Magazine of Documentation Center of Cambodia Table of Contents

Letter: For the truth	.1
About the Magazine	.4

DOCUMENTATION

Necessity of Preserving Physical Evidence	The Khmer Rouge Documents	5
Confession of Sann Po	Necessity of Preserving Physical Evidence	6
Baray Choan Dek under the KR Regime	Introduction to Confessions	9
DK Province, Zone, Region, and District	Confession of Sann Po	10
Cham Minority Prisoners	Baray Choan Dek under the KR Regime	11
Confession of Thou Hai	DK Province, Zone, Region, and District	13
Confession of Tiv Mei19	Cham Minority Prisoners	14
	Confession of Thou Hai	16
Mapping the "Killing Fields"23	Confession of Tiv Mei	19
	Mapping the "Killing Fields"	23

HISTORY

Voices From S-21	.25
The Perils of Neutrality	26

LEGAL

A Sampling of Documentary Evidence	27
International Human Rights Law	30
"Nexus to Armed Conflict"	33
The Doctrine of "Command Responsibility"	35

PUBLIC DEBATE

What is truth?	37
Legacy of the Khmer Rouge	42

FAMILY TRACING

My Sister	47
To My Uncle	48

KHMER ROUGE ARTS

New Year, New Rice Field





Searching for the truth.

Number 1, January 2000



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
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Letter:

for the truth.



The Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) is an independent Cambodian research institute dedicated to documenting the genocide history of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime, more commonly known as Khmer Rouge (KR), from 1975 to 1979. Founded pursuant to the U.S. Cambodian Genocide Justice Act initiatives in April 1994, DC-Cam became a fully independent Cambodian research institute in January 1997. DC-Cam has to date received political and financial support from a variety of sources, including 39 countries on four continents: North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia.

DC-Cam believes that seeking justice for the Cambodian genocide through an independent tribunal requires the participation and monitoring of everyone in society, particularly the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. The victims deserve to see the perpetrators tried for their crimes. In order to relate to the legal process, they additionally need to be kept closely informed of the history as well as the Khmer Rouge tribunal process.

DC-Cam will facilitate this process of active participation and monitoring for the Khmer Rouge victims by serving as a "messenger" on these matters. In order to accomplish this task, DC-Cam has

Number 1, January 2000

launched an education campaign with the objective of disseminating information on the tribunals and the history of the Khmer Rouge regime. The information used in the campaign is based upon original documents held at DC-Cam and other sources, including respected law schools in the United States and Europe, Cambodian non-governmental organizations, Cambodian scholars, legal experts, historians and DC-Cam's Academic Board of Advisors. The end result of this education initiative is DC-Cam's new monthly magazine: 'Searching for the truth', which you are holding in your hands at this moment.

In order to help ensure both that justice is done in the courtroom and that it is perceived as being done by the public, especially survivors, there is a need to raise the general awareness of how the rule of law is (or is not) being reflected in the Khmer Rouge tribunal.

There are very few sources of independent news in Cambodia. The newspapers, TV and radio are all blatantly biased in one way or another, and even the Khmer-language Voice of America (VOA) is considered by some to be politically aligned. 'Searching for the truth' fills this critical need for a Khmer-language source of non-partisan coverage of the Khmer Rouge history and tribunal. More importantly, 'Searching for the truth' will act as the trial "watchdog" and limit the degree of political interference as only a free and unfettered Khmerlanguage publication can. In addition, general explanations and updates of what is going on in the courtroom will be of great value to survivors and the general Cambodian public.

There is a convincing legal and moral argument that the survivors of massive human rights abuses have a right to know the truth about what happened. The importance of learning "the truth" is a recurring theme whenever I talk to victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. They almost always say something along the lines of, "I want to know what happened, who ordered the killings, and why." By publicizing exactly what happens as the Khmer Rouge tribunal unfolds, 'Searching for the truth' will be an integral part of the truth-telling mechanism and

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Searching for the truth — Letter

will play a major role in national reconciliation. While in South Africa they televised or broadcast by radio most of the proceedings of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Cambodia does not have independent television or radio coverage, and newspapers are politicized and unlikely to provide unbiased, comprehensive coverage of what happens. A magazine partly dedicated to covering the Khmer Rouge trial proceedings from beginning to end will which may not arise at a Khmer Rouge tribunal. For example: violence against women under the Khmer Rouge regime; violence against the ethnic Vietnamese; violence against the Chinese; and violence against the Buddhist monks. 'Searching for the truth' will be one of the few sources of information in the world on these matters–and will undoubtedly be the only one in Cambodia, in the Khmer language. Additionally, 'Searching for the



fill that information gapwhile acting as a healing mechanism as well. In addition, 'Searching for the truth's' accessibility (Khmer language distribution throughout the country), its authority and independence are of paramount importance. This DC-Cam publication will be the only media source in Cambodia fulfilling those criteria.

In addition to publicizing the trial, 'Searching for the truth' will also cover issues and topics on which DC-Cam has an abundance of information, but truth' will include a variety of ongoing reactions to the Khmer Rouge trial from members of society. Thus, the magazine will serve as a general historical document that records Cambodia's processes of reexamining its past and undergoing national reconciliation.

DC-Cam's archives are the only ones in Cambodia in independent hands. Information coming from the DC-Cam will be politically independent, rather than disseminated to serve some political purpose or interest.

Cambodians are hostages to their own past. They cannot be trouble-free within themselves unless genocide justice is found. Cambodia can move forward and transform itself into a strong democratic society only when her people are permitted to know the truth concerning the recent, terrible past.

The current generation of Cambodian schoolchildren has no memory of the 1970s, and the history curriculum has been widely criticized for only addressing the Khmer Rouge period in a cursory, politicized fashion. The majority of Cambodians need an answer to the fate of their families lost or missing during the Khmer Rouge regime in order for their souls to be at peace. The children of Cambodia need to learn the truth about their nation's troubled past if they are to overcome its bitter legacy and build a peaceful, democratic future. 'Searching for the truth' will help bring those responsible for the Cambodian genocide to justice. Punishing those who commit crimes is the strongest message that can be sent to the Cambodian people that they are equal before the law in a democratic society. The most important outcome of a Khmer Rouge tribunal for Cambodia would be its impact on Cambodia's "culture of impunity." Many Cambodian civil servants-politicians, police and soldiers-and even ordinary Cambodian citizens-have come to accept as inevitable this culture of impunity. They have even come to concede that "the strong take what they can, the weak suffer what they must; no one expects that the rule of law will intervene to modify this relationship". Convincingly punishing the most heinous criminals who have ever existed in Cambodia (the leadership of the Khmer Rouge) is the most effective way to begin to erode this culture of impunity and nurture the fragile foundations of a society built on the rule of law. This is the key to helping Cambodia transform itself into a state of law.

The purposes and objectives of DC-Cam's magazine 'Searching for the truth' are:

1. To support the tribunal to judge the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975-1979; to educate and contribute to the establishment of the rule of law in Cambodia. Number 1, January 2000

2. To promote a better understanding of a) the legal procedure of the Khmer Rouge tribunal, and b) the history of the Khmer Rouge regime, based upon materials held at DC-Cam and other institutions.

3. To serve as a forum for informed debate concerning the conduct of the Khmer Rouge trial and the history of the Khmer Rouge regime.

4. To serve as a source of information for Cambodians to learn about and debate what is happening (or not happening) internationally concerning the prosecution of massive human rights abuses (i.e., the Rome Statutes, the Pinochet case, the Milosovic case, East Timor). [What is happening and not happening in Cambodia is affected by this international context, and I believe that Cambodian readers will want to know about developments outside as well as inside the country].

A panel of independent journalists, Cambodia scholars and legal experts will continually evaluate 'Searching for the truth'. An editorial board of legal and historical experts will be established to review each edition of 'Searching for the truth' before it goes out. 'Searching for the truth' welcomes every constructive comment on, and input to, the legal proceedings from the public, and encourages and appreciates the general readership concerning Cambodia's recent, horrific history. I believe that 'Searching for the truth' can be a good friend for all of you, a rare friend with whom you can study and share, and increase your understanding of the Khmer Rouge history.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all Cambodian citizens in general, and to the people in the remote countryside in particular, who have assisted me in many ways in my research work, and who have helped me to become who I am now.

Although I cannot include all of your names here, I wish to tell you that you are all in my heart every day-most warmly. Please help us with your continued contribution in our cause of searching for the truth and justice for the Khmer Rouge victims.

Youk Chhang

100

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Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)

ABOUT THE MAGAZINE: *'Searching for the truth.'*

The Magazine will include five sections concentrating on different topics as follows: 1) documentation at DC-Cam; 2) history; 3) legal analysis; 4) public forum for debates; and 5) family tracing column describing the efforts of the DC-Cam to locate information about missing family members in the Khmer Rouge time.

The first column will be prepared by the staff of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, based on the

original documents.

Simply put, it will have summarized texts converted from the original documents. The objective of this section is to inform the public about the kinds of documents at the DC-Cam.

The second column feature articles will concentrating on analysis of the Khmer Rouge history. The text for this section will be provided by international experts on Khmer Rouge history, and its aim is to examine this history. This column will support preparation of history text books about the Khmer Rouge to be included in the Cambodian government's educational curriculum in the future.

The third section will feature legal analysis by international lawyers, judges, or experts. The articles will analyze legal concepts concerning the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge (and of the resolutions) of each crime.

The fourth section will provide a public forum for debates. The articles will be contributed by nongovernmental organizations, government officials, Searching for the truth — Documentation

teachers, students, and others. While the opinion pieces will reflect all opinions in society, debate articles accepted for publication will have virtue, quality of education, and dignity. It is a section for sharing ideas designed for resolutions for justice, historical illustration, mental illness healing, and future education.

The fifth section is for tracing victims' family members, who died or disappeared in the Khmer Rouge time. While it will be a column of horrific and tragic pain, it is a column that will help eliminate doubt and bring an eternal happiness. The column will help honestly disseminate information to the public, and it

will describe new lives

after the Khmer Rouge

time. All requests by the public for family tracing

above five columns of the magazine of the

Documentation Center

of Cambodia will be

open to the public from

all walks of life on a

nondiscriminatory basis.

'Searching for the truth'

is for every Cambodian

citizen, established by

Cambodians, for the sake

of Cambodians and to

help Cambodians find a

to be sent to "The Truth"

should bear the name,

occupation, address and

telephone number of the

contributor for confir-

All letters or texts

real justice.

In summary, the

will be welcome.



mation of the authenticity and essence of letters or texts before their publication. The Magazine reserves the right to correct words or letters for the purpose of maintaining their intended meaning. However, the Magazine will rigorously respect the government press law, specifically as per Chapter 5.

Youk Chhang

THE KHMER ROUGE DOCUMENTS

By Youk Chhang

The Documentation Center of Cambodia has preserved more than 400,000 pages related to the Democratic Kampuchea, or "Khmer Rouge" regime. This number does not include the many photographs, audio and videotapes, diaries, and copies of the party magazine that form part of the DC-Cam collections.

Due to the word usage of the Khmer Rouge cadre and the fact that much of the documentation concerned security matters. the documents will frequently appear obscure to the general reader. While each document is independent, each must also be seen as a piece of the larger puzzle. The records fall into several broad categories, including biographies, reports, meeting minutes, telegrams and communications, and confessions extracted under torture and threat of torture. Among the documents are one particular collection of 6,185 pages, most of which contain notations by, or individual concerning, members of the Khmer Rouge leadership. The exact nature and origin of the documents in this particular collection is a matter of dispute among the experts. Some believe they belonged to Son Sen, the former Khmer Rouge Minister for National Defense, while others variously believe they belonged to the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the "Santebal" (the Khmer

Number 1, January 2000

Rouge security organization), or to Pol Pot himself.

These documents are of both historical and legal value. The magazine writers will try to summarize the original documents, converting them into appropriate texts that will be easier to understand. The Documentation Center is only playing the role of "messenger" in relaying these samples in their original sense to the public. It is left to the reader to draw his or her own conclusions as to their value and meaning.



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NECESSITY OF PRESERVING PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

By Kosal Phat

The mass graves and remains of its thousands of victims are perhaps the main physical evidence of the crimes committed by the DK regime. This evidence has both historical and legal importance.

It is imperative that Cambodians should understand and believe the whole truth about the Khmer Rouge genocidal regime so that they can learn from it and prevent such tragic history from ever being repeated in the future of Cambodian society. Only by properly securing and preser-ving this important physical evidence can the full horror of the Khmer Rouge genocide history be made clear to Cambodians and the world.

As the Khmer Rouge tribunal approaches, the victims' remains, the regime's prisons and mass graves, which are located in almost every one of Cambodia's 170 districts, will be among the most important subjects of the court's investigations. To highlight the importance of physical evidence, the United Nations' "Group of Experts" has noted that "the physical evidence most relevant for any proceedings can be divided into three categories: human remains, structures and mechanical objects and documents..." (Report of the United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia [1999], Section 4, Point "B").

Although the People's Republic of Kampuchea took steps to preserve the evidence of the Democratic Kampuchea regime in the 1980s, the Royal Goverment of Cambodia should, and indeed is obligated, to take timely measures to ensure that this evidence of the Khmer Rouge crimes will never be lost or contaminated. It is especially important to ensure that local authorities are well informed of this vital need. Victims' remains must be securely stored and any plans for erasing or developing killing sites must be put on hold at least until a proper investigative process for the Khmer Rouge trial is completed.

