Magazine of Documentation Center of Cambodia

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Granny Oum Sum living at Thmei village, Bankan sub-district, Prey Kabas district, Takeo province. (She died in September 2003)

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Letter :

The Right to Life

I would like to share with you some reflections about our work for truth, justice and national reconciliation in Cambodia, work we have been doing at the Documentation Center of Cambodia since 1995.

On Saturday, March 9, 2002 at the Toul Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh, I organized a film screening for the United Nations Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia, Prof. Peter Leuprecht. The film we showed, entitled Bophanna, is about a couple who were tortured and killed by the Khmer Rouge because they married without permission from Angkar. After the screening I asked Professor Leuprecht's staff—some twenty or twenty-five international human rights workers: "what is the most important human right"? As usual, many ideas were expressed, ranging from the right to free speech and the right of association, to the right to gather freely for peaceful purposes and the right to a free press as the most important human right for a democratizing country. I bluntly told the group that all of the above rights and others are meaningless if you are dead. The most important right is the right to life. All other rights can be enjoyed if and only if this most basic right is guaranteed. And it is this fundamental right that was so massively violated by Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime—also known as the Khmer Rouge regime. Some thirty to forty percent of the Cambodian people were killed by the Khmer Rouge in less than four years. No other government in history has taken away the right to life from such a high proportion of its people. For this reason, I believe we can say that the Khmer Rouge regime was the worst violator of human rights in the history of mankind.

Even so, the leaders of the Khmer Rouge such as Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith remain free men and women today, unpunished more than a quarter of a century after they committed these unprecedented atrocities. Their on-going impunity sends a message to the Cambodian people that our most fundamental rights do not matter. That most fundamental right was violated again and again and again, at least 2 million times, and yet the violators remain untouched. And there is more than that. Former Khmer Rouge leaders today ride around in expensive cars, and live in fancy villas with bodyguards and servants. In a word, they remain rich and powerful, while the masses of the Cambodian people continue to live lives of poverty and desperation. This is the condition of my country, Cambodia, today.

We at the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) have spent the last seven years working to change this unacceptable situation. We have extensively documented the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime. So far we have carefully mapped 19,440 mass graves, 167 extermination centers (prisons) and 77 genocide memorials. We have collected more than 600,000 pages of Khmer Rouge documents, which we are translating, cataloguing, and entering into a computer database. We have assembled dossiers on 18,000 Khmer Rouge cadres, and we are tracing the chain of command of Pol Pot's Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) all the way from the Chairman himself down to the chiefs of districts, communes and villages. When we began, it was not clear how the Khmer Rouge carried out their evil design. Now we can prove much more regarding the who, what, when and where. We have found that there were many more victims than scholars previously believed, with more than two million killed. Even so, all of this work in assembling the evidence is but one part of the puzzle. We have also been working for the last seven years to catalyze a process that would cause responsible authorities to marshal this evidence and bring it to bear in a court of law against the perpetrators. We have been

working with legal experts in the Cambodian government, the United Nations and other interested nations around the world such as the United States and various European countries to design an institutional framework for genocide justice in Cambodia. At the same time, we have been working with—and sometimes against—political authorities from around the world to get them to do the right thing and take the hard decisions that are required to end the culture of impunity in Cambodia.

Though we have come a very long way and accomplished a great deal, we have not yet achieved this goal. We have as yet been unable to persuade the Cambodian government and the international community that the crimes against humanity should be prosecuted in an acceptable manner that would help Cambodia to heal itself and to move forward.

The goal of genocide justice in Cambodia may or may not ever be achieved. So the Documentation Center of Cambodia has a second goal, no less important than promoting justice, and that is ensuring memory. Memory, like justice, is a critical foundation for establishing the rule of law and genuine national reconciliation in Cambodia. Beyond our efforts to document the facts of the Cambodian genocide, one of the ways we seek to promote memory is through our monthly magazine, Searching for the Truth. Now in its third year of publication, The Truth brings the findings of our research and documentation to people all over the country and abroad. We distribute it free of charge at the commune level each month. Although this and our other projects aimed at sustaining memory are crucial, they are not enough. For the Cambodian people to be released from the chains that bind us to our past, we need justice.

The United Nations has tried to bring Cambodians justice, spending more than four and a half years in negotiations with the Cambodian government on the establishment of a criminal tribunal for the Khmer Rouge leadership. In early 1999, the United Nations experts proposed establishing an ad hoc international tribunal for the Khmer Rouge, modeled on the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia; the Cambodian government flatly rejected this proposal on the grounds that it violated Cambodian sovereignty. Undaunted, the United Nations and Cambodia then tried to agree on an unprecedented new model of international justice, a "mixed" tribunal designed to take into account the Cambodian government's stated concerns about sovereignty.

But, as I am sure all of you know, on February 8 of this year, the United Nations announced that it would not continue the negotiating process. The United Nations says that the law adopted by the Cambodian government last year (August 10, 2001) cannot guarantee international standards of justice for the tribunal. In the face of widespread pressure from the international community, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has held firm to his decision. As recently as March 13, the Secretary-General declared that those in the international community who wish to see a change in the United Nations decision on the tribunal need to lobby Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen and, in the Secretary General's words, persuade him to "change his position and attitude."

The Cambodian government said it was surprised by the United Nations' decision, insisting that everything in the Khmer Rouge tribunal law was agreed beforehand with the United Nations, a position that the United Nations does not share. On March 15, the chairman of the government's tribunal task force, H.E. Mr. Sok An, reiterated the government's "earnest hope" to find a way out of the present impasse, stating that the government believes "there is every basis for the negotiations to resume." But H.E. Mr. Sok An gave no indication that the government itself is prepared to change its position and modify the Khmer Rouge tribunal law to take into account the United Nations' objections.

The United Nations always talks about justice, about achieving international standards of justice in Cambodia. They are right about the importance of this matter. The Cambodian government always talks about reconciliation, the need to preserve the peace and heal the wounds of war in Cambodia. They, too, are right about that being crucially important.

But it seems to me that nobody really talks about

the truth, and the truth is that justice and reconciliation are indivisible. We cannot have one without the other. We have trusted the United Nations and the Cambodian government too much, believing that they would bring us justice and reconciliation. Now the Cambodian people are being held hostage on this issue. Both the United Nations and the Cambodian government are abrogating their responsibility to us, the victims, and also to the perpetrators. They are failing us. They are failing the truth.

The on-going impunity of the Khmer Rouge leadership continues to haunt the Cambodian people every day. Every family was robbed of the most precious things, things that can never be replaced. My family was no exception.

During the Khmer Rouge regime, my brother-in-law (Suntharak) ate very little of his family's meager rations, saving the few precious grains of rice to feed his three young children. One day he was caught stealing garbage from a trash pile, in an attempt to get a few additional morsels of nourishment for his family. He was savagely beaten by the Khmer Rouge cadres for this so-called "crime." He lay on his bed for many days, too battered to eat, until he finally died.

My sister (Titsoryé) did not report the death of her husband to the Khmer Rouge for almost a week, so that she could continue to collect his tiny food ration to feed her babies. His body stayed there on his bed, with his daughters clinging to it.

My niece (Theavin) became very ill with some kind of tumor, but of course, there was no modern medical care during the Khmer Rouge regime. In fact, there was practically no medical care at all. So my niece simply had to suffer in pain, unable to walk, crying every day on her bed, until one day she cried no more. Her sister (Theavy) remembers that this was during the rainy season, and at that time there was a big flood. My niece's body, on top of her bed, just floated away, and that was the last time anyone ever saw her.

Soon thereafter, my sister's infant boy died of starvation. She had been so hungry that she could not produce milk to nurse him. In 1977, she was accused of stealing rice from the communal kitchen. She denied having committed this crime, but the Khmer Rouge cadre refused to believe her. To prove his accusation, he took a knife and slashed her belly open. Her stomach was empty. And then she died a slow, horrible death.

The most fundamental right—the right to life—of my niece, my sister, her husband and her baby boy was taken away by the Khmer Rouge. This story from my family makes me very sad every time I tell it, not only because it is so personal, but also because it is such a common story. Every family in Cambodia suffered similar crimes under the Khmer Rouge.

We refuse to accept a world where people who do these kinds of things remain unpunished. God may forgive the killers, but here on earth, until there is justice, until the truth is told about these crimes, our people cannot reconcile with one another. We want to live in the present, not in the past, but the past is still with us. We need to have closure. If nothing is done, we will be setting a very bad precedent for Cambodia, and a very bad precedent for the world in this new century. And so, in closing, I appeal to you, the members of this esteemed conference, to help the Cambodian people to find the truth, to find justice, and to achieve reconciliation. We have been denied truth, justice and reconciliation for so very long. That is just not right.

At the very minimum, even if the United Nations refuses to resume negotiations with the Cambodian government, they should assign the United Nations Center for Human Rights in Phnom Penh to communicate directly with the Cambodian people, and explain to them whether or not they share the Cambodian people's aspirations for genocide justice—and if they do share these aspirations, what they intend to do about it.

The Cambodian government has this same obligation to explain their policy to the Cambodian people, and because of the personal and family experiences of the members of the government, they know very well the suffering of the people and the confusion of the victims and perpetrators, who continue to be denied justice. The government, too, must act for genocide justice.

Youk Chhang
Editor-in-chief and Publisher

Chhim Sochit: A Student from Canada

Sophal Ly

Chhim Sochit was a Khmer intellectual who was born into a poor farmer family in the province of Battambang, but pursued his studies abroad. He moved to Canada as a refugee just before the Khmer Republic collapsed. When he came back to his country, he was arrested and sent to S-21 (Tuol Sleng prison) on October 10, 1976. His interrogator in Tuol Sleng was Brak Bo. Chhim was killed by Angkar on January 28, 1977.

Brief Biography

Sochit, 32 years old (1977), was born in Svay Pao commune Sangke district, Battambang province. His father's name is Chhim Chea. His mother's name was Samrith Huon (dead). His stepmother is Aop San, a farmer in Battambang province.

Chhim Sochit has four siblings:

1. Chhim Somitr, a (male) high school student in Battambang
2. Chhim Sometra, a (female) high school student in Battambang
3. Chhim Somno, a (male) primary school student
4. Chhim Somny, a (female) primary school student.

In 1967 Chhim Sochit graduated from the Faculty of Business in Phnom Penh. In November 1967 he received a scholarship to study in Belgium, but he returned home when he contracted an illness that forced him to abandon his studies there.

In January 1969 he began work at Electricity of Cambodia in Phnom Penh, becoming its chief accountant in September of that year.

Political Life

A. In Cambodia

In December 1969 Chhim Sochit was introduced by his friend, Bun Yeun, to Saray Bunky (an agent), a major in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Facing the financial hardship of his family who lived in the countryside, he decided, in February 1970, to become a member of a CIA group led by Peter Thomson and Andre Motte (a French CIA agent), through Saray Bunky. He earned US$180 per month as an agent whose job was to instigate students to rise up against the royalist regime, led by prince Sihanouk, and to support the Lon Nol regime.

Chhim Sochit contacted Koy Pech, a law student, and asked him to help create a movement against the royalist regime. Then he contacted some other students —Pen Kien, San That, Yim Kechse, and Kem Sontro—to ask them to enlarge the movement.

In October 1970, Saray Bunky sent Chhim Sochit to contact more students to propagandize that prince Sihanouk went to the People's Republic of China in order to ask Viet Cong armed forces to help him return to power and that the prince used his reputation to conceal this from the international community. In the same month he met the students who he had contacted and strongly believed that prince Sihanouk was a traitor. Chhim Sochit kept in touch with the five students more closely in order to persuade them to help spread his plan.

In January 1971 Chhim Sochit contacted three other students: Blong Lysuong from the Faculty of Medicine, Kim Srieng from the Faculty of Pedagogy, and Chhim Nath. Chhim Sochit tried to convince them to believe that the revolutionary army was under the control of Vietcong [and] Vietminh, and that Yuon communists were using Vietminh to attack and capture Cambodia as its satellite.

April 1971 was the time when the Khmer New Year would be celebrated. Chhim Sochit went to visit his relatives in Battambang province where he was born. On the way to Battambang he talked with a teacher named Kong Reth about the war in Cambodia, saying that high-ranking cadres of the revolutionary army were Vietcong and Vietminh, and really not the Cambodian revolutionary army. The teacher agreed with Socthit's opinion because he hated the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer

Rouge forced people in his village to give the army food and money, and forced them to flee into the jungle to join them. Discovering that Kong Reth was unhappy with the Khmer Rouge, Sochit enticed him to help encourage people to rise up against the Khmer Rouge.

In September 1971, Chhim Sochit resigned from his position in Electricity of Cambodia and applied for a new job at the National Credit Bank. There, he was in charge of export and import paperwork. One month later he asked Koe Mongkry, the dean of the Faculty of Business, to accept him to teach accounting to students in the Faculty. During his classes he took time to tell students about the Khmer Rouge to fill them with hatred and a desire for revenge against Khmer revolutionaries.

In November 1971, the political situation in Cambodia changed. Founders of the Khmer Republic broke up and their political standing became weak. Students who had supported the Khmer Republic took a quiet position in order to observe the events.

In March 1972 Chhim Sochit met with Koy Pech, Yim Kech Se, and Blong Lysuong to learn about the position of students at the faculties. The three told him that most of the students did not like Khmer Rouge soldiers and they still supported the Republic, but were unhappy with the republican leaders who did not practice the principles of a republic. After learning that the republic was still supported by most of the students, Sochit continued to contact other two students to stir up anger among them in order to spread this sentiment to other students.

In August 1972, Saray Bunky sent him a message saying that the Khmer Rouge abroad were resolutely waging a political war against the Republic and were supported and recognized by many countries. Moreover, they continued waging a political war in the international arena. In order to curb the spread of the Khmer Rouge on the international stage, Saray Bunky sent Chhim Sochit, Ith Sareth (Ministry of Information), and Lev Suth Sophoantha (Electricity of Cambodia) to join a delegation to Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil. This was called a goodwill delegation. The delegation visited the four countries to ask them for [political] support. After being informed about the political situation in Cambodia, governmental representatives from each country pledged support for the republic against the communist group.

On October 17, 1972 Chhim Sochit went to South Korea to study international business after being selected by the Ministry of Education. Chhim Sochit came to a party with his fellow participants. After being asked by his colleagues about the continuing war in Cambodia he told them, "The Khmer Rouge revolutionaries said they fight against imperialism. In reality, we don't see imperialists in Cambodia. The war [in Cambodia] is like the war waged by North Korea..." Most of his fellow friends gave their support to the Khmer Republic because South Korean people also experienced suffering when North Korea had waged a war against them between 1950 and 1953.

In March 1975 Chhim Sochit had to come back to his country, but unfortunately, the Pochen Tong Airport was under shelling attack. Phnom Penh was surrounded by revolutionary soldiers. When he could not return to Cambodia, he applied for refugee status to live in Canada.

B. In Canada

In Canada he became an accounting secretary at a women's fashion shop. In December 1975 he met Choun Viseth, the group leader in Canada (his CIA adviser in America was William Schneider). Through his contacts with Chuon Viseth, Chhim Sochit volunteered to join the Khmer Free Movement in order to liberate Cambodia. He continued to work with Chum Ty (a military reporter) and Kuy Rong (In Chuon Viseth's group and a propagandist responsible for recruiting Khmer people in Canada).

