sar	Airplane clerk	Region 33	March 23, 1976	May 23, 1976	
410	Kok Lorn	Base person	Region 25	March 12, 1976	May 23, 1976	
411	Kong Teang	New person	Region 22	April 1, 1976	May 23, 1976	
412	Meng Seng	Base person	Region 25	March 5, 1976	May 23, 1976	
413	Prach Torn aka Phy (F)	Worker	Phsar Tauch Electricity	November 13, 1975	May 23, 1976	
414	Kim Sapho aka Lata	Worker	Battery Factory	December 18, 1975	May 23, 1976	
415	Khy Seng	Worker	Lathe D-6	April 3, 1976	May 23, 1976	
416	Lam Hong	Worker	Lath D-6	April 24, 1976	May 23, 1976	
417	Pin Lai	Worker	Milk factory	November 29, 1975	May 23, 1976	
418	Ke Nan	Combatant	Division 502	February 3, 1976	May 23, 1976	
419	Yim Vin	Combatant	Division 502	February 3, 1976	May 23, 1976	
420	Chem Singat (F)	UNICEF	Battambang	March 6, 1976	May 23, 1976	
421	Yin Sum	Driver	Region 22	February 24, 1976	May 23, 1976	
422	Rut Kut	Medic	Region 22	November 30, 1975	May 23, 1976	
423	Tip Mam	Doctor	Region 22	December 14, 1975	May 23, 1976	
424	Hul Hong	Engineer	Battambang	November 21, 1976	May 23, 1976	
425	He Bun Lak	Teacher	Region 25	March 4, 1976	May 23, 1976	
426	Lim Nguon	Fine artist	Battambang	Jan12, 1976	May 23, 1976	
427	Luom Samborn	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai
428	Saom Lauy	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai
429	Kham Sirakphan	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai
430	Prasaet Lorb Kaet	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai
431	Sam Sion Phea Vieng	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai
432	Pheng Chan Sen	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai
433	Manaot Chuy Chem Sai	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai
434	Charoun No Krase	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai
435	Cha Rieng No Krase	Fishery worker	Kampong Som	May 7, 1976	May 24, 1976	Thai

(Continued in the August 2002 issue)

Nean Yin is the team leader of the Microfilm Project of the Documentation Center of Cambodia.

Khmer Rouge Guerilla Training

(Document D21931)

1. Military Nature

1) Squad chief; 2) group chief; 3) deputy group chief; 4) handgun group leader; 5) machinegun group; 6) insertion of magazine; 7) insertion of cartridges; 8) carrying of ammunition; 9) handgun group deputy leader; 10) handguns and hand grenades; 11) a handgun and a number of grenades; 12) guiding way....handgun ...a number of grenades; 13) handgun...a grenade; 14) grenade thrower; and 15) bring a message along with a long gun or a pistol.

2. Group Gatherings

A group chief or deputy group chief stands still, raises his/her left hand, and calls out to signal the forces to gather. Then the first squad has to stand behind the chief or deputy chief, with a space of six steps separating them. And the second or third squad comes next and stands on the right-hand side.

Soldiers must rush in and follow their squad chief, keeping the same distance apart. The first soldier in a row shall raise his left hand, while those following him stretch their left hands and touch the left shoulder of the man in front of them. The remaining men do the same until the end of a row.

Squad members come to the front and check whether the soldiers are in a straight line or not. If they are, they shout for the soldiers to halt, and the soldiers drop their hands at the same time. The squad leader then reports to the group chief or deputy group chief on the number of those present and how many are missing.

3. Military Techniques

1) Gathering groups; 2) lining up squads; 3) raising hands for lines; 4) halting; 5) right face; 6) left face; 7) about face; 8) at ease; 9) attention; 10) dropping weapons; 11) saluting with a weapon; 12) halting; 13) moving forward; 14) halting; 15) carrying weapons; 16) pointing guns toward the instep; and 17) facing left and right.

4) Standing without a Weapon

Stand at attention. Move your left foot until it touches the heel of your right foot with the insteps stretched. Raise your head and make your body straight. Drop both hands down and line them up against the seams of your trousers.

5) Left Face

To turn left with the body:

1) Pivot on the left heel.

2) Bring the right heel to the left instep.

6) Right Face

To turn right with the body:

1) Pivot on the right heel.

2) Bring the left heel to the right instep.

7) About Face

Move the right leg backward 0.15 meters. Pivot 180 degrees and bring the right leg to join the left.

8) At Ease

Take a 0.5 meter step with the left hand raised and placed on the front of the trouser belt. Bring the right hand down along the trouser seam.

9) Being Ready with a Weapon

This is applied in the same way as being ready without a weapon. But the right hand, which is holding the weapon, must be placed down with the thumb and fingers holding the upper part of the gun, placing the gun butt along the right leg.

When the squad is called, raise your weapon to your waist and put your hands forward, in the way mentioned earlier. When the chief orders weapons to be dropped, resume your original position.

10) Carrying a Weapon

There are three ways of carrying a weapon on the shoulder. 1) Pull the weapon upward and backward with the right hand. The left hand holds the middle of

the weapon, with the left elbow across the chest and the right hand holding the handle. 2) Place with weapon on the shoulder with the right hand, while the left hand moves along to the bottom of the gun butt. The right hand holds the weapon close to the body. 3) Pull the left hand backward.

11) Dropping a Weapon

There are three ways of dropping a weapon. 1) The right hand holds the bottom of the gun butt and moves it down to the waist, while raising the left hand to catch the weapon in the middle with the left elbow covering the chest. 2) The right hand holds the gun and the left hand turns it around in the middle. 3) The left hand moves back to become parallel to the trouser seam. The right hand drops the weapon with the butt lying next to the toes of the right foot.



12) Carrying a Weapon Using a Shoulder Strap

There are three ways to carry a weapon with a shoulder strap. 1) Raise the gun with the right hand, pushing forward. The left hand holds the weapon. 2) The left hand holds still and the right hand takes the sling of the gun and tightens it. 3) The right hand moves the sling to one side and places the gun on the right shoulder. The left hand drops, while the right hand moves down to the gun butt.



13) Placing a Weapon in Front of the Toes

This can be done in four steps. 1) Raise the right hand to hold the gun sling. 2) The right hand jerks the sling with the weapon moved in front. The left hand holds the gun at the middle of the chest. 3) The left hand holds the gun and the right hand holds the gun over the left hand at the waist. 4) The left hand is placed along the body paralleling the trouser seams. The right hand drops the gun in its original position.

14) Weaponry Inspection

There are five steps in weaponry inspection. 1) Move the left foot forward and raise the gun by its middle with its barrel facing forward. 2) The right hand moves the mobile pin backward. 3) Move the right foot to join the left. The gun butt is moved forward with the gun facing backward on the shoulder. 4) The right foot moves backward along with the gun butt. The right hand closes the mobile pin. The gun is kept by the waist, moving its point to the front. 5) The left hand is thrown to one side along the seam of the right trouser leg, while the right hand drops the gun.

15) Saluting while Marching

There are two steps in saluting. 1) Carry the gun by the shoulder strap. When facing a high ranking [military] official, touch the bottom of the gun butt and make [your] self stiff. 2) Raise your head to the official. The salute does not end until six steps have been taken beyond the official. Then turn back and remain in the same position. Without a weapon, the salute must be made with the hand. After you are six steps past the official, drop the hand. When holding something with the left hand, raise the right hand to salute. When holding something with both hands, turning your head is enough.

16) Saluting while Wearing a Beret

There are two ways of saluting while wearing a beret. 1) Be ready to raise the right hand to the other side with the fingers close to each other. Turn the hand upside down. The fingertips are placed above the eyebrow at the end of the eye. And the elbow is placed

above the shoulder. 2) Stretch the hand to one side and drop it down to its original position.

17) Using a Weapon

Soldiers have to know how to use weapons well. Do not fire a gun without a real purpose. Doing otherwise will waste ammunition and the national interest, or be harmful to ourselves.

1) Before leaving for battle, military chiefs must mobilize the troops and make a weaponry inspection to make sure that guns are not too old or rusty, and to avoid unexpected incidents and accidental firing, which may cause the deaths of our soldiers. 2) When a gun is found to be defective, it must be brought to the gunsmith for repair. Cartridges must be supplemented in case of shortages. Upon returning from any battle, the weapons used must be collected and examined. Soldiers are required to clean them. 3) Military chiefs must instruct their men on how to use guns effectively in terms of target distance and how to calculate the speed of the bullet.

18) Firing from a Distance

1) Fire a gun by standing within a distance of 500 to 700 meters.

2) Fire a gun by sitting within a distance of 300 to 500 meters.

3) Fire a gun by lying on the earth within a distance of 50 to 200 meters.

4) Throw a grenade from a distance of 20 to 30 meters.

5) Rush to bayonet [the enemy] from a distance of 5 to 7 meters.

19) Firing a Gun at the Enemy

To shoot a man while standing, the gun must be raised close to the right shoulder with the head turned a bit. Close your left eye and aim at the man through the scope on the upper part of the gun and a mark the line of sight. To shoot a man while sitting, aim at his knee(s). To shoot a man while lying, aim at his upper throat.

20) Firing a Gun Standing Up

1) Move your left leg forward. Jerk the gun to the waist. Place its point to the front. Sit on [your] right heel. 2) Rest the gun butt against the right shoulder. Move [your] body forward a bit. Move [your] finger(s) to the others arm. 3) Close your right eye. Open the right eye, aim and shoot.

21) Firing a Gun Sitting Down

1) Move the left hand forward. Jerk the gun to the waist. Move its point to the front. Sit on the right heel.

2) Cock the trigger, insert a cartridge and rest the gun butt against the shoulder. Raise the right elbow above the shoulder. Move forward a bit. Place the left elbow against the left knee. Then pull the trigger.

3) Close the left eye, while opening the right one, checking the distance to the target against the post on the edge of the gunpoint. Stop breathing for a while and shoot.

22) Firing a Gun while Lying Down

1) Jerk the gun to the waist. Place the left knee and left elbow on the earth and stretch the body forward. Stretch both legs backward.

2) Cock the trigger and insert cartridge(s). Place the gun butt against the right shoulder.

3) Close the left eye, while opening the right and aim at the target, checking the distance to the target against the post on the edge of the gunpoint. Stop breathing for a while and shoot.

23) Using a Bayonet

(Continued in the August 2003 issue)



Factors Leading to the People's Victory

(Document D21930)

A people's war is a war that liberates, following class guidelines, to free the nation and the people from exploitation and oppression by imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism. To achieve a people's war, five principles shall be followed:

1. There shall be a strategically and tactically correct party policy. The policy itself has to be well formed and strong. The party's leadership must be followed absolutely and proactively. This is the first and most basic factor; without it, there shall be loss because consciousness, politics and spirit are the main factors. If [we] are not sure where to go or what to do, [we] would be likened to a man who cannot walk on the right path or strikes out blindly, and who cannot distinguish between friend and enemy.

2. There must be a solidarity front gathered from the masses, standing side by side with farmers under the leadership of the party. The front is a human force —the force of the masses—and is the source of all efforts for the people's war. Without correct politics and a correct front, the people's force cannot be solidified—and the people's war will not make complete sense or be able to achieve victory.