Very recently, a DC-Cam team made a visit to a genocide site called Kuk Sang (Sang Prison) in Trapeang Sva village of Kandal province, a site that was also visited



by the UN Group of Experts during its mission to Cambodia in November, 1998. The team noted that the remains of the Khmer Rouge victims there had been disturbed. Below are excerpts from our interview with a local Patriarch Monk:

Question (Q): We are from the Documentation Center of Cambodia. We are here to see the remains of the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime in Kuk Sang. When we arrived, we noticed a proper memorial for the remains. Villagers have told us that you initiated the construction of the memorial. What was the reason for your constructing this memorial for the remains?

Answer (A): One reason I got the idea to construct this memorial is that one member of my family was killed at Sang Prison. Another reason is that I observed the remains in a sad state, just sitting there exposed to the sun, wind, and rain. The remains have decayed and have even been eaten by cows. That inspired me to think that if the remains continued to lie in the state they were in they would certainly vanish and no evidence would be left for younger generations to see. In addition, if Buddhist followers wanted to come to light incense and pay homage to commemorate the souls of the dead, there was not a place for them to do so. So this idea of building a memorial for the remains came to my mind. I started with the idea of gathering Buddhist followers from many localities, including the local authorities such as the District Governor and Provincial Governor. Then, with their contributions, we built this memorial and stored all of the remains inside it. Contributions continued to come from generous individuals until the building of the memorial was finished. Another problem is that when people come, they do not have a shelter. When we had a religious ceremony during Phchum Ben Day (day to pay homage to the dead), it rained and everyone got soaked. But in remembrance of the souls of the dead, the monks ate the offered food in the rain. When we held an inaugural

Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)

ceremony for the memorial, the governor of Kandal province himself came.

(Q): What is his name?

(A): His Excellency Khoem Bo came and I solicited a contribution from him, which he agreed would be used for the building of an eating hall. However, his contribution was not enough, and I could only build pillars. I think that this project should be carried on gradually every year. The Governor has also told me to keep going, and that he will help.

(Q): So you first started to put this idea into motion? (A): Yes, it was me.

(Q): Did the district authority support this idea initially?(A): Yes, they supported it. I just started the idea, and was

immediately joined by commune, district, and provincial authorities so that we were then able to really take off.

(Q): So the main reason you have is that your father died?

(A): One reason is that my father died, but an especially important additional reason is that I pity people who do not have the ability to build a memorial. They depend on monks who can solicit contributions to build this.

(Q): Why not take the remains somewhere else? Why have you built the memorial in the vicinity of the original site?

(A): Before, there was a suggestion to remove the remains

to Koh Sokram pagoda, but years went by, and we never saw any one take the remains there. That is when I pointed out to the district governor of Kandal Stung that if we took the remains away from their original location, we would be separating the evidence from the scene. So I requested permission to build a memorial there. The government has given the land on the left-hand side of the site exclusively to me, while the land on the right-hand side belongs to the state.

(Q): What about the original place?

(A): The original ruined structure is said to be designated as a building for the Royal School of Administration. I do not know when they will begin.

(**Q**): What will be done with the structure of the former Khmer Rouge prison?

(A): The plan is to demolish the prison and replace it with a new building. This used to be a big prison and where the memorial stood is where the Khmer Rouge chiefs in charge of the prison lived during that time.

(Q): How did you feel, as someone who wishes to see the evidence and scars of the genocidal regime preserved for Cambodia's younger generations, when the authorities attempted to demolish it and build a new building?

(A): If we could keep the former Khmer Rouge prison where it is, it is very good. But if the district authorities need it, we can not prohibit them because they said if we keep it without using it, we will lose our rights. If for this reason, they build something new, it is good too.

(Q): What year was that when you started building the memorial?

(A): In late 1999.

(Q): Why, in the first place, did you not think of rebuilding

the roof of the old structure to shelter the remains from the rain? (A): I aimed to do so, but the circumstances at that time were that even if we wanted to keep the remains there, the authorities would not let us keep them there. Possibly the remains could be brought somewhere else. I was not able to tell them to keep them where they were. And if I did not move them, the remains would be lost gradually every year until nothing would have been left there.

(**Q**): What about the officials who made contributions to build the memorial? Did they have relatives who were killed at Sang Prison?

(A): Some did, but others did not have relatives who were killed there because they come from distant places. Most people who died were people from Kandal Stung district. (Q): Many people here went to the site to light incense. Were many of their family members killed there?

(A): Yes, many relatives of people here in Kandal Stung were killed, but not people in Trapeang Sva village, because in the Pol Pot time, they were the killers. So what we did would not please them, because they wanted to erase the evidence from our sight that would trigger our anger toward them. They do not want us to build this memorial.

(Q): So there are people against your idea?

(A): There are... but they dare not oppose...because the authorities stand behind me. So they are reluctant to do anything against us. If they dare, we have the authorities to protect us.

(Q): So you have their support because many of their

Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)



Number 1, January 2000

Number 1, January 2000



relatives died here in the Pol Pot time?

(A): Many people from here died in the Pol Pot time, as we know from people who live nearby and those who made contributions, not to mention many others living at some distance from here. We just spent a small sum of money to disseminate our plan to build. Then people came with their contributions and help.

(Q): The death of your father at Sang Prison partly motivated you to build that memorial. Were you aware of how your father was killed?

(A): No I was not. I did not know because I was small, but my mother told me that he only worked as a plumber but the Khmer Rouge said my father was a high-ranking officer in the Khmer Republic regime. Then they took him from Sang to be killed.

(Q): How do you know that he was killed?

(A): There are people who saw and told me, and the Khmer Rouge cadres who took my father to be killed are still alive.

(Q): What are their names?

(A): They are Roeung and Mao. They controlled this

prison. Many Khmer Rouge killers from Trapeang Sva are still alive.

(Q): A moment ago someone mentioned about stealing skulls and remains. Is that true?

(A): There was no stealing of skulls! But shackles were stolen. Before there were many shackles, youngsters stole shackles to sell. A few years ago, I saw a lot of shackles but when I was there to remove the remains, I found few shackles left there. Skulls were eaten by cows and bones were scattered around. I once gathered the bones to keep them where they were. Before the election in 1993, the remains were taken care of and provided with shelter. Trea sub-district took good care of them. But since the election, concern has diminished.

(Q): So the remains that you have collected and stored are all there were, and nobody cremated anything?

(A): No, I brought all the remains.

(Q): Do you believe that by doing so, you can keep the remains for long?

(A): I am not so sure, but they are not exposed now. They may continue to decay, but it will take a long time, unlike when they were exposed to the wind and rain. If they remained in those circumstances much longer, they would have quickly been turned into earth.

(**Q**): What about Hatred Day of May 20? Did the district authority go and organize a ceremony there?

(A): We did. Many people from Kandal Stung district went there.

(**Q**): So from now on, do you think that the celebration of Hatred Day May 20 will take place at the memorial?

(A): Yes I think so. The last food offering ceremony took place there, and the provincial governors also came.

(Q): Among the reasons that you have set forth-first the death of your father, second, concern about losing the remains, third, concern about a shelter for holding ceremonies-which is the most important that so inspired you to build this memorial?

(A): The second reason-worry of losing remains-is the most important reason. My father is gone and I cannot get him back. But the loss of the remains is what I have worried about the most. Because if people say "many died there", but there are no remains there, how can we believe? So preserving the remains is the most important reason. I am not conceited. Many people have contributed their money. I did not build this on my own. I do not want to lose the evidence, so that people from various places can come to pray and pay homage to the dead. And I will request the district governor that this memorial for the remains should exist forever. And I am thinking of having monks stay there and for people to come and pay homage because some souls of the dead have made their parents or

Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)

children dream of them, and told them that they are wandering around and have not reincarnated in another world. I want to have monks meditating there so that the souls of the dead will rest in peace. In Buddhism, when someone dies and their mind is still with this world, then their souls wander around. The remains are a legacy for the younger generation so that they may know how vicious the Khmer Rouge regime was, because the young did not experience the regime. I experienced this regime. Some lived through this regime as children but they still do not believe; how can those who did not live through believe? What can they base belief on?

(Q): If they want to demolish the old prison, would you dare to oppose them?

(A): No, I wouldn't.

(Q): There are many big mass graves at the site, what do you think the local authorities might develop the area into? Because I think that if they clear up the area for development, then they may erase all, including the mass graves?

(A): Yes, all will be gone. The whole area will be developed. There are many graves at that site but I do not know how many are on the land that was given to me to build the memorial. Before, piles of victims' remains were taken from those mass graves, not just 5-6 cubic meters like this. Only about 30-60 mass graves have been excavated. There are many more left to be excavated-some with 2 bodies each, some with 5 bodies each and some others with 6 bodies each. The sub-district chief told me that there are many small pits with victims' remains there. (**Q**): If they erase everything, what will you think?

(A): Personally, I want to keep the killing site just the way it is. But the authorities think that if we leave the land like that, and do not develop it, then we will not gain any benefit. Their idea is different from ours. It would be great, if they could think like us and we could preserve it like that in Japan (Hiroshima). We could put a fence around it so that the younger generations could come and see.

(**Q**): So if one day, someone in authority comes to you and orders you to burn all the remains, and they say it is not worth keeping the remains, what will be your reaction?

(A): I would not dare to oppose them at all. I could only request that they do not burn them, but give them to me. Please do not touch the remains because I have a stupa for them already. If they do not want that, I can bring them to my pagoda here. But if they still insist that the remains be burnt, I dare not oppose them. In my opinion, if they do not want us to keep the remains there, I would like to keep them in my pagoda so that people can come and hold religious ceremonies for their dead relatives.

(Q): When you built the stupa, were you thinking of your

father?

(A): I did think about my father. I prayed that "when I was small, I could not fulfill my duties in return for your raising me. But now that you are dead, I am only able to build this memorial for you to lie in. I can only light incense and pray when I have food."

(Q): Were you born here in Kandal Stung district?

(A): Yes, I was born here; I was a monk in Moha Montrei pagoda in Phnom Penh for about a year. Then I was asked to come back to this pagoda in my native village because my predecessor was too old. And the villagers invited me to be Patriarch and I have been here for 6 years. I think that in the eating hall at the memorial, after the roof is built, I will have pictures of the Khmer Rouge tortures and atrocities committed against the prisoners at Sang Prison painted on the ceiling and walls for the younger generations to see how heinous the Khmer Rouge were.

INTRODUCTION TO CONFESSIONS

Toul Sleng Prison was an interrogation and torture center operated by the Khmer Rouge security apparatus, the Santebal, known at the time as S-21. Of the approximately 14,000 men, women and children who were sent to S-21 during its operation between 1975 and 1979, all but a handful were eventually executed, most ending up in the mass graves af Choeung Ek.

Several of the over 4,000 extant "confessions" obtained at Tuol Sleng are being presented in this magazine in a summarized format. The reader is warned that these confessions were obtained by the use of torture. Therefore, the truth of any factoral assertions contained therein cannot be assumed. As David Chandler states in his book "Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison": "First without corroboration from other sources, very few of the 'facts' contained in the cofessons, aside from strictly autobiographical ones, can be taken at face value. Whether prisoners told the truth nder torture, said what they were told to say, said what they thought their interrogators wanted to hear, or produced a mélange of truth under torture, half truth, and fantasy is impossible to determine. It is safe to assume, however, not only that in their broad outlines most confesions were fabricated to suit what S-21 officials assumed to be the wishes of the Party Center but also that strands of genuine conspiratorial narrative, and actual angry conversations are sometimes woven into the confessions."

The following texts are summaries of several of the confessions recorded at Toul Sleng.

CONFESSION OF SANN PO

By Kalyan Sann

This is a summarized text (extracted from file number J00451) of a confession made by Sann Po, prisoner at Tuol Sleng under the Khmer Rouge regime. Sann Po, 24, born in Chi Kreng District, Siem Reap Province, was arrested by "Angkar" and sent to Tuol Sleng on July 28, 1978 under an accusation of being a traitor. Before the day of his arrest, Sann Po was serving as a combatant working in a state-run market (Phsar Thmei) under the management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

File number 451(J) bears the title "Confession of Sann Po, combatant of state-run market; his history of disloyalty to the Party". It is a typewritten text dated August 2, 1978, consisting of 12 pages, containing a signature of confirmation by Sann Po himself, as well as that of the interrogator, a person named "Than".

On the first page of the confession, there is a note in red script reading: "Comrade Vann." [Comrade Vann was an alias of Ieng Sary, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea. His birth name was Kim Trang]. On the back page there is a list of 34 "traitorous elements" extracted from the confession of Sann Po, of which two names, Cham Raen and Phy, are marked "already arrested by Angkar." In the "confession", Sann Po tells of his own "traitorous activities" as well as that of his partisans. According to his statement, Sann Po had committed the following acts against Angkar:

In December 1973, Sann Po joined the revolution through the introduction of San, chief of a hospital in Chi Kreng District, who Sann Po had met during his hospitalization. In January 1974, San convinced Sann Po to join his activities against the revolution in association with Lam, Phen, Neary Khmao, Vorn, and Nun, all of whom were serving on the hospital staff in Chi Kreng District. San persuaded the above individuals to hate those who were loyal to the Khmer Rouge revolution, and not to give any injections to them when they were sick. Furthermore, San enticed the elements not to work so hard for public health, to kill the chickens raised for food, to spoil medicine by keeping it hidden for too long, and not to provide enough food for the sick. Sann Po and the others reluctantly accepted these conditions, fearing that San would mistreat them, as they had once witnessed happen to some people who were tied and kept in a security office because of their refusal to do what they had been told.

In April, 1974 Sann Po, Phen, and Try were removed to a military base in Siem Reap-Uddar Mean Chey, Special Region 106, located in Siem Reap Province between Preah Vihear Region 103 and Northwest Zone 560 (According to a map published by the Ministry of Education of Democratic Kampuchea in 1976). Before Sann Po left for Siem Reap-Udder Mean Chey, San told him to make contact with a person named No, chief of a military unit there. At the military base, Sann Po and another thirteen people hid two truckloads of weapons and ammunition, and thousands of tons of rice.