Chhim Sochit made several contacts with many Khmer refugees abroad to incite anger among them and persuade them to join the Khmer Free Movement to fight against the Cambodian Revolution, raising family separation to justify their cause: Khmer revolutionaries captured Phnom Penh and evacuated people from the city to rural areas to live miserably in hunger and without shelter during the hot season, causing deaths and suffering. Cambodian people were treated like animals and were killed by Angkar—whenever they wished— without trials. Angkar's principles held that

feeding old people was a waste of food because they could not work any more and deserved death. The people who were evacuated were fed only to help Angkar do agriculture. When Angkar was dissatisfied with or suspected someone, they dug up the past, saying that the accused was against Angkar or was a secret agent of imperialists. After that, the accused were brought to higher Angkar and were never seen again.

Ironically, thousands tons of rice that the people produced were exported to China or Laos, while leaving the Cambodian people hungry. Thus, Cambodians could not decide their own destiny, as Angkar promised. Rather, their lives were in Angkar's hands. Chhim Sichit used these negative aspects to entice Eab Bunlong to join the Free Khmer Movement.

In May-June Chhim Sochit attended two meetings at Chuuon Viseth's invitation. The meetings were held to inform participants about a plan to liberate Cambodia through political means, which had already been worked out.

In August 1976 Chhim Sochit went to Cambodia under Chuon Viseth's orders. Chuon Viseth told him to recruit evacuated people and let them know about plans that would be implemented in Cambodia. First plan: when he arrives in Cambodia, he must make contact with an eight-member group—Saray Bunky, a major in the Ministry of Defense; Bun Yeoun, a second lieutenant in the Ministry of Defense; Sin Rong, a salesman; Lev Suthsophoantha, an official of Electricity of Cambodia; Ith Sareth from the Ministry of Information; Nong Phaly and Nhem Daovreoung from a private school called Dara Rasmey high school; and Hor An—to prepare for the next meeting. Second plan: after contact is made, Saray Bunky will be selected as the group leader. He will assign the eight members of the group to recruit evacuated people. The third plan: he must meet and seek support from twelve people in the revolutionary army. Saray is assigned to contact Sarin Chhak, Huot Sambath, and Chao Seng (an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Ith Sareth is to contact Phok Chhay, Chao Teary and Uch Ven. Lev Suthsophoan's duty is to make contact with Dy Phon, Ruos Cheatho, and Phlaok Saphan. Chhim Sochit is to contact Men Niktho, Nuth Bunsong and Deng Kaory to seek support and to persuade them to be secret informers from the Khmer Rouge.

On August 20, 1976, Chhim Sochit arrived in Cambodia. He was then sent to K-15 Unit (in the Cambodian-Russian school of Technology).

Between the time of his arrival and his arrest, Chhim Sochit did not carry out any plan made by Chuon Viseth because he was not free to move about, as he had expected he would be. In his confession, Sochit wrote that he was very shocked by what was going on and saw the real goal of the revolutionary Angkar.

On September 1, 1976 Chhim Skochit was brought to Boeung TroBek camp. On September 23, Chhim Sochit was sent to another unit, called Talei camp. Chhim Sochit lived there until he was smashed by Angkar.

Sophal Ly is a staff-writer for Searching for the Truth.

Brak Youtry (aka Brak Bo): Chhim Sochit's Interrogator

Twenty-three years old in 1976, Brak Youtry was also called Brak Bo and Comrade Bo. He was born in Prek Ta Duong village, Prek Thmey commune, District 18, Region 25. His father was Brak Orn, a 55-year old Khmer. His mother was Chea Kuy, a 48-year Khmer farmer.

Brak Bo left school when he was in grade 9. He joined the revolution in early January 1973 through Ngorn Sry, chief of a fish sauce factory. Ngorn Sry helped Brak Bo get a job in the trade department of Region 25, where he worked for one year under the leadership of Hong, the president of business 21 in Region 25. Next, Angkar assigned him to cut trees and produce rice in the farming department of S-21 under Ta Sim, the chief of the farming department. He stayed in this position for six months.

On April 17, 1975 Brak Bo was sent to Unit 265, Platoon 22, headed by a man named Rath. After nine months, he was sent to study at a military technical school of Division 703, run by Tuy and Peng. He finished his studies after 5 months and 16 days, and was then appointed to be a messenger at S-21 (Tuol Sleng prison) under a platoon officer named Bou. After nearly a year, Brak

Honorary Red Flag Award to the Districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach Leu and Tram Kak

June 30, 1977, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea

Respected and Beloved male and female cadres and all cooperative farmers of the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach and Tram Kak:

In 1976, which has just passed, all of you—male and female cadres and cooperative farmers—heightened our spirit of struggle with the stand of independence and self-mastery in breaking obstacles of all kinds. All of you have done your jobs well in the fields of national defense, protection of our revolutionary aims, and continuation and construction of the socialist revolution. This will make your three districts enjoy rapid progress, which has qualified it as a 1976 model for the whole country, aiming to provoke a movement committed to achieving the party's 1977 plan with the speed of a great leap forward in all fields.

1. Exemplary fields of production and settlement of problems arising from people's living conditions: The fact is that these three districts were poor, having soil of lesser quality. Villagers had been living in poor conditions since the old regimes.

However, their rice production climaxed as a result of the implementation of the party's 1976 plan. Sufficient seeds were prepared, problems surrounding people's living conditions were tackled, while a large amount of rice went to the state.

2. Exemplary stand: Independence, self-reliance in fulfilling the tasks of building socialism, in order to achieve the party's plan of three tons per hectare.

3. Exemplary stand of socialist revolution: Good work in this field. Active involvement and deep engagement in class struggle in all of the districts, especially in the party.

4. Exemplary stand of collectivism, devotion, consciousness of broad solidarity in the frameworks of the district, region, and zone.

This is a prominent victory for you, comrades. Also, it is a prominent victory for our people as a whole, our army, our revolution and our party.

This is a significant contribution to the promotion of the national defense, the socialist revolutionary movement, the construction of the socialist revolution, and the settlement of problems arising from the people's living conditions.

Therefore, the CPK's Central Committee would like to appreciate you, cadres, with warm revolutionary sentiment and in recognition thereof, award the Honorary Red Flag of 1976 to all of you.

Beloved comrades,

Your districts have received the Honorary Red Flag 1976 from the party. It is a great honor for our party, our cooperative workers and farmers throughout the country, as well as our army, to give this award to you. It signifies that your tasks have been completed well. All beloved comrades have to further extend your exemplary qualifications by:

1. Strengthening and extending your 1976 triumph by drawing on past experiences in the political, ideological, and organization fields, force distribution, technical work, defense tasks, construction and continuation of the socialist revolution, etc.

2. Further strengthening and extending the stand of collectivism, socialism, self-mastery, the high spirit of revolutionary responsibility, and the stance of overcoming obstacles of any sort, for the sake of more successes. In doing so, we must take a firm stand and show constant revolutionary politeness, thorough internal solidarity and solidarity with other bases.

3. Modeling ourselves on the general revolutionary heroism of our people, cooperative workers and farmers. Our army's valiance is also to be copied. By doing so, you comrades will improve yourselves rapidly in the party's political, ideological and organizational fields for the sake of your beloved comrades' district progress following the plan of 1977 and the years to come.

4. Based on your basic qualifications, combined with your active engagement, you comrades have to achieve the party's 1977 plan of 3-6 tons per hectare without fail. Surpluses will also be rewarded.

With the warmest and deepest revolutionary sentiment, the CPK's Central Committee would like to wish you comrades consecutive successes in fulfilling the brilliant tasks assigned by the party.

The CPK's Central Committee is strongly convinced that other districts and bases will achieve the party's 1977 plan in all fields, like the districts of Prasot, Kampong Tralach, and Tram Kak, and even bring about further improvements. Accept, comrades, our greetings with the warmest revolutionary fraternity.

Please send letters or articles to

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Master Genocide Site Data:

Mapping the Killing Fields of Cambodia 1995-2000

No.	Site No.	Site Name	Data of Pits and Victims by SITE FORM		Data of Pits and Victims by FIELD REPORT		YEAR Report Report Set/Year
			Estimated Pits	Estimated Victims	Estimated Pits	Estimated Victims	
(Continued from the March 2002 issue)							
402	040701	Trapeang Ampil	over 500	over 10,000	N/A	N/A	1999
403	040702	Trapeang Ampil	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
404	040703	Sre Chreou	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
405	040704	Prey Damrei Srot	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
406	040705	Prey Damrei Srot	200	400	N/A	hundreds	1999
407	040706	Prey Ta Kuch	10	300-500	10	300-500	1999
408	050606	Pralay Tuol Tong Long	5-6	300-400	N/A	N/A	1999
409	080606	Wat Khnao Rorka	1	200-250	N/A	N/A	1999
410	080607	Phoum Khnao Rorka	1	16	1	16	1999
411	080608	Trapeang Chap	lake	2,190-2,920	N/A	2,190-2,920	1999
412	100101	Kuk Dambann 21	1	700-800	1	about 800	1999
413	100102	Prey Trasek	rubber plantation	6,000-7,000	hundreds	6,000-7,000	1999
414	100501	Chamkar Kaosou Pha-ak	rubber plantation	4,000-5,000	more than 1	4,000-5,000	1999
415	110201	Trapeang Toeun	N/A	N/A	1	about 200	1999
416	110202	Kuk Phnom Kraol	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
417	120101	Tuol Sleng	N/A	15,000	N/A	N/A	1999
418	120102	Vityealai Boeng Trabek	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
419	120501	Cheung Ek	129	13,000	N/A	N/A	1999
420	120502	Cheung Ek	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
421	140505	Phoum Tuol Sa	4	30-40	3	30-40	1999
422	160203	Phoum 3	11	over 1,000	more than 2	about 600	1999
423	160401	Pralay Samraong Pen	1	40	1	40	1999
424	160204	Phoum 6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
425	170101	Tuol Bos Preal	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999

426	170102	Tuol Bos Kuy	4	70 families +90 people	4	250-640	1999
427	170301	Wat Tbeng	N/A	N/A	1	150-240	1999
428	171401	Beng Thmei Cheung	1	40	1	N/A	1999
429	171402	Kauk Ta Yea	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
430	171403	Boeng Thmei Tbaung	1 well	20 families	1	35-50	1999
431	171404	Sala Svay Sa	1-3	over 50	1	50-57	1999
432	171405	Wat Svay Sa	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1999
433	171406	Prey Kok Chambakk	1	25 families	1	50-57	1999
434	210608	Po Chrey	1	100-200	N/A	N/A	1999
435	030105	Tuol Ta San	4	30-40	4	20-30	2000
436	030106	Wat Praes Meas	15	50-70	3	more than 10	2000
437	030107	Tuol Prasat Cham	15-16	about 100	N/A	about 100	2000
438	030207	Chamkar Svay Chanty	60	5,000-7,000	6	5,000-7,000	2000
439	030208	Chamkar Svay Chanty		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A2000
440	030209	Lo M18	nearly 20	1,500	nearly 20	500 families	2000
441	030210	Lo M18	10	2,000	N/A	N/A	2000
442	031303	O Ta Kung	lake	about 1,000	1	about 1,000	2000
443	031304	Tuol Krasaing	small pits	about 1,000	N/A	nearly 1,000	2000
444	031305	Tnaot Chour	70-80	240-300	70-80	240-300	2000
445	031306	Munty Santesokh Mitt Sup	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2000
446	031307	Sala Paktham Soeksa Khum Kor	60	about 250	60	about 250	2000
447	031308	Andaung Ta Phan	1 well	about 100	N/A	about 100	2000
448	031309	Munty Santesokh Srok 77 Leu	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2000
449	040202	Po Poun Phnom	7	more than 30	7-8	30-40	2000
450	040405	Munty Kunvibatt	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2000
451	040406	Tuol Ta Sam	6-10	100-120	14-15	100-120	2000
452	040407	Phnom Kang Kep	14-15	4,000-5,000	14-15	4,000-5,000	2000
453	040408	Munty Santesokh Veng	N/A	more than 100	N/A	70-100	2000
454	040409	Phnom Thma Rieng	40	more than 10,000	more than 4	more than 10,000	2000

(Continued in the June 2002 issue)

Khmer Rouge Cadres and April 17, 1975

Meng-Try Ea

Today, many Cambodians view April 17, 1975 as the day they began their terrible journey into separation from their families, forced labor, hunger, and death. However, Khmer Rouge cadres and leaders saw this day in a different light, as evidenced by the statements contained in this article.

Pol Pot said in the Central Army nomination ceremony that, "This is the day to mark most auspicious history! It is a day of great victory of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, which liberated poor workers and peasants from more than 2000 years of oppression by America and feudalism. This historic victory was inscribed with blood, not with gold gilt." The next task of the revolutionary army is to defend and build the country, Pol Pot told the revolutionary army.

Nuon Chea, the deputy secretary of the party, was in charge of promulgating policy and party instructions. He propagandized the party's triumph and the continuation of the revolutionary army's mandate, saying that, "April 17, 1975 was the day of historical victory over American imperialism, the CIA, and KGB. American imperialists, CIA, and KGB agents keep carrying out theirs plans to recapture power from inside and outside of the country, so therefore, shortly after the liberation we evacuated all people from the cities. Then CIA, KGB and Vietnamese agents were sent to the countryside and could not implement the plans they prepared." Nuon Chea addressed his remarks to a delegation of the

Communist Workers' Party of Denmark.

Ieng Sary, former deputy prime minister in charge of foreign affairs, emphasized that on April 17, 1975, the day of great victory, he was not in the country. Ieng Sary said that then he was on duty in China and would not come back to Cambodia until April 25. He said he was not involved in making the decision to evacuate people. The plan to evacuate people from the cities was initiated by Pol Pot and aimed at seeking and arresting enemies of the revolution.

Hor, chief of the hundred-member unit of Division 703, was assigned to evacuate people from the city, but he claimed that he did not know the plan's ultimate objective. On the morning of April 17, 1975 he was ordered to send people out of the city within three days. He immediately began to implement the party's order. His unit was responsible for evacuating people who lived near Kirirom Cinema from Phnom Penh to Kampong Speu, Takeo, and Kampot provinces by traveling down the street where the glass manufacturer was located. That day Hor, clad in black pajamas, a red scarf, and a cap, with and a microphone in his hand and accompanied by two well armed soldiers, announced the party's plan to have people leave their homes. Hor admitted that a group of soldiers did in fact fire warning bullets, but denied having done so himself. He said he just checked homes and announced the party's plan. Hor recalled his announcement: "You have to pack your luggage and leave the city for a week in order to escape from the bombing by America." In the evening of April 17, Hor's group found about ten Lon Nol soldiers hiding near Pet Chin Hospital and smashed them all.