3. Because our armed forces have to be utilized, people have to be equipped to attack enemies on any battlefield, no matter whether they are male, female, blind or have lost a hand. There are three types of armed forces: regional militia, front troops, and local militia. At the front and the rear, storm attacks must be employed using traditional and modern weapons. With the mass forces, [we] can smash the enemy. In contrast, without such forces, [we] cannot defeat the enemy, who, on the contrary, will be able to smash the people's forces. In this case, the revolutionary party would be nothing.

4. There must be a strong rear zone with people, military, administration, and the "People's Marshal of the Party," that will provide all means and advice to the battlefront. Without the rear zone, there will be no support for the battlefront—no place for military training and no strong foundation for leadership. Without these things, the people's war cannot take place. So [we] therefore have to build and seek support from the rear zones—both small and big, inside and outside the country so that all means will be provided to the battlefront. This is one of the most important factors for the people's war.

5. There must be maximum support from the party and our comrades abroad—especially from the socialist countries—in order to gain victory in the people's war. The most important determining factor is our internal force, since in every country, a people's war is carried out by its own people. This doesn't mean that a people's war uses people from different countries. Although assistance is taken from friendly parties and people, resources must also be managed correctly. However, assistance and support from friendly parties and people are absolutely necessary for materials, political and consciousness forces, especially in a world where there are simultaneously two classes, and when socialist revolutions are gaining advantages over imperialism. Therefore there must be correct in political and foreign affairs so that [we] are able to reach maximum force in the world. The people's war cannot gain successive victories unless the four characteristics and five absolute factors exist, no matter how sophisticated the enemy's weapons might be. In a word, in the people's war against American imperialism, the number one imperialist in the world, America must be defeated.

Criticism and Self-Criticism

Sokhym Em

Communal meetings, which were also referred to as "criticism and self-criticism," were held widely during the Democratic Kampuchea regime. At these meetings, people were required to criticize one another with a view to building and beautifying their revolutionary society. This process took the lives of many people.

Pol Pot, general secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and prime minister of Democratic Kampuchea, issued an order for all ministries and localities to carry out communal meetings for criticism and self-criticism on a regular basis. The minutes of the second session of the Standing Committee dated May 31, 1976, repeat Pol Pot's mandate to all ministries to "call a meeting once a month" in order to examine the general situation, and to stimulate each ministry's work with the speed of a great leap forward. Document D2180, dated July 13, 1978, quotes Pol Pot as stating that "drawing on our experiences, in order to be clean, criticism is the better way. If it doesn't work in the ministry, it can be done in the standing [committee]. I (Brother Secretary) offer this safeguard."

In a conversation with a delegation from Belgium in Phnom Penh on August 5, 1978, Pol Pot asserted that "criticism and self-criticism shall be carried out constantly so that conflicts can eventually be settled. [We] will progress if [we] try to refresh each other, although at this time, we do not have sufficient capacity."

A notebook written by a Khmer Rouge cadre named Aok Lum echoes this sentiment. It states that: "criticism and self-criticism are to eliminate and build up forces, eradicating imperialism, capitalism, feudalism, and class in order to build socialism and struggle for the internal solidarity of the revolution."

The criticism and self-criticism meetings at Khmer Rouge hospitals were designed to build and improve technical shortcomings and avoid conflicts with patients. Criticism and self-criticism required participants to reveal all they had done to those present. And those who criticized themselves had to admit and accept their mistakes, and promise to keep improving themselves.

The minutes of a "hospital meeting" for the medical personnel of the April 17 Hospital ("Russian Hospital") indicate that minister of social affairs Ieng Thirith was always present. Ieng used these meetings to talk about the party's policy and the duties of a socialist hospital, frequently citing hospitals in Vietnam as examples. The minutes state that Roeun, who headed the child care department, was fired on the grounds that she had paid insufficient attention to her duties, failed to respect organizational discipline, was inclined to dogmatism, rankism, clanism, and gossip, and liked to attack others' weaknesses. Nhim was criticized by the committee for his failure to be enraged by class oppression and for the fact that he looked down on the patients. Ken was criticized for his failure to fulfill his assignments, lack of morality, and lack of responsible speech. Worse still, he did not respect organizational discipline during surgery and didn't want to study.

Sometimes the self-criticism stemmed from poor patient treatment. Chan, for example, gave too many injections to patients. Rat gave the wrong serum to patients. Mom was reportedly blamed by hospital committee members Yet, Ry, and Phai for her misuse of medicine, leading to patients' deaths. Hundreds of the staff of the April 17 Hospital were imprisoned and executed for minor offenses, and others were arrested for causing the deaths of patients (during May and June 1978, for example, the hospital had 83 deaths).

Mom Heng was on the medical staff of a district hospital. He said that group meetings were held every three days for exchanges of criticism. Mom was criticized for his stupidity, and for not being easily awakened. He, in turn, criticized his accuser. Others

were criticized for their displays of emotion. Madame Porn Say, a primary school teacher in Phnom Penh, claimed that Pol Pot took the wrong path, and was not sympathetic to the "intelligentsia," who were regarded as feudalists and bourgeoisie. She was singled out for execution. Porn Say herself was criticized on the grounds that she sobbed when feeling nostalgic for her seven-month old baby who had been taken to a child care unit. She admitted her unsteady emotions during self-criticism meetings, but she dared not criticize Angkar's mistakes.

Morality was a main focus of many self-criticism meetings at hospitals. Love affairs were strictly prohibited. When such "moral offenses" occurred between males and females, the lovers were likely to be considered to have committed a "crime" and then taken away to be tortured, imprisoned and/or executed. Ung Vuth, a medical worker in Region 13, was criticized by the head of the hospital and her staff as "demonstrating some sort of feudal legacy" due to her sexy style of dressing, which revealed her skin. In the end she was taken to Phnom Sanlong and imprisoned there.

Duong Mala recounted that secret love also met the criteria for a "crime." In 1978, a man named Chea fell in love with a woman named Yarath. Chea and Yarath asked permission from Angkar to be married. However, their request was denied since the two lovers were from different social classes. A year later, their secret love was revealed. Angkar undressed the lovers, tied them up to a pillar, burned them, and beat them with the butts of their guns. After being tortured, the lovers were imprisoned, put into forced labor, and died.



Ngin Han, former KR female medic, once imprisoned at Kraing Tachan

Chey Sarim, a relative of Chey Saroem said, "Chey Saroem, a former medical staff of Hospital P-6 in Phnom Penh, was taken to be killed because of her secret love for a man." Ngin Hean, who was on the medical staff of a hospital in Tram Kak, was imprisoned in Kraing Ta Chan prison on a similar moral offense. Ang, a member of the Widow's Unit at Wat Phnoun, Kandal Stung district, was singled out for execution on the grounds that she had had a love affair with a local man.

The criticism and self-criticism meetings helped engender an atmosphere of paranoia in Democratic Kampuchea. Every man and woman became the enemy of Angkar due to this exchange of criticism. The communal meetings divided parents and children, who were also required to criticize each other. For instance, Suong Sikoeun, then a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was criticized by his colleagues for having a French wife and for irresponsibility, even though his wife was credited in the revolutionary struggle abroad. Suong Sikoeun himself often criticized his wife.

Pol Pot, Ieng Thirith and their comrades failed in their objective of building a utopia based upon the theory of "criticism and self-criticism." The minutes of every criticism and self-criticism meeting reveal the shortcomings of its revolutionary members, no matter how much merit they brought to the society and the party.

Dy Phon was a dentist until the early 1970s when he left his practice to devote his life to the Khmer Rouge. During the regime, he developed traditional medicines for the entire country. However, he was still criticized by Angkar and in December 1978, wasimprisoned at Tuol Sleng.

Sokhym Em is a staff-member of the Project to Promote Accountability.

Voices from S-21
Chapter Six: Explaining S-21
David Chandler

(Continued from the June 2002 issue)

Another sequence of experiments conducted in the United States in the early 1960s by Stanley Milgram provides additional insights. Volunteers in New Haven, Connecticut, were asked by the "educational psychologist" to sit at a console and act as "teachers" (college students were expressly forbidden to take part). They were then asked to deliver what they were told were electric shocks in response to "incorrect" replies given to questions put by the "psychologist" to unseen but audible "students" in another room. In fact, there was no electricity transmitted by the buttons the teachers pressed, and the students were actors hired by Milgram. As the students' "errors" multiplied, the intensity of the shocks increased until some of the teachers were delivering what they were told were extremely painful, dangerous doses of electricity—a fact seemingly confirmed by thumps, cries, and eerie silences from the adjoining room. Over several days, only one in three of the teachers objected to what was happening or broke off the experiment. Over the next two years, several variables were introduced into the experiments, including moving them to the working-class city of Bridgeport, allowing physical contact between teachers and students, introducing a greater number of women into the teacher group, and removing the psychologist from the room. Most of the results remained consistent. With rare exceptions, the experiments showed, as Alan Elms has written, that "two-thirds of a sample of average Americans were willing to shock an innocent victim until the poor man was screaming for his life, and to go on shocking him well after he lapsed into silence."

In another study of the experiments, John Darley suggests that the obedience of the teachers was keyed to the presence of the experimenters, who were asked to validate extended violence. Left to their own devices, Darley suggests, the teachers would not have administered the shocks. There is thus a gap, as he vigorously argues, between Milgram's teachers and people who commit atrocities. He adds, however, that socializing people toward greater violence might be merely a matter of time.

Alexander Hinton has argued that unquestioning obedience of the sort displayed most of the time in these experiments occupies a particularly strong position in Cambodian culture. I would agree that the destruction of "enemies" at S-21 was made easier because of the deference and respect that were traditionally due in Cambodia to those in power from those "below" them. This culture of exploitation, protection, obedience, and dependency had deep roots in Cambodian social practice and strengthened the grip of those in power in DK in spite or even because of the power-holders' insistence that pre-revolutionary power relations had been destroyed. Hierarchies, patronage, and "paying homage," so characteristic of an "exploitative" society (the Cambodian phrase translated as "exploit," chi choan, literally means "ride on and kick") had not been extinguished by the revolution. Instead, familiar, lopsided relationships involving a new set of masters and servants (however much they might be deemed "empowered" and designated as comrades), as well as a new set of victims, came into play. Under its discipline the population of S-21 was divided: on one side were

those who commanded or put others to use (neak prao) and those who "listened" (neak sdap) and were put to use (neak bomrao); on the other side were their common victims. In some ways, the "new" society consisted of the same mixture as before and followed pre-revolutionary patterns of authority and compliance.

Although interrogators at S-21 owed allegiance to those "above" them, and although the relationship between interrogators and prisoners in any institution is always complex, at S-21 the interrogators' overriding advantage, as Pon remarked in his notebook, was that the prisoners were "in [the interrogators'] hands." No constraints of law, no pressures from outside the government, and no deadlines operated in the prisoners' favor. So long as they questioned prisoners energetically and tortured them sufficiently to obtain confessions, the interrogators were free to operate as they saw fit.

In a haunting fashion, the power of the interrogators, the powerlessness of prisoners and the process of interrogation at S-21 call to mind La Fontaine's fable about the wolf and the lamb. In the fable, a wolf encounters a lamb and proposes to kill it because the lamb, according to the wolf, had insulted the wolf "a year ago." When the lamb replies that it had not been born a year ago, the wolf answers, "If it wasn't you, it was your brother." "I have none," says the lamb. "Then it was some relative of yours, or a shepherd, or a dog," the wolf retorts and devours the lamb.