In July 1974, No was replaced by a man named Khroeun. Khroeun also helped Sann Po and his partisans to hide weapons, food, and equipment, and allowed the enemy to evacuate many families. After the 1975 liberation of Phnom Penh, Sann Po was sent to work at Phsar Thmei state-run market under the administration of a person named Sin, chief of the market unit. Sin ordered Sann Po and the others to hide supplies, including 30 Kei (a measure of cloth sufficient to make four shirts), 15 cases of wine, and 15 cases of pate. A week later, Angkar replaced Sin with a new chief named Lum. In 1976, Lum was replaced by a person named Phy who, after the appointment, led Sann Po and the other forces to hide food, including dried fish, fish paste and sugar, for so long that it spoiled. Two weeks later, another person named Daun was appointed to the position of chief of the market unit.

In December 1977, Daun was taken out of the Phsar Thmei unit. In January 1978, Vuy became responsible for the market. Under the command of Vuy, Sann Po, along with his partisans, took part in activities such as the hiding of unhusked rice, typewriters, scarves and other clothes. In February 1978, Vuy was replaced with another person named Moeun. Moeun later sent Sann Po to work at a plantation in Prek Phnoeu. On July 18, 1978 Sann Po was arrested by Angkar and sent to Tuol Sleng prison. There is no evidence that Sann Po survived Tuol Sleng.

BARAY CHOAN DEK PAGODA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME

By Kosal Phat

Baray Choan Dek pagoda is located in Tros village, Balaing subdistrict, Prasat Balaing district, Kampong Thom province, and lies approximately 3 kilometers from National Road #6 at Phsar Skun. According to a map of Democratic Kampuchea from 1976, Baray Choan Dek pagoda was in the Northern Zone (Zone 303). Over 20 years ago, under the Khmer Rouge regime of 1975-79, the Khmer

Rouge transformed the whole compound of Baray Choan Dek pagoda into a security office, prison, and killing site where thousands of innocent people and monks were brutally executed. To survivors of the prison, these terrifying events seem as vivid as a very recent occurence.

Mr. Le, 70, who lives in Daung village about 3 kilometers from the location of the site, told our mass grave research team that he was imprisoned in Baray Choan Dek for three years (from 1976 to 1978). Before he was sent to prison, the Khmer Rouge had arrested him in 1974 under orders from Comrade Nhem, a village chief who is

now dead. Nhem had reported to his superiors that Le had been a first deputy chief of a sub-district during the Sihanouk regime and the later Khmer Republic regime. The Khmer Rouge had first sent him to be imprisoned in Tradet village. He was told to cut trees and clear bushes day and night.

At Baray Choan Dek prison, The Khmer Rouge assigned Mr. Le and his team of four the task of constructing four ox-carts per month. Mr. Le told us that because the workshop where he made the ox-carts was not far from the pagoda entrance, he had observed that on average, about five truckloads of prisoners were driven into the prison each month. Sometimes, the prison was too full and could not accommodate all of the prisoners, in which case some were transported out.

By early 1980, Mr. Le was a village chief. He led people in the village to excavate the bodies and remains of the victims at this site to keep for purposes of a religious ceremony. Mr. Le estimated the number of victims at



Baray Choan Dek prison at between 1000 and 2000. Mr. Yoeng, 65, presently lives in Daung village. He told us that he was also imprisoned at Baray Choan Dek prison from 1976 to 1978, because in the Khmer Republic regime, he had been a leading person in Buddhism as a layman. He pointed to the enormous pagoda eating hall and the main pagoda building and said that the Khmer Rouge had used these two buildings as prisons. He led us up into the eating hall and showed us where he had slept and been shackled. He was among hundreds of prisoners who slept with their feet shackled to an iron bar and their heads in opposite directions, line by line on the wooden floor. All of the prisoners had been subjected to starvation and were forced to live in terribly filthy conditions, where they were tormented by vermin and mosquitoes, and forced to eat and defecate where they slept. The prisoners were allowed to bathe only once every 15 days.

Mr. Yoeng added that on some days, 5 or 10 prisoners would die from starvation and untreated

Number 1, January 2000



diseases. Then the Khmer Rouge guards would drag the dead bodies away through the side door toward the site behind the pagoda. Mr. Yoeng said that when he thought of these events, he was still haunted by feelings of terror. One time, the Khmer Rouge security called the name of a prisoner next to him. They then released that prisoner from the shackle and walked him away at gunpoint from behind. Later, Mr. Yoeng was taken from the eating hall and placed in Mr. Le's team making ox-carts. He did this work until the liberation in 1979.

Mr. Hai, 79, lives in Tros village, Balaing subdistrict. He also told us that the pagoda had been a prison, but Mr. Hai said the prisoners had not been handcuffed and shackled in the main pagoda building, nor had they been forced to work. He said that the Khmer Rouge only used the main building to keep prisoners for a short time while awaiting their deaths at the pits behind the pagoda. Hai now lives very close to the pagoda. He had also been imprisoned at Baray Choan Dek, but was released in late 1977. Shortly before the liberation day, in 1978, a cadre from the Khmer Rouge security at Baray Choan Dek was fleeing from the Vietnamese troops that attacked this area. This cadre came to Hai's house and lived there for two days. Due to the cadre's carelessness, Hai had observed a document in his possession. Hai remembered that the document had indicated that 2,514 people had been imprisoned at Baray Choan Dek. Hai insisted that he had seen this number himself.

Hai directed our eyes to a memorial behind the pagoda where the remains of the victims were stored. It is

close to the killing site. Hai and Le told us that there were between 30 and 40 mass graves. Each mass grave is 2.50 meters in depth and 3 meters on each side. There were hundreds of small pits around the pagoda building, each containing three or four victims. Hai, Le and Yoeng told us that all prisoners had been killed with axes or hammers. They were hit on the head with these implements and kicked into the mass graves. Hai picked many skulls from the pile to show us. He pointed to the cracks and wholes in the backs and sides of the skulls, which supported his statements as to how the victims were killed. Hai said that he had

heard from the cadre who had stayed at his house for two days that the victims had been from many social layers, such as officials of Khmer Republic regime, police, military, teachers, and urban people from various places who were evacuated into this area. He said that among the victims were members of a royal family-Norodom Odomvong, his wife and two daughters.

Hai, Le and Yeong mentioned their shared concern that a considerable amount of victims' remains were being eaten by pigs and cows. Some remains had been lost due to removal at different times and exposure to wind and rain for a long time. Now there is a concrete memorial behind the pagoda in which the remains are piled up. We saw a cup of sand with remains of incense, and Tung Proling "cloth of souls" stuck into the wall of the memorial. The monks in the pagoda told us that people come from various places in Kampong Thom province and other provinces to pay homage to the victims because those people believe that their relatives were among the people killed by the Khmer Rouge at Baray Choan Dek. Every year on May 20, officials and representatives from all sub-districts and districts hold a ceremony to remember the genocide regime at the memorial.

Hai also told us the names of the Khmer Rouge security chiefs and cadres at Baray Choan Dek prison who were responsible for what had happened there.

Hai, Le and Yoeng told us that they want courts to seek justice for them and the other victims at Baray Choan Dek prison. They would be willing to testify should the court require it.

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DK PROVINCE, ZONE, REGION AND DISTRICT

A Khmer Rouge text describing the DK administrative and political geography, first published by the DK Ministry of Education for Elementary Class 2, 1977, pp. 9-10.

Kampuchea consists of 19 provinces: Stung Treng, Ratanak Kiri, Mondul Kiri, Kratie, Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, Takeo, Kampot, Koh Kong, Kampong Speu, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Thom, Preah Vihear, Oddar Meanchey, Siem Reap, Pursat and Battambang. These provinces are further divided into 112 districts, 1,160 sub-districts, and many hundreds of villages. During the period of our secret political struggle, and of our internal and revolutionary war more than five years ago, with the aim of creating more favorable conditions for communications, administration. and work implementation to fulfill revolutionary tasks in all sectors, our revolutionary organization divided the country into new zones and regions on top of these

former provinces, districts, sub-districts, and villages. In addition, we had established cooperatives since the revolutionary war. Since the great victory on April 17, 1975, our revolutionary organization has found it expedient to retain the new zones and region subdivisions as being highly useful for administrative purposes. At present, our Democratic Kampuchea has been divided into six zones and some other regions distinctively designated with their own administrations, not under any zone. Kampong Som is a city under a separate administration like the other Regions. The Regions or cities under separate administrations are directly controlled by the State Organization, not via any Zone. At the same time, we have created certain new districts, including Koh Chey (formerly called Preah Sdech district), Krasaing district in the East Zone, Taing Kok and Baray districts in the North Zone, Choam Sangke in the Southwest Zone, Thmar Sar in the West Zone, and Kandieng, Kdat, Thlea Ma-am, and



Samlot, in the Northwest Zone.Our six zones are the Northeast Zone, East Zone, Southwest Zone, West Zone, North Zone, and Northwest Zone. We do not establish a zone for each province, and thus each of certain zones consists of two or more provinces.

For example, we have combined all of Svay Rieng and Prey Veng together with part of Kampong Cham province located on the left bank of the Mekong to form the East zone and one district of Kratie province (Chhlong) as well as apart of territory from Kandal province.

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CHAM MINORITY PRISONERS AT TUOL SLENG PRISON

By Sorya Sim

Like other ethnic minorities, Chams were arrested and incarcerated at Tuol Sleng by the Khmer Rouge. When they fled from the Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge left many documents at Tuol Sleng including biographies, lists of prisoners, and confessions. Well-known historians have never paid much attention to the ethnic minorities issue, arguing that the documents are not valid because the confessions were made under forced interrogation. On the contrary, upon reviewing these documents, I have found many of them to hold important factual information relating to the Khmer Rouge's torture of persons representing many ethnic minorities. In this paper, I would like to introduce the case of a Cham named Ha Chy Sa Leah Yass Ya, called Kong Sei Matt, or Saray in the Khmer Rouge time.

Yass Ya's confession is four pages long. He was interrogated by comrade "Leng", who worked in an interrogation section called "Small Pon's Interrogation Group" at Tuol Sleng prison. These pages describe in detail Yass Ya's autobiography, his education, work, and alleged traitorous activities against the Khmer Rouge.



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Based upon my investigation, the one aspect of Yass Ya's confession that is inarguably false is that of his purported traitorous activities against the Khmer Rouge. As of yet, we have not found any one who can verify any of these purported traitorous activities on the part of Yass Ya. Does it not make sense to conclude that Yass Ya did not commit these traitorous acts, but just wrote this part of his "confession" under the forced interrogation of "Leng"? The significant points we have verified are that Yass Ya was in fact a member of the senate of the Khmer Republic, that he was minister for Muslim Affairs of the Ministry of Cults in Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community), and that he was arrested and sent to Tuol Sleng by the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, we have already checked this information against his documented confession. Based on my interviews with his relatives and the many other people who used to know him, Yass Ya's confession is largely true.

After stating that he had encouraged Cham leaders named Him Man and Ly Mou Ha Matt, as well as people in Ko He Village, Roka Kaong Sub-district, Srok Muk Kampoul District, to rebel against the Khmer Rouge, Yass Ya added: "On the night of December 6, 1975, at 10 pm, Angkar arrested me at my home located in Ko He Dam Rei Sar Raka Kaong". Yass Ya's nephew, who was kept in the same prison and survived the Khmer Rouge regime, told me that he had met his uncle Yass Ya in Wat Dam Rei Sar:

"At about 5 p.m., he saw me in that place. Upon seeing me, he fell to the floor and crept towards me. At that time, there were about 30 prisoners present. When he managed to reach me, Yass Ya rested his head against my thigh and took my hand to put on his head asking me how long I had been there. I replied that I had been there for about two weeks. Then he said he had been staying next to the room we were in, but had not seen me. He continued, saying they had taken him to question and then they had sent him to meet me. He asked me to struggle against the Khmer Rouge, and ask them for permission to perform worship at his burying ceremony if he died. I touched his head, which was wounded. When I asked him what the Khmer Rouge had hit him with, he said he had been hit with a pistol. At 6 o'clock the Khmer Rouge opened the door and said they had tried to find Sa Leah Yass Ya for a long time, and that now that they had found him, that would be the end of the problem. They took Yass Ya away, and after a few moments, all we heard were screams of pain. Prisoners next to the room tried to steal a glance over the wall. They saw something that frightened them, and dropped down from the wall."

According to the confession document, the information about Yass Ya had not been known to the Khmer Rouge. Based on the "black list of honor" at Tuol Sleng prison, Yass Ya continued to be tortured at Tuol Sleng until May 2, 1976–the day of his death. Yass Ya had been arrested after a rebellion on November 22, 1977. The rebellion was put down, and hundreds of participants were imprisoned at Wat Dam Rei Sar. Two victims who were kept at this monastery are still alive and have been interviewed. Most villagers call this Buddhist Monastery "Wat Dam Rei Sar", or "Wat Serei Mung Kul", the present name appearing on the entrance sign.

In summary, the confession document reveals the following facts about Yass Ya: the exact time of his arrest, the place of his arrest, people who had met him, the names of prisoners held at the same place, the fact that he died of "gaseous illness and suffering pain", and lists of prisoners held at Tuol Sleng. In addition, the confession file contains photographs of Yass Ya taken at the time he was a member of the senate, as well as those that were made and kept at Tuol Sleng and have survived the Khmer Rouge regime.