Theng was a Khmer Rouge cadre in charge of evacuating people living near Oreussey market. Theng said he was ordered to implement two plans given by the party: 1) arrest former Lon Nol police who surrendered, and 2) evacuate people who lived near Oreussey market to Kandal Province, departing from Kbal Thnal. His group carried out the first plan with good results, arresting 50 former Lon Nol soldiers who hid themselves to the north of Dara Rasmey High School, and sending them to higher Angkar. Theng's group also implemented the second plan effectively by making an announcement to ask people who lived near Oreussey market to depart to Kbal Thnal. Soldiers who were in charge of the Kbal Thnal area sent them to Kandal province. Theng recalled a terrible event at that time, saying that a soldier in his group pushed an old woman from the fourth floor of a flat east of Oreussey market because she was "against Angkar's plan." Theng said that in reality, the woman was paralyzed and her children had left her alone in the flat.

After leaving the city, Phala, a fighter in Division 703, found a dead body in a bed. The body was very thin and bore no scar. Phala claimed the victim died of disease or hunger.

Along with the evacuation plan Angkar ordered those in the lower class to seek and kill enemies. Tam, a former chief of Kampeng commune, Pre Kabas district, Takeo province, said he was ordered to carry out the party's plan. In mid-1975 he arrested and sent several former Lon Nol soldiers in Kampeng commune to the district chief of Prey Kabas.

Another Khmer Rouge cadre named Em Min, alias Sen, was ordered to find and kill enemies. According to the plan, the party was to receive the evacuees from the cities and provincial towns, and arrange for them to live in villages and communes. Those who were mingled with the people would be singled out and sent to another place for clear evaluation and investigation. Those identified as officials would be smashed one by one.

April 17, 1975 was a day of great victory for the Khmer Rouge. It was also the day that they began undertaking their plan to search out and kill the enemies of the revolution. Consequently, more than two million people were killed by the Khmer Rouge, who saw April 17, 1975 as the beginning of their "great leap forward."

Meng-Try Ea is a co-author of Victims and Perpetrators?: Testimony of Young Khmer Rouge Comrades. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2001.

List of Prisoners Smashed at S-21 (Tuol Sleng)

Compiled by Nean Yin

(Continued from the March 2002 issue)

No.	Name	Role	Place of Arrest	Date of Entry	Date of Execution	Others
190	Sara Patt Vanne (F)	Tailor	Region 25	April 11, 1976	??	Pakistani
191	Kha Diya	Cattle tender	Region 25	April 11, 1976	??	Pakistani
192	Sara Patt Sivini	Vendor Region 25		April 11, 1976	??	Pakistani
193	Prum Kim Choeun	Engineer	Battambang	May 1, 1976	??	Stomach ache
194	Om Phal	Worker Battery	Factory	??	May 1, 1976	Numb, chest hurt
195	Choulong Rainsei	Radio broadcaster	Region 22	??	May 1, 1976	Numb, physical pain, swollen
196	Khou Chhang Se	Chemical engineer	Region 25	??	May 1, 1976	Numb, physical pain
197	Yi Saleh Yassya	Ministry of Cults	Region 22	??	May 2, 1976	Numb, physical pain
198	Sao Som	Fifty-member	Northern Division	??	May 3, 1976	Died of disease
199	Sisowat Butsara	First lieutenant	Region 25	??	May 3, 1976	Physical pain
200	Hen Sa Un	Teacher	Region 22	??	May4, 1976	
201	Kim Din	Spy Secretary	Pursat	??	May 4, 1976	
202	Thach Koeung	Worker Phsar Tauch	Electricity	??	May 4, 1976	Physical pain, numb
203	Sok Run	Corporal chief	Region 25	??	May 5, 1976	Died of disease
204	Svay Mok	Region 25	Region 25	??	May 6, 1976	Dysentery
205	But Phat	Fishing engineer	Region 25	??	May 6, 1976	Physical pain, numb
206	Nguon Samit	Villager		??	May 7, 1976	
207	Moul Vandy aka Ya Len	Villager	Kampong Som	July 18, 1976	May 7, 1976	
208	Sam Ha Khun	Worker	Tire Factory	??	May 7, 1976	Died of disease
209	(Unknown)	Siamese	Kampong Som	??	May 7, 1976	Died of disease
210	(Unknown)	Siamese	Kampong Som	??	May 8, 1976	Died of disease
211	Sao Man	Combatant of Unit 260	Division 703	??	May 8, 1976	Numb, swollen
212	Tem Sophon	Worker Tire factory		??	May 9, 1976	Died of disease
213	Ly Yaphoeuk	Vietnamese	Kompong Som	??	May 9, 1976	Died of disease
214	Sin Ean	Worker Phsar Tauch	Electricity	??	May 9, 1976	Dysentery and numb
215	Yim Sarin	Worker	Chak Angre	??	May 10, 1976	Physical pain, numb and constipation
216	Nguyen Yav	Vietnamese	Kampong Som	??	May 10, 1976	Died of disease
217	Le Yang Ngie	Vietnamese	Kampong Som	??	May 10, 1976	Died of disease
218	Savan Lai	Base person	Region 25	??	May 10, 1976	Died of disease
219	Hing Chrun	Villager	Kampong Chhnang	??	May 10, 1976	Died of disease
220	Thai Ra aka Rom	Agent of Office 11	Region 25	??	May 10, 1976	Physical pain and swollen
221	Lay Sam Oeun	Student	Prek Ho	Sept. 1, 1976	May 11, 1976	
222	Hun Phal	Combatant of	Division 703	??	May 11, 1976	Dysentery

		Unit 99				
223	Aing Ly	Villager	Region 25	??	May 11, 1976	Dysentery
224	Yuok Horl	Khlaing Prak staff	Region 25	??	May 11, 1976	Dysentery
225	Lay Sam Oeun aka Sam Ol	Student	Region 25	??	May 11, 1976	Fever
226	Heng Nhil aka Moeun	Clerk	Sangkat Lek 5	??	May 12, 1976	Numb, heart attack, swollen
227	But Chhoeun	Worker	Textile T-2	??	May 12, 1976	Physical pain, numb
228	Khlok Darapheak	Technical engineer	Region 22	??	May 13, 1976	Physical pain, heart attack
229	Hun Sary	Fishery	Kampong Som	??	May 14, 1976	Died of disease
230	Chang Nguyen Loeb	Vietnamese spy	Kampong Som	??	May 14, 1976	Died of disease
231	Theung Vang Yi	Vietnamese spy	Kampong Som	??	May 14, 1976	Died of disease
232	Chheav Tech Hour	Student	??	??	May 14, 1976	Numb, physical pain
233	Nget Yann	Fifty-member Unit (134)	??	??	May 14, 1976	Numb, heart attack
234	You Phan	Worker Phsar Tauch	Electricity	??	May 14, 1976	Died of disease
235	Peang Pho	Worker	Milk factory	April 8, 1976	May 14, 1976	Died of disease
236	Nget Chhun Ngan	Combatant of Unit 170	??	??	May 14, 1976	Died of disease
237	Nou Pum	Battalion 257	Prek Phneou	??	May 14, 1976	Died of disease
238	Sam Sasna	Teacher	Region 22	February 22, 1976	May 15, 1976	Died of disease
239	Tep Sokhom	Government employee	Mouk Kampoul	January 29, 1976	May 15, 1976	Died of disease
240	Kim Sa Em	Worker Chak Angre	Electricity	??	May 15, 1976	Died of disease
241	Peang Po	Worker	Milk factory	??	May 15, 1976	Swollen, numb
242	Nget Khan	Deputy Chief of Fishery Section	Region 25	??	May 15, 1976	Numb, stomach ache
243	Chheang Thaong	Cadre of T-13	Boeng Trabek	??	May 15, 1976	
244	Hen Hun aka Hean	Combatant of Kor-92	Boeng Trabek	??	May 15, 1976	
245	Chen Sie aka Han	Cadre of School Kor-92	Boeng Trabek	??	May 15, 1976	
246	Ao An aka Ry	Military Chief of Kor-92	Boeng Trabek	??	May 15, 1976	
247	Seun Sary aka Prev	Office Kor-14	Boeng Trabek	??	May 15, 1976	
248	Roath Bo aka Kang	Office Kor-13	Boeng Trabek	??	May 15, 1976	

(Continued in the April 2002 issue)

Nean Yin is the team leader of the Microfilm Project of the Documentation Center of Cambodia.

Documentary Photographs

Sophal Ly

(Continued from the March 2002 issue)

Portrait One

Kang Khem, age 21 in 1977, was born into a middle class family in Prek Tamem village, Prek Sdei commune, District 18. His father's name was Kang Srei and his mother's was Tep Nim. He had eight siblings. Kang Khem joined the revolution on May 04, 1973. He was transferred to work as a combatant in S-21 in June 1975. (Present status unknown)

Portrait Two

Kuy Kol, age 26 in 1977, was a student from the bourgeois class. He was born in Samrong Ke village, Samrong Thom commune, District 16, Region 25. Kuy Kol's father's name was Kuy Mut and his mother's was Lang Pok. He had three siblings, a brother and two sisters. He joined the revolution as a combatant on August 27, 1973 in Prek Tahang village, Kampong Kong commune, District 20. Kuy Kol began working at S-21 prison in June 1975. (Present status unknown)

Portrait Three

Kit Tay, age 20 in 1977, was born into a lower-middle class family in Kampot Pul village, Prek Ampil commune, District 20, Region 25. His father's name was Kit Tom and his mother's name was Bou Heng (42 years old). Kit Toy had four siblings: two brothers and two sisters. He joined the revolution as a messenger combatant on March 13, 1973. After training for six months, Kit Toy was transferred to Unit 143 and then to Regiment 267, where he again worked as a messenger combatant. He became a medical combatant

at S-21 prison in January 1975. (Present status unknown)

Portrait Four

Chhoeung Chean, age 23 in 1977, was born into the poor peasant class in Tbeng village, Tang Krorsaing commune, District 14, Region 31. His father's name was Chhoueng, and his mother's was Mil Pong. He has seven siblings: three brothers and four sisters. Chean joined the revolution in District 14, Region 31, after having been a unit chief for three months. He was then sent to study at the military training Center of Division 703, headed by Tuy. After he completed his training, he began work in S-21 prison. (Present status unknown)



Portrait Five

Roath Nim, aka Som Nim, was 28 years old in 1977. She was born in Prek Thmey village, Prek Thmey commune, District 28, Region 25, to a poor peasant class family. Her father, Som Rath, worked in a cooperative during the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Her mother, Him Orn, was dead. Som Nim was a farmer before joining the revolution. She joined the revolution on May 15, 1974. Today she lives in Kandal Province.

Portrait Six

Seng Chak, age 20 in 1977, was born into a lower-middle class family in Kampong Trea village, Saang Phnom commune, District 20, Region 25. His father's name was Kar Seng. His mother, Por Sem, was dead. Seng Chak has six siblings: four brothers and two sisters. He joined the revolution in Saang Phnom commune on March 8, 1974 and worked there as a combatant for eight months. After taking a training course, he was transferred to work in Unit 296 and then Unit 130. Seng Chak was sent to work at S-21 on November 28, 1975. (Present status unknown)

Sophal Ly is a staff-writer for Searching for the Truth.

They Disappeared in the Khmer Rouge Revolution

Dara Peou Vanthan

"Always [be ready to] attack, being wrong with hands takes hands; being wrong with legs takes legs, without any consideration," said Chuon in reference to the massacre of Phnom Penh evacuees.


Chey Sem

Prior to 1975, the Khmer Rouge recruited children between the ages of 13 and 18 in Kampong Thom province to join their revolution. Most of these children were not well educated and did not understand what "revolution" meant. Watt, Chey Sem's son, was brought by the village chief, Im, to join the Khmer Rouge army when he was about 10 years old. Chey Sem asked how his son could join the army when he was so young. Im replied that even younger children were joining the army. Besides, he stated, children in the military could other work, like typing (Thea, also known as Sok, was assigned to do typing when he was 16 or 17 years old).

Until April 1975, the children who joined the revolution were allowed to come home to visit once or twice. Chey Sem's son went to visit his home once when he was driving to Prear Vihear province. His short visit, however, soon turned sour: the cooperative chief did not allow Watt's younger sister to see her elder brother when he arrived. Enraged by the way the cooperative chief behaved, Seun, Watt's younger sister, committed suicide by making thirty cuts in her stomach. She died after being sent to a hospital in Kampong Kor Commune.

Kan, Kheun's younger brother, visited his home only once for two days after he joined the revolution at age 17. He did not have permission to make the visit, so he did so in secret when he was wounded and staying in a nearby hospital. The village chief's subordinates saw him and took him away. Kan has not been seen since.

Duong Chin did not have a chance to visit his home after he joined the Khmer Rouge army. Only when Democratic Kampuchea was overthrown in January 1979 could he come back. During the war between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam, he had lost one of his legs to a landmine.

Koy Torng and Khoem Chhoeu never visited their homes after joining the Khmer Rouge. They were only allowed to send one letter each to their families. Koy Torng's sister remembered the contents of the letter her brother sent. She recalled that Koy Tuong had sent the letter via a construction site when Phnom Penh was liberated in 1975.

Many parents, siblings and other relatives still wait for news of their loved ones, but there is too little hope for them. "My mother waited until her death, but she never saw her son return," said Mong, Ry's younger sister. Chey Sem recalled that he got a message from his son Watt in the 1980s through Chhom. According to Chhom, Chey Sem said his son lived in the Site 2 refugee camp, but added, "Never, never heard anything from him so far."

Chuon received a message in the 1980s through her uncle, Hou Yan, that her elder brother, Koy Torng, was still alive. This uncle had brought his wine to sell in Chy Sampeou village and spotted Koy Torng on the way. But Koy Torng did not recognize

him. Since then, Chuon has not received any word of her brother. "Whenever she heard thunder, she thought of her brother and was very, very sad," said Chuon.


Ray Rim

Ray Sok, a tall man with dark skin and curly hair, joined the Khmer Rouge revolution at the age of 13. His father, Ray Rim, is still waiting for the day his son comes back, although he really believes that his son is dead. "Though we are poor, we need to live together. We can share a ladle of rice, a string of bean to feeds all of us. When I think of the rain and thunder, it reminds me of my son. Food can be enough or insufficient [for him]," Ray Rim said with sadness. It is difficult for him to accept that there has been no news from his son. "Even some people in Australia, very far from here, they can send letters to their family. There is news from every- where. Their children do but my son does not," said Ray Rim.


Sam Khoeun

Sam Khoeun went to see a fortuneteller to learn about the fate of her younger brother, Kan. The fortuneteller said Kan was still alive; he was not dead. However, there has been no news from him. "None, none at all," said Sam Khoeun.

Thea, also known as Sok, was sent by Khmer Rouge Angkar to work as a typist in Phnom Penh at the age of 16-17. She is still alive. It is not known whether her parents were killed by the Khmer Rouge. Put Un, Thea's aunt, described his parents' lives: "Her father used to be a precinct official and after a long time he was accused of having a [political] tendency. He was taken for reeducation in Cham Kar Loeu district. His wife and the entire family who lived in Kandal pagoda were killed. Thea is the only one who survived because Angkar sent her to work as a typist in Phnom Penh." Between 1995-1996 Thea was only able to visit her aunt in Hantvea village, Chror Long commune, Baray district, Kampong Thom province. Thea now has a family and children who live in Orathkros, Pailin. She has a new name, Sok Ek.