In chapter 5, we examined some precedents in Cambodia's past for the violence at S-21 and the ways in which torture at the prison fell under Foucault's rubric of the "vengeance of the sovereign." We also saw that the totality and thoroughness of S-21 drew on a range of peculiarly twentieth-century models, linked in part to Communist practice and in part to modern systems of surveillance. Models for S-21 included the Moscow show trials and purges in the 1930s and "reeducation" campaigns in Maoist China and Communist Vietnam. More distantly, S-21 drew on the notion of French "revolutionary justice." In the 1790s revolutionary justice received much of its momentum, semantically, from the neologisms counterrevolution and counterrevolutionary, which allowed its proponents enormous freedom to maneuver. The significance of these two words could change from one day to the next. At S-21, the word enemy had the same elastic character.

From other Communist regimes, the Party Center adopted the doctrine that the leaders of a Communist Party, unfettered by a "bourgeois" legal code or a capricious judicial system, were fully entitled to punish enemies of the state. They were empowered to do so because of their privileged relationship to historical laws. From Communist China and Vietnam came the somewhat contradictory idea that at least some enemies of the state could be reeducated and reformed—a notion that had deep roots in both countries but little resonance in Cambodia. Tools for this reformation included the practices of criticism and self-criticism, embodied in self-critical, publicly presented life stories. At S-21 prisoners redeemed themselves and were reeducated by their confessions, that is, by the same texts that condemned them all to death.

While what happened at S-21 was "Cambodian," "communist," and "foreign" to varying degrees, the massive death toll in DK forces us to seek deeper explanations than these to account for the effects of the regime and for S-21 in particular. Ben Kiernan's suggestion that one of the "two most important themes" of the Pol Pot era was "the race question" is helpful up to a point, and so is Michael Vickery's proposal that the Cambodian revolution, far from being Marxist-Leninist, can best be described as a prolonged and largely uncontrollable outburst of peasant rage.

Kiernan's notion is helpful because the ferocity and indifference of S-21 displayed a belief that those killed were considered subhuman and therefore not of the same "race" as their assassins. Overt, anti-Vietnamese racism, shading into a sense of Khmer racial superiority, also dominated DK thinking, speeches, and behavior after 1977; in 1978, many prisoners at S-21, as enemies of the state, became for all intents and purposes

Vietnamese. The ways in which some prisoners were made to pay homage to pictures of Ho Chi Minh and Lyndon Johnson suggest that they were being erased from Pol Pot's Cambodia in the same fashion that Nazism's racial enemies, even before they were killed, were erased from Hitler's Europe. Although most of the victims had been born into the same "race" as their assassins, racist mechanisms came into play in their arrest, torture, and execution. Turning the victims into "others," in a racist fashion—and using words associated with animals to describe them—made them easier to mistreat and easier to kill. A similar process of distancing has been described by writers dealing with the Holocaust and the Indonesian massacres of 1965 and 1966.

In Steve Heder's view, the racism displayed by DK toward its enemies was linked to its leaders' feelings of superiority not so much over other races as over those individuals unwilling or unable to carry out a Marxist-Leninist revolution with the same uncompromising fervor as the Party Center. Those targeted as incompetent or as counterrevolutionaries were often labeled "Vietnamese." Heder writes: "Democratic Kampuchea racism was a byproduct of efforts to advance an historic world view based on unexamined and unsubstantiated assumptions about the potentialities of the Cambodian nationality and 'race' to make a contribution to the modern world via rapid construction of a highly advanced socialism."

It is tempting to agree with Vickery, however, that the savagery of the Cambodian revolution owed less to racism or to Marxism-Leninism than to peasant anger. Vickery argues that the Party Center was swept along, perhaps to some extent against its will, by the fervor of class hatred from "below." Vickery's argument, which proceeds by analogy with such violent non-Marxist movements as Spanish anarchism, can be applied to the purges that swept the country in mid-1975 and to the vicious treatment of "new people" by DK cadres later on, particularly in the northwest. Peasantism was indeed an ingredient of the Cambodian revolution, as it was in China, and so was the mobilization of hatred, which characterizes all revolutionary movements. Vickery's explanation is not especially helpful, however, when we face the mountain of DK documentation including theoretical journals, the leaders' speeches, and the notebooks recording self-criticism sessions. His argument breaks down further before the methodical, Communist-inspired procedures of interrogation and "confession" that were followed so fastidiously at S-21. For the argument to work, Duch, Chan, and Pon, all intellectuals, would have had to be reflecting the passions of their subordinates, rather than the reverse.

At S-21, as we have seen, traditional Cambodian

punitive practices and others inspired by Communist models blended with other twentieth-century techniques of surveillance, documentation, and control discussed so eloquently in Foucault's Discipline and Punish and, from another perspective, in Orwell's 1984. The contradictory ingredients that constituted "S-21" were tempered in turn by notions of intrinsic Khmer superiority that pervaded the thinking of the Party Center, provided a triumphalist language for its pronouncements, and insulated its members from reality. These notions of innate superiority, in turn, came in part from DK readings of Cambodian history and in part from the windfall empowerment of a small segment of Cambodia's rural poor, whose supposedly revolutionary energies, harnessed for economic programs, found expression more frequently in flaunting newly won power, claiming privileges, and humiliating and exterminating "class enemies" when they were asked to do so.



S-21, therefore, like DK itself, was a Cambodian, Communist, imported, twentieth-century phenomenon. As an amalgam, it was unique. For this reason, prolonged comparisons with facilities in other times and places are not especially rewarding. In spite of its "Cambodian" character, a jailer from pre-revolutionary Cambodia would have been baffled by S-21. While the physical abuse, chains, fetters, poor food, and mercilessness would have been familiar to him, its inflexibility and totality, its isolation from the outside world, and the masses of documentation assembled there were without precedent. Similarly, while Prey Sar can be compared with the "reeducation" facilities in China and Vietnam, the mercilessness of S-21 is unmatched in either country, while the interrogations at S-21, so central to its operations, set the place apart from the Nazi extermination camps to which it has often been compared.

From the sources I have examined it is impossible to say whether anyone working at S-21 or any of their superiors was ever distressed or disoriented by what they were doing. Misgivings were luxuries that workers at the prison and the leaders of the country could not afford. Kok Sros told Douglas Niven, however, that interrogators who hesitated to use torture were arrested, suggesting that hesitations occasionally did occur.

(Continued in the August 2002 issue)

David Chandler is Professor Emeritus of History at Monash University, Melbourne, Australia. He is the authors of* A History of Cambodia *(1996),* Facing the Cambodian Past: Selected Essays, *1971-1994 (1996), and* Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot *(1992).

From the Border to S-21

Dany Long


Cham Lim

Every year during the Sino-Vietnamese Hungry Ghost Festival, Chan Lim remembers the terrors his family faced. The day after the 1978 festival, his wife and two sons were arrested in their rice field and taken away by the Khmer Rouge. Chan Lim knows that his wife and eldest son were tortured and killed at S-21; their portraits are now displayed at the former prison. He never learned the fate of his second son.

Had Chan Lim's wife, Norng Kim Gech, lived, she would be 60 years old. Her father was of Chinese descent and her mother was Vietnamese. She was a native of Prek Sangke village, Peam Koh Sna subdistrict, Stung Trang district, Kampong Cham province. After the couple was married in 1960, they lived in Phnom Penh for a year. But his wife missed her parents so much that the couple decided to return to Prek Sangke, where they earned their living by trading wood products such as rattan, vines, and fruits. Chan Lim bought these products from rural areas.

The Khmer Rouge "liberated" Prek Sangke village in 1970. Many of the Khmer Rouge liberation forces stayed in Prek Sangke when they returned from North Vietnam.



During 1970, Cham Lim made contacts with several Khmer Rouge comrades so that he could buy raw tobacco from Prek Sangke and other nearby villages and resell it. He bought a motorcycle to transport the tobacco and sell it in an area that was not controlled by either Lon Nol or Khmer Rouge troops. He brought back cloth, rope for hammocks, canvass, rice and gasoline to resell in the villages. Chan Lim also sold rice to the Khmer Rouge from 1971-1974. This business enabled him to maintain a middle-class family. He had had five sons and two daughters.

In 1974 Chan Lim learned that a Vietnamese communication committee in Region 304 had asked those of Vietnamese origin to get ready to repatriate. After the Khmer Rouge took power on April 15, 1975, Chan Lim's wife, children and his wife's parents gathered near Prek Sangke along with other Vietnamese migrants to depart for Krauch Chhmar district in the Eastern Zone. From there, they took a bus to Vietnam. The Vietnamese government did not transport these people itself. It just facilitated their repatriation.

Lim's family and about 1,000 other families were the first to repatriate. They were allowed to clear land in Smach subdistrict. Vietnamese migrants who came later had to pay for their own housing.

When they first arrived, Chan Lim's family did not clear their land. Instead, they earned their living by running a small business. Chan Lim was responsible for going up to Prey Nokor to get goods for resale, while his wife took care of their home. However, their business did not earn much money, and they lapsed into poverty. In 1977 Chan Lim decided to allow his two eldest sons to clear two

hectares of land for rice farming. They also prepared a 200 by 10 meter plot behind the residence for potatoes and sugarcane.

The morning after the Hungry Ghost Festival, Kim Gech, who was eight months pregnant, and two of her sons went to their rice field about 4 four kilometers from the Cambodian border. The Khmer Rouge had attacked this area twice before, but Vietnamese troops had repelled them both times. That day, the Khmer Rouge forces attacked again while Kim Gech and her sons were approaching the field. Chan Lim had left to bring goods from Prey Norkor city. After being told that his wife and sons had been captured, Lim was shocked. His other five children were screaming.

At the end of 1979, Chan Lim brought his remaining children and parents-in-law home to Cambodia. In 1981 his brother-in-law Hong Chea visited the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh. There, he came across portraits of Lim's wife and son. Hong told Cham Lim about this when he returned home. Cham Lim was stunned and afraid to go and see the photographs. So Hong brought Lim's children to see them and take photographs of the portraits. They bear the same date: August 22, 1978. The nametag of his wife reads "Norng Kim Vet," and that of his son "Chauv Kea." The family still uses the photographs for ceremonies.

Chan Lim cannot forget his family's suffering during the regime, even though more than 20 years have passed. He is still preoccupied with the image of his wife and son. During the Hungry Ghost Festival, Cham Lim always pays homage to the pictures. He never dares to burn incense before the portraits; he cannot bear the suffering. Instead, he asks his children to do this.

Cham Lim supports an independent tribunal to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders and obtain justice for his wife and son as well as all the other innocent people of Cambodia who perished under the Khmer Rouge regime. The longer he waits, the less hope he has that justice will be done.

Dany Long is a staff-member of the Project to Promote Accountability.

KHMER ROUGE VIEWS ON DEMOCRACY

The people in democratic regimes have the following characteristics:

Policy

[They are] under four absolute classes, namely worker, peasant, bourgeoisie and national capitalist, and patriotic, progressive staff. [They] support a worker and peasant alliance under the leadership of the party.

Economy

1) The state economy is to depend on imperialism, feudalism, reactionary for capital to build the national economy.

2) The states economy will be mixed; it must share its capital with national capitalists in order to build the national economy.

3) The state cooperative shall gather the peasants in order to carry out collective cultivation.

4) A private economy is allowed for families to purchase subsidiary supplies to cultivate crops according to a fixed ration.