Yass Ya was one of 40 members of the senate during the Khmer Republic under the leadership of Field Marshal Lon Nol. In the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community) of the 1960s, Yass Ya was the Office Administrator in the Ministry of Cults and was responsible for Muslim Affairs. He stood for election in Krek, Kampong Cham Province in the Sangkum Reastr Niyum time. Yass Ya had also participated in a conference on Asian-African Muslim Affairs held in Indonesia in 1965. He had celebrated the Islam Ha Chy ritual ceremony in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Yass Ya was born in 1922. He majored in Islam and general education at Chroy Chang Va, Phnom Penh. His wife's name was Amy Nass. His mother's name was Kh Ti Cheh. His father's name was Sa Leh.

Number 1, January 2000

CONFESSION OF THOU HAI

By Sophal Ly

Confession file J00043 of a prisoner kept at Tuol Sleng describes the case of Thou Hai who was identified as an enemy of Angkar. It is critical to keep in mind that all of these "confessions" were extracted under torture, and that the truth of the factual assertions herein can never be assumed. The "confession" document consists of 38 pages. On page 3 there is a note reading: "For Comrade Mok to make contacts between Region 28 and Region 33 (South Western)". Beneath it there is another note reading: "Contact for information about the events of March 28 to February 11, 1978". The one who summed up the confession of

Thou Hai was Comrade "Pheap". On pages 35 to 37 there are lists of peoples' names and their occupations. Among those implicated by the answer of Thou Hai, four names were marked as having been arrested, while 14 names were crossed out. Who was They Hai?

Who was Thou Hai?

According to the contents of this confession document Thou Hai was a worker. Before the day of his arrest, Thou Hai served as a worker at saw mill A-5. He was born in Ta Lai Village, Prek Ampel Sub-district, District 20 (Sa-ang), Region 25, Kandal Province. Thou Hai's wife was

Ham Trav Rtav. They had 7 children. On December 26, 1977, Hai was arrested by the Khmer Rouge and sent to Tuol Sleng, known as Office S-21.

Interrogated by Prak Khan, Thou Hai made the following confession: During his time at the sawmill, Thou Hai came to know Moch, the brother-in-law of Master Chhun Tea. Moch asked Thou Hai to join the army, but because of illiteracy, Hai became a spy (CIA) instead. Thou Hai then served as both worker and spy from 1960 to 1977. In 1960, he became a CIA fullrights member activist under the appointment of Major Commandants Sao and Sem through the introduction of Moch. After being appointed, Thou Hai was responsible for propagandizing people not to believe in the Khmer Rouge, and to keep track of the Khmer Rouge and those involved in bringing food and supplies to them. In 1961, Thou Hai returned to being a worker at the sawmill again and managed to recruit three individuals named Sreng, Thlang, and Sroeun, who were sawmill workers in Sam Pan Village, Srok Koh Thom, Kandal Province.



In 1962, Thou Hai made a report for Sao and Sem about the forces he had built. Sao and Sem encouraged Thou Hai to increase his efforts by giving him 1,500 riel as incentive. In that same year, Thou Hai managed to recruit two more agents. The five forces enticed by Thou Hai were introduced at Phsar Prey Lvea to Sem and Sao to become CIA agents. The five people were: Sreng, Thla, Sroeun, Chray and Cham.

In 1963, Thou Hai married a daughter of the sawmill master Chhun Tea. Later, the workers of the sawmill rebelled against

Chhun Tea and chased him out. Then Thou Hai brought his wife to work at the Prey Lvea sawmill for Master Leng and took this opportunity to connect with Master Leng who was in the network of Commandant Sao. Master Leng educated and enticed Hai to make great effort to build up CIA forces, keep track of those who were serving in the Khmer Rouge, and report to him if there was any event worth reporting. Hai was also

charged with turning people's loyalties from the Khmer Rouge to the Americans. With the persuasion of Master Leng, Thou Hai worked in the same capacity as Master Sam Korn and Master Pao. Later he met Sem. Knowing Thou Hai was coming back, Sem asked Hai to make connections with another three elements: Sin, Sung and Heng. These three people had also managed to educate three more people. Sem ordered the elements to entice the people in the village to report to him if there was any Khmer Rouge activity. In mid-1963, Thou Hai received orders from Sao, Som and Sem to eavesdrop in Kampot in order to make contacts with former soldiers who were previous networks of Sem. Then all elements jointly examined the Khmer Rouge activities and persuaded the villagers to hate and not to believe in the Khmer Rouge on the grounds that, in the presence of the Khmer Rouge, any business opportunity would be lost.

By the end of 1963, Thou Hai brought his family to Prek Ambel, Kandal Province. Then he came to earn his living by driving a cyclo in Phnom Penh with Heng. Heng drove the cyclo at night, and Hai during the daytime. In 1964, Thou Hai, through Heng, contacted two policemen in Kratie Province named Sien and Ly, who were also in Sem's network. Hai continued to work at sawmills in that province until 1966. During that time, Thou Hai managed to recruit three more operatives by introducing them to the rights of Americans, who were happy, prosperous and free. After succeeding in enticing these three people, Thou Hai returned to his home village by the end of 1966, earning his living by sawing wood in Chheu Khmao Subdistrict, Koh Thom District, Region 25, Kandal Province. A month later, he worked with three people in Chheu Khmao: Phat, Neang, Seng, who were in the network of Sao. In 1967, Thou Hai received orders from Phat to encourage people to fight against the Khmer Rouge, keep track of people if they gave food or supplies to the Khmer Rouge, and to build up CIA agents. Between 1967 and 1968, Thou Hai was instrumental in having Neang arrest two Khmer Rouge elements living in Kampot Province, this based upon a secret report from Prey Lvea to Sin and Sung.

Number 1, January 2000

In 1969, Thou Hai returned to his home village bringing his brother to work with a man named Khut, after realizing that Khut was in Phat's network. Thou Hai introduced Chak and Cheav to Khut for cooperation. In 1969, Thou Hai arrested and then released two people who were reportedly Khmer Rouge elements from Region 33, Southwestern Zone. In 1970, Thou Hai started working with former sub-district chief Khut and his three forces. Khut brought up the fact that where there were many "Yuon" (a pejorative term for the Vietnamese) elements entering the country and suggested starting a movement to encourage people not to support the Vietnamese, to help hide former civil servants of the previous adminis-tration, and not to tell any one so that the secret forces could continue working.

In 1971, Khut asked Hai, Chak and Cheav to work with him. He had joined North Vietnamese and Viet Cong networks, but only in name; his real objective was to conquer the power of the revolution as the CIA agents were doing. However, the three couldn't agree to the working conditions because they had too many children. Khut understood, but urged the three to work in the bases by encouraging people not to support the revolutionary forces, to keep track of and destroy revolutionary elements wherever they met them, and to return after having fulfilled these tasks. Khut tried to make Hai and his wife work together, because he thought it would not be a healthy situation to make Hai work without involving his wife. Then, Hai educated her to work with him by assigning her to encourage troubles among women in the village in an attempt to make them fight each other.

In 1972, Hai asked Heng to make a connection with Khut's networks. Khut agreed and five days latter announced that Heng, Hai and his wife were in the lines of the Labor Party of North Vietnam. At the same time, a person named Song Heng took a statue of an anchor from his pocket to show them that this was the coat of arms of the Labor Party. In the same year, Hai, Chak and Cheav went down to the base to encourage people to urge sub-district chiefs to issue letters of permission to allow villagers to have free movement accessing

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Region 33 in order to bring their unhusked and husked rice there in exchange for something else. They and then destroyed a waterwheel.

In 1973, the three people put into practice the plan to provoke troubles among cooperatives with the aim of making them fight each other and destroy the cooperatives' equipment. Later, Hai made contacts with another person named Son. After forming an agreement, they jointly destroyed plowing tools and a waterwheel in a cooperative located in Sam Pan Krom Village, Prek Ambel Sub-district, Kandal Province. In 1974, Song Heng, Teacher Chak, Bon, Hai and subdistrict chief Khut gathered together outside of Prek Ambel Village with the aim of extending the implementation of special tasks, especially that of destroying the cooperatives. Hai and his partisans continued destroying tools of cooperatives in Sam Pan Leu by dropping those items into the water. In May they spoiled 40 bunches of rice seedlings by placing them under water for a long time, and cut flesh from the legs of cattle in the cooperative of Prek Ta Lai. In October, they stepped on all newly planted corn, and then continued destroying plowing instruments, rakes, and waterwheels in Traey Troeng Village, Prek Ambel Subdistrict, Kandal Province.

In 1975, after the Liberation Day, Hai was removed to work at a sawmill in Phnom Penh, where he

met another person named An. After becoming friendly with this person, Hai realized An was connected with Chak. The two then cooperated in destroying the clutches of two sawing machines. They then threw four water pumps into the river. In November 1975 a person named Phem, a member of Factory Kilometer 6, wanted to see and work with Hai because he heard that Hai was easygoing, and that at his place all kinds of food were available at any time. Phem introduced Mom to Hai. About three days later, Mom asked Hai to catch fish by means of a spreading fishing net, and then asked

Hai to work with him, to which Hai agreed.

In 1976, Hai was persuaded to sabotage a sawing engine by putting a crow bar into the engine to wear out the teeth of the gearwheel and cause the oil to flow out of the engine. During that year, Hai worked with many other people in this negative manner. In 1977 the group continued with these and similar activities. As a result, 25 planks were in bad condition. Then, during working hours, they tried to push the sawing machine over. As a result, a sawing machine was put out of order. In October, Angkar assigned Hai to install a sawing machine in Preah Vihear Province, where he met a worker named Chhan who used to live next to his home. Hai asked Chhan to work with his group. Chhan agreed, because after joining the revolution he found it very hard to get enough to eat, got bored, and had no freedom of movement. In Preah Vihear, they failed to put oil into some engines, leaving one machine and a diesel generator worn out. On November 20, 1977, Hai received an order from Angkar to return to his original working place.

Over a period of 10 years, Hai committed his acts of sabotage and built up a number of forces to fight against the Khmer Rouge regime in an attempt to impede progress of the revolution. Unfortunately, after fulfilling the mission, Hai, his wife, and seven children were arrested by Angkar.

WHAT ARE THE ALLEGED ACTIVITIES OF TIV MEI IN THE CIA MOVEMENT AGAINST THE KHMER ROUGE IN NORTHERN ZONE?

By Sophearith Chuong

File number J00642 dated October 28, 1977 is a "confession" of Tiv Mei, alias Sante Pheap, a "new person" living in a cooperative in Takeo Village, Kor Sub-district, Prev Chhor District, Northern Zone, and a prisoner of the Khmer Rouge. The document states that from 1965, Tiv Mei served as worker at Sugar Manufacturer in Kampong Tram, Kampong Speu Province. The reason he became a CIA agent in the Northern Zone was that in 1971, So Bo Men, former worker at the Sugar Manufacturer (and later an agent of the Ministry of Interior) and a person named Nhem, a former agent of the Ministry of Interior, enticed him to serve as a CIA agent. These two persons told Tiv Mei: "Once you join us you will live at a higher, more prosperous standard due to the CIA's high salary. The workers in the manufacturing are in receipt of only 3,000 riel, while we are earning up to 10,000 riel. I used to live a hard life, but after working with this group, the living conditions are better. You see, nowadays there are only two main superpower countries. If we succeed in capturing power from the communists, our country will become more prosperous because of the support of a number of western countries. Both political and economic aspects of these countries-factory, machinery, building and equipment-are modern. The main political principle of the CIA is to fight against communist countries. If we lose the fight to them, there will be changes in terms of living conditions, as we have already noticed that aid from communist countries in the form of engine, factory, and commodities are not so good."

The confession purports to show the program organized for newly selected people to become CIA members. First, they had to pledge allegiance to the flags of the Khmer Republic and the United States of America. Second, there was the oath taking for the members to promise to abide by all rules and regulations of the Ministry and absolutely follow the guidelines of the Ministry. The network of the CIA consisted of: So Bo Men, who led a CIA group and eavesdropped in Ang Snuol District, Kandal Province;

Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)

Keo Chann, former national police agent, who worked as a spy in Srang area; Tiv Mei, who was a spy working in Kampong Tram; Prak Sophat, former national police agent, who was a spy working in Tmat Porng; Nhem, who was a spy in Bek Chan; and Sa Vang, who was serving as a spy in Kambol. The main objective of the CIA was to fight against any interference by the communist party.

In 1971, So Bo Men raised the issue of salaries and made a comparison of lifestyles between democratic and communist societies. He also provided more education about the duties of CIA agents and their more favorable working conditions. In 1972, Tiv Mei heard that the Khmer Rouge had often entered Chrey O Chrov, Takeo Province. After learning this, Tiv Mei tried to spy there. As a result, he learned that the Khmer Rouge were building up their forces in that area. Tiv Mei then reported to So Bo Men. So Bo Men immediately sent this information to the Ministry of Interior. At that time, the CIA called an urgent meeting. During the meeting, every CIA individual reported on the situation in his or her workplace. At the end of the meeting, the chairman gave the following instruction: "We have to learn how to burrow ourselves to get clear information. Report to me as soon as possible if there is any phenomenon so that I can send the information to the Ministry on time. We have to work harder, because the Ministry wants results after assigning us to go on missions."

As for Paris Village, east of Kampong Tram, there were Khmer Rouge elements entering very often to propagandize local villagers. Tiv Mei reported this situation to So Bo Men. After that, the Khmer Rouge continued to enter that area quite often for propagandizing. In 1973, the Khmer Rouge accelerated their activities, for example by blocking the road from Wat Bak Kar to Phnom Srang, Kampong Speu Province. Access to the road from Kampong Tram to Phnom Srang, and from Kampong Speu to Phnom Srang was completely prohibited. At that time, the Tiger Head-branded soldiers of the Lon Nol administration

were also trying to access these roads.