In addition to the disappearance of female and male Khmer Rouge cadres, some information exists on their parents and relatives' lives. Throughout the Democratic Kampuchea regime, Chey Chhem served as a cook for the precinct (Sangkat Sala Visay in Prasat Baling district, Kampong Thom province) chief and his soldiers. Kat, the precinct chief, was killed by the Khmer Rouge. As far as the food rations were concerned, the chief decided whether the precinct should be given rice porridge or rice, said Chey Chhem. "The chief decided to cook rice porridge or to cook rice each day. We just followed orders," he added.

In addition to his job as a cook, the precinct chief also ordered Chey Chhem to help tieup people who were to be killed. He refused to carry out the order, saying "I refuse to help. You are not vindictive. How can you act like that?" Chey Chhem also saw people being sent off in trucks in Kampong Kok commune, Balang Brasat. They often traveled northward at 5 p.m. to a place called Vor Yeav Kul Thnot. He estimated that there were 30 to 50 people in a truck, including very small children. The precinct chief, who decided whether a person should be killed, arranged the transport. "The precinct chief arranged people to be killed. The chief gave you the order to kill this person with this name or that one with that name all the time," said Chey Chhem.

When they wanted to send people to be killed, they always used tricks and excuses, saying that they would have a meeting or be transferred to another place to be reeducated. The people gathered and got on the truck without knowing that they would be killed. "People got on trucks and were pleased to be transferred in hope that they would have rice there because they did not have enough food to survive here. Some of them felt happy because they did not believe they would be treated like that..."

Between 7 and 8 p.m., the trucks came back empty. Chey Chhem never heard whispering about people being sent away because even he, who had been ordered to tie people up, was not allowed to be near the trucks. Only the precinct chief and the men who reported directly to him knew what was occurring. "I wanted to approach them but I was not allowed to do so. They had their own workplaces. When they came to work they entered their places. I did not dare come close to them," said Chey Chhem. This year, Chey Chhem turned 66 years of age and earns his living as a farmer and a blacksmith. He still constantly misses his son and is still hurt at the loss of his only daughter, Soeun.

Koy Chuon, age 51, experienced and remembers things regarding violations. She described what had happened to the people who were evacuated from Phnom Penh to her village. The evacuees underwent serious hardship and were forced to overwork in bases. "The Phnom Penh evacuees were easy targets for punishment. Only small mistake could get them killed and my village almost became empty. No one survived—ten families from Phnom Penh were all killed. They were blamed that we built a road like that, but we had only two days. At night they were killed along with their big and small children. As far as the killing of Phnom Penh evacuees was concerned, they were killed with the whole family—no one, a child or a wife—could escape from the killing."

Koy Chuon's colleagues consider her to be very brave. She asked the cooperative chief, Pak, why people were killed without any apparent reason. "He replied that because they were second lieutenants, first lieutenants, captains...it was no use letting their wives survive when the husbands had been killed," said Koy Chuon. She remembered that Tho and her son were killed because her husband had been a captain in the Lon Nol regime. Tho was killed at night. The night before, she had borrowed Chuon's blouse to wear, but the old cooperative chief, Lim, shouted: "Give the blouse back to Chuon." He said, "I do not have to catch her. I have to kill her in front here. It is not necessary to take her away and kill her in the forest. No one will bury her." A mass grave was already dug near a roadside. After she was killed, her body was not buried completely and her legs could be seen.

After the Phnom Penh evacuees were killed, an unidentified man told Koy Chuon to be careful and keep quiet. One of her group would be sent away, he added, telling her that, "I heard worrying news that your nephew's unit wants to take one of them." Koy Chuon was very surprised by what the man had said and was very scared. So she asked, "Oh, who will be sent away? I supposed that only Tho would be sent away, because she was the target of revenge for a long time."

Dara Peou Vanthan is the supervisor of DC-Cam's Promoting Accountability Project.

Khmer Rouge Slogan

◆ Revolution against imperialism is not an action of inviting guests to have meal, writing articles, braiding, education, softness or fear of enemy. But it is a class wrath seized to topple another class. *(KR notebook Nhok: 78)*.

(Continued from the March 2002 issue)

Sun Ty, in his confession, scribbled a private note to the Organization that protested his innocence and said he had been tortured: "At first I refused to answer, but after I had been beaten with a heavy stick I invented an answer. I beg the Party not to arrest the people I named. Our comrades are good. I am not CIA or Khmer Serei." The presence of these comments in Sun Ty's file suggests that they never left S-21.

Instances of torture mentioned in the archive and by survivors are given in the following list.

- Beating
  - by hand
  - with a heavy stick with branches
  - with bunches of electric wire
- Cigarette burns
- Electric shock
- Forced to eat excrement
- Forced to drink urine
- Forced feeding
- Hanging upside down
- Holding up arms for an entire day
- Being jabbed with a needle
- Paying homage to image(s) of dogs (all from 1978)
- Paying homage to the wall
- Paying homage to the table
- Paying homage to the chair
- Having fingernails pulled out
- Scratching
- Shoving
- Suffocation with plastic bag
- Water tortures
  - immersion
  - drops of water onto the forehead.

The list does not include many of the tortures that are depicted in Vann Nath's paintings. Talking to East German filmmakers about S-21 in 1981, Nath recalled: "This is the room I used to work in. Sometimes I could see through a crack in the window what was happening outside. So I saw them submerging prisoners in water. Others were brought to interrogation stark naked. Whatever I observed in secret I tried to record [later] in my pictures."

Voices from S-21

Chapter Five: Forcing the Answers

David Chandler

Of the 21 interrogators listed in the 1978 telephone directory for S-21, 18 were implicated in torture in their own comments to prisoners' confessions, in other interrogators' confessions, or in self-critical study sessions conducted for prison staff. Of the twenty-four interrogators at S-21 who were later arrested, eighteen admitted torturing prisoners. Eleven confessed to beating prisoners to death, as did one of the guards. Some of the confessions implicated others on the staff whose confessions have not survived. The archive suggests that certain interro-gators resorted to torture more readily than others. One of them, Buth Heng, who was eventually arrested, confessed to a series of barbaric sexual assaults and to beating several prisoners to death, including one who had already been severely injured after a suicide attempt.

Sexual violations of female prisoners probably occurred frequently, but sexual references seldom surface in the confessions of S-21 personnel. Such offenses were certainly frowned on by the men administering the prison, as an entry in Chan's note-book suggests: "When questioning females, there must always be two people asking the questions. Don't lie down [with them?], and don't pinch their hair or their cheeks."

All the survivors remember being beaten, and, as the S-21 survivor Ung Pech told David Hawk, "For beating, anything that fell into [the interrogators'] hands was used: different kinds of tree branches, bamboo, whips hurriedly made from electric wire."

Electric shock was administered to prisoners so commonly that a list of instructions drawn up for all prisoners included a request not to scream when electric shocks were applied. The penalty for disobeying an interrogator, said the instructions, could be ten strokes of a whip or "five electric shocks." Vann Nath's memories of electric shock were probably typical:

"[The interrogator] tied an electric wire around my handcuffs and connected the other end to my trousers with a safety pin. Then he sat down again. 'Now do you remember? Who collaborated with you to betray [the Organization]?' he asked. I couldn't think of anything to say. He connected the wire to the electric power, plugged it in, and shocked me. I passed out. I don't know how many times he shocked me, but when I came to, I could hear a distant voice asking over and over who my connection was. I couldn't get any words out. They shocked me so severely that I collapsed on the floor, my shirt completely drenched with sweat. To this day I don't understand why they arrested me."

Interrogators' notes to some confessions suggest that prisoners often physically collapsed and confessed "fully" when threatened with electric shock. Others succumbed after the shock had been inflicted. One prisoner, the interrogator wrote, "says he can't withstand [any more] electric shock, that his liver and gall bladder have dissolved." Other prisoners were tougher. One of them, an interrogator remarked, "would respond only after strong torture," and another, when "strong torture was applied, refused to talk." Ly Phen, a veteran revolutionary, "refused to say anything about his activities, so I applied torture," his interrogator noted. "When he regained consciousness, all he could do was vomit." Interrogators found one female prisoner "very lascivious" (*kbul khocb nah*). "Unable to withstand torture, she removed her sarong and pretended to be sick." Toward anyone offering resistance, Ouch was merciless, telling an interrogator on one occasion, "Beat [the prisoner] until he tells everything, beat him to get at the deep things."

Another frequently imposed torture at S-21 was that of "paying homage." Vann Nath remembered a drawing of a dog's body with Ho Chi Minh's head tacked to the wall of an interrogation room and recalled interrogators talking about it. *Tbvay bongkum*, or "paying homage," as John Marston has argued, is a more "explicit declaration of hierarchy" than the normal Cambodian greeting, with palms together, known as *sompeab*. Both terms were used to describe this particular torture. In prerevolutionary society, the *tbvay bongkum* gesture, which involves raising the joined palms above one's head and also occasionally prostrating oneself, was reserved for greeting royalty or Buddhist monks, or paying homage to an image of the Buddha. At S-21, the gesture probably involved assuming a painful, groveling posture, perhaps related to the infamous "airplane" that prisoners were made to mimic in the Cultural Revolution in China. One interrogator's note tells of making a prisoner pay homage for half an hour, and another mentions the torture being repeated "five times." "Paying homage" was painful enough in some cases to induce a full confession.

By 1978, an image symbolizing America had been added to that of Ho Chi Minh. The interrogator's notes to Svang Kum's confession identify the second image as one of Lyndon Johnson: "At first when we came to the interrogation place, after I had asked about her history and asked why the Organization had arrested her, she wept and shouted, saying that her husband was a traitor and that she wasn't a traitor. I applied discipline by making her pay homage to the image of the dogs Ho Chi Minh and Johnson, but she refused to salute [them], so I beat her for refusing to tell her story and for not respecting the discipline of *santebal*. She gave up hope and began to speak about her secret networks."

Two other passages that discuss "paying homage" to the images occur in notes takes by senior interrogators Chan and Tuy-Pon at a livelihood meeting convened on 28 May 1978. They differ slightly and are worth quoting in full.

Tuy Pon Text

"We test them by getting them to pay homage to two dogs. Dogs have a political meaning. The first

dog is America. The second is Vietnam. When they salute them, they acknowledge that they support these two.

From the standpoint of ideology, we cast [the prisoners] aside, and no longer allow them to stay with us.

From the organizational standpoint, we force them to honor *santebal*. We have achieved good results from this already."

The document closes when Tuy-Pon quotes the speaker at the study session as saying: "You should not beat prisoners when they are angry. Beating doesn't hurt them when they are angry." The interrogators also were urged to keep their tempers, for as the interrogators' notebook asserted, "Sometimes we go blind with rage, and this causes us to lose mastery. It causes [the prisoners] to be incomplete, ideologically, spinning around thinking [only] of [their own] life and death." The rights and wrongs of inducing these death-dealing effects are left unmentioned.

Chan Text

"We force them to salute the images of two dogs. This is a kind of interrogation. The dogs have political significance.

First dog: American imperialism.

Second dog: Vietnamese consumers of [our] territory.

We have them pay homage so as to hold them firmly, because when they are arrested, 90 percent of them [still] consider themselves revolutionaries. After they have paid homage to the dogs, they will realize that they are traitors.

From an ideological standpoint, we reject their ideology.

From an organizational standpoint: do they respect santebal, or not? Procedures: Say what you can to make them change their minds and obey "older brother." If they argue, don't beat them yet, but wait for a minute before making them say that they served these two dogs: from what year? in what organization? Be careful: they may say that the CIA has no venom [real strength?]."

"Paying homage" in this way introduced many prisoners abruptly to the power relations of S-21. It highlighted the contrast or contradiction in Khmer Rouge thinking between hidden, abject, foreign, and treasonous "facts" on the one hand and the overwhelming "truth" of the hidden but resplendent Organization on the other, and between the omnipotence of the interrogators and the powerlessness of "guilty people." This particular torture also set out the discipline of the interrogation that was to follow and forced the prisoners to identify themselves, even before they started talking, as traitors.

Some "ninety percent" of the prisoners, it seemed, began their interrogations by pluckily referring to themselves as "revolutionaries." How was this possible, the interrogators wondered, if they had been arrested? How could a genuine revolutionary be fettered, numbered, and locked up? "Paying homage" was one of a series of degradations designed to force prisoners to recognize their animal status. Their foreign masters (me) were depicted as animals, and only animals would pay homage to them. Once the patron—dogs' identities and the prisoners' loyalty to them—had been displayed, the prisoner was divested of revolutionary and human status, and the interrogation could proceed, majestically or at a fast clip, to unearth "treacherous activities," "plans," and "strings of traitors." The prisoners by that point had become debased, unhealthy, document-producing creatures tottering on all fours toward their deaths.

To place torture at S-21 into a historical context, it seems clear that "paying homage," electric shock, immersion, suffocation, beatings and other tortures at S-21 combined the traditional "vengeance of the sovereign" with a comparatively new, disturbingly "rational," and quasi-judicial quest for documents, memories, and evidence, raw terror transmuted into history.

In this hushed and brutal ambience, counter-revolutionary actions, whether "true" or "false," needed to be brought to light, and memories had to coincide with expectations. Inevitably, however, "doing politics" often failed to motivate the interrogators or to unearth the memories that were required. Was torture any more reliable? There is no way of telling; no discussions of the issue have survived. The practice was certainly

widespread. I would argue that after demonizing and dehumanizing the "enemies," routinizing violence and unleashing the interrogators' hatred, torture was doled out in substantial portions at S-21 with no thought for the pain it caused or, as far as the "truth" was concerned, its value compared to that of "doing politics."

The Interrogators' Notebook

The relation of torture to "doing politics" that the officials at S-21 desired is spelled out in a hand-written, unsigned notebook prepared at the prison between July and September 1976, with doodles dating from 1978 on the closing pages. The notebook may have been initiated by an S-21 cadre, perhaps one of those purged in 1976 or 1977, and lost or abandoned for a couple of years. In the pages that relate to doing torture and doing politics, the notes stress that: "We must take the view that the question of keeping [prisoners] alive or asking for their papers or killing them is decided on for us by the Party. That is, we do whatever we can, so long as we get answers. The use of torture is a supplementary measure. Our past experience with our comrades the interrogators has been that they fell for the most part on the side of torture. They emphasized torture instead of propaganda. This is the wrong way of doing things; we must show them the proper way to do them."

The notes go on to suggest that while torture is inevitable, its use should be delayed in many cases until after a valid confession has been obtained:

"The enemies can't escape from torture; the only difference is whether they receive a little or a lot. While we consider torture to be a necessary measure, we must do politics [with them] so they will confess to us, [but] it's only when we have forced them via politics to confess that torture can be used. Only when we put maximum political pressure on them, forcing them by using politics to confess, will torture become effective. Furthermore, doing politics makes the prisoners answer clearly, whether or nor the use of torture follows."