Culture

Culture must be of a national, scientific, and popular nature. Thus, in a democratic regime, people are the foundation leading to the construction of a new society - socialism in Cambodia. (D21509)

Khmer Kampuchea Krom

Kannitha Keo Kim

During the Democratic Kampuchea regime, the Khmer Rouge discriminated against the Khmer Kampuchea Krom (ethnic Cambodians whose lands had been annexed by Vietnam). Because many of their families had lived in Vietnam for several generations, the Khmer Kampuchea Krom are slightly different from central Khmer in terms of dress and accent.

In early 1977, when the Khmer Rouge were at war with Vietnam, the Angkar of Bakan district, Pursat province ordered cooperative chiefs to screen the biographies of Khmer Kampuchea Krom. Later they were rounded up and told to stay in the vicinity of Bak Mek village, Khna Torting subdistrict, where they were separated from local villagers. Next, they were singled out for execution on the grounds of being members of "Vietnamese networks."

Kim So, a native of Rum Lich subdistrict, Bakan district, recounted that in late 1977 Angkar summoned local Khmer Kampuchea Krom to a meeting, reasoning that "this was the time for screening out Vietnamese networks." After the announcement, Khmer Rouge cadres began killing Khmer Kampuchea Krom, including the parents and siblings of Kim So as well as several other relatives. Kim So herself was imprisoned for treason. Kim So claimed that none of her family members were part of a "Vietnamese network or traitorous network."

Angkar described Khmer Kampuchea Krom as having "Khmer bodies with Vietnamese heads." The killings in Rum Lich subdistrict were directed at Khmer Kampuchea Krom. If they had a spouse of Cambodian nationality, they were given a choice. Those who decided to follow their husband or wife would be killed along with them. Those who decided otherwise would survive. Children were also treated this way. If they chose not to follow their parents, they could escape death.

After killing the Khmer Kampuchea Krom, the Khmer Rouge would force their Cambodian widows and widowers into marriages so that they would not feel nostalgia for their lost loved ones, who were referred to as the "Vietnamese enemy."


Nget Lauy

Nget Lauy married a Khmer Kampuchea Krom man. When Angkar planned to take her husband away for execution, they had Phup, his unit chief, tell Nget Lauy that Angkar needed her husband to harvest corn at Prey Thom. Sensing something amiss, she decided not to follow her husband. Knowing that Lauy was Khmer, the unit chief agreed. None of their children went with their father either. Two months after her husband was killed, Angkar made Nget Lauy marry a Khmer man whose Khmer Kampuchea Krom wife had also been killed by Angkar.

Thoek Bun Roeun, the chief of Rum Lich, asserted that Khmer Kampuchea Krom were killed in three phases. The first two took place during 1977, when they were taken to be killed at Prey Kabao, Ta Lo subdistrict, Bakan district. The third phase began early in 1978, when victims were taken to Khnar Torting subdistrict, Pursat province for execution. Bun Roeun witnessed the waves of killings in the first and second phases. He testified that the Khmer Rouge took 350 families in the first phase and 200 in the second.


Prak Sarin

Prak Sarin, a resident

of Rum Lich village since 1964, claimed that before the Khmer Rouge took power, this village had more than 500 Khmer Kampuchea Krom families totaling 3,000 to 4,000 people, all of whom were killed during the Democratic Kampuchea regime.

The fate of Khmer Kampuchea Krom was similar in Tram Kak district of Takeo province. In Nhan, who has been living in Tram Kak district for over 30 years, said that during the 1975 liberation, Angkar separated out 70 families of Khmer Kampuchea Krom. Later they were summoned and told: "If anyone wishes to return to his/her homestead, Angkar would provide support in terms of clothes and food for traveling." The people who said they would return were killed because they were alleged to have "some sort of trend to Vietnam."


Phat Samot

Phat Samot was in charge of greeting guests at Olympic Stadium during the regime. He said when fighting along the Cambodia-Vietnam border intensified during 1977 -78, Pol Pot called a meeting concerning the Khmer Kampuchea Krom. Phat Samot attended. He recalled that Pol Pot said, "As for the Khmer Kampuchea Krom, if any of them wish to follow Angkar, his/her life could be spared; if not, death."

A document from S-21, the central security office, shows that 40 Khmer Kampuchea Krom were detained in this prison: 5 in 1975, 18 in 1976, 6 in 1977, and 12 in 1978. Yoeung Keo, a Khmer Kampuchea Krom, was brought to S-21 on January 16, 1978 and killed on June 10, 1978. His confession stated he was a Vietnamese spy sent to eavesdrop in Cambodia.

In April 1978, Khmer Kampuchea Krom Neang Sang, a member of Preah Vihea region in Democratic Kampuchea, was brought to S-21 and tortured. Neang Sang admitted that he had been a Vietnamese spy burrowing inside the front, especially in the Communist Party's center.


Yoeung Keo

The author is now conducting a study on the fate of the Khmer Kampuchea Krom under the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Her research will benefit from all relevant, extant documents. Should you find documents pertaining to this topic, she can be reached at 023 211 875 or P.O. Box 1110, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

***Kannitha Keo Kim is an author of the soon to be published,* Children Under the Khmer Rouge. *She is working on another paper entitled,* Khmer Krom Under the Khmer Rouge.**

Khmer Rouge Slogans

◆ Combat enemy movements and stir up the masses to stand up to conquer our enemies and master our territory. *(Excerpts from notebook 200 KNH)*

◆ Communists are best known by the sacrifices they make for their country. *(Excerpts from Comrade Iv's notebook)*

Former S-21 Comrades Reunite and Recall Their Past Experiences

Vannak Huy

All of them were dressed differently, but the six men who walked slowly into the Toul Sleng Musuem shared a common past—all had emerged alive from this place 23 years earlier, when it was the Khmer Rouge hellhole known as S-21. They had returned at the invitation of Pann Rithy, the Cambodian filmmaker, who was making a documentary film.

These men first entered the prison as "catchers," interrogators, guards, and executioners. Standing quietly in front of the remains of the regime they had served for nearly three years, all of the men agreed that they had been forced to perform these tasks in exchange for their survival.


Prak Khan (2002)

Former interrogator Prak Khan revealed, "When I come here I am terrified by the past. This prison was a tragic place. I feel ashamed for having committed these horrible acts. But the fear I feel now cannot be compared with that I experienced in the Khmer Rouge regime. In this prison if we did not obey an order, we would have been dead very quickly."

To most young Cambodians, the past that these men recall so vividly is a vague, faraway time, and the Khmer Rouge who ordered these atrocities have never been brought to court. All of these men admit that the have been cursed and insulted by their neighbors for their acts during the regime.

Former guard Nheb Hor stated, "The villagers called me pro-Pol Pot. I was not angry with them, since it is true that I did it. Most villagers know I used to work in Tuol Sleng Prison. I am not regretful, but I pity my wife and children."

Beginning in 1980, most former S-21 comrades were "reeducated." Some of them were arrested and sent to prisons. Suos Thy, who kept lists of prisoners' names, was detained in a high-security prison for four years by Kandal province authorities after the regime was defeated. Him Huy, who was deputy chief of the guard unit, was imprisoned in Kandal province for two years.


Suos Thy (1977)


Suos Thy (2002)

Suos Thy stated, "I still feel discontented. It is unfair that a simple youth working under the command of others was imprisoned, while the top leaders wander around freely. Those leaders created the murderous regime. They must be punished for their crimes. I am not defending myself, but it is not just." Prak Khan said, "I maltreated and hurt others, but justice must be considered."

Responding to the claims of the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders that they had no knowledge of Tuol Sleng, Suos Thy noted that "Tuol Sleng was huge; it covered an area of one square kilometer. It could only have been established by high-ranking cadres, and prisoners were brought here were from all over the country. How could anyone arrest people in regions and camps without orders?" Nheb Hor added,

"Tuol Sleng executed people on a daily basis. Where were those top cadres during that time? This should not be difficult to answer, just ask Duch, the prison chief."

Him Huy recalled S-21 as "a place with no exit." In addition to his role as a deputy chief of the guard unit, Him was responsible for transporting prisoners to the execution site, Boeng Cheung Ek. He admitted that he personally killed five prisoners by clubbing them to death with an iron bar. "I did not want to do it, but Duch and Hor forced me to. If I did not comply with their orders, they would have killed me."

S-21 began to operate in 1976 under the administration of Duch. Most youths conscripted to work there were not told that they were being brought to work in S-21. They were generally tricked by saying either that "Angkar" was bringing them to the top or that they would work with the people. Once they arrived at S-21, they had no chance of leaving.

At the end of 1976, the secretary of the military technical school at Stung Prek Tnaot sent Khiev Ches to S-21. He was told he was going to live in the countryside with the people. This former guard recalled that many S-21 comrades were killed for failing to adhere to Angkar's guidelines.

Khieu Ches continued, "When I look at the photographs on the wall, I think of the many prisoners I guarded as they were escorted into the compound. I still remember the screams of the prisoners. One of my friends, Hong, who worked in the same unit as I did, was taken away to be executed. He said to me, 'If you make it out of this place alive one day, please tell my mother I am dead."

S-21 comrades were forced to work for the revolution, and were forbidden to give any thought to their parents and siblings. Former guard Cheam Soeu related that, "Duch never allowed me to visit my mother. In the past this was a terrifying place. When I left this prison, I never thought I would come back again. Tuol Sleng was the most ruthless detention and torture facility. Now it is a place where Cambodians should come to remember."

All six former S-21 staff testified to the harsh life under the Khmer Rouge regime. Conversation itself was forbidden, and they could rarely discuss what was transpiring around them. Meeting one another and sharing memories of the past, they felt a sense of relief. They are ready to reveal what they should never have been called upon to do.

Khieu Ches (1977)

Him Huy (1976) **Nhep Ho (1977)**

***Vanak Huy is a supervisor of DC-Cam's Publication Project. He is also the author of* Khmer Rouge Division 703: From Victory to Self-destruction.**

Former S-21

Combatants



Agents of Death: Explaining the Cambodian Genocide in Terms of Psychological Dissonance

Alex Hinton

Many people have asked me: how could the Cambodian peasant, whom we had always regarded as gentle and charming and smiling and civilized, turn into the kind of tough and grim, and even brutal, revolutionary who entered Phnom Penh on April 17? I have no easy answers.

People often used to characterize Cambodia as a "gentle land" inhabited by nonviolent Buddhists who were always courteous, friendly, and ready with a smile. Beginning in the late 1960s, however, the country was rocked by socioeconomic unrest, civil war, intensive U.S. bombing, and finally, social revolution. While around six hundred thousand of Cambodia's eight million inhabitants perished during these years, up to a million and a half people later died from disease, starvation, overwork, and execution during Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979). Survivor accounts are replete with stories of how the Khmer Rouge shot, bludgeoned, stabbed, and tortured legions of their own countrymen. This type of violence demands the attention of scholars. How could the seemingly "gentle" Cambodians come to commit such genocidal acts?

While other disciplines have addressed this challenging issue, anthropology has been remarkably silent on the topic of large-scale genocide, an omission that is particularly striking because anthropologists have demonstrated the ability to productively explain the roots of violence in other, non-genocide contexts. To help to redress this deficiency, this essay will provide a psychosocial explanation of how people come to commit acts of genocide. Drawing on the psychological concept of cognitive dissonance, modified and enhanced by anthropological notions of the self, cultural models, and emotion, I will analyze the events that took place in Cambodia in terms of what I call "psychosocial dissonance" (PSD). By doing so, I intend to provide a starting point for anthropological debate on large-scale genocide, to delineate an explanation for how people come to commit genocidal atrocities, to develop a general explanatory model that can be applied to other genocides, and to explain the psychosocial origins of the Cambodian genocide.