The Khmer Rouge blocked roads around Ang Me Trei Senior High School leading to Phnom Srang. At that time, the contact between Keo Chhan and Tiv Mei was cut off. Tiv Mei then reported to So Bo Men so that he could in turn send the report to the Ministry. Approximately a week later, the road to Phnom Srang was opened. Subsequently, So Bo Men called a secret planning meeting for the eight members, including Tiv Mei. So Bo Men said:

"Presently, the Khmer Rouge launch attacks almost every where, and they also block roads. Therefore, you all have to be vigilant. Try to gain valid information and send it to me as soon as possible. We must not slack off, because right now the Khmer Rouge elements are gearing up their activities. If anyone gets information about unusual phenomenon, please send it to me and then return to your work."

The Khmer Rouge conducted secret activities in Kampong Tram by capturing forty commandos who were on guard duty at a bridge. They also seized weapons. According to sources, the Khmer Rouge took Kampong Tram market, and intended to attack the Sugar Manufacturer and block roads to Srang. Tiv Mei then reported to So Bo Men. At night, the Khmer Rouge came to blow up a road and a bridge. As a result, the traffic at O Kraing Ambel Bridge, west of Prey Phdao, was brought to a standstill. In the meantime, Tiv Mei made a secret contact with a Cambodian-born Chinese man named Hao Srieng, who was a former member of the CIA working at Kampong Tram's rice wine company. The Khmer Rouge had evacuated Srieng because he refused to move away from his residence before their attacks in Kampong Tram and on the Sugar Manufacturer. Tiv Mei asked Hao Srieng to get information from the Khmer Rouge-controlled areas, and to help him persuade the workers at the wine manufacturer and the villagers in Kampong Tram to fight against the Khmer Rouge. Because of sympathy for his commandos captured by the Khmer Rouge, Srieng agreed to work for Tiv Mei.

One day, Tiv Mei heard that the Khmer Rouge were about to launch attacks and block roads from Ang Snuol to Kampong Speu and in Kampong Tram. Tiv Mei sent this information to So Bo Ben. A moment later, a person named Kong Yen arrived with a report

Searching for the truth — Documentation

saying that the Khmer Rouge were blocking the road from Angsnuol to Kampong Speu and the roads in Kampong Tram. The three people (So Bo Men, Tiv Mei and Kong Yen) returned to Nhem's place in Bek Chan, Phnom Penh District, Kandal Province. After several hours, Keo Chhan also arrived with information indicating that the Khmer Rouge were about to block the roads in Kampong Tram and Phnom Srang. It was thought that this time the Khmer Rouge would launch heavier attacks because they were deploying a large number of forces. Keo Chhan then reported to So Bo Men. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge were preparing their troops to attack the Sugar Manufacturer and block roads from Kampong Tram to Tmat Porng and from Angsnuol to Kampong Speu. After being informed of these facts, So Bo Men, immediately sent the report to the Ministry.

According to the confession of Tiv Mei, the Khmer Rouge attacked Angsnuol barracks, Sugar Manufacturer, and Prey Phdao District Office, and blocked the roads between them. Traffic was brought to a standstill for 20 days. People in Kampong Tram found it hard to travel. They could only access the road from the Sugar Manufacturer to Thnal Toroeng, Dam Nak Ampel Sub-district, Ang Snuol District, Kandal Province. Houses located in Prey Phdao, Kampong Tram, Thnal Tortoeng and Ang Snuol were destroyed, while villagers were evacuated to various places, including the Khmer Rouge-controlled areas. At a time when all CIA agents were present, So Bo Men said: "People in all places where we worked have been evacuated. So, we have no place to stay now. So we will stay at Nhem's place for the time being. Give me some time to meet and talk with Nov Sam Iech."

After having met with Nov Sam Iech, So Bo Men returned to meet all members saying: "Nov Sam Iech, has decided to remove Tiv Mei, Prak Sophat, Keo Chhan, and Kong Yen to another workplace in Phnom Penh, while Nhem and Savang will remain in the same position where the Khmer Rouge have not attacked yet." Nov Sam Iech then asked the five agents to work at the Investigation Office for the Ministry of Interior and the CIA. As for So Bo Men and Kong Yen, they were assigned to work in Chbar Ampeou with Prak Sokhom, former chief of the Special Investigation Office of the Ministry of Interior and the CIA.

In 1974, Nov Sam Iech ordered Suong Vuthy to introduce the three agents to all members of the office so that they could continue working together for the CIA. Suong Vuthy then called together all 20 members of the office and introduced each member, both old and new, in order to make a joint effort to fight against the Khmer Rouge. Vuthy said: "You all have to work harder, because right now the Khmer Rouge are increasing their attacks." Vuthy then assigned Tiv Mei to spy in Kilometer 6 area, Russei Keo District, Phnom Penh, while Keo Chhan was to work in Stung Mean Chey and Prak Sophat in Chak Angre.

Based on the confession of Tiv Mei, the villagers in Prek Phnoeu, on the other side of river, said there were many Khmer Rouge elements in their village. People could not cross over to the other side for business. The Khmer Rouge also controlled Dam Nak Sek Village, adjacent to the Wine Manufacturer. After learning this, Tiv Mei reported to the office immediately.


At that time, the Ministry decided to change the Office Chief and called all section chiefs and members together for a meeting, including Vann Sar, Nov Sam Iech and Sokh Samat, former chief of the investigation office for the Ministry of Interior and the CIA. Vann Sar

Number 1, January 2000

said: "We would like to replace Suong Vuthy with Sokh Samat. Vuthy is supposed to do another job and Samat will become a new office chief." Later, the CIA group went down to "the base" to persuade villagers to join the CIA based upon the living standards and the progress of western countries. After several attempts at propagandizing, more and more people joined the movement, and ceremonies for the new CIA members were subsequently held.

In 1975, Tiv Mei moved to Ta Khmao, Kandal Province to get information about the Khmer Rouge. According to the villagers, on the other side of river facing Ta Khmao, Khmer Rouge elements moved in and out very often. People usually saw the Khmer Rouge at night. They feared that the Khmer Rouge would attack. Khmer Rouge activity gradually increased. In April of 1975, the Khmer Rouge opened heavy and continuous attacks on their targets, gaining victory at most of them, including the Sugar Manufacturer, Thnal Tortoeng, Ang Snuol, and Bek Chan. On April 12, after Field Marshal Lon Nol fled the country for America, the Office Chief called a meeting. The chairman of the meeting said:

"The Ministry has suggested a plan to strengthen our tactics. Despite Field Marshal Lon Nol's departure,



we must not despair. We have more leaders. So we must overcome our difficulties, and must not reduce the speed of our work. The Ministry just indicated that in case we fall under the control of the communists, we have to know how to hide ourselves in all situations and find ways to keep our members in touch as well as to recruit more CIA agents. Tiv Mei has no additional suggestions. However, we have to try harder to get precise information, because the Khmer

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Rouge are coming closer and closer. Now go to your work places."

On April 15, 1975 the situation in Phnom Penh seemed to be stable, except the area north of Pochentong, where the Khmer Rouge increased their attacks. In northern parts of Ta Khmao and east of Chbar Ampoeu, the Khmer Rouge launched such heavy attacks that the villagers were forced to flee to Phnom Penh. At that time, Tiv Mei made an urgent report to the office chief. On the night of April 16, 1975, Chbar Ampoeu was attacked by the Khmer Rouge. Houses were burned down indiscriminately, and numerous shells were fired over at Kbal Thnal. Tiv Mei moved back to Phnom Penh. Normally, the curfew in Phnom Penh began at seven in the evening, but on that night, the curfew could not curb the masses of people fleeing into the city. All roads were jammed. No one could know that Phnom Penh was to be liberated on April 17, 1975, and the Ministry took no measures. On the morning of the following day, the word was that soldiers had stopped fighting each other due to a negotiation, and that white flags, a sign of victory, were being raised everywhere. At around 11 pm, the Khmer Rouge military told people to prepare and move out luggage from their homes within three days so that Angkar could rearrange the whole city. Every one became doubtful, but no one realized it was the "plan of evacuation" of Angkar. People hoped that they would be permitted to return to their homes because they had prepared food for only three days, based upon the statement that they would be gone for only three days. Some felt afraid, while some others were happy, saying: "We will wait and see the new management of the revolutionary Angkar and the abolition of corruption as they are pure people, and have never been in favor of any corrupted government official."

After the evacuation, Tiv Mei lived with his parents in a cooperative in Takeo Village, Kor Subdistrict, Northern Zone. At that time, comrade Nang, the village representative, asked him about his history during his time working in Phnom Penh. Tiv Mei told the representative: "I still work for the Sugar Manufacturer." If I was not a worker, I would have been killed, because Angkar have already swept up from villages the people in all ranks from soldiers, ordinary policemen and military policemen."

Searching for the truth — Documentation

Based on the Tiv Mei confession, the control of the New People by the village representative and the "sweeping up" campaign of Angkar against the enemies were increased dramatically. During every meeting, the representative always talked so much about the "enemy sweeping" that Tiv Mei became seriously frightened. Having witnessed the transportation of Angkar's traitorous elements by the Regional Security Office based in Takeo Village, Tiv Mei felt so scared that he dared not operate. He only thought of to survive.

The evacuation plan of Angkar effectively disrupted CIA networks. As a result, from the day of the evacuation to the day of his arrest, Tiv Mei never met any of his partisans. In the cooperative, Tiv Mei worked very hard in all fields under the assignment of the cooperative chief. He paid so much attention to his work that the local villagers could not help but appreciate him. Tiv Mei was arrested on May 11, 1977 by the chief of the cooperative with the assistance of a few forces while he was loading hand-sewn palm leaves onto an ox-cart for roofing his house.

Overall, the confession of Tiv Mei purports to describe his traitorous acts against the Khmer Rouge revolution in the Northern Zone. Tiv Mei's answer implicated the 31 persons that he named as "accomplices" under torture at Tuol Sleng. The confession text, dated 18 September 1977, bears the thumbprint of Tiv Mei who was interrogated by Oeun, an interrogator at Office S-21, now known as Tuol Sleng. Several notes appear on the confession document.

After receiving this document, Duch, the chief of Office S-21, relayed the "confession" to a higher level with an introductory note beginning: "Dear respected Brother" and concluding: "By Duch, 11 November 1977". The document was sent to Son Sen and apparently Nuon Chea as well, based upon a note reading, "Ph. Ph.1/2 (Central Zone). Younger brother Tiv Ol. I haven't yet read. Sent a copy to brother Nuon, 11 September 1977." 'Younger brother Tiv Ol means Tiv Mei was a younger brother of Tiv Ol, who had already been arrested by Angkar. Enclosed with the confession file, there is a list of the 31 people's names identified by Tiv Mei as being traitors. These 31 names were crossed out as "remarks" by Son Sen.

MAPPING THE "KILLING FIELDS" OF THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA REGIME

By Kosal Phat

The "Killing Fields" Mapping Project of the Documentation Center of Cambodia is a crucial part of documenting the history and physical evidences of the Khmer Rouge atrocities committed against the Cambodian people between 1975-79. The mission is to locate and map mass graves throughout Cambodia, and collect information and documents found at each "genocide site". The data from the mapping project is important not only for its evidentiary value, but also for historical and educational purposes. It will constitute a critical source of information for understanding the full magnitude of the Khmer Rouge prison system and security organization used to carry out the mass executions of Cambodians during the Democratic Kampuchea era of 1975-79.

The mapping team uses Global Positioning

System (GPS) devices to record the exact latitude and longitude of each genocide site, as well as its features; for example, if it is a burial site, a prison or a memorial, as well as further detailed attributes such as the types of buildings etc... This GPS data is then downloaded into the DC-Cam computer system and sent to the University of New South Wales in Sydney, where experts from the School of Geomatic Engineering process the data using the ArcInfo Geographic Information System (GIS). In combination with mapping data developed by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), by mine clearance projects, and by the Geographic Department of the Council of Ministers of the Cambodian Government, this data is processed into a nationwide scale map of genocide sites by the University of New South Wales, in



conjunction with the Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) at Yale University.

What we have so far found has unraveled the mystery of the Democratic Kampuchea mechanism to exterminate millions of Cambodian people. In almost every district in Cambodia, the Democratic Kampuchea created a network of Khmer Rouge security organs and prisons where they murdered "enemies of the Communist Party of Kampuchea", both real and

imagined. On average, the Khmer Rouge killed 5,200 people every week for a period of 3 years, 8 months and 20 days. Another one million people died due to the general serious mistreatment and neglect of the Democratic Kampuchea government, from such causes as starvation, disease, lack of medicine and forced labor. The mapping project is currently carried out by a team of highly trained and experienced Cambodians, with technical assistance from experts in the United States and Australia. Since 1995, the mapping team has visited 145 of the 170 districts of Cambodia, with support from the Council of Ministers and Ministry of Interior of the Royal Government of Cambodia, and cooperation from district and provincial authorities. So far, we have mapped 415 genocide sites. Each genocide site includes mass graves, Khmer Rouge prisons and security facilities, and memorials of victims' remains built in the 1980s by the People's Republic of Kampuchea. In addition, data on each site includes witness accounts, photographs of the site, and the names of informants or witnesses. In addition to the national map, the mapping team produces sketch maps of each site, along with relevant road conditions, to aid in future access, because locations of sites are mostly in the jungle or on small roads leading to sites that bear no names. The findings from the mapping project, which are being compiled into a comprehensive report, are based entirely on interviews with survivors from the barbarous regime, who either experienced or witnessed the horrible events.