The passage suggests that torture should be used and indeed became "effective" after confessions were obtained, seemingly acknowledging that workers were going to torture prisoners anyway and that perhaps some tortures carried out as medical experiments might best he performed after documentation was complete. The passage also implies that torturing prisoners might be a bonus for S-21 workers after a confession had been obtained. But what is meant by "effective" remains unclear. The notebook goes on to provide hints about tactics that interrogators might employ to propagandize, beguile, and disarm the prisoners without torturing them, and adds:

"One objective of doing torture is to seek answers from them, and not to make us happy. It's not done out of individual anger, out of heat. Beating is done to make them fearful, but certainly not to kill them. Whenever we torture them we must examine their health beforehand, and examine the [condition of the] whip as well. Don't be greedy and try to hurry up and kill them."

The passage suggests that torturing prisoners made some interrogators "happy," while others freely acted out of "heat" or were in haste to kill the Party's "enemies." Moreover, provided that the whips were in acceptable condition, beating relatively healthy prisoners almost, but not quite, to the point of death was considered fair. None of this violence is surprising, given the wholesale dehumanization of prisoners and the culture of the prison, but it is chilling to see it so dispassionately written down. Almost as if its author were aware of overstepping a limit, the document then backs off and adds sanctimoniously:

"You must be aware that doing politics is very important and necessary, whereas doing torture is subsidiary to politics. Politics always takes the lead. Even when doing torture, you must also constantly engage in propaganda."

(Continued in the May 2003 issue)

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A victim of torture at S-21.
Artist: Van Nath, a former S-21 prisoner.

Reminders from the Bombing at Dak Dam

Sophearith Chuong

The bombardment of Ratanak Kiri province is reminiscent of an event that took place at Dak Dam subdistrict, which housed a military post and was heavily damaged by the bombing campaign in 1969. Dak Dam is located in Oraing Ov district, Mondol Kiri province, and is bordered on the northeast by Vietnam.

During the Vietnam War, almost every part of Mondul Kiri was showered by B-52s, including Oraing Ov. Along with the destruction of military targets, many people were killed and wounded, and lost their homes and household possessions.

Phsa Prai, 52, is an ethnic Phnorng who is chief of Dak Dam subdistrict. During the 1969 bombing, he recalled that 40 people were killed, 30 of whom died in a mass trench. Six of them were artillery gunners and four other were civilians. In addition, a primary school and several military vehicles and other equipment were damaged.

The following is a brief, general description of an artillery hit by the B-52 bombs in 1969 in Dak Dam subdistrict. I'm afraid that I don't understand this article. If might be based on a document the Americans left behind at Dak Dam, but it certainly wasn't written in English originally. It also doesn't seem to describe a "hit"; rather it describes equipment and procedures. Was this taken from a Khmer Rouge document found at Dak Dam?

The M012 105mm Howitzer

Caliber: 105 mm
Length: 2.57 meters
Weight: 1934 kg
Elevation: -6 degrees to + 65 degrees
Traverse: 46 degrees
Range: 11,430 meters
Muzzle velocity: 472 meters per second.

This is the newer lighter version of the M2, which was introduced in Vietnam during a war where guns were often transported by helicopter. It is in action at a new firebase. Technically, earth revetments have to be bulldozed and sandbags have to put in place in order to use it. This 105mm howitzer can be airlifted into a firebase on top of a hill. Everything for these remote firebases has to be airlifted in and out. But gradually this combination of guns, ammunition and other equipment becomes home for the gunners.

Mortars provide shorter-range cover. Once an area of the jungle is cleared, the 105mm howitzers are airlifted in by crane. With the firebase established, operational units can go out into the surrounding area. On search and destroy, they can sweep through the countryside until they make contact with the enemy. Then they radio back the map reference and call down an artillery barrage. The M105 howitzer provides battlefield flexibility for gunners in rough terrain. It can be towed, but in Vietnam, it was usually airlifted. As we move up a hillside in the jungle, sweating through every pore, we are liable to come under fire at any moment. It's good to know that we've got firebase support, able to crash down 105mm rounds within seconds of a call on the radio.

Procedure for Field Military Officers

1. A point squad is in trouble and the Forward Observer (FO) instructs his Radio Transmission Officer (RTO) to transmit the position and distance back to the firebase.

2. Back at the Fire Support Base (FSB), the Fire Direction Center (FDC) quickly checks the FO's calculations on the plotting board and then relays the exact required elevation and deflection to the gun crew.

3. After a couple of smoke-rounds to pinpoint the target, the seven-man crews of the 105mm howitzers load 42 lb HE rounds into the breaches, and start pulverizing the distant target.

4. After the intense artillery barrage, Huey Cobra Gunships are flown into the target area to harass the retreating enemy.

Sophearith Chuong is a staff-writer for Searching for the Truth.

Him Huy Needs Justice

Vannak Huy

"I will testify at a trial for crimes committed in Tuol Sleng prison," said Him Huy. Twenty-five years ago he was deputy chief of the guard unit at S-21 (Tuol Sleng prison). "I did not want to commit mistakes, but they [Duch and Hor] put me under pressure to follow them," added Him.

In 1977 Him Huy started working as a combatant in S-21's guard unit. In 1978 he was appointed deputy chief of this unit by Khoem Vat, also known as Hor, deputy chief of S-21. His main responsibilities were to arrest prisoners, guard them, and send them for execution at the Boeung Cheung Ek killing fields. Him admitted that he had killed five prisoners using the iron bar of a cart wheel.

Him said that he only summoned the nerve to kill the five prisoners when he was goaded by Hor, who asked: "Him, are you absolutely determined or not?" I was forced to answer 'absolutely determined'; otherwise, they would have suspected I was an enemy and would have killed me if I was not absolutely determined. They would have killed not only me but they would have tried to find and kill my family and relatives," said Him. Duch also used to order him to kill prisoners. Duch was a cruel revolutionary who once ordered S-21 prison guards to kill two of his own brothers-in-law.

Him described how prisoners were handcuffed and blindfolded before they were sent to be killed at Boeung Cheung Ek. After they arrived, security guards told the prisoners to get down from the trucks and then sent them into a house. Then, the "prisoner-killers" were ordered to kill them one by one. Him was in charge of the prisoner list: he verified each name on the list. The list then was sent to Suos Thy, a cadre of the documentation department of S-21 prison. After a prisoner's name was called, he or she was brought in front of an already-dug mass grave and told to kneel there. "They were hit and their throats were cut. Then their handcuffs were removed and they were pushed into the grave," said Him. Teng was in charge of the massacre of the prisoners at Boeung Cheung Ek.

S-21, the central prison, played a very important role in obtaining prisoners' confessions and smashing those accused of being internal and external enemies of the communist party. Duch, the chief of S-21, managed the daily workings of the prison and its branches. Hor was Duch's deputy chief and Nun Huy, known as Huy Sre, was the chief of S-21D prison, a branch of S-21.

In January 1977 Huy Sre made a list of eleven pregnant women to be smashed, and sent it to S-21. In the section entitled "various events," Huy wrote notes in longhand in front of each name. One of these reads: "Eight women are expecting babies and Angkar smashed three pregnant women." At the bottom of the list he wrote, " Including some small children."

The means of arresting and killing prisoners at S-21 was under the close control of the Khmer Rouge army staff. According to a decision reached during a meeting of the Standing Committee on October 9, 1975, Son Sen was in charge of the army staff and security, and Nuon Chea was a high-ranking official who could make decisions on the fate of the S-21 prisoners. Seeing the misery and subsequent killing, Huy asked permission from Son Sen to leave S-21 and join the army unit (before working at S-21, Huy was the chief of Battalion 705 of Division 703). His request was refused.

Huy called S-21 "A place you can enter, but cannot leave." Not only its prisoners but also some of its combatants and cadres met the same fate,

particularly after 1977. The killing of the S-21 cadres rose as the war between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese troops escalated along the border. For example, Him said a 200-member combatant unit was reduced to only 50 between 1977 and late 1978. He noted that the killing of the cadres was caused by "the accusation that they were consorting with the enemy."

"I was afraid of being accused every day. If I was accused I would be sent to prison," said Huy. He recalled the names of several cadres who had worked with him in Division 703 who were later arrested and killed at S-21. These cadres worried him very much because he felt afraid that they would accuse him of having a connection with the enemy network, CIA, and peace alliance. Five S-21 cadres who were accused as being enemies were Nob Nuon, Snguon, Ky Chun, Pho, and Poch. They were also friends of Huy's. Duch ordered the arrest and execution of these cadres. The five cadres' confessions are kept at the Documentation Center of Cambodia.

Huy first joined the revolutionary army in 1973. While he was working in S-21 prison, he submitted a nine-page resume. In his resume Huy said: "I joined the revolution because I was mentally hurt by old and new colonists, capitalists, feudalists, and reactionaries who controlled, invaded and treated people badly. That's why my consciousness woke up and I joined the revolution to fight against American imperialists to liberate classes and people."

After the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, the Koh Thom district committee of Kandal Province reeducated Huy for more than a year for being involved in the Khmer Rouge regime. Huy came back to live with his wife and children after he was released from prison in Koh Thom.

Huy looked back at his work at S-21: "What I did was just for my life. It was not my responsibility because I was ordered. If I did not follow orders, I would have been killed." If he escaped Duch would have killed his parents and relatives, said Huy. He will testify in public when the Khmer Rouge trials take place.

His willingness was shared by some other top Khmer Rouge leaders. Recently Suong Sikoeun, spokesman of the National United Movement for Democracy, has spoken publicly on The Voice of America, urging the establishment of a tribunal to try former Khmer Rouge leaders.

Suong Sikoeun said he would like to have a court of law judge former Khmer Rouge leaders to clear up misperceptions about his past. Meanwhile, he quoted Ieng Sary, former foreign minister of the Khmer Rouge regime, as saying "Ieng Sary is ready to appear in a trial."

Recently, former S-21 prisoner Phan Thonchan died in a private Phnom Penh hospital. His death terrified Van Nath and Chum Manh, former S-21 prisoners. Van Nath and Chum Manh said they are expecting justice. They want to see Khmer Rouge trials before they pass away.

On February 15, 2002 Ke Pauk, the 72 year-old former secretary of the Northern Zone and a member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party, died of a stroke in Anlong Veng. Ke Pauk was accused of committing crimes during the Khmer Rouge regime. His death occurred when the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia broke apart in their effort to establish an extraordinary chamber to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice.

The establishment of a tribunal to judge Khmer Rouge leaders will result in justice for both the victims and the culprits. The Khmer Rouge trials will become an example for the next generation and give Cambodia a chance at sustainable development. The failure to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to court means that the Cambodian people will not be able to find justice and that their history will be buried by criminals.

***Vanak Huy is a supervisor of DC-Cam's Publication Project. He is also the author of* Khmer Rouge Division 703*:* From Victory to Self-destruction.**

East Timor's Special Panel For Serious Crimes

Suzannah Linton

(Continued from the March 2002 issue)

Starting Up

Regulation 2000/15 was passed without an accompanying budget for the Serious Crimes Project. Nevertheless, work was expected to commence immediately. There were enormous difficulties in "getting up and running" with no equipment, personnel or office premises allocated (staff and equipment were "loaned" from other departments). There was infighting about which department within UNTAET would be responsible for the high-profile work. Much time and effort was spent during the first few months on locating files and evidence scattered between UNTAET's different agencies. The cases of the many low-ranking militiamen, who had already been held in detention for some time and who were continuing to be arrested by UNTAET's law and order agencies, had to be processed as a matter of urgency. Once the Serious Crimes Unit was operational, the minimal resources that were allocated to the project hindered effective investigation of the complete range of crimes committed in East Timor and led to a focus on prosecuting crimes under domestic law rather than as international crimes.

It is therefore vital that adequate resources and appropriately skilled staff are made available for the KR Tribunal at start-up, and that there are clear lines of authority and responsibility. Whether with or without the UN, the government needs to have secured funding for the project. This would have to link into a projected lifetime which is a matter of speculation, but what is clear from East Timor is that the project should not be started if there is no money for it. There should ideally be a "grace period" to enable the institutions to be set up and staffed before work commences. Stakeholders must realize that demands for swift results cannot be fulfilled if the project is to be a meaningful and effective vehicle of justice. Although much work has already been done in the collation and analysis of documentary materials by institutions such as DC-Cam, genocide and other international crimes involve highly complex investigations and long-drawn out trials. It is not an easy or quick matter to investigate, prosecute or try such crimes. Adequate resources, firstly for investigators, the offices of the co-prosecutors and the co-investigating judges, and the chambers themselves, must be provided to enable them to perform their professional duties in accordance with international standards.

Strengthening the Criminal Justice System

East Timor's Serious Crimes Project suffered greatly from being part of a dangerously weak criminal justice system. Some of this weakness was avoidable; some of it was due to the enormity of the task that UNTAET faced when it rushed to create a justice system from the charred ruins left behind by Indonesia. Many feel that UNTAET proceeded in pursuance of a political need to establish a system, without a strategic vision or master plan, consultation of the East Timorese, and without sufficient focus on the development of local capacity or on the viability of that system. Poor administration of the courts has been identified as the source of many of the shortcomings of the justice system, including the Serious Crimes project. Interpretation and translation into the four official languages has been both of inadequate quality and quantity. In the absence of proper transcription, there have been major problems with the accuracy of court records. Court administration and the development of court registries were severely neglected, and judges ended up serving as

administrators. There has been no witness protection or counseling programs for victims. Nor has there been provision for witness expenses. Forensic facilities have been, and continue to be, very basic.

To meet the immense challenge of prosecutions under the KR law, immediate reform is needed to strengthen Cambodia's courts and investigative agencies. Many eminent persons, such as the Special Representatives of the United Nations Secretary General, have suggested ways of improving the justice system. The government has in fact prepared a Governance Action Plan for the reform of the judicial sector, but its impact has yet to be felt. If not across the boards, then the reforms should start with the institutions that will be directly involved in the KR Tribunal project.

The KR Law expects Cambodia's Judicial Police to investigate extremely complex crimes involving the highest levels of State authority, going back to the period between 1975 and 1979 and based on international law - all of which they are unfamiliar with. There are many substantive public reports (for example, those of Human Rights Watch) indicating that the police already have difficulty in coping with ordinary criminal investigations. One way of dealing with the problem could be to identify Judicial Police investigators for specialist training as part of a special unit that exclusively investigates crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. This unit, whilst part of the Ministry of Interior, would by law come under the supervision of the prosecutors. International assistance in developing this specialist investigative capacity would be crucial and the Ministry of Interior should consider permitting specialist international investigators to work alongside Cambodian investigators and as advisors throughout the process. Forensic facilities badly need to be strengthened - securing the expertise of specialists such as forensic pathologists and anthropologists as well as crime scene experts must be made a priority if mass graves are to be exhumed and memorial sites turned into hard evidence for criminal prosecutions.