The first section of this essay briefly outlines the theory of cognitive dissonance and then illustrates how it can be developed by anthropological concepts into a model of "psychosocial dissonance." The second describes two salient cultural models that existed prior to Democratic Kampuchea, the "gentle ethic" and the "violent ethic." The third section shows how these models came into conflict when the Khmer Rouge attempted to radically transform Cambodian society, thus creating a situation of PSD. I then illustrate the steps the DK regime took to help reduce the PSD of its "agents of death." The fourth section illustrates how, in part by drawing on this "state-level response," Khmer Rouge cadres made a series of cognitive moves to reduce their PSD - i.e., the "individual-level response." I conclude by discussing the implications of PSD for the anthropological study of large-scale genocide.

1. A Psychosocial Model Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive Dissonance

Leon Festinger's original formulation of "cognitive dissonance" theory asserts that if a person holds two conflicting cognitions, she or he will be motivated to reduce the resulting state of psychological discomfort in a manner similar to drive reduction. Upon hearing

a report that cigarette smoking is bad for their health, for example, many smokers will likely be motivated to reduce the resulting psychological discomfort/dissonance by: changing cognitions to make them more compatible (e.g., dismissing the research out of hand), circumspectly adding new cognitions that bridge the gap between the cognitive elements (e.g., finding information that indicates smoking is less dangerous than driving a car), or changing her or his behavior (e.g., stopping smoking). The stronger the "magnitude" of dissonance, the more a person will be motivated to reduce it.

This theory has generated a great deal of research, much of which indicates that cognitive dissonance is greatest when an individual has a behavioral commitment to one or both of the conflicting cognitions. Such experimental findings and a growing dissatisfaction with the vagueness of the formation of dissonance theory have led Elliot Aronson to assert that cognitive dissonance "is clearest and greatest when it involves not just any two cognitions but, rather, a cognition about the self and a piece of our behavior that violates that self-concept." Dissonance therefore arises in situations in which a person is confronted with behavioral expectations that conflict with this concept of the self.

While the theory of cognitive dissonance and its later reformulations provide a great deal of insight into human thought and behavior, this concept is nevertheless predicated on some of the biases of Western psychology. From an anthropological perspective, this cognitive dissonance research is problematical in its: 1) treatment of the relationship between culture and individual variation; 2) lack of an adequate theory of motivation; 3) insufficient attention to contextual complexity; 4) transcendent conceptualization of the self; and 5) disregard of emotion. As opposed to simply dismissing the theory, however, we can revise it in accordance with theoretical developments about cultural models, the self, and emotion.

Anthropological Contributions: Cultural Models and Self

Problem #1-Culture: While Festinger (1957) included "cultural mores" as a potential source of dissonance in his original formulation of CD theory, culture was never treated in a very sophisticated manner in later research. Recent developments in cognitive anthropology, however, have made it possible to bridge the gap between culture and cognition through the concept of cognitive schema, or knowledge structures through which people interpret stimuli and determine appropriate behavioral responses (D'Andrade 1995).

The key move cognitive anthropologists have made is to illustrate that a large number of these cognitive schemas are culturally shared. While no exact correspondence exists between such cultural models and the way they are internalized by different social actors, individual variability is somewhat constrained by language and shared social experience (D' Andrade and Strauss 1992). When going to a restaurant, for example, the expectations and behavior of most members of our society are largely meditated by a "restaurant script" (e.g., entering, ordering, eating, and exiting; see Shank And Abelson 1977) that they have learned through childhood observations, personal experience, dramatization on TV, books, etc. One of the strengths of cultural models theory lies in its ability to illustrate the relationship between such personal knowledge structures and their social analogs (Shore 1996). By connecting cognition and culture, the concept of cultural models thus provides a means for culture to be actively incorporated into CD theory.

Problem #2-Motivation: Dissonance theory lacks an adequate concept of motivation (Kunda 1990). Festinger originally asserted that people would be motivated to decrease dissonance in a manner similar to the way they pursue drive reduction. While Aronson's introduction of the self-concept adds greater specificity to this "black box," the processes underlying CD motivation remain vague. The concept of motivation delineated in cultural models research can therefore help bring much needed specificity to CD theory.

Cognitive anthropologist have argued that, as opposed to just being a response to an internal drive stimulus, motivation can be explained more complexly in terms of schemas since they often establish goals that instigate action (D'Andrade and Strauss 1992). Thus, within the restaurant script, dissatisfaction with service may motivate a person to complain to the manager. It is important to recognize the hierarchical arrangement of such schemas. In this case, the "unsatisfactory service" schema is one component of the higher-level restaurant script. While this lower-level schema may have links to other models (e.g., to a "shopping" or an "auto-repair" schema), interpretations tend to be passed on to "the topmost level of interpretation, which is typically aligned to the actions by which the organism operates in its environment. That is, the top-level schemas tend to be "goals" (D'Andrede 1992: 30). Since many of these high-level schemas are cultural models, culture sets goals and therefore has motivational force.

Cultural models are also internalized in disparate ways by different actors (Shore 1996). For some people, a given model may be regarded with relative indifference, while for others it may be highly salient. In each case, the motivational significance of the model will vary according to the degree to which the model is internalized and the degree of affective force it carries (D' Andrade 1992). To determine the motivational salience of any cultural model for a given individual, it is necessary to understand something about the extent to which the model has acquired emotional force during her or his life history. However, some extremely high-level models will seem more "natural" and thus tend to motivate the behavior of most people in a given society (e.g., "individual rights" and "equality" in the United States).

Problem #3-Contextual Variation: While CD theory has always acknowledged the importance of taking situational factors into account, it has lacked criteria by which to determine which cognitions are salient within a given context (Sclenker 1992: 342). Cultural models theory can provide this guidance. In addition to varying between individuals, the significance of schemas also differs across social contexts (Holland and Quinn 1987). Thus, while a restaurant script meditates behavior when people dine out, few follow this event sequence when eating at home. Such alternative schemas may even be inconsistent. To determine which cognitive schema are germane in such situations, a researcher must specify the contextual background that frames an interactional sequence using discourse analysis, life histories, behavioral observations, and/or the study of socialization practices (D'Andrade and Strauss 1992; Holland and Quinn 1987).

Problem #4-The Self: CD researchers have found that dissonance is strongest in situations that necessitate behavior that violates a person's self-concept. Aronson states that this psychological discomfort occurs because people strive to "preserve a consistent, stable, predictable...competent...morally good sense of self" (1992:302). Anthropologists have pointed out, however, that this more extreme view of the egocentric self ignores the fact that the self-concept may vary across social contexts.

Katherine Ewing (1990), for example, has proposed a "model of shifting selves" in which people are conceptualized as having multiple, often inconsistent self-concepts that, while experienced as "whole" at a given moment in time, are contextually defined. To illustrate her point, Ewing describes how one of her Pakistani informants, Shamim, held disparate re-presentations of herself (i.e., as a "good daughter" who would obediently follow her parents' wishes and become a good wife, and as a "politician" who employed various strategies to achieve her personal educational/ work goals) in different contexts. We can use this anthropological notion of the contextually defined self-concept to refine CD theory. In particular, as opposed to arising when a transcendent concept of the self is violated, dissonance can be said to occur when

a person must act in ways that violate a contextually defined self-representation.

Problem #5-Emotion: Festinger's model of cognitive dissonance is predicated on the Western Judeo-Christian emphasis on conceptual consistency. Anthropologists have shown, however, that in other cultures dissonance often arises only in situations in which discordant cognitions are emotionally salient to actors (De Vos 1975; Nuckolls 1993). The notion that dissonance occurs only in situations that necessitate behavior that violates a person's contextually defined self-representation dovetails nicely with the anthropological view that emotions are "embodied thoughts, thoughts steeped in the apprehension that 'I' am involved" (Rosaldo 1984:143). In other words, situations that implicate the self are emotionally significant.

George De Vos has pointed out that, in most societies, people are socialized by taboo to avoid directing aggression toward those with whom they share a collective identity and social bonds: "We cannot tolerate emotional conflict, or as I term it the 'affective dissonance,' which results from killing within the social group" (1975:82). As we shall see, one way of getting individuals to kill in such a situation is to redefine who belongs to the group so that the victims are excluded from the in-group and dehumanized as the "enemy." What is important to note, however, is that when a person must act in a manner that violates a contextually defined self-concept (e.g., to kill a person with whom she or he shares a social identity), she or he will likely experience an emotionally charged form of cognitive dissonance. This insight forms the basis for a model of psychosocial dissonance.

Anthropological Contributions: A Model of Psychosocial Dissonance

Drawing on the aforementioned anthropological insights, we can now reformulate Aronson's theory of cognitive dissonance in the following manner. Cognitive dissonance arises when an (often culturally informed) emotionally salient cognition about the (culturally informed and context-dependent) self comes into conflict with another (often culturally informed) emotionally salient cognition that motivates behavior that violates that context-dependent self-concept. Psychosocial dissonance is reserved for those cases in which an emotionally salient cultural model about the context-dependent self comes into conflict with another emotionally salient cultural model that violates that context-dependent self-concept. Thus, Shamim experienced PSD when her parent's demands that she marry (i.e., the "good daughter" model that shaped her self-concept in familial interactions) began to conflict with her desire to achieve personal occupational goals (i.e., the "clever politician" model that informed her self-representations in the workplace). Whereas previously these contradictory models had been salient in different contexts, they began to overlap and caused PSD. PSD is thus a subset of CD, since all cultural models are cognitions, but not vice versa.

The degree of dissonance is a function of the emotional salience of a cognition. If being a "good daughter" was not particularly important to Shamim, she would only have experienced a small degree of PSD when her parents raised the subject of marriage. Because both the "good daughter" and the "clever politician" models were extremely important to her, however, Shamin experienced a great deal of PSD. People are motivated to reduce such dissonance because the cognitions in question establish goals that necessitate contradictory courses of action. In Shamim's case, her goal of getting married established a behavioral sequence that directly conflicted with her goal of advancing her career. I will examine the precise ways in which people attempt to reduce such dissonance in a later section.

First, I will illustrate how this model of psychosocial dissonance can be applied to genocidal acts, using Cambodia as an example. As De Vos notes, in almost every society, powerful injunctions exist against killing other members of a social community. Within some contexts, however, the destruction of "others" is

often culturally and/or legally legitimated (e.g., military, penal code, political enemies). Because cultural norms against killing tend to be so strong, some of the individuals who kill will experience PSD. In the case of large-scale genocide, PSD had the potential to be much greater because these acts are often being perpetrated against people who were formerly members of the same society. In other words, two extremely salient models fostering extremely contradictory behavioral goals—"kill" versus "don't kill"—begin to overlap within a context, thus potentially causing a great deal of PSD for the "agents of death."

If a regime is to accomplish its genocidal goals, it must make changes in the environment that will potentially decrease the degree of PSD its minions experience. These perpetrators of genocide will draw both on this "state level" response and one of their own "individual level" dissonance reduction strategies

Phnom Penh in 1979

to achieve consonance with the idea of killing. This is exactly what transpired in Cambodia.