The mapping team has so far interviewed hundreds of potential witnesses. Ms. Say, 62, living in Anh Chanh village, Kratie district, Kratie province said, "In the Pol Pot time, I was imprisoned in Au Lorng work site in Kratie district for nearly three years. Before my arrest, the Khmer Rouge arrested my husband took him away from my house to be killed. They arrested me because my

Searching for the truth — Documentation

husband was a Lon Nol military officer. In Au Lorng work site, there were between 200 and 300 prisoners working all day and night. The Khmer Rouge security surrounded the work site with such dense barbed wire that even a chicken could not get out. The chief killer there was Comrade Au...During my imprisonment, I saw a woman who I knew as Ms. Phal with a child being raped by the Khmer Rouge security cadres. She had been deceitfully told to come receive some clothes that Angkar had distributed for her. After having been raped, she was dragged away to be killed at a nearby mound".

Ms. Say is only one of many important witnesses in Cambodia who can tell us her experience of the Khmer Rouge terror. Our concern is that such witnesses are getting very old. Important information about the Khmer Rouge regime is only in their memory and will never be documented should they die without telling their stories. Even worse, throughout the Cambodian countryside, mass graves, victims' remains and memorials are disappearing or being damaged every day by erosion, animal activity, and general neglect. For these reasons, it is urgent to document all pieces of this important evidence before they disappear. For example, remains in Bati district are almost gone, having been replaced by a small stupa. The Documentation Center of Cambodia appeals to the Cambodian government to pay more attention to the preservation of the Khmer Rouge genocide sites.

The ultimate objective of the mapping project is to produce a narrative mapping report in both the Khmer and English languages that will contain not only the maps indicating the locations of the graves themselves, but also the numbers of graves, pits, and bodies, witness accounts of both victims and former Khmer Rouge cadres and photographs. This report will complement the comprehensive national map of the Khmer Rouge genocide sites.



Photo: Hong Hun, female combatant arrested October 1976.

Voices from S-21 Chapter One: Discovering S-21

By David Chandler

On 7 January 1979, a bright, breezy day in Cambodia's cool season, heavily armed Vietnamese forces, accompanied by lightly armed Cambodian allies, reached the out- skirts of Phnom Penh after a blitzkrieg cam-paign that had begun on Christmas Day. For over a year, Vietnam had been at war with the Maoist-inspired regime of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), Known in the West as the Khmer Rouge. Their invading force of over one hundred thousand troops, including armored units, was reinforced by a sustained aerial bombardment.

The rapidity of the Vietnamese success took

their commanders by surprise. After barely two weeks of fighting, Cam-bodia cracked open like an egg. The leaders of DK, most of their army, and tens of thousands of their followers fled or were herded out of the city. The invaders were welcomed by nearly everyone who stayed behind. These were people terrorized and exhausted by nearly four years of under-nourishment, back-breaking labor and widespread executions. A similar welcome, tragically misplaced, had greeted the Khmer Rouge themselves when they had occupied Phnom Penh in April 1975 and ordered its population into the countryside to become agricultural workers. In both cases, people were longing desperately for peace.

By late afternoon the Vietnamese forces had occupied the city. Aside from a few hundred prisoners of war and other people-including some of the workers at S-21-who were in hiding, waiting to escape, Phnom Penh was empty.

After the Khmer Rouge had emptied the city in 1975, Phnom Penh had remained the country's capital, but it never regained its status as an urban center. The bureaucrats, soldiers, and factory workers quartered there probably never numbered more than fifty thousand. During the DK, the country had no stores, markets, schools, pagodas, or public facilities, except for a warehouse in the capital serving the diplomatic community. In Phnom Penh, barbed-wire fences enclosed factories, work-shops, barracks, and government offices. Street signs were painted over, and barbed-wire entan-glements blocked many streets to traffic. Banana trees were planted in vacant lots. Automobiles abandoned in 1975 were rusted in piles along with refrigerators, washing machines, television sets, and typewriters. Scraps of paper in the gutters included pre-revolutionary currency, worthless under the Khmer Rouge. On 7 January 1979, no people or animals could be seen. As in 1975, the central government, such as it was, had disappeared. Once again, Cambodians were being made to start at zero.

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THE PERILS OF NEUTRALITY: THE BREAK IN U.S. - CAMBODIAN RELATIONS, 1965

By Kenton J. Clymer

Early on the morning of 26 April 1965, a flash telegram arrived at the State Department from the American embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Several hundred demonstrators were converging on the embassy, the crowd was growing steadily, and "rocks have begun to fly." All local employees were sent home, embassy automobiles removed from the vicinity, and American dependents sent to the Hotel Royal. In another hour most of the windows had been broken and the embassy's American flag burned. A few placards were seen calling on the United States to go home. The police, who had arrived late, made only perfunctory efforts to control the demonstrators and instead were reportedly "standing around watching the festivities."

For another hour "rocks of assorted sizes" barraged the embassy and then police in riot gear moved in and began to push back the crowd, which by then amounted to several thousand people. Chargé d' affaires ad interim Alf Bergesen characterized the participants as predominantly "riffraff". Cyclo (bicycle rickshaw) drivers were reputedly the chief rock throwers. By the end of the demonstration the building was a mess "with rocks, tomatoes and broken glass in every room." Graffiti covered the exterior walls. But the crowd did not penetrate the embassy itself, and damage to the building was a relatively modest \$4,878.06.

This was not the first violent demonstration against the American embassy. In March 1964 a more serious attack caused nearly \$160,000 in damage. On that occasion Cambodia's leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, may personally have given the order to trash both the American and British embassies. Afterward, relations were tense, but there was no break. Now, however, it looked as if Sihanouk was determined to cut the ties. On the day following the demonstration, for the first time in memory, anti-American demonstrations took place in several provincial cities, with the participants demanding that Cambodia break relations with the United States. About the same time, Cambodian authorities ordered the last American missionary, Carl E. Thompson, out of the country. They told him that all other Americans would soon be forced out as well, including even the American spouses of Cambodian citizens.

On 3 May the embassy reported that in an "imperfectly monitored" speech, Sihanouk had indicated that he was breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. The prince hoped, however, to maintain consular relations, since, as he acknowledged, Cambodia needed the foreign exchange American tourists provided. Bergesen got the word officially at 6:00 P.M. that evening. Because Cambodia would not give assurances regarding the continuity of

consular relations, the United States decided to cut off relations entirely. By the end of May no official Americans remained in the Khmer kingdom.

The ostensible reason for the demonstration was Sihanouk's outrage over Bernard Krisher's article in the 5 April issue of Newsweek magazine, which alleged that Queen Sisowath Kossamak (Sihanouk's mother) was "money-mad" and kept a string of bordellos on the outskirts of the capital. Sihanouk was very sensitive to criticism of Cambodia-especially of the royal family-that appeared in the Western press. Australian diplomat and historian Milton Osborne agrees that the Newsweek piece enraged Sihanouk and "triggered" the break. Historian David P. Chandler concurs. The article, he writes, was the "last straw for Sihanouk in his dealings with the United States."

At the time, however, American officials believed that the offending article was only a pretext, for relations that were near the breaking point well before the demonstration. Some officials felt that the demonstration was related to Sihanouk's campaign to block a proposed Geneva conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality, a conference that the prince had long wanted but that he was no longer supporting. An official unpublished history of U.S.-Cambodian relations offered another explanation: an armed incursion into Cambodian territory from South Vietnam in April was to blame.

No single factor caused the break. Rather, it was the cumulative effect of several issues that increasingly strained the relationship. The war in neighboring Vietnam was of central importance. The demonstration at the embassy came shortly after the United States had begun bombing North Vietnam in a sustained way and had sent its first combat units to South Vietnam. The war was on the verge of escalating out of control, and Sihanouk feared that the hostilities would engulf his own small country. As Bergesen put it at the time, the demonstration resulted from "the Prince's frequent and increasingly vituperative criticism of American policy, especially in Viet-Nam." More generally, the overarching Cold War and Sihanouk's militantly neutral posture underlay the break. In the end, the demands of the Cold Warparticularly the desire to contain China and defeat the Communist-led insurgency in neighboring Vietnam-revealed the limits of American acceptance of neutralism in Cambodia. Although internal Cambodian factors contributed to the break in relations, in the final analysis in Southeast Asia the United States was simply unable to find a way to support anti-communism and neutralism at the same time.

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A SAMPLING OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE LINKING SURVIVING SENIOR LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA TO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

By Steve Heder

Introduction:

In March 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made public the "Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia" established "to evaluate the existing evidence" of "serious violations of Cambodian and international law" committed during the rule of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK-derogatorily known as "the Khmer Rouge") in Cambodia from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.

The three UN Experts, Rajsoomer Lallah, Sir Ninian Stephen and Steven R Ratner, had visited Cambodia from 15 to 22 November 1998. As Kofi Annan put it in his letter presenting the Report to the Presidents of the Security Council and General Assembly, the three concluded that "the evidence gathered to date testifies to the commission of serious crimes under international and Cambodian law" including "crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, forced labor, torture and crimes against internationally protected persons".

They identified several victim groups "targeted ... for extermination by virtue of their imputed political beliefs or social or ethnic background," declaring in this regard that "without recourse to any formal judicial system, virtually every unit of the [CPK] regime appears to have had the right, even the duty, to identify, detain and execute those believed to be enemies." They specified that "those categories of society regarded with particular suspicion" included "officials of the prior regime", such as "former government leaders, military officers and bureaucrats of the Khmer Republic" that collapsed on 17 April 1975, who "were immediately



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targeted for elimination". They added that "by 1977, this purge had extended to the lowest ranks of the Khmer Republic's army as well as to relatives and friends." They also included ethnic minorities that were "targeted ... for forced assimilation or worse." Above all Islamic Cham communities, were "forcibly dispersed, had their language and customs banned and saw their leaders and others resisting governmental policies killed," virtually all members of which were eventually killed.

Two other categories of victims which were included on the list of targeted groups were "teachers, students and other educated elements" and "religious leaders" generally, not only minority Islamic leaders

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but also monks of the Buddhist majority.

Finally, the Experts pointed to "purges within the CPK" itself that targeted purported "enemies within the Party" who were accused "of being agents of the CIA, KGB or of Viet Nam".

They concluded that members of all these groups were subjected to "direct executions" by CPK cadre aiming at "specified targets," although they also declared that "some abuses appear to have occurred without any clearly identifiable pattern."

While declaring that

the evidence testified to the commission of genocide, and indeed that under CPK direction, the "Government subjected the people of Cambodia to almost all of the acts enumerated in the Convention [on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide]," the Experts cautioned that it might be a "difficult task" to determine whether the CPK "carried out these acts with the requisite intent and against groups protected by the Convention". They therefore called for further investigation into evidence for "the commission of the genocide against the Cham, Vietnamese and other minority groups, and the Buddhist monkhood."

The Experts appeared to be arguing more unequivocally that former Khmer Republic officials and

committed by their subordinates and...failed to prevent,

... political viewpoint."

stop or punish them." They argued that this suggested "the need to investigate the roles of those ... officials in responsible governmental positions with actual or constructive knowledge of the atrocities." At the same time, they cautioned that the formal "list of top governmental and party officials may not correspond with the list of persons most responsible for serious violations of human rights in that certain top governmental leaders may have been removed from chart of senior leaders may have played a significant

role in the atrocities."

As one of them explained in a more general context, "conclusions based on the historical record are not the same things as definitive findings concerning the guilt of individuals. These require an examination of detailed evidence regarding precise events and the role of individual actors in them, and evidence deemed admissible by a proper judicial forum."

In any case, they recommended "that any tribunal" convened in relation to the crimes of 1975-1979 should "focus upon those persons most responsible for the most serious violations of human rights" during responsibility over the abuses as well as those at lower levels who are directly implicated in the

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Searching for the truth — Legal

members of the CPK itself were victims of crimes

against humanity, because of the extensive torture, and

targeted in a mass or systematic way through acts that

were "committed with a discriminatory motive based on

responsibility, the Experts stressed that "international

law has long recognized that persons are responsible for


acts even if they did not directly commit them." Thus,

criminal responsibility should extend not only to CPK

military but also to those who "knew or should have

known that atrocities were being or about to be

With regard to the question of individual criminal



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Searching for the truth — Legal

Number 1, January 2000

most serious atrocities." They suggested this might result in the trial of "some 20 to 30" persons.


The Experts reviewed existing collections of primary CPK documentation, including those held by the nongovernmental Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) and by other "documentary evidence" that "demonstrate the role of particular individuals in serious human rights abuses" of the kinds described above. However, they said that while the archives and the work done on them by DC-Cam and others "provide critical background



and details of the events in Democratic Kampuchea, they may well, in themselves, not be sufficient to build a case against particular individuals." They noted that research efforts had so far not been "oriented towards investigation in preparation for prosecution of particular individuals." Specifically, they concluded that although a documentary record that "clearly points to the role of specific individuals as immediate participants or as superiors" appears to be "quite extensive" for the

crimes committed at the CPK interrogation and execution center known as Tuol Sleng, other "documentary evidence that directly implicates individuals, whether at the senior government level or the regional or local level, is currently not available and may never be found."

I visited Cambodia in December 1998-January 1999 and again in July-August 1999 to take a perhaps closer look at the documentary evidence than time and other constraints had allowed the UN Experts. I focused on the materials held by DC-Cam. My hope was that a sampling of the hundreds of thousands of pages of DC-Cam evidence might add to an evaluation of the cases against the such surviving senior leaders of the CPK as Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Kæ Pok by clarifying the extent of their involvement in or at least their guilty knowledge of the crimes against humanity com-mitted against former officials of the Khmer Republic and members of the CPK itself that the UN Experts



indicated had most indisputably been committed under CPK rule.

It must be stressed, however, that this sampling represents only a small part of the overall DC-Cam evidence with regard to these and other individuals. Much research into the documentation still remains to be done. The fact that a piece of evidence is not covered by my work should of course not be considered indicative that no evidence exists with regard to any particular individual.