All Cambodian professionals involved in the KR Tribunal will require intensive preparatory and ongoing training, not just the Judicial Police. Across the board, the base levels need to be strengthened as a matter of urgency. Legal personnel selected for the tribunal (see later comments on selection) will clearly need training that also focuses on public international law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international human rights law. Investigating judges and prosecutors require additional training to develop the skills for investigating crimes of unusual magnitude and complexity, and developing cases for prosecution. Given that there will be enormous pressure for the enterprise to get to work immediately once the "green light" is given, Cambodian personnel should be appointed as soon as possible in order that there is sufficient opportunity to develop their capacity. It is recommended that substantive work not begin until local staff have received adequate training. There will also be a need for ongoing training and for the legal experts attached to both the judiciary and prosecution, to be recruited as soon as possible to enable them to assist the project from the start.

The KR Law provides for the establishment of an Office of Administration. One would assume it is to serve as a registry, providing support to the chambers, prosecution and defense. However, its responsibilities, as spelt out in Article 30, are only the supervision of the staff of the judges, the investigation judges and prosecutors of the Extraordinary Chambers. This begs the question of who is to be responsible for court administration and issues such as movement of detainees in and out of the premises, secure holding facilities, preparation of court budgets, maintenance of court buildings and facilities, making documents available to members of the public, dealing with the media, interpretation/translation facilities, handling court documents and filings by parties, and listing of cases. And, what about the safe storage of evidence?

An efficient court administration must be developed, and the government may wish to consider expanding the responsibilities of the Office of Administration beyond what is stated in Article 30, establishing an internal registry office or a totally separate institutional structure. Provision needs to be made for multilingual translation and interpretation into the languages of the court (Khmer, French, Russian and English), and for court proceedings to be properly transcribed. The KR Law speaks of the "Court" being responsible for the protection of victims and witnesses. There are no such programs in Cambodia today, and a dedicated and independent Victims and Witnesses Protection Unit needs to be established with appropriately trained staff. It should be noted that at the ICTY and ICTR, responsibility for assisting the court and parties with witness and victim protection falls on the Registry.

Several sites have been examined as possible venues for the Extraordinary Chambers. This would be because the project is not institutionally part of any of Phnom Penh's existing courts (the Municipal Court, the Supreme Court and the Appeals Court), and the reality is that none of these premises can physically accommodate the Extraordinary Chambers. They are already severely overcrowded, over-used, in poor condition and lack the necessary security and technological capabilities that would be required for the KR Tribunal (e.g., facilities for multi-lingual simultaneous translation). New premises are correctly being identified and will need to be refurbished to fit the needs of the Extraordinary Chambers; these will have to strike a balance between public access and security. Yet it must not be forgotten that the Offices of the Co-Investigating Judges, the Offices of the Co-Prosecutors and Defense Counsel also require siting. It would not be appropriate for the chambers and one of the parties to be located in the same building - the fact that the prosecution, registry and chambers of the ICTY have shared premises at Churchillplein 1 in The Hague has been a source of much complaint since that tribunal's inception.

Providing the Institutions with the Means with Which to Perform Their Tasks

Sometimes, political considerations mean that the mere existence of an institution is enough to satisfy its makers. Judge Antonio Cassese, the first president of the ICTY, often spoke of how that tribunal was never meant to be anything more than a "paper tiger," a means of assuaging global public opinion that was outraged at the unspeakable atrocities being perpetrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Seen in this context, the control of resources is a most useful way of controlling the effectiveness of any enterprise.

The lack of resources provided to East Timor's Serious Crimes Project impacted upon the enterprise in a variety of ways. For example, it resulted in many suspects being released and others being prosecuted for domestic rather than international crimes. It has also impacted on the ability of the Serious Crimes Unit to investigate fully what occurred in 1999, let alone the preceding years of occupation. A mere fraction of the 1999 cases has been investigated at the Serious Crimes Unit and little could be done to develop leadership cases against persons such as General Wiranto, the former head of the TNI. Defense counsel was not provided with the means to develop their clients' cases adequately. Special panel judges were not selected from those with expertise in international law and were not provided with research facilities or law clerks to assist with legal research. Securing witness attendance at court has been a logistical nightmare, as has the daily movement of prisoners from the detention centers to the court. Until a modern courtroom was constructed, there were no recording or transcription facilities to record proceedings accurately. The impact of inadequate and insufficient interpretation/translation services has already been highlighted.

If the institutions connected with the Extraordinary Chambers project are created as a "show" without being provided with adequate resources to enable

them to perform their tasks, the project will undoubtedly fail to deliver justice. It can condemn the enterprise to being a token gesture, the ultimate injustice to victims and their families. Given the extent of the atrocities committed in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, it is of utmost importance that all institutions involved in the project are provided with meaningful material and political support (this does not equate with interference), and clear lines of authority are established. If foreign expertise is brought in, then there must be adequate interpretation/translation provided to enable full utilization of their skills. One of the major failings of the current system is that judicial police, investigating judges and prosecutors are provided with inadequate logistical support to enable them to carry out adequate investigations and they are often forced to used their own personal resources (cars, petrol, etc.). There is thus a disinclination to conduct proper investigations.

Having made the point about the importance of meaningful support to the institutions, it is also important to stress that lack of resources must not be used as an excuse for under-performance. This links to the following section dealing with the quality of personnel—much can be done with very little if the right people are involved and a coherent and realistic strategy is pursued.

Managing Strong Institutions that are Able to Fulfill their Mandate

International standards require prosecutorial and judicial independence from undue influence. A compromised system will result in tainted justice, and every effort needs to be made to select personnel who are, and can be expected to remain, immune to improper influence.

East Timor's experience has been that the quality of the personnel provided is of utmost importance for the ultimate success of the judicial process. For example, policemen with no investigative experience (traffic policemen, administrators, etc.) were seconded to the Serious Crimes Unit by CIVPOL and expected to carry out investigations into crimes against humanity. Ongoing conflict within the Serious Crimes Unit led to public allegations of incompetence, mismanagement, lack of communication, and an absence of direction, strategy or policy. As a result of the difficult working environment, many qualified investigators and legal staff resigned. Two areas specifically identified by NGO and media reports as indicating weak leadership of the Serious Crimes Project were (1) the perceived failure to develop a policy in relation to atrocities that were committed between 1975 and 1999, which has resulted in a complete failure of the Serious Crime authorities to investigate or prosecute atrocities of that era and (2) the exhaustion of limited resources through prosecuting low-ranking militia leaders rather than developing cases against leaders. Observers have also voiced particular concerns about UNTAET's wooing, under the banner of reconciliation, of militia leaders currently in West Timor. This had been carried out with the noble aim of securing the return of up to 100,000 refugees currently under militia control. But many have questioned the impact this has had on Serious Crimes Unit strategy and decisions, citing the failure to indict militia leaders engaged in reconciliation negotiations. The project also suffered from the harsh reality that for most of its existence, the Serious Crimes Unit has been without a permanent leader (both the first Officer-In-Charge and the first Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes resigned after a few months, citing unacceptable political interference).

(Continued in the May 2003 issue)

Suzannah Linton practices International Law and has worked on accountability for gross violations of human rights in many countries, as well as at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. She worked in Cambodia in 2001/2002, has published several legal studies on accountability for the Democratic Kampuchea era.

Constructive Arguments for the Sake of a Genuine Justice

United Nations
SG/SM/8160
13 March 2002

THIS IS A TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL KOFI ANNAN AT UN HEADQUARTERS, MARCH 13, 2002.

Question: It has now been more than a month since Mr. Corell made a rather categorical statement closing the door on the trial of the Khmer Rouge. A lot of people have said they are very unhappy with that. Have you reopened the dossier, and do you see any chance of coming to an agreement with the Cambodian Government?

The Secretary-General: About a dozen ambassadors came to see me on this issue, and they felt that we should reconsider. I advised them that I thought it would be more effective if they undertook a démarche in Phnom Penh and persuaded Prime Minister Hun Sen to change his position and attitude, and to send them a clear message that he is interested in a credible tribunal which met international standards - that they needed to start there.

[End of extract]

STATEMENT FROM THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA TASK FORCE ON THE KHMER ROUGE TRIAL



The statement on the Khmer Rouge trials by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Wednesday, 13 March 2002 reflects certain misunderstandings of the Cambodian government position, which we would like to clarify in the belief that there is every basis for the negotiations to resume.

The Secretary-General is quoted as saying that Cambodia must show that it desires credible war crimes trials and that Cambodia was obstructing efforts to create a framework that would guarantee a fair trial that meets international standards.

But it was precisely in order to assure a credible trial on the basis of internationally accepted standards that Cambodia in 1997 sought UN assistance and participation in the trial, and this continues to form the basis of Cambodia's good-faith negotiations.

The Khmer Rouge Law, which was itself the product of those negotiations, provides checks and balance between the numbers and decision-making powers of the Cambodian and foreign judges, investigating judges and prosecutors; and provides specific guarantees of the legal rights of defendants.

Cambodia has expressed its willingness to spell out these rights in even more detail in the Articles of Cooperation. The UN has not identified any violations of internationally accepted standards in the Cambodian Khmer Rouge Law, and has not responded to the letter from the Royal Government of Cambodia dated 22 January 2002 in which a detailed response was given to the 11 points raised by His Excellency Hans Corell.

The Secretary-General is also quoted as saying that Cambodia made clear that its law setting up the tribunal would take precedence over any agreement with the United Nations on the conduct of the trials. In fact, Cambodia has never made any such statement. The Royal Government of Cambodia has always recognized its international obligations, and the supremacy of one document over another is not at issue here.

Cambodia sees a clear distinction between the nature and purpose of the Khmer Rouge Law and the Articles of Cooperation, with no hierarchical subordination of one to the other. There should be no contradiction between the two documents. They should be parallel and complementary to each other, with the Law determining the jurisdiction and competence of the Extraordinary Chambers as well as their composition, organizational structure and decision-making procedures; while the Articles of Cooperation, which will pass through the normal procedures of ratification by the National Assembly, will determine how the Royal Government of Cambodia and the United Nations cooperate to implement those provisions of the Law concerning international participation in the trials.

On 15 February 2002 the Chairman of the Task Force wrote to His Excellency Hans Corell expressing dismay with the announcement of UN withdrawal from the negotiations, and expressing the earnest hope that the UN will return to tasks of finalizing the Articles of Cooperation and establishing the Extraordinary Chambers.

The Chairman of the Task Force states that the Royal Government of Cambodia is determined to find away out of the present impasse, and hopes that this statement will clarify Cambodia's position.

Phnom Penh
15 March 2002

Theories of Leadership

Socheat Sam

Born in January 1925, Pol Pot was actually named Saloth Sar when he came into the world. Much of what has been written about Pol Pot since his time in power has been intemperate, reflecting the prevailing human reactions toward the brutal dictator, whose rule was responsible for the deaths of over one million Cambodians in the late 1970s. The horrors of his crimes against his own people and the sort of ignominy he inflicted on his victims have all been well documented and are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper will instead focus on the notion of Pol Pot as a charismatic political leader. My portrayal of Pol Pot as a charismatic leader is not an attempt to diminish the magnitude, the enormity of his crimes, nor is it an attempt to deflect the responsibility for such crimes away from Pol Pot. Any attempts to do so would constitute a grave injustice to the memories of the innocent people who perished during Pol Pot's rule, to the truth, and to history.

The senseless human destruction and sufferings that occurred during his time in power have predisposed people to empathize with the strong feelings against a

man whose deeds were nothing short of the utter reduction of a country of seven million people into mass killing fields. It is difficult, however, to explain how this man, whom some have called "worse than Hitler" and a "genocidal maniac" (Chandler, 1999, p. 4), was able to lead a political and armed movement to national power. His military triumph in April 1975 paved the way for him to impose his vision of "a collectivist agrarian utopia" (Thayer, 1997, p. 14) on the entire nation.

What made Pol Pot a charismatic leader in the eyes of his followers? And, why did Pol Pot, whose political career seemed all but over when he was driven from power in 1979 and when his horrific crimes against his own people became known to the world, continue to command respect from his core followers virtually up until his death in 1998? To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand the phenomenon of charisma, the basis for charismatic authority, the conditions under which charismatic leadership often arises, and the characteristics that are typical of charismatic leaders. To understand Pol Pot as a charismatic leader capable of appealing to the hearts and minds of his followers, it is also necessary to place him inside a Cambodian context.

Charismatic Leadership Theory

The word charisma is derived from a Greek word meaning "gift of grace." For years, social scientists have analyzed and debated the origin of charisma and why people gravitate toward charismatic leaders. Influential sociologist Max Weber was one of the first to study the theory of charismatic leadership. According to Weber, social actions are controlled and directed by a general belief on the part of the members of a society that a legitimate social order exists. The probability that social behavior will be oriented in terms of that order constitutes the basis for its authority. Weber postulated that there were three ways to convert power into legitimate authority: rational, traditional, and charismatic, and that each type of authority was validated differently. Established orders such as educational institutions or courts of law give rise to rational authority. Traditional authority arises when leader and follower relationships such as parent/child, teacher/student, or officer/soldier are bounded by long-standing traditions. Traditional and rational bases of authority are not effective forms of authority to bring social or organizational changes.

Charismatic authority, on the other hand, is part of the expression of schismatic tendencies in society. In contrast to legal or traditional authority, charismatic authority is the antithesis of routine activities and represents the desire for disruption and change of the prevailing social order. It is a necessary part of the dialectic between the human need for structure and the equally human need for variation and innovation in society. Charismatic authority is different from rational or traditional authority in that it spawns not from established orders or traditions, but rather from the special trust the charismatic leader induces in his followers, the peculiar powers he exhibits, and the unique qualities he possesses. According to Weber, it is difficult for charismatic leaders to maintain their authority because followers must continue to legitimize this authority. There is a need for the charismatic leader to constantly exhibit leadership performance to his followers to reinforce the legitimacy of his authority.

Several theoretical frameworks have been put forth to explain the crucial elements that give rise to charismatic leadership. Our psychological sense of self-worth or self-esteem is a function of the status of our identifications with certain self-objects. These self-objects may be tangible (i.e., a social class to which we belong or a car we drive) or intangible (i.e., a belief or a cause). When the status of the self-objects with which we identify increases, our self-esteem increases. When the status of the self-objects with which we identify diminishes in value, our self-esteem diminishes. Effective leaders elevate the status of the self-objects with which their followers identify, raising their followers' self-esteem to new heights. When followers identify with a leader, and that leader enhances their self-esteem,

the followers perceive the leader as charismatic.

Another theory states that individuals who have solved for themselves problems the followers have not been able to solve for themselves are perceived as charismatic. The perception of charisma is of great importance only between the leaders and their followers. How non-followers perceive the leaders has very little relevance to the notion of charisma. According to Weber, people have extraordinary needs, especially in times of great stress and crisis in a society, and leaders who are able to satisfy these needs are considered charismatic. Charismatic leaders help their followers achieve a state of transcendence by becoming the embodiment of the qualities they wish that they possessed. Charismatic leaders appear most frequently in times of societal crisis.