Psychosocial Dissonance Applied: the Cambodian Genocide

Many people have been struck by both the friendly demeanor of Cambodians and their ostensible lack of conflict in daily interactions. Given the harmonious atmosphere that is so prominent in everyday life, it is easy to be somewhat taken aback by the political violence that has characterized Cambodian history. Such violence illustrates the fact that while everyday communal life (i.e., relations with fellow members of a family, village, or organization) is frequently meditated by a high-level cultural model that fosters pro-social behavior, larger sociopolitical interactions (i.e., relations with an "enemy" in military activity, law enforcement, or national politics) are often informed by an extremely salient, yet potentially contradictory cultural model that promotes aggression. These two models, which I will hereafter respectively refer to as the "gentle ethic" and the "violent ethic," were significant in different interactional contexts and thus rarely came into conflict in pre-DK Cambodia. The conditions for PSD arose, however, when the violent ethic was legitimated in everyday communal interactions during DK. The unfortunate result was a situation in which acts of extraordinary violence took place.

The Gentle Ethic

While disputes sometimes occurred, the few ethnographies that were conducted in pre-DK Cambodia are striking in their description of the overall harmony of village life (Delvert 1961; Ebihara 1968; Martel 1975). Over the course of a year, for example, May Ebihara observed only a few significant intra-communal quarrels. This apparent lack of discord was due to several factors. Members of a community often shared a strong sense of social solidarity that was developed through years of association, cooperative labor exchanges, mutual aid, overlapping friendship and kinship networks, communal activities, and a sense of identification with and loyalty to the group (Ebihara 1968).

Cambodian socialization practices emphasized that, when interacting within such a known community, a person should attempt to "have friendly relations with others" (roap an knea, reak teak). In addition to avoiding conflict and potentially making patronage connections, Cambodians who were friendly and polite were respected by others and thus gained honor (Hinton

n.d.). Individuals who transgressed social norms, in contrast, were subject to gossip, avoidance, and public censure. In a culture in which "face" (mukh) is highly valued, the threat of such potentially shameful (khmas ke) consequences represented an effective control on individual behavior.

Buddhism also promoted pro-social behavior among villagers. The temple, for example, reinforced social bonds by serving as a center both for communal and religious activity and for the moral education of children (Ebihara 1968; Martel 1975). While people did not necessarily know the intricacies of Buddhist doctrine, all were familiar with the five moral precepts, which told them not to lie, steal, have immoral sexual relations, drink, or kill living creatures. Such prohibitions were coupled with Buddhist notions of karma and merit that encouraged villagers to maintain harmonious relations (Ebihara 1968).

Although domestic violence existed, intrafamilial relations, like communal life, appear to have been generally harmonious. Family members were tried together by economic production, daily social interaction, sharing, and joint participation in important ceremonies (Ebihara 1968; Martel 1975). Harmony was also promoted by rules of proper etiquette (Ebihara 1968; Ledgerwood 1990). Like Cambodian society in general, the family constituted a mini-hierarchy in which people were accorded different degrees of respect depending on age and sex. Folktales, didactic poems, and terms of linguistic etiquette reinforced such patterns of appropriate behavior that could both regulate interactions and diffuse conflict. The threat that village and/or familial spirits would cause an innocent member of the family to become ill when siblings quarreled provided a more proximate mechanism for curbing improper behavior (Ebihara 1968; Martel 1975). Such values and practices were part of a high-level cultural model that fostered a disposition toward prosocial behavior (i.e., the "gentle ethnic") in the context of everyday interactions within a known community.

The Violence Ethic

Cambodia's history of violence against those defined as sociopolitical enemies began long before DK. During the Angkorian period, "god-kings" led their troops into battles against foreign states; both these external foes and any internal opposition were dealt with in a brutal fashion (Chandler 1992). Political violence was rampant during the nineteenth century and continued during French rule. The Khmer Issarak, in particular, were known for a style of ruthless violence against enemies that foreshadowed later practices of the Khmer Rouge (Bun 1973). After independence, Prince Sihanouk reestablished the royal tradition of absolute authority (Becker 1986; Chandler 1991): opposition to his rule was considered treasonous and dealt with accordingly. The actions of Lon Nol's troops were not much different. Such evidence illustrates that while a person might have been "gentle" within a known community, a different ethnic often held sway in the context of larger sociopolitical interactions.

The origins of this tradition of sociopolitical violence can be traced back to Brahmanistic notions of status and function (Chandler 1992; Ponchaud 1977). The "naturalness" of given social roles was embodied in the concept of dharma, the "cosmic doctrine of duty in which each sort of being in the universe...has by virtue of its sort, one ethic to fulfill and a nature to express - the two things being the same" (Geertz 1983: 196). This duty could vary across place and time. In one context, a warrior had to be respectful to his social superiors, while, in another situation, his dharma would require him to "crush the enemy" (kamtech khmang) without hesitation.

(Continued in the August 2002 issue)

Alex Hinton is the Assistant Professor at Department of Anthropology, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.

Procedures for the Taking of Evidence

(International Human Rights)

Testimony Under Oath or Affirmation

The U.N. Draft Model Rules and the rules for the U.N. Ad Hoc Working Group on Chile provide that all non-governmental witnesses shall be sworn in before testifying. Although U.N. and non-governmental bodies lack contempt and perjury prosecution power, it is believed that the taking of an oath at least impresses upon witnesses the seriousness of oral testimony.

NGO fact-finding commissions rarely take sworn testimony from those whom they interview and generally do not attempt to reproduce the style of court proceedings. The formality of oath taking might have a chilling effect on human rights victims and other potential informants, who fear reprisal and often demand that their testimony not be attributed. NGO fact-finding commissions thus generally rely upon polite probing, questioning, and cross-checking to assure the reliability of oral testimony.

Questioning of Witnesses

Intergovernmental fact-finding proceedings are generally far more formal than similar efforts by NGOs, whose inquiries resemble interviews more than adjudicating hearings. In some ways, NGO fact-finders conduct themselves like juges d'instruction in a civil law country. The NGO questioner need not demonstrate facts to some independent body, such as a judge or jury, but both poses the inquiries and analyzes the responses. Hence, the interviewer can get meaningful information through polite, and sometimes indirect, questioning. Mildly suggestive or leading questions are used by IGOs to elicit information from witnesses and could be employed by NGOs. Nevertheless, on some occasions, such as the examination of governmental representatives, NGO fact-finders have needed to use more forceful questioning.

Methods of Assessing the Reliability of Evidence

a. Corroboration

For international NGOs, corroboration is the most significant and commonly used method for determining the reliability of human rights information. Faced with unreliable or politically motivated informants and frequently with circumstantial evidence, the NGO attempts to sift its information for common patterns and corroborative data deriving from independent sources.

Sometimes a commission receives corroborative physical evidence such as bruises, scars, and other physical evidence of torture, although the passage of time often makes this type of evidence very difficult to acquire. On-site visitations can provide an opportunity to verify witnesses' descriptions of buildings and rooms.

b. Use of Direct Evidence

Every visit tries, whenever possible, to base its findings on direct evidence. Most NGOs do not, how-ever, exclude all findings based on hearsay testimony, especially where the testimony is consistent with other evidence available to the visit.

In the absence of direct evidence, NGO visits rely on the number of allegations of torture and the similarity of alleged circumstances to establish a prima facie case of mistreatment. Where 50 complaints of mistreatment are received, and all describe similar types of torture at the same locations, there is a substantial likelihood that some form of torture is being conducted. Findings of fact based on such evidence have proven reliable in the past.

c. Witness Conduct

The demeanor of a witness may indicate confidence or nervousness, from which a finder of fact may infer the veracity of statements made or merely that the individual has a certain disposition. The fact-finding reports of IGOs and NGOs do not usually make reference to the importance of witness conduct in assessing reliability, even though on-site visits are motivated to some extent by a desire to see and hear witnesses.

d. Burden of Proof and Production of Evidence

The concepts of burden of proof and burden of production of evidence play a very significant role in

assuring the reliability of factual findings by placing responsibility for the production of evidence on the party who either ought to possess the evidence or has the greatest interest in presenting it, and by establishing a burden of persuasion for the proponent of a position. It may well be that an NGO, which is both the investigator and the decision-maker, bears the burden of producing all evidence necessary to support its findings. The accused government, however, has both an interest in the proceeding and is most able to locate and present relevant material. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights appears to place a burden of production upon governments under investigation. Similarly, if an NGO can at least establish a prima facie case that human rights violations have occurred, it may then insist that the government discharge a burden of presenting contradictory evidence. This "rule" probably best describes the working of public opinion when an NGO has reported that human rights have been violated and the government has failed to rebut the findings presented in the report.

The degree of proof employed by an NGO may vary, depending upon the impact of the action that follows a fact-finding effort. For example, if an NGO proposes only to send a diplomatic letter of inquiry to a government, the NGO may merely need credible second-hand reports of human rights violations. If an NGO is publishing a major report, it ought to require more substantial evidence of wrongdoing.

e. Dissemination of Reports

The major question concerning the dissemination of fact-finding reports is whether reports should be submitted to the concerned government for comment or rebuttal before release to the public. Given the less than conclusive evidence upon which some findings are based, fairness requires that governments be given a chance to rebut the conclusions.

NGOs regularly submit their findings to and/or solicit evidence from concerned States. Often, an agreement to submit findings and receive government comment is a precondition to permission for on-site visitation. The major problem with this procedure has been the refusal of governments to respond.

An NGO should never make a commitment to withhold publication of a report until it receives a government's comments. A time limit for response should be set at the time the report is submitted to the government, with the proviso that the full report will be published immediately upon any public release or public comment by the government.

Researchers and journalists interviewing victimized children in preparation for the 1979 trial.

Moving on Requires Looking Back

Alex Boraine and Paul van Zyl IHT

Reconciliation

In the wake of conflict, violence and human rights abuse, one would expect those committed to peace to embrace the idea of reconciliation. Yet the notion has become controversial in some quarters—not because of its true meaning, but because it has been exploited by those with cynical agendas and shady pasts. The leaders of abusive military regimes in Central and Latin America have often invoked reconciliation to mean, "forgive and forget." An enforced national amnesia that masquerades as reconciliation should obviously be rejected by anyone who seeks to build a sustainable peace.

On the other hand, a proper understanding and implementation of reconciliation is crucial in coming to terms with a divided and violent past. Real reconciliation requires and honest examination of history to uncover and recognize past crimes. Rather than silencing and marginalizing victims, it demands that their voices be heard and their suffering acknowledged.

Argentina's new president, Nestor Kirchner, expressed this eloquently in his inaugural address, stating that he intended to rule "without rancor but with memory." Justice and accountability are also central elements of genuine reconciliation. Reparations should also be provided to victims, not only to compensate them for their losses, but also to send the message that violations are no longer acceptable.

Without truth, justice and reparations, victims and their communities will feel that the new order has failed them. Condemned to the perpetual status of victim, they can become vulnerable to unscrupulous leaders who seek to exploit their anger and insecurity. Both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia reveal the deadly consequences of allowing a sense of historical grievance to be manipulated by a nationalist and racist politicians. Without genuine reconciliation, yesterday's victims can all too easily become today's perpetrators. The recent apology and guilty plea by Biljana Plavsic, former leader of the Bosnian Serbs, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, can play an important role in dispelling the myth that Serbs have been victims only and bear no responsibility for recent conflicts. By accepting punishment and expressing remorse, Plavsic has opened the door to real reconciliation in the region.