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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW RELEVANT TO THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE

By Elizabeth van Schaack

1. Genocide

a. The Genocide Convention

The term "genocide" was first coined by Dr. Raphael Lemkin in response to Winston Churchill's description of the Nazi extermination program as a "crime without a name. " The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter, "Genocide Convention") was one of the fledgling UN's first major human rights instruments and is the primary authority on genocide. The Convention defines genocide as: "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

The specific acts that make up a crime of genocide will be discussed below under separate headings.

According to Article III of the Genocide Convention, the following acts are punishable: genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. The Genocide Convention obligates state parties to take action to "provide effective penalties" for those found guilty of genocide and genocidal acts as defined in Article III. More specifically, the Genocide Convention requires that those charged with punishable acts be tried by a tribunal of the "State in the territory of which the act was committed," or by an international penal tribunal. Constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, and private individuals are all punishable for acts of genocide as defined in Article III. State parties to the Genocide convention must undertake the obligation to punish "in accordance with their respective constitu-tions." This may be viewed as limiting their duty to enforce the Genocide Convention, to the extent that their constitutions are unaccommodating.

On the other hand, the prohibition against genocide is binding on all states, even nonsignatories, as a jus cogens norm. The International Court of Justice recognized the jus cogens nature of the norm against genocide in the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-ment of the Crime of Genocide case. Later, the I.C.J. reconfirmed this obligation in the Barcelona Traction case. Here, the I.C.J. proclaimed that the responsibility of states under the Genocide convention was a duty erga omnes (for all). Such responsibilities "by their very nature ... are the concern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

To invoke the Genocide Convention, one must first identify a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as the victim. Second, it is necessary to show intent to destroy wholly or partially that group. Intent to destroy a group distinguishes genocide from other crimes against humanity.7 Intent is perhaps the most difficult aspect of genocide to prove, because it is necessary to distinguish between ordinary combatant and civilian casualties arising out of an act of war

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Searching for the truth — Legal

perpetrated against a governmental opponent, and acts specifically intended to destroy in whole or in part a protected group. Demonstrating lack of intent can therefore provide an affirmative defense to a charge of genocide. Once intent to commit any of the acts enumerated above is proven, however, it is not necessary to show success in the endeavor, since both attempt and conspiracy to commit genocide are punishable.

The General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention on December 9, 1948, and it entered into force on January 12, 1951. Forty-three states signed the original document; one hundred and four later ratified or acceded to it. Cambodia ratified the Convention on October 14, 1950, without qualification, and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under the Convention in 1957. As mentioned earlier, the prohibition against genocide has been recognized as customary international law from which no derogation is permitted.

Making A Determination Of Whether Genocide Occurred Under Article II Of The Genocide Convention

All three elements set forth in Article II must be present.

Element I: Acts of Genocide

Is one of the five proscribed acts present?

The treaty is unclear about the specific content of some of the acts proscribed by Article II. In determining whether specific acts violate Article II, it is important to focus on the potential the act has to cause the physical destruction of the group. Examples of acts that might be violative are listed below:

a) Killing members of the group;

b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

The following forms of treatment might qualify as violative of this clause: Enslavement, starvation, deportation, persecution, torture, and detention in ghettos, transit camps or concentration camps in conditions designed to cause degradation, deprivation of the victim's rights as human beings, or to suppress and cause inhumane suffering. Mental harm might also include the coerced use of drugs, and other forms of mental abuse.

c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

The following forms of treatment might qualify as violative of this clause: placing a group on a subsistence diet, reducing medical services below a minimum level, and withholding sufficient living accommodations.

d)Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; The following forms of treatment might qualify as violative of this clause: Sterilization, separation of the sexes, compulsory a abortions, and the prohibition of marriage.

e)Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The forced transfer of children to a group where they would be given an education different from that of their own group, and would have new customs, a new religion and probably a new language, might be in practice tantamount to the destruction of the group, whose future depended on that generation of children.

Element II: Protected Groups

Was the act directed at a "national, ethnical, racial or religious group"?

The genocide Convention does not extend its protections to political, economic and professional groups. This is because the drafters of the Convention felt that it should only protect individuals who were members of a group by birth, and thus could not alter their status. Similarly, political, economic and professional groups tend to be transitory rather than permanent.

Element III: Intent

Was the act committed with the intent of destroying in whole or in part, a protected group? According to a UN study on genocide, "in part" can be understood as "a reasonably significant number relative to the total of the group, such as its

Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)

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leadership." The killing of all men or women of a particular group, or all members of a group that reside in a particular country or region of a country, may also fulfill the "in part clause".

Intent distinguishes genocide from common crimes, such as murder and, unless this intent element is present, no act, regardless of how atrocious it might be, can constitute genocide.

The actual ability of the perpetrators of genocidal acts to destroy the target group is irrelevant to the determination as to whether acts constitute genocide.

Intent is generally perceived as the most difficult element of genocide to prove and often only indirect or circumstantial evidence of it will be available.

Examples of evidence that might show intent:

• Written or oral orders to the effect that a protected group is to be eliminated.

• Evidence that a protected group has been labeled as an enemy of the state or evidence of a systematic and destructive pattern of behavior with respect to such a group.

• Proof of the genocidal intent of an organization or a state may be imputed to individuals closely associated with such an organization or state.

Searching for the truth — Legal

• If the foreseeable consequences of an act are, or seem likely to be, the destruction of a group.

• With regard to Article II(c) of the Convention, a report on the draft of the Convention offered the following guidance with regard to the establishment of genocidal intent:

"Obviously, if members of a group of human being are placed in concentration camps where the annual death rate is thirty percent to forty percent, the intention to commit genocide is unquestionable. There may be borderline cases where a relatively high death rate might be ascribed to lack of attention, negligence or inhumanity, which, though highly reprehensible, would not constitute evidence of intention to commit genocide."

• Intent should be inferable from, among other things, actions or omissions of such a "degree of criminal negligence or recklessness that the defendant must reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the consequences of his conduct.

Most jurists assert that so long as the requisite intent is established, underlying motives are irrelevant. According to this assertion, an act would not fail to constitute genocide merely because it was motivated by political reasons.

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


Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)

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Searching for the truth — Legal

Number 1, January 2000



For the average reader unfamiliar with the fine points of the law concerning "crimes against humanity", scholars and lawyers discussing these matters may sometimes sound as if they come from another planet. How, the reader may wonder, faced with the suffering and death of untold numbers of human beings, can these "experts" concern themselves with such niceties as whether or not the atrocities were committed "in connection with" an international armed conflict? Are not murder and torture equally heinous regardless of the presence of such seemingly irrelevant circumstances? In order to understand the answers to such perfectly reasonable and legitimate questions, it must be recognized that the law of international accountability for human rights atrocities is by its very nature in conflict with a central principal of international law-the sovereignty of the nation-state. For the international community to reach inside of a sovereign nation and hold its leaders legally accountable for the inhumane treatment of their fellow citizens is a concept that was unheard of in the not-toodistant past. That this concept has begun to be taken seriously at the dawn of the new millenium is a testament to humanity's common disgust with the savagery of the 20th century.

The purpose of this article is to briefly explain the meaning and origin of the "nexus to armed conflict"

requirement for prosecutions of crimes against humanity under international law. A tribunal's determination as to whether or not this "nexus requirement" was still in force at the time of the Khmer Rouge regime, and if so, whether or not it can be demonstrated to have been satisfied with respect to the Khmer Rouge regime's conduct during its rule over Cambodia, will be important preliminary issues in any prosecution of the Khmer Rouge leadership for the crimes against humanity they inflicted upon the people of Cambodia.

Briefly defined, the "nexus to armed conflict requirement" for prosecutions of crimes against humanity under international law necessitates the establishment in fact of, first, an ongoing international armed conflict in which war crimes were committed, and second, a linkage between the acts alleged to have constituted crimes against humanity and the war crimes committed during that ongoing international armed conflict. The importance of demonstrating these two facts to a prosecution of the Khmer Rouge leadership for their crimes against humanity is entirely a result of the historical development of international law in this area. Unlike the case with most national law, the international law of crimes against humanity does not exist in any specific, written document. Rather, this body of law has evolved over time based upon the

custom and practice of nations.

The original modern formulation of the law of crimes against humanity arose out of the Nuremberg Tribunal, at which the leaders of the German Nazi party were prosecuted for the crimes they committed during World War Two. The Nazis murdered millions of civilian non-combatants during that war. The dead included both civilians of other nations that the Nazis had conquered and civilians of German nationality, mostly Jews, but also members of other minority groups. The problem facing the Nuremberg Tribunal was that, while it had clearly been a violation of the international law of war for the Nazis to have murdered civilian noncombatants of other nations, there did not yet exist any international law that criminalized the murder of the millions of German citizens who also perished in the Nazi concentration camps. (Here the point should be made clear that the need for an international tribunal in cases such as the Nazi Holocaust and the Khmer Rouge Genocide arises because the national government leadership itself was the perpetrator of the crimes, and without prosecution by the international community, their crimes would likely go unpunished. Thus there is a need for an international tribunal conducted pursuant to international law.)

Despite the lack of any clear authority under international law to prosecute the Nazis for the murder of their fellow German citizens, the Tribunal at Nuremberg concluded that the conscience of humanity itself demanded that justice be done for these murdered millions. After much debate, a compromise was reached between those who argued that the Tribunal was without authority under international law to prosecute the Nazis for the murder of their fellow German citizens, and those who argued that such atrocities should not be allowed to go unpunished. This compromise was that, to the extent the murder of German citizens by the Nazis could be shown to have been connected with the Nazi regime's war crimes perpetrated in the course of its armed conflicts with other nations (which crimes were already clearly punishable under the international law of war), to that extent the Tribunal would prosecute the Nazi defendants for the murder and mistreatment of their own citizens. This determination of the Nuremberg

Searching for the truth — Legal

Tribunal marked the birth of the modern concept of "crimes against humanity", and the compromise just described developed into the "nexus to armed conflict" requirement for prosecutions of crimes against humanity under international law.

While the matter is open to debate, many scholars are of the opinion that as of 1975, this "nexus to armed conflict" requirement was still in effect. Most legal scholars agree that the continued development of the international law of crimes against humanity since the end of the Khmer Rouge regime has dispensed with the "nexus to armed conflict" requirement. Thus if a government were to commit mass murder against its own citizens today, there would be no need to address this "nexus to armed conflict" requirement in order to prosecute such a government's leaders for crimes against humanity under international law. However, it is a basic rule of criminal law that a defendant must be tried pursuant to the law that was in effect at the time the crime was committed. Therefore, in order to prosecute the Khmer Rouge leadership for the murder and mistreatment of their own citizens while they ruled Cambodia, a tribunal may conclude that it is necessary to prove that these acts were committed "in connection with" war crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge during an ongoing international armed conflict. While these are clearly matters to be determined according to law by a duly constituted tribunal, it is submitted that sufficient evidence exists tending to demonstrate: 1) that the Khmer Rouge regime was in a state of armed conflict with Vietnam from the very first year of its rule over Cambodia, 2) that the Khmer Rouge regime committed numerous war crimes during that armed conflict, and 3) that the Khmer Rouge regime's selfdescribed "smashing" and "sweeping" of so-called "internal enemies" was inextricably linked in theory and practice to the international armed conflict(s) in which it was engaged. Given a finding by the tribunal in accordance with these conclusions, the "nexus to armed conflict" requirement should pose no bar to a prosecution of the Khmer Rouge leadership for the crimes against humanity they perpetrated upon the people of Cambodia. (Interested readers are directed to the September, 1999 DC-Cam publication on this issue.)

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THE DOCTRINE OF "COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY" AND THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA REGIME

By John D. Ciorciari

The doctrine of command responsibility is a well-established principle in international law that holds commanding military officers and civilian leaders responsible for certain criminal acts committed by their subordinates. When certain legal requirements are satisfied, it enables a court or tribunal to find a general guilty of the murders carried out by his foot soldiers or a prime minister guilty of the torture and executions conducted in a state prison.

The relevance of the principle to prospective Khmer Rouge trials is clear: the doctrine of command responsibility provides a legal means to hold former Khmer Rouge leaders accountable for many of the criminal acts perpetrated by lower-ranking members of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). It is common knowledge that top CPK leaders committed only a small fraction of the worst offenses themselvesrather, most of the millions of criminal acts of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime were carried out by low-level soldiers, security officers and prison Therefore, the doctrine of command guards. responsibility will be essential to any Khmer Rouge prosecution. The basic elements of the doctrine are described below.

1. History

Although the doctrine of command responsibility was part of customary international law long before the Khmer Rouge came to power, the first true codification of the principle occurred in the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It is set forth in Articles 86 and 87 of the Additional Protocol and contains the basic tenets of the principle. The doctrine was clarified and elaborated significantly in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and with minor exceptions, the ICTY and ICTR articulated the doctrine as it would apply in trials of former Khmer Rouge leaders today.

The provisions of Articles 86 and 87 include the following provisions, which set forth the doctrine of

command responsibility by elucidating the following obligations of superiors: The fact that a breach of the Conventions or this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach (86...[2]). The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof (87...[3]). (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S.3, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), arts. 86, 87.)