What are some of the common qualities and characteristics of charismatic leaders? Charismatic leaders are able to distill complex thoughts and ideas into simple messages through the use of symbolism, analogies, and metaphors. Charismatic leaders embrace risk and feel empty in its absence. And, they take chances without fear of failure. Charismatic leaders rebel against the status quo and conventional wisdom. According to Weber, charismatic leaders reject rational, economic objectives and orders, choosing more "irrational" but more humanistic pursuits, and that one of the signs of charismatic leadership lies in the leader's ability to leave a significant mark on the traditional institutionalized structure that he rejects. Charismatic leaders have robust empathic capacity—they attempt to see the world through their followers' eyes. Finally, charismatic leaders challenge, prod and poke their followers to test their courage and their commitment. Charismatic leaders score high on expression of values, emphasis on commitment, setting high standards, stressing a sense of mission, talking optimistically about the future, expressing confidence when making personal sacrifices, providing encouragement to followers, and displaying conviction in ideals.

Pol Pot's Rise to Leadership

Post-colonial Cambodia was a society with a deeply rooted sense of hierarchy that permitted one man to exercise enormous power. From 1945 until 1970, that one man was Norodom Sihanouk, who ruled Cambodia first as king and then as its Head of State (Chandler, 1991, pp. 14-178). Cambodian political structure during Sihanouk's rule bestowed "power on a small group of men who exploit[ed] the majority of the people at every level" (Chandler, 1999, p. 39). "Nepotism and corruption" (Chandler, 1999, p. 47) were the way of life. Cambodia was an agrarian society whose economy did not develop beyond agriculture and other small labor-intensive industries. The absence of strong economic bases manifested in the people's low standard of living. The resulting gulf of economic disparities between a concentrated group of wealthy ruling elite and the poor masses served as the battle cries for social and political changes intended to wrest political and economic power from the ruling elite and to distribute them to the poor masses.

Pol Pot's entrance onto Cambodia's political landscape was inspired by the desire to bring about such social and political changes to benefit the poor masses. After having spent three years at a university in France, where he was exposed to Communist ideology, Pol Pot returned to Cambodia in 1953. Pol Pot "saw communism as a set of techniques" that would allow for social and political changes to occur in Cambodia (Chandler, 1999, p. 34).

To spread the message of Communism to his compatriots, in 1956 Pol Pot embarked on a career teaching French and geography at a private college in Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia. Teaching provided Pol Pot with a stage for his budding political talents to attract young people to the Communist movement. Many recollections of Pol Pot referred to his skills as a teacher. In choosing to play this role, he drew on the reservoir of reverence Cambodians have always had for their teachers, reflecting the centuries

in which education was in the hands of Hindu Brahmans or Buddhist monks, and the high status accorded teachers in the French Third Republic under which Pol Pot was raised. In the Cambodian education system, even a mathematics professor taught ethics. Students traditionally gave respect to their teachers, as they did to elderly relatives, in exchange for moral guidance. Older brothers and teachers who returned this respect with warmth and kindness were rare and doubly honored. Among his students, Pol Pot seemed to have been an immediate success as a teacher of "progressive knowledge" (Chandler, 1999, pp. 50-53).

People who knew him at that time found him "well presented... an attractive figure. His deep voice and calm gestures were reassuring. He seemed to be someone who could explain things in such a way that you came to love justice and honesty and hate corruption" (Chandler, 1999, p. 51). Some students remembered him "as calm, self-assured, smooth featured, honest, and persuasive, even hypnotic when speaking to small groups" (Chandler, 1999, p. 5). During group discussions, he attacked dishonesty and corruption in Sihanouk government circles without revealing his communist political alignment. One of his students recalled Pol Pot as "popular among students, a good teacher and very correct in his ways." In 1950s' Cambodia, the term "Communist" often referred to people like Pol Pot who had simple taste, a good education and a hatred for corruption. A good education meant and included a post-secondary education in France. People like Pol Pot were thought to be the only ones who cared about the poor (Chandler, 1999, p. 53).

In 1962, Pol Pot spoke at a seminar in Phnom Penh to an audience consisting of Buddhist monks and college students. One participant remembered Pol Pot's speech as "harmonious and persuasive; he used examples skillfully. He made himself easy to like" (Chandler, 1999, p. 62). He appealed to his audience to consider Cambodian society. He mentioned that the Sihanouk government charged people fees when they were born, when they were married, and when they died. "No one can do anything unless the government gets its fee," he said. He suggested that the pervasive corruption within the government led the people into deeper and deeper poverty. He spoke of a new society with equality among all its members (Chandler, 1999, p. 62).

While teaching about the domestic situation inside Cambodia, he abruptly stopped the lesson and asked, "What can we do to make the people love us?" Several suggested exposing the corruption of other factions and demonstrating the Khmer Rouge's patriotism; others maintained that the key was economics... Pol Pot kept shaking his head, dissatisfied. Then one man raised his hand and responded, "We must put ourselves in the same position as the poorest of the poor, then the people will crowd around us and love us." "Yes," cried the teacher, delighted that one of his students had answered correctly. "Yes! Yes!" (Chandler, 1999, p. 175).

In a document used at a study session by the Khmer Rouge in 1970 as the Cambodian Communist movement entered its armed struggle phase, its anonymous author wrote: "A revolutionist should be kind and sympathetic to the people; a revolutionist should always use kind words when talking to the people. These words should cause no harm; make the listeners sympathetic to the speaker; sound polite in all circumstances; be pleasing to everyone; and make the listeners happy" (Chandler, 1999, p. 90). This passage seemed to reflect the mannerism of Pol Pot. Other documents stressed that revolutionists "must be drawn from poor peasant... and worker backgrounds - from deep down in rural areas." To use the Khmer Rouge parlance, revolutionists must be "extracted from the earth like diamonds" (Chandler, 1999, p. 94).

Pol Pot as a Charismatic Leader

Pol Pot was a charismatic leader for several reasons consistent with the theoretical explanations mentioned earlier. As discussed in the previous section,

his genteel charisma, combined with simple taste, a good education and staunch hatred of corruption, had a broad appeal to certain segments of Cambodian society, particularly the students and the peasants. "Cambodians who came into his presence found him charismatic because he embodied the ideals of conduct-self-control, ...kind-heartedness—that had been drummed into them for years" (Chandler, 1999, p. 151). People who were not brought up in this social context may find Pol Pot exasperating and hypocritical. However, how non-followers perceive a leader has very little relevance to the notion of charisma.

Pol Pot and his ideals represented the good virtues (i.e., social and economic equity, anti-corruption) desired by the average Cambodian. On the other hand, the traditional authority represented all evil forces—social contaminants—infecting Cambodian society, which the people wanted, but were not able, to eliminate on their own. In this respect, the people, who came to share his view about Cambodian social order and its problems at that time, regarded Pol Pot as someone who had solved for himself problems that they had not been able to solve for themselves. These people had endured years of "narcissistic injuries" at the hands of their own government. They looked to Pol Pot to bring them together in order to bring about changes in Cambodian social order to improve the basic living conditions of the poor and uneducated.

The peasants' acceptance of this view laid the foundation for the Cambodian Communist movement to eventually achieve victory. Cambodian peasants were willing to take up arms and sacrifice their lives in open military conflicts against what they perceived to be the force of evil. Cambodian peasants, within Cambodian social, economic and political structures, were treated as the ruled, and were never part of the ruling circle. Pol Pot identified with and raised the self-esteem of his followers (Cambodian peasants) when the ruling elites looked at the peasants with contempt and disdain. He raised their self-esteem by allowing them to play active roles in determining the political future of Cambodia. By participating in the armed struggle against the corrupt regime, these peasants were led to feel that they, for the first time in Cambodia's history, had an opportunity to affect the course of history. The peasants viewed active participation in Cambodia's political process as the ultimate form of gratification.

Pol Pot exhibited the qualities and characteristics of a charismatic leader. He was able to communicate his messages in simple terms and he usually spoke with complete candor. His message to the people, his deeds, and his way of life reinforced the image of a man who was incorruptible and who cared passionately about the poor. He was a man with broad empathic capacity for Cambodian peasants. When he spoke of the corrupt government, people accepted his message readily because they, too, saw corruption with their own eyes. When he spoke of his vision of a new society free from all corruption, people were eager to embrace this vision. He instilled confidence in his followers and was able to inspire them to rise up and fight against "the enemy."

Conclusion

As suggested by David P. Chandler in his political biography of Pol Pot entitled Brother Number One, Pol Pot or Saloth Sar belonged among the visionary leaders of Cambodian history - a history filled with prolonged exploitations by foreign powers from near and far. At some stage in his life, he reacted against the subservience and quietude of the Cambodian people. The traditional authority of the Cambodian royal family and its indolence depressed him. In the 1950s, he came to see communism as a set of empowering and liberating techniques that could be applied to Cambodia to remove the traditional authority, social and economic injustice, and subservience. The crucial role to be played by intellectuals like Pol Pot in this process was the inclusion of Cambodia's peasants as the main instrument, the means with which social transformation could be achieved. His charisma

played an important role in recruiting followers from among Cambodia's poor and illiterate to his cause. For the most part, the people from this social stratum of Cambodian society remained loyal to Pol Pot virtually until the day of his death in April 1998.

Throughout his life, this man seemed to have tailored his performance to fit the people he was with —to fit the expectations of his followers—making the "genocidal maniac" hard to find. Such masterful performances demonstrated his broad understanding of the fundamental notion that an effective leader must appeal to the needs of the masses. Until the end, many people, particularly Cambodian peasants, continued to embrace his vision of "a new society."

The disjunction between his genteel charisma and the death toll of his regime, however, remains an enigma that transcends dispositional explanations. As Pol Pot told Nate Thayer in 1997, "Look at me, am I a savage person? My conscience is clear."

At the end, an observer of Cambodia's contemporary history cannot overlook one important irony. In retrospect, the man whose revolutionary awakening was firmly rooted in his utter hatred of traditional authority was no better than his predecessor was in ruling this small nation. Pol Pot's rule turned out to be a human tragedy much, much worse than the rules of those before him. His unswerving love of power resulted in the deaths of more than a million of his compatriots, or one in seven, in less than four years. So many innocent people perished pointlessly and in unimaginable pain. The actions of one man changed the course of the entire nation. This was not the first time that humanity had to endure this kind of injustice. It is very doubtful that it would be the last!

Editor's Note: Information regarding references cited in this paper can be obtained by contacting the publisher from DC-Cam.

Socheat Sam, a reader, submitted this article.

The Milosevic Case and War Crimes Accountability

Peter Maguire

Now that the trial of former Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milosevic has begun, some have heralded his prosecution as the dawning of "a new era of international accountability," further evidence of "the globalization of justice." During the first week of the trial, Hague prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has insisted that this is not a political trial. Milosevic countered with a challenge to the tribunal's legal legitimacy.

Bubbling beneath the surface of this dispute is a fundamental clash between the competing claims of national sovereignty and universal human rights. If we have entered a new era of war crimes accountability, then the rules only apply to some. During the 1990s, the United Nations, backed by a well-funded human rights industry, pushed for a new international order based on an expanded set of rules for statecraft. Alas, the rules have been applied only to some, leaving this "new era of war crimes accountability" more a claim than a reality.

The alleged new era began when courts in the Hague, Spain, Belgium and the United States challenged the sanctity of national sovereignty by considering cases against sitting national leaders like Slobodan Milosevic, Israel's Ariel Sharon, Chile's Augusto Pinochet, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Cuba's Fidel Castro and many others. The sad irony is that as western human rights groups and civilian lawyers refined and expanded new codes of international criminal law, their leaders could not summon the resolve to act forcefully in order to stop mass atrocities in brutal civil wars in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. Throughout the 1990s, the most basic distinction between soldier and civilian all but disappeared in places like Dili, Kigali, Sarajevo, and Freetown.

Even with civilians the victims of genocidal violence, there was little interest in intervening militarily. Instead, the UN promised the victims post-tragedy justice in the form of war crimes trials. Since 1993, the UN has spent over one billion dollars to try less than fifty individuals before tribunals in the Hague and Arusha, and Tanzania. However, the application of justice has been selective, uneven, and proves once against that the rules only apply to some.

Nearly twenty years after the Khmer Rouge killed two million Cambodians, the UN began negotiating with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen over a trial for the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders. After four years of negotiations, the United Nations announced in 2002 that is would not participate in a trial for the Khmer Rogue leaders because "the Cambodian court would not guarantee independence, impartiality and objectivity." Human rights advocates and many in the western human rights industry praised the UN's decision as an example of the UN standing "its ground with integrity."

After the Vietnamese toppled the Khmer Rouge in 1979, neither the UN nor the Carter administration supported efforts to try the Khmer Rouge leaders, whose policies led to the deaths of two million Cambodians. The U.S. voted repeatedly, throughout the 1980s, for the genocidal regime to retain Cambodia's seat in the UN General Assembly. Although he had been sentenced to death in absentia in a 1979 show trial, Khmer Rouge leader Ieng Sary served as Cambodia's representative at the United Nations.

Ultimately, the Khmer Rouge was not defeated by the UN or the long arm of "universal jurisdiction," but rather by a brutally Machiavellian series of political moves taken by Prime Minister Hun Sen. Amnesty was the price of peace in Cambodia.

Over the objections of western governments and

human rights groups, Hun Sen granted amnesties to Ieng Sary and other Khmer Rouge defectors in 1996 and 1997. Once again, "universal jurisdiction" and national sovereignty clashed. When the UN recommended holding the Khmer Rouge war crimes trials in a third country under its auspices in 1999, Hun Sen vetoed the plan. The Cambodian strongman argued bluntly that the fate of the Khmer Rouge leaders was a political question, not a legal one, "So, if the lawyers have evolved and changed both in morals and in politics, I think that they should end their careers as lawyers and work in politics."

The double standards of contemporary international law also became obvious after a bloody civil war in Sierra Leone. After Foday Sankoh, leader of the infamous Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was captured by civilians in 1999, the UN promised Sierra Leone a war crimes court. Although the UN has established a tribunal for Sierra Leone, it has yet to try even Sankoh. The court's budget has been cut from $114 million to $57 million.

After the end of the bloodiest century in human history, the "international community" has grown increasingly accepting of the horrors suffered by its most powerless and politically insignificant members. In the long shadow of September 11th, with America's al-Qaeda prisoners facing traditional military tribunals, triumphant claims about "the globalization of justice" and "universal jurisdiction" sound increasingly hollow. If Slobodan Milosevic's extradition and trial mark the dawning of "a new era of international accountability," then it looks incredibly similar to the previous era.

Peter Maguire has taught the law and theory of war at Columbia University and Bard College. He was the historical advisor of documentary Nuremberg: A Courtroom Drama.

Peou Hong: He Lost his Family
Because of his Vietnamese Origins

Dany Long


Peou Hong

Peou Hong, 36, was born in Angkor Yuos village, Prek Anteah, a town in Prey Veng province. His father, Ieng Peou, is Khmer and his mother, Meng Sim, is of Vietnamese origin (his great grand-father is Chinese and his great grandmother is Vietnamese). Because of his Vietnamese heritage, his siblings and his mother's relatives were taken away by the Khmer Rouge under the pretense of reeducation and killed. Only two of his relatives (Peou Hong and his mother) were lucky enough to survive. Peou Hong survived because his mother forced him to go home to look after his ill father.