Reconciliation also requires a changing of the old guard. In societies where venal leaders have spawned abusive institutions, a secure peace will not emerge until the police, the military, courts and other organs of government undergo fundamental change. If the combustible mix ethnic and religious groups in postwar Iraq is to hold together, it will require the creation of state institutions that have completely shed the repression and sectarianism of the past.

It is obvious that massive discrepancies in wealth and power lie at the heart of man intractable conflicts. Those who retain disproportionate privileges in the aftermath of violence often fail to recognize that reconciliation cannot be secured in a context of ongoing inequality.

While nothing can excuse the reckless, cynical and counterproductive policies of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, they would be less accepted if, after independence, whites had adopted a more progressive approach to an equitable distribution on wealth.

In this context, it is amazing to consider how far South Africa has come in building a "rainbow nation" committed to reconciliation. But Zimbabwe should serve as a cautionary lesson for whites who continue to control the majority of South Africa's wealth. Real reconciliation involves painful sacrifice, including a commitment to remedying the inequalities that endure after the fighting stops.

Lasting reconciliation requires far-reaching legal, political and economic change. But it also depends on the actions of leaders who played a prominent role during the conflict. Visionary leaders, like Nelson Mandela or Aung San Suu Kyi, are able to show magnanimity even when it would be both understandable and expected for them to demand retribution. But rapprochement will not lead to reconciliation unless this generosity is reciprocated by a commitment to address and remedy a legacy of abuse by those responsible for it.

Alex Boraine is president and Paul van Zyl is director of country programs at the International Center for Transitional Justice.

A Request for the People of Cambodia's Forgiveness

Meng-Try Ea


Pheng Pul

"I am sorry for joining the Khmer Rouge, who killed and mistreated the people," said Pheng Pul. She was brought into the revolution by Ta Sarim, a cadre from Santuk district, Kampong Thom province, and joined the Khmer Rouge in 1972 at the age of 15. From 1974 until 1978, Pheng Pul served as a regional combatant; one of her duties was giving speeches at the closing ceremonies of political sessions chaired by comrade Khieu Ponary. In 1978 and 1979, she worked as chief of Trapeang Beng village and chief of the garment factory at Chamkar Andaung Rubber Plantation.

Thousands of people were arrested, detained, and executed at the Trapeang Beng village security center. Pheng Pul claimed that the security office was designed for detention and interrogation, and that its chief decided the fates of people held there. Those marked for execution were blindfolded and taken to the rubber plantation. After they were killed, their bodies were pushed into open pits. The killings took place both day and night. The Khmer Rouge attempted to keep the executions secret by playing music through loudspeakers so that villagers could not hear people's cries.

Pheng Pul noted that most of the killings in the area of Trapeang Beng took place from mid-1975 to the end of 1978; they slowed in late 1978 when Office 870 issued a circular that prohibited further executions. Pheng Pul read this circular herself. Most of those killed at the rubber plantation, Andaung Ta Hong and Prey Tamom were evacuees from Phnom Penh, Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham.

Pheng Pul asked forgiveness from every Cambodian because she had been a Khmer Rouge cadre who knew about the mistreatment and executions of the regime's victims. She felt that the killings were the consequence of stupid Khmer Rouge policies. She recounted what Khieu Ponary said during a 1974 political session for regional female cadres: "The feudal-capitalist is an oppressive class that exploits the farmer-worker class. So we must abolish this class." Pheng Pul continued, "At that time we didn't know there was a plan to eradicate this class. During 1973-74 there did not seem to be any killings. However, they began in 1975. I did know about the slaughter in my own village, but I didn't know what to do. We each had different jobs to do and were not to interfere [with the jobs of others]. Low-ranking cadres received orders from the higher level. They had no choice but to follow their orders."

Pheng Pul also wanted to apologize to the people of Trapeang Beng village and those at the Chamkar Andaung Rubber Plantation. In order to help Cambodians reach reconciliation and help her country to develop, Pheng Pul asked all former low-ranking Khmer Rouge cadres to ask forgiveness for what they did to the villagers. She stated, "Don't be afraid to say that we had done wrong and explain what really happened then. Perpetrators have to admit their mistakes. By doing this, our country will enjoy happiness, not hatred or enmity."

Meng-try Ea is a co-author of Victims and Perpetrators?: Testimony of Young Khmer Rouge Comrades. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2001.

Fortunetellers Say Her Elder Brother is Still Alive

Sophal Ly

Tit Nary

Tit Nary aka Kry, 43, earns her living by farming in Hang Heng village, Beong Tranch Tbaung subdistrict, Samrong district, Takeo province. She is a native of Srey Chey. Her brother Nup Nuon worked in the interrogation unit of S-21 and subsequently became a prisoner there. Tit Nary told his story.

Nup Nuon's father's name is Tit Nop; his deceased mother's name was Dy Tem. The family's four children are brothers Tit Chhorn, Tit Saroeung, and Tit Nuon (Nop Nuon), and Tit Nary. Tit Nary remembered her brother as being very polite. He loved all his siblings and never provoked anyone. He was also a good student. In the old regime he went to a Buddhist called Wat Chumpou Rainsei in Takeo province. He spent all his free time assisting his father in the field.

His school life ended in 1970 with the Long Nol coup and the closure of his school. At that time, the Khmer Rouge needed soldiers to defend the country. Hup Nuon volunteered to join them. He first served as a Boeng Tranh subdistrict militiaman. A year later, he joined the army with three of his peers. No one has had news of the other three since.

Some time later, a man named Nin brought a letter from Nup Nuon to his father, stating that, "I have already reached Neak Loeung." They knew then that he was fighting against Lon Nol troops. Nin was also a soldier stationed at Neak Loeung; he died when Neak Loeung was liberated. Nit Nary has had no news of her brother since then.

After Phnom Penh was liberated in 1979, Tit Nary tried to find her brother through other soldiers who had served in the army with Nup Nuon. She even sent a letter to Samlot. After learning nothing, Tit Nary still felt uneasy. She went to several fortunetellers, who gave similar answers, saying, "he's staying very far away, but [we] don't know where" and that "sooner or later, you will meet." Her father often prepares traditional offerings to his missing son, sensing that his son will never appear again.

Tit Nary still misses her brother and waits for his return. She said, "I'm not sure whether he is alive or dead. However, I hope one day we will have a chance to meet."

Tit Nary tries to clear the Khmer Rouge past from her mind because it was such a bitter time. Moreover, she doesn't want to see such a regime take power ever again.

A newly discovered confession indicates that Nup Nuon was killed by Angkar.

Sophal Ly is a staff-writer of the Searching for the Truth magazine.

The Life of Teacher Lieng under the Khmer Rouge

Visal Mony Khuoy

Hong Kim Lieng, 55, is the deputy principal of Bek Chan Senior High School, Angsnuol district, Kandal province. His wife Tim Teng is a farmer and sells food at the school. He had three children.

During 1970-1975 Lieng lived in an area near Wat Tuol Krasaing in Phnom Penh. He worked at the Credit Bank north of the Old Market.

Teacher Leang and his family.

After April 17, 1975 Lieng's family was evacuated from Phnom Penh along National Road 4. He rode on a Honda motorbike with a cart attached, in which he put some clothes and food. His elderly mother, wife, and three children rode in the cart. But after they reached Kok Banh Choan, a group of Khmer Rouge forces appeared and pointed their guns at him, saying they wanted to check something. They took his motorbike and watch. Lieng was frightened and said, "You comrades can take anything you wish to." After that, Lieng pulled the cart, while his wife carried the baby. They traveled west toward their home in Chong Bangkol village, Bek Chan subdistrict, Ang Snuol district. When they arrived, there were many Khmer Rouge staying in his house.

When he approached the entrance gate, the Khmer Rouge called out to him: "Why the hell are you coming here?" Lieng replied, "I came to see my home." Then the Khmer Rouge shouted, "It belongs to no one, you will not be allowed to enter

this house." Lieng turned back in fear.

Lieng and his family continued along National Road 4 toward his hometown in Prey Puoch village, Prey Puoch subdistrict, Angsnuol district, Kandal province. For 15 days, they stayed at Wat Prey Puoch temple with other evacuees. After that Angkar sent all of the people there to Kdei Chass village, Preah Nipean subdistrict, Korng Pisey district, Kampong Speu province. Lieng's family spent one and a half months there while Angkar extracted their biographies to ferret out former civil servants. Learning that Lieng was a civil servant, Angkar sent him to Prey Russey in Kampong Speu province.

There, he and other men dug out bamboo. Each man had to clear three trees each morning. They were also used as cattle to drag plows and as rakes to prepare land for cultivation. Lieng noted that no one dared refuse to do anything. His group, at all costs, had to labor in order to survive. A few months later, in 1975, Lieng's family was moved to Sdao village, Rorkat subdistrict, Phnom Kravanh district, Pursat province.

Lieng claimed that at the end of 1975, Angkar announced that Prince Sihanouk was coming back and that people should return to their homes, But instead, Lieng's family was sent to Daun Ei village, Daun Ei subdistrict, Krakor district, Pursat province.

In Pursat, Lieng was assigned to a work site on Daun Ei Island. His first job was to carry thirty to eighty buckets of water from Leach stream to the eating hall. The food ration was two cans of rice per huge pan mixed with the soft parts of palm tree and three baskets of plants. Sometimes the porridge was made without rice, using a small amount of potatoes.

Lieng's wife was assigned to work in the fields, transplanting rice seedlings with a unit comprising women who had just given birth. Because of the insufficient food rations, Lieng's wife became very sick and emaciated. She had no breast milk to feed her baby. At the end of 1975, two of his children were sent off to stay in a children's unit. With lack of care and food, their feet swelled and they became alarmingly thin.

One day the work site chief told Lieng, "Angkar asks you to break stones at Kampeng, Phnom Kravanh district, Pursat province tomorrow." There, he broke rocks and cut wood for the construction of Cheu Taok Dam. He worked from dawn until noon. After a brief rest, he continued working until five p.m. After dinner, he brought soil up to the dam until 11 p.m. Lieng remembered that one by one, the workers became sick and died due to overwork, lack of food, and untreated diseases.

After three months, Lieng asked the work site chief for leave so that he could visit his home. He was allowed to do so. When he reached home, he saw that two of his children had very swollen feet, while his wife was sick with malaria. His wife still went to work in the fields so that she could bring back some porridge to feed her children. His two eldest children then became sick and died, but their youngest daughter survived on the diet of thin rice porridge.

In 1975, 637 New People (April 17 People) lived on Daun Ei Island. By 1977, only 13 were left alive, including Lieng, his wife, and their daughter. Some had died due to overwork, insufficient food, or disease. Others were executed after being accused of being Chinese descendants or committing vandalism, including the breaking of plows or plowing in a clumsy manner. Some were accused of transplanting rice seedlings upside down, or of working for the CIA, KGB, or feudalists with imperialist natures.

Lieng recalled, "Angkar once accused me of being a captain in charge of an economic unit in Phnom Penh." Angkar asked his wife to confirm Lieng's former occupation. His wife said he was a bread maker in Phnom Penh, and that he was not a captain or anything like that. After questioning him, Angkar always tracked Lieng's work—the way he plowed and the way he constructed the dam—as well as his political stance. But because he did a good job and had the dark complexion of a farmer, Angkar gave up on its investigation. After that, he tried not to make any

mistakes. "If I did something wrong, even a little mistake, I would have been killed." He also feared that someday he would be taken away for education because of an unconscious mistake. The word "education" actually meant "execution," he said.