2. Elements of Command Responsibility

In skeletal form, the doctrine of command responsibility holds a commanding officer or civilian leader responsible for the criminal acts of his subordinates when the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The Criminal Act

The first requirement of the doctrine of command responsibility is obvious: a crime must have been committed. Any serious crime can lead to command responsibility, including genocide, war crimes, torture, destruction of cultural property, and most of the other alleged offenses of the Khmer Rouge. The crime, which can be committed by any subordinate soldier or civilian official, must be proven by legally sufficient evidence before the court or tribunal may proceed to address the criminal liability of the accused superior.

b. Command Relationship

The second requirement of the doctrine is that a

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command relationship existed between the accused superior and his subordinate at the time the criminal act was committed. The relationship may be de jure (existing by law) or de facto (existing in fact), and both military and civilian superiors can be held guilty under the doctrine. In order to establish the required command relationship, the accused superior must have had actual power to control the actions of the subordinate. "Actual power" means that the superior had the ability (1) to prevent the subordinate from committing the criminal act or (2) to punish the subordinate for committing the act after the act's commission. It is important to note that the accused superior can be held liable even if he is many levels of authority removed from the perpetrator of the act. Thus, a high military officer can be held responsible for the act of the lowest soldier beneath him if an unbroken chain of command, or line of authority, is properly established.

c. Mens Rea (the Intent Requirement)

The second requirement for a superior to be held liable under the doctrine of command responsibility is mens rea, the intent requirement. The superior satisfies the intent requirement if he had actual knowledge, proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, that his subordinate either had committed or would commit the criminal act in question. A court or tribunal will not presume that the commander had actual knowledge; that fact must be proven according to evidentiary standards. A prosecutor can show that the accused superior had actual knowledge by providing evidence such as (1) the number, type and scope of illegal acts; the timing and logistics of the acts; (2) the number and type of troops involved; (3) the geographic scope and location of the acts; the speed with which operations were carried out; (4) the way other, similar crimes were committed; (5) the identities of officers and staff involved; and (6) the location of the superior at the time of the crime's occurrence.

The intent requirement is also met if the superior had information that should have put him on reasonable notice that his subordinate might commit a criminal act and should have recognized the need for additional investigation. Normally, a commander cannot be held responsible if he was merely negligent. He must have had actual knowledge, as described above, or he must have been so negligent that his actions demonstrate his acquiescence in the crime or his malicious intent toward its victims.

d. Actus Reus (the Act Requirement)

To be held liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, a superior must also satisfy the act requirement (actus reus.) Although called the act requirement, actus reus can be satisfied by either an affirmative act or an omission. A superior is "directly" responsible when he ordered or encou-raged criminal acts by his subordinates. "Indirect" responsibility occurs when the accused superior (1) failed to punish subordinates for criminal acts committed or (2) failed to take measures of reason-able prevention and investigation when he knew or should have known that there was a high risk of the crimes' occurrence. A superior can only be held "indirectly" responsible if he had reasonable ability to prevent or punish the act in question.

3. Command Responsibility and the Khmer Rouge

When all of the requirements of the doctrine are met, the guilty superior faces the same responsibility as the subordinate who committed the act. Thus, the doctrine of command responsibility exposes even the most senior former CPK leaders to legal accountability and justice. In the case of the DK regime, it is not difficult to find hundreds of thousands of underlying crimes, nor is it difficult to show that many of the most heinous offenses were encouraged, or at least However, the secrecy of the CPK unpunished. organization makes it challenging to show all of the necessary command relationships. As the trials of surviving CPK chiefs approaches, prosecutors will need to clarify the chain of command that existed in the DK regime, blending documentary evidence, oral testimony and expert scholarly reports to demonstrate the required command relationships. In addition, evidence showing that the defendants had guilty knowledge and meet the intent requirement will be vital. Again, a combination of sources will yield the most complete picture and aid the court or tribunal in its effort to assign the appropriate criminal responsibility. Only by understanding and applying the doctrine of command responsibility will justice be done for Cambodia and for the myriad victims of the DK regime.

Number 1, January 2000



What is "*truth*"? This may seem like a silly question. To most people, it usually seems quite obvious what is the truth. After all, if someone shows you a black cat, and tells you, "This is a white cat," then you know that is not the truth. Conversely, if they tell you that the black cat is a black cat, then you can feel fairly certain that this is true. So truth seems like a simple matter. But in reality, truth is not a simple matter, not at all. Knowing what is the truth is one of the greatest philosophical problems of all time.

Buddha recognized this problem very clearly. Buddha teaches that many of the most obvious things in life which we ordinarily feel are "real" or "true" are in fact illusions, designed to mislead us from the truth. If I am hungry for food, or if I am in love with someone, or if I experience anger or hatred toward an enemy, then my perception will often be that these are "true" feelings, that they somehow reflect something true and real about the world and my relationship to it. But that is not what the Buddha teaches. Buddha teaches that such feelings lead one away from true understanding and true knowledge. According to Buddha, the world of human appetites and sensory experience is not the path to truth. And in this way, Buddha understood the essence of the problem, "What is truth?"

Philosophers have struggled with this problem through all of recorded history, and still, after thousands of years of careful thought by the most brilliant minds that have ever existed, surprisingly, there is no firm, universally-accepted consensus on what is the nature of truth. In fact, there is an entire branch of philosophy, called Epistemology, which is devoted to the debate over the meaning of "truth," and how to know something is true when seen. There is an entire field of scientific inquiry, called the Philosophy of Science, which attempts to address the problem of what is truth; it is a very important branch of science, since many scientists believe that the whole scientific enterprise really is all about the search for truth. There is seething debate about truth among philosophers of science, and it is a very, very complicated debate.

The ancient Greeks devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of what is truth, and their civilization was one of the first to carefully record their thoughts and debates about this question. One of the greatest of all Greek philosophers was Aristotle. 50

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Attempting to get at some parts of the problem of truth, Aristotle devised a system of "logic." He began with the most self-evident of propositions: "a thing is itself." This relation is called the "identity," and can be expressed in symbolic form as "A equals A." From this simplest of observations, Aristotle proceeded to develop his system of logic, by which we can determine if something makes sense. Using this system, for example, we can construct "syllogisms," or sets of logical relations.

A classic example of a syllogism is the construct, "All men are mortal, Socrates is a Man, Therefore Socrates is mortal." However, if we change this just a little bit and say instead, "The statement 'All men are mortal, Socrates is a Man, therefore Socrates is mortal' is true," then we have a problem. This second proposition, strictly speaking, is a misnomer. And it is a misnomer that is responsible for much confusion. Properly stated, the syllogism about Socrates' mortality is not "true," but rather it is said to be "valid." A valid statement is one in which there are no logical inconsistencies, or internal contradictions.

The distinction between truth and validity has caused lots of problems to very smart people for a long time. This can be seen in the history of a branch of mathematics called geometry. Another famous ancient Greek philosopher named Euclid developed a system of mathematics concerned with lines, angles between lines, figures and shapes. This system of geometry bears his name-"Euclidian Geometry"-and it is still an essential element of basic instruction today in schools everywhere in the world, 2,300 years after he invented it. Euclid was a follower of Aristotle, and as such, Euclid's principles of geometry were built upon and always followed the rules of Aristotle's Logic. An example of this is the proposition, "In any triangle, two angles taken together in any manner are less than two right angles." Because this proposition-indeed, all of the propositions in Euclid's geometry-followed the rules of Aristotle's logic, Euclid believed that his system described immutable truths of nature. But it turned out that he was not quite right.

Many centuries later, a group of mathematicians including Labachevsky, Bolyai, Gauss and Riemann developed a branch of mathematics now called non-Euclidean geometries. In these systems of geometry,

Searching for the truth — Public Debate

some of Euclid's propositions are not true! Going back to Aristotle, to make an analogy, it is possible in non-Euclidian geometry that in some cases, "A is NOT equal to A." So this gave rise to a terrible debate: which of the geometries is "true," Euclidian geometry, or non-Euclidian geometry? As often is the case with such things, this dilemma was confusing because it was based on an incorrect question. No geometry is "true." Rather, just as with systems of logic, a system of geometry is said to be "valid," because its rules are all internally consistent. Validity refers only to logical consistency of relations among or between propositions. Truth, on the other hand, refers to a relationship between a language statement and an empirical reality in the objective world.

Even so, the ancient Greeks had two different words, both of which translate into English as "truth." To distinguish between these two terms, I will refer to one as (small-t) "truth" and to the other as (capital-T) "Truth." One Greek word for "Truth" is "episteme." This kind of Truth refers to a divine state of true knowledge, something that is accessible only to God or the Gods (depending upon whether one believes in a mono-theistic or a poly-theistic religious philosophy). Episteme means that whole, true knowledge of the Universe that is beyond the grasp of mortal beings such as ourselves. This is omniscience, knowing all about everything. That's a bit much to expect from you or me!

A second word for "truth" used by the Greeks was "noesis." This meaning of truth refers to the world of ordinary experience and sense perception. Noesis, then, is in the realm of commonplace human understanding. This kind of truth is that which is sought by scientists. In fact, this meaning of truth is that which is to a certain extent mastered by any successfully functioning human being. One of the greatest thinkers of all time, Albert Einstein, referred to noesis when he made famous comment. "The his most incomprehensible thing about the Universe is that it is comprehensible."

In that comment, Einstein encapsulated one of the enduring mysteries in the Philosophy of Science. Why does mathematics "work"? Why do scientific theories permit us to so accurately predict so many things about the external world? What is the relationship between those theories and the world

which allows us to understand what is going on around us? In other words, what is the nature of "truth"? This begins to get into questions of metaphysics and ontology, and that's where the problem of truth starts to get really complicated!.

A philosopher of science named Karl Popper sought to unravel this mystery of why scientific theories seem to "fit" so well to the world. Popper posited that there are different worlds. One world is the "objective" external world, the world filled with stars, planets, plants and animals and so forth. Another world is the "subjective" world, that is, the world which is within

each of our minds. He attempted to describe a system by which we humans, locked in our subjective worlds, are able to discover things about the external, objective world. He called this the "logic of scientific discovery." According to Popper, the way that the logic of scientific discovery works is actually fairly simple.

Popper describes science as the process of creating statements or hypotheses to which one can apply some kind of test. Scientists attempt to prove that particular statements or hypotheses are not true. If they cannot show that the statement is false, then it must be "correct." This method is called "falsification," because the goal is to prove things false, and then to accept as correct what cannot be shown to be false. Or at least it is close enough to "correct" to accept until we come across another, better explanation which describes the phenomenon in question more fully, and also cannot be shown to be false. Across years and centuries of testing hypotheses in this way, so Popper argues, complex and sophisticated theories have been devised which help us to understand how the world works, such as the germ theory of disease, or the table of periodic elements. In this way, science seeks and finds a kind of "truth." But Number 1, January 2000

the kinds of truths discovered in science are only one kind among the sources of truth known to humanity. There are also religious truths, literary truths, and what we might call "political" truths. Followers of the great monotheistic religions–Judaism, Christianity and Islam–believe that truth is handed down by God, and revealed in their scriptures or holy texts. Interestingly, these three religions all "reveal" pretty much exactly the same "truths," such as 'thou shall not kill,"Thou shall not commit adultery,' and so on. These are moral and ethical principles or rules by which humans are supposed to conduct their lives, and the world is



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probably a better place for having these truths to live by. At least that is the case when people obey those rules, instead of killing each other in arguments over whose version of the rules is true! Similarly, non-theistic "religions" such as Buddhism and poly-theistic religions like Hinduism also provide rules or "truths" by which people may order their lives, and understand their relationship to the universe.

Some stories that are found in literature also contain another kind of "truth." The stories handed down by oral tradition in some societies, mythological tales committed to ink and paper and thus preserved, and the writings of great fiction authors often display a distilled wisdom of the ages, a wisdom which counts as another type of truth. For example, the story of Oedipus the King, written by the Greek poet Sophocles more than 2,400 years ago, is not true in any literal sense. Yet the play contains "truths," insights about the nature of human relations, of hubris, ambition and tragedy. These insights are one of the reasons why this play survives to this day, and is still performed on stage and screen. We can learn important truths by studying it, even if it is entirely based upon fictional events.

Political "truths" are another matter. In the United States, for example, one of the most basic documents of American democracy begins with the words, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all

men are created equal ... " This "political truth" is one of the basic organizing principles for government and politics in America. In Cambodia, to give an example closer to home, many would consider it a "truth" that "The King is the father of the nation and the protector of religion." This is reflected in the national motto, Article 4 from of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia: "Nation-Religion-King." Thus, this is a basic organizing principle for government and politics in Cambodia-though the precise nature of that relationship can

Searching for the truth — Public Debate

be difficult to understand at times, much as it sometimes is difficult to see how "all men are created equal" always applies in the USA. One of the great men of American letters, Henry Adams, is famously said to have once written, "He really did not care whether truth was, or was not, true." Perhaps this helps us to distinguish between political truths and some of the other kinds! A friend of mine recently told me a joke about truth. It goes like this: A businessman was looking to hire an accountant to work at his company. Three candidates showed up for the inter-view. The businessman called the first accountant into his office and asked him, "How much is 2+2?" The accountant answered, "Four." The businessman thanked him and showed him to the door. Then the second accountant came in for his interview, the businessman again asked, "How much is 2+2?" The second accountant also answered, "Four." The second accountant is then also asked to wait outside. The third candidate for the accountant job then comes into the business-man's office, and he is asked, "How much is 2+2?" This third candidate then got up from his chair, locked the door to the office, closed the curtains on the window, and whispered into the businessman's ear, "How much do you want it to be?" The third accountant was hired on the spot. Such a story, though it is a joke, somehow rings true to people in many countries!



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How, then, can we discover the truth about politics? In the Khmer language, the words for "politics" and "cheating" share the same root–and this may reflect a basic cul-tural view that politics is somehow an opposite of anything true! But it is possible to discover truths about politics; we can do this by applying versions of the scientific method. This is a discipline of study which in many western countries called "political science" – some thing which, curiously enough, is not taught in most Cambodian schools. But perhaps it should be taught, because through this means, we can better understand that truths lie behind words and posturing of politicians.

For example, we can think of a hypothetical case where a businessman is awarded a large contract to perform some public work for the state, such as building a new road. We can ask questions about how that contract came to be awarded to that particular businessman. Did the businessman