Late in 1975, the chiefs of Angkor Yuos village, Ta Muon and Sin, told Vietnamese immigrants and those who had Vietnamese blood that, "Angkar must send them back to Vietnam." Then Hong's family - his great-grandmother, great-grandfather, grandparents, great aunts, great uncles, and aunts - along with other Vietnamese in the village were accompanied by Khmer Rouge cadres on a boat that went from Angkor Yuos to Ka-am Samna, Loek Dek district, Region 25, near the Vietnam border. Ka-am Samna was an area where Cambodia sent Vietnamese people out of the country and Vietnam came to pick up its people. After Hong had been in Ka-am Samna for five days, the Vietnamese announced that: "All these people are Khmer and Vietnam cannot accept them." Khmer Rouge cadres told the people to return to their home village. Hong's family traveled back to Angkor Yuos. After their arrival, Hong's family made their living by farming, as did most of the villagers.

Early in 1977 militiamen in Prek Anteah commune summoned Hong's great-grandparents, great uncle and aunt, aunt and uncle to attend a reeducation course. His mother was not sent for reeducation because she had just given birth. Hong's family suggested, "If they come to take us we let them take only our mother and we all should not go but escape." Fifteen days later the militiamen came to take his mother and other five siblings for reeducation, but two of his younger brothers hid themselves in a bamboo thicket. Muon, the village chief, however, succeeded in finding them,

On the day the village chief took his mother away, Hong was not at home. The chief of organization unit had assigned him to take care of buffaloes at a dry season rice field and he did not return until evening. When he was eating rice at a cooperative dining hall in Angkor Yuos village, Muon called Hong and grabbed his hand: "You must go with your mother!" he said. Hong did not know why Muon had come to find him. At dusk two militiamen on bikes carried Hong and his two younger siblings from Angkor Yuos village to Prek Koam pagoda, a prison in Prek Anteah commune. Hong's mother and other Vietnamese residents were also there.

Hong's father had a disease that caused abdominal distention. He had suffered from the disease since Yuos, the chief of Prek Anteah commune, ordered him to dig a canal called Prek Yuos. Every night he urinated about two liters into a zinc palm juice container. He was unable to move from his home. Hong's mother whispered to him, "You have to go home and look after your father."

At Prek Koam, people had nothing to eat all day until at 10:00 p.m. when the prison guards gave them rice porridge. At that time, Hong slipped down the

mossy steps of the pagoda's dining hall into the backyard, which was full of mass graves. He was very frightened, but tried to overcome it so that he could walk through the sparse forest. After getting lost, he arrived at home at 3:00 a.m. When he reached home, he learned that the village militiamen were trying to catch him. Hong fled to the house of his great aunt whose husband and son had been taken away in 1977 for reeducation. Village chiefs Muon and Sin had said, "If a family has a Khmer husband and a Vietnamese wife, the children and wife will be sent for reeducation. If a family has a Vietnamese husband and a Khmer wife, Angkar will need only the husband for reeducation." Because his great aunt's family had a Vietnamese husband and a Khmer-Chinese wife, Angkar took both her husband and son. Her son Ban Keach was able to escape and return to the village, but Muon had him arrested.

When Hong was staying with his great aunt, the militiamen kept trying to arrest him. Hong escaped to another great aunt's house in Kampong Reussey village, Kampong Reussey commune in the same district (she survived the regime). Hong's great aunt told him to go back to his hut. After he left, he found shelter with a family that made sugar from palm juice.

In September 1977, after Angkar announced that Sor Phim was a traitor, the Eastern Region was plunged into chaos. Angkar then announced that, "people can move around at will." At this point, Hong's father's health improved, and he was able to walk. Both father and son packed their luggage and fled to his father's older brother in Svay Antor commune. When they arrived, the village chief accused them of being "April 17 people" and said they must be sent to Dey Khlanh in the west, probably in Pursat or Battambang. Hong's great uncle argued about this with the chief of Svay Antor village: "My younger brother and nephew have never lived in Phnom Penh. They are not April 17 people and are the old people of Angkor Yuos village. Because they felt very lonely there, they came to stay in Svay Antor." The village chief agreed to withdraw Hong and his father from the list and allowed them to stay in Svay Antor until Vietnam liberated Cambodia in 1979. Hong's father was assigned to work in a fishing group and Hong was allowed to stay with his uncle and was told to look after the cows, collect cattle dung and kill mice in the dry-season rice fields.

Although Hong was lucky to survive the killing, he has suffered sadness and pain ever since. Every Khmer and Vietnamese New Year, Hong feels very lonely and remembers his mother's last words: "If my milk is valuable I will meet you again." Hong's mother, siblings and relatives were killed by Khmer Rouge because his family was of Vietnamese origin.

Peou Hong married his younger cousin, the daughter of his great aunt in Kampong Reussey. They had a son. But during the 1996 Phchum Ben holiday, his wife and son traveled on a boat to Kampong Reussey. On their way home, the current was very strong and the boat crashed into a bridge and broke up. His son drowned. The loss of his beloved son brought back memories of his mother and other relatives who were killed by the Khmer Rouge.

Peou Hong hopes for the establishment of an independent tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders and render justice for the innocent people they killed. Meanwhile he appeals to the leaders of the next generation: "Please not discriminate against any race. If they have lived here very long, we should allow them to live peacefully and happily like all the people throughout the country."

Dany Long is a member of DC-Cam's Promoting Accountability Project.

Khmer Rouge Slogan

◆ Die for the interest of the people which is heavier than Mount Meru. Capitalists, feudalists and reactionaries are not even as heavy as a goose's feather. *(Notebook Nhok, p.60)*

Khmer Rouge Novel:

The Sacrifices of our Mothers

(Continued from the March 2002 issue)

But I heard my mum whisper to me, "Don't cry, my daughter. Don't cry before the enemy at all." These words stopped my tears from rolling down my face. I did not raise my hand to wipe away the tears in my eyes because I did not want the enemy to see me crying. I bit my lips instead.

After my father passed away, my mother became ill. We sold everything we had, including our cows. The black and the gray cows did not belong to me anymore. We tried to find something to sell and finally everything we had was gone. We owed Chhuon more and more rent on our land. Khut and Nom supplied our meals, but we did not have enough because even they did not have adequate food supplies. My older brother was employed to work in a field, tending cattle, which earned him some rice to support the family. I collected firewood and gathered wild plants—tips thor [a shrub], rokam [a kind of thorny plant], and manioc tubers and potatoes—to supplement our food so we could survive.

Even though she was sick, my mother was restless. When she got out of bed, she walked by leaning on the wall and the columns, and tried to weave clothing or make baskets so as not to waste time. She took a rest only when she was very dizzy.

Over time, my mother recovered. My brother, our neighbors, and I felt very happy to see her brighten up again. As soon as she recovered my mother started to work in the rice field. Because we had no ox, my mother worked as one, pulling the plow. My older brother worked as a plowman, and I helped by pushing the plow from behind. After plowing once around the rice field, my mother was exhausted and gasped for breath. That land was as sticky as wax—the plowshare barely broke the earth. We felt that if we could borrow an ox from our neighbors, we could plow at night or when it was windy and raining, since otherwise they needed their ox to plow. We had to struggle like this in order to have enough food to eat, to pay our debt, and supply the revolution.

In every difficult situation, my mother acted as a model. When we produced some rice, she always kept some to send through uncle Moeun to our comrades working in the mountains. Once my mother dried some bananas and packed them to send to our comrades. I saw her licking the sweet, delicious taste on her hands. I felt great pity for her and asked her, "Why didn't you eat one?" She replied, "No, I won't, my daughter. The bananas are for our comrades who are struggling and experiencing much more hardship than we are. They are in the forest and sleep without a mosquito net. They are infected with malaria and their bodies are covered with wounds caused by blood-sucking insects. Forest leeches suck their blood from almost every part of their bodies. Worse, they have nothing to eat for a day, and sometimes as long as a week. Sometimes, all they can find to eat are the leaves of trees. When they are ill they have no access to medical treatment. In the village we are at least helped by our neighbors. I licked my hands just to find out how the bananas tasted!"

Days later uncle Moeun assigned my mother to bring food supplies to the mountains. My mother fulfilled her duty with high responsibility. Sometimes she was gone for half a month. My older brother and I awaited her return every day. One day Aunt Thim told us that our mother had been arrested and soldiers had taken her to the Banteay Treng military base. She had been

accused of bringing food supplies to the "Khmer Rouge."

The next day we traveled on our neighbor's ox cart to Banteay Treng. It was evening when we arrived. We had to camp outside the base and wait patiently to see her. The next morning, we and other people asked the commander for permission to visit the prisoners. At about 11:00 in the morning, the prisoners were allowed out to visit their relatives. Because we were small, we had to push our way through the crowd of people at the gate. Mom was nowhere to be seen. I grabbed the barbed wire fence separating the prisoners and the visitors, and looked for her in every direction until my eyes hurt, but still I could not find her.

My older brother and I were about to ask the chief of the prison guards to check the list to make sure her name was on it. But then, a hand made rough by labor grabbed my hand tightly and I heard a murmur, "My daughter! My daughter!" I was so shocked that I wanted to jerk my hand away, but then I looked up.

I saw a female prisoner with bushy gray hair, nasty wounds on her body, and bruised eyelids, which made her eyeballs look whiter than normal. What she was wearing was beyond imagination. Her clothes were ragged and faded, and torn just like those of a beggar. I peered at her closely, but I could not recognize her. Only when I saw two amputated fingers did I realize that she was my mother. After just half a month of separation, my mother had become skeletal. I placed her hands on my cheeks and my tears came flooding out, wetting her hands completely. My brother could barely speak; he just shook his head and sobbed: "Oh, mommy! Oh, mommy!"

He opened a box of fried shrimp, grilled fish, and rice, and then handed them to mum. I gave her some dried bananas for dessert. We had nothing else. As soon as she saw the package of dried bananas, my mother chided us in a soft voice: "Why don't you send it to our comrades in the mountains?" I told her that we had already sent some food, and this was what was left over.

When I put my hands on her chest, she jerked back. "What's wrong with you?" I asked her. "Nothing," she replied, and turned to talk about other things. Only later did I learn that her chest was completely burnt by the cigarettes our barbaric enemies had thrust into her, trying to force her to reveal the hideouts of our fighters in the forest. But my mother was committed to the fighting. She always said no to them. She was tortured into unconsciousness four or five times a day. She was not given food or water. When she became too thirsty, she drank her own urine. However, they could not force her to give them the answers they wanted.

My mother asked me: "Did Uncle Noeun come to our home?" "No, he did not," I replied. "Our comrades probably starved to death in the forest! I'm very sorry that I was caught before I could reach them," she sighed as two tears rolled down her face. She squeezed our hands tightly, then said: "You both must perform this duty for me. Otherwise, I cannot rest in peace. Can you promise me?" Her loyalty and devotion to the revolution was absorbed into our hearts through her eyes, breath and warm hands. We were inspired and declared simultaneously: "We will definitely accomplish this task for the revolution." If we had not been separated by barbed wire, mother would have kissed us with great satisfaction.

(Continued in the June 2003 issue)

Khmer Rouge Stance

◆ Real elements are close to the public: The public sides with the party. A committee of the party will not be strong if the public does not support it. Support involves consciousness and organization.

(Revolutionary Flag, June 07, 1976)

◆ Khmer Rouge's definition of word "Violence": Use of force by people or a political group to smash their life-and-death enemies. *(Excepted from the book: "Geography of the Democratic Kampuchea", for second grade education, printed in 1977)*

An original skull-map designed in 1979.



Removal of the skull-map in 2002.



A letter from Balang District

Brasat Baling, February 22, 2002

Dear Excellency,

On behalf of the territorial authorities and myself, I would like to express my sincere and heartfelt admiration for your excellency's and colleagues' research achievements - both pictures and other evidence - published for the people of Cambodia and abroad to understand the terrible and unutterable tragedy in Cambodian history, committed by the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea. The pictures and documents in your publication remind the people of what happened in the three years, eight months and twenty days of the regime. It is especially valuable for the youths who were born after the Liberation Day, January 07 1979, who never witnessed and experienced that era. Even though documents and pictures could not detail every activity of Pol Pot's regime, they can help national and international courts to try the leaders of the savage regime.

Your Excellency! Before the magazine Searching for the Truth of the Documentation Center of Cambodia was first published, I always thought that it would not be possible to document and record the misery and crimes committed in the Pol Pot regime, and that those activities would be hidden from history and would not be believed by the younger generation or the world. But fortunately for our people, under your excellency's leadership, the magazine called Searching for the Truth uncovers and compiles all documents, pictures and other evidence in detail, and is published and distributed to the public throughout the country. Of special value is the fact that the magazine is distributed free of charge to the administrative authorities. Therefore, the public and government officials can have a greater understanding and keep in mind what happened in the regime. I hope that our innocent compatriots who were killed and the survivors who suffered from the regime will receive justice when the tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge leaders is established in the future.

Your Excellency! Since your magazine came into existence, I and other civil servants in the districts, along with the commune chiefs, are very interested in the documents and pictures produced in every issue of the magazine. We are deeply moved by some of the photos and articles, which remind me of my parents and other Cambodian people who were cruelly punished and killed in the bloodthirsty regime. Even though more than twenty years have passed, I thought, everything seems to be new, unfinished, and fresh in view and mind. Thanks to the magazine, double thanks to the leadership of the Cambodian People's Party, who secured our lives and liberated Cambodia's people from the excruciating and barbaric tragedy of the inhuman and immoral regime.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Royal Government of Cambodia, led by Samdech Hun Sen, for making efforts to try Pol Pot and those who were responsible for the massacre of the Cambodian people in that era. We, government officials, armed forces, teachers, students and people in Brasat Balang, would like to extend our full support to the process of bringing the Khmer Rouge leaders to the court to find out whether we "Will we see fish when the water is clear ?"

Your Excellency! All of your information and pictures encouraged me to regard your valuable and priceless documents of the history of Cambodia and the world as the documents complied for our nation's interest for the present and the future as well, not to cause division or take revenge for life in Cambodian society, but to give light to Khmer children of future generations to obtain knowledge and take it into consideration. I wish you and your colleagues prosperity and success in your noble job.

Prum Roatha

KHMER ROUGE SONG:

LONG LIVE APRIL 17, THE DAY WE LIBERATED PHNOM PENH

From every direction Phnom Penh chiefs were shot; they were gangsters selling out [our] country.

Our liberators launched a clever attack, moving forward and rushing to shoot the traitors.

Lon Nol supporters fled the country and we advanced to totally smash the imperial puppets–both the regime and individuals–in order to bring them to a permanent end.

Chorus: April 17, 1975 our great army liberated Phnom Penh as a whole, and shook hands simultaneously in the heart of the city after expelling the traitors.

From northwest next to the north to southwest, from southeast next to the east to northeast, the revolutionary flag fluttered in the air in Chaktumuk Square.

This is the greatest victory, great revolutionaries of the Cambodian people who were brave enough to defeat the enemy with their supreme individuality.

Chorus: Long life! Great people, great free army who won great victory.

The Documentation Center of Cambodia would like to appeal to governments, foundations and individuals for support for the publication, *Searching for the Truth*. To contribute, please phone (855) 23 21 18 75 or (855) 12 90 55 95 or Email: dccam@online.com.kh. Thank you.

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