In 1977 Angkar sent Lieng to plow farmland at Pich Kaong in Pursat province. One day after finishing plowing at Pich Kaong, Lieng released two pairs of cows to eat grass by a lake. As he was following the cows, he came across a group of three or four militiamen leading people into the jungle. When they saw him they asked, "Why do you come here?" Lieng replied, "I'm here to find cows" and moved away very fast, terrified.

In the jungle close to the lake, Lieng found the scattered clothes and mass graves of hundreds of victims. He was traumatized by the sight, fearing that his life and the lives of his whole family would end in the same way as those of the victims he found.

In 1977 Angkar sent Lieng back to work in the farm fields, where he was supposed to plow land for watermelon, beans, sesame, and tobacco. One day Lieng had a stomachache and could not work. He asked the work site chief, Ta In, to allow him to rest in a hammock to relieve his symptoms. He was so tired that he fell asleep. As he was sleeping, a hot water container fell on him, burning his two upper thighs, which became infected. He could not walk. Angkar accused him of having a "social (sexually transmitted) disease" and ordered his execution. Lieng asked his co-workers to inform the chief of the women's unit at Daun Ei to help him and beg Ta In for mercy. She told Ta In that Lieng had an inflammation and not a social disease. She then made traditional medicine to cure Lieng's wound. Half a month later, Lieng recovered from the wound. He resumed his work and Ta In could not use that pretext to have him killed.

In 1978, Angkar moved him from the work site on Daun Ei. Thousands of craftsmen skilled in constructing dams and water gates at Dei Ling, and farmers from Arch Ka-ek, Veal Prahok, Boeng Pich Kaong, O Rorka and Chamkar Koh in Rorleap village, Lorlork Sa subdistrict, Kravanh district were arrested that year. They were executed in the jungle along Boeng Run Lake and at Boeng Run in Bak Chenh Chien cooperative of Phnom Kravanh district.

One day, a work site chief named Horn brought him to cut run plants for making straw roofs. Approaching Boeng Run, he smelled something very bad. Lieng glanced at the lake and the surrounding forest, and saw hundreds of bodies lying in several layers. He asked Horn why "so many people were killed?" Horn replied, "Angkar killed those people because they came from the Eastern Zone, had contacts with Vietnamese, and committed treason against Angkar." He warned Lieng, "Don't spread this news, or you will face trouble." Lieng continued cutting run plants, thinking that one day he himself might meet the same fate.

By the end of 1978, fighting intensified along the Cambodia-Vietnam border. Cooperative workers did not have as much work as before, and food rations began to increase. People were told to bring harvested rice to be stored in barns inside Kravanh Mountain. They brought it to the mountain twice a day. At that time, there was chaos among the Khmer Rouge, knowing that Vietnamese troops were capturing Phnom Penh.

In January 1979 the Salvation Front and Vietnamese troops liberated most of the country, including Pursat province. However, the place where Lieng worked was located in a rural area that remained under the control of the Khmer Rouge.

In April 1979 seventeen families, including Lieng's, escaped from their Khmer Rouge-controlled area at night. Lieng carried his child on one shoulder and household goods on the other, working their way toward the liberated zone of Pursat town. They arrived at 3 a.m., crying tears of joy.

Visal Mony Khuoy is a staff-member of the DC-Cam's Documentation division.

KHMER ROUGE NOVEL:

The Cleverness of a Young Water Buffalo Tender

(Continued from the June 2002 issue)

At that time the boy was very hungry because he had not eaten a meal since that morning. He sat down, debating for a moment whether to enter the village or to hide himself in the jungle. The boy remembered everything about the atrocities committed by contemptible Thieu's soldiers in his village. He seemed to see those soldiers committing barbarous crimes against the villagers, including his parents and other relatives. The boy bit his lips in the heat of passion. He stood up and walked straight to the village, where Thieu's soldiers were seen walking here and there around the village and in front of his home.

The boy then cried and asked his mother to cook rice for him so that he could go out to find the missing buffaloes. His parents were stunned, but they agreed to do what the boy wanted to. He screamed very loudly, alarming Khieu's soldiers. Their chiefs came and asked what had happened. The boy came closer and hugged his feet using the alibi, "The buffaloes were eager to have sex. They had so strong a passion that we could not calm them down. As a result, they went away. Now I am asking my father to escort me to find the missing buffaloes. We have to go now. If we wait until tomorrow, the buffaloes would go further and further. We will not able to keep pace with them. However, my father refuses to go. He's afraid that you will not allow him to do so." The boy then went to the chief and asked for permission to take his father along with him that night.

At a time when they needed buffaloes to be killed for food, the invading thieves agreed on the condition that the buffaloes had to be returned that night; otherwise, the father and the son would be killed together. The boy accepted, blew his nose and wiped away his tears. He immediately took the wrapped rice, held the hands of his father and left. Walking for a moment, the boy told his father about his plan, who then agreed. They walked toward a militia camp.

A few moments later, they reached the camp. The two reported to the militiamen that Thieu's soldiers were staying in the village that night. Realizing this, the militia team moved very quickly to prepare to ambush Thieu's soldiers along the road.

The boy and his father said goodbye to the militiamen and began searching for their missing buffaloes. Upon finding them, they tethered them and ate their rice at a leisurely pace. They looked at the stars and made a good guess that it was 1 a.m. The father said to his son, "We don't need to enter the village now; otherwise our buffaloes would be killed for food. We will have to wait until 4 a.m., when they are supposed to withdraw. "They won't have time to kill our buffaloes, since our militiamen will have come to liberate us by then." The boy agreed. After eating, the two slept briefly. At around four a.m. the father awakened his son and they entered the village together. At the same time, Thieu's soldiers were stealing chickens, ducks and pigs from the villagers to prepare for their trip back. When they saw the father and son coming, they were very happy. Some came to take the buffaloes, while others came and touched the boy's head, saying how clever he was to find the buffaloes. They seized the three buffaloes to take along with the villagers' poultry.

At 5 a.m. they began to leave the village to return to their home base. At about 6, a firefight exploded mixed with hand grenades. The villagers were very satisfied, hoping that the militiamen would punish the thieves from Prey Norkor. However, no one knew about the plan that the father and his son had laid the night before. Due to their perfect preparations, the attack lasted only 15 minutes. As a result, our militia managed to smash a platoon of Thieu's soldiers and seized all their military belongings including guns, cartridges and other ammunition. The three buffaloes ran away for a period of time. After the fighting they were herded back to the village. The villagers came up to show their enthusiasm for the victory of our militia. It was then that the plan of the father and son was made known.

All of them appreciated the cleverness of Phat in searching for and smashing the enemy. He became a role model for other children.

With the high revolutionary consciousness and absolute spirit of defending the village against the enemy, the country beloved by all of us, male and female, old and young under the leadership of the correct revolutionary Angkar's guidelines, Kamchay Mea as well as other districts along the borders were completely liberated and people now live in peace. They can cultivate, raise dams, and dig canals independently. Now our villages and subdistricts in this area have new faces. People live better lives in a way that owners of a country and the revolution do. They are endeavoring to raise dams and dig lakes, ponds, and canals to settle our irrigation problems so that we can achieve 100 to 200 percent of the cultivation plan to improve our living standards and support the battlefront to a great extent.

LETTER FROM THE READER:

What I Have Known and Heard of

My name is Kim Lay; I am Cambodian-French. I experienced suffering and bitterness under the Khmer Rouge regime. However, I survived. I came across a piece of information via the Internet on the reaction of the Chinese embassy to a document indicating that Chinese personnel taught the Khmer Rouge killers at S-21 (or "Tuol Sleng") how to catch and kill suspects who were allegedly accused of committing treason against Angkar.

I'm writing to inform you what I knew and heard about at a time that I was suffering to the point that my life was on the brink of death under the killing field regime. I know that you know what I'm going to ask:

1) People of our kind, who were then called "April 17 People," heard of or witnessed the Chinese operating in Cambodia, where they controlled many things at the time the Khmer Rouge were starving Cambodian people. We were emaciated and treated worse than animals. Physical and mental hardships made the Cambodian people, who were victims, dare to whisper to Chinese technicians about their living conditions when the Khmer Rouge cadres were not present. What was the reaction of the Chinese to the complaints of the unfortunate Cambodian victims? They ignored them. It is important to note that many of those who talked to the Chinese experts were also Chinese. They begged the Chinese government to take care of them, since the Khmer Rouge were killing innocent people every day on a non-discriminatory basis. Does this mean that the Chinese were standing by when the Khmer Rouge were killing their own nationals?

2) Cambodian people like me noted that those Chinese were snobbish. They refused to drink juice from coconuts that had dropped and hit the ground. They would only drink the juice of those coconuts that were carefully picked. Our emaciated Cambodian victims whispered to each other, "These new Chinese colonialists are more snobbish than the American colonialists." Is this proletarian Communism?

Although the information I cited here is not probative evidence for a court of law, I believe that it pertains to so-called "moral responsibility." The world these days believes that passively standing by while criminal acts are being committed is no longer humanism. Mr. Chinese ambassador, please be informed. That's why Cambodian students in Phnom Penh wanted the Chinese government to make "apologies" before the Cambodian people. The visits of US President Bill Clinton to Vietnam and the one of Jiang Zemin to Cambodia were very different. The point is that the people of Vietnam were very happy to see the president, while in Cambodia people were gathered forcefully to decorate the streets for Jiang's visit.

To conclude, I would like to express my appreciation for your efforts in searching for truth and justice for the people of Cambodia, who were victimized by a vision of transforming human beings into animals. This is what I think was a crime against humanity.

Sir, accept my assurances of high consideration.

December 2, 2000

Yim Kim Lay

KHMER ROUGE SONG:

THE EXISTENCE OF THE KAMPUCHEAN REVOLUTION IS OUTSTANDING IN THE WORLD

Girl: The victory of April is so shiny in the new Kampuchea, both in the municipal and rural areas. Its fragrance infiltrates throughout the world.

Boy: A country, small and having a handful of people with shortages in all fields can beat the world's great power of the most barbarous nature.

Girl: Thirty years after World War II is a different story in which a small people, as strong as iron, manage to drive out Americans.

Boy: We gained an absolute victory as a result of our thunderstorm fights without compromise, negotiations, or hesitation. We fought until we achieved our goal.

Girl: We gained a complete victory as shiny as precious stones. Our existence purely merits special attention from people all over the world.

Boy: The new Kampuchea is great, glittering like a sun, and even better than in the Angkorean time. This is a pure and perfect society in which workers and peasants are their own masters.

Girl: This is a priceless guideline of the revolution's independence and self-reliance, and constant struggle.

Boy: This is because of the highest revolutionary heroism of the people and army who devoted their lives for the sake of the nation's brilliant existence.

Girl: Nowadays the existence of the Kampuchean revolution is widespread throughout the five continents, where our outstanding society is considered as a role model.

Boy: This is the best role model of a poor people, standing up for struggle.

Boy and Girl: We the people of Cambodia are so proud, polite and adhere to the extension of our national existence. All these have to be proportionate to the sacrifices of our comrades. We are determined to conduct storming attacks to defend localities and construct a new Kampuchea, with the traditional self-support ethic, in order to gain successive great victories. Self-support is so sparkling, making the new Kampuchea shiny in the world.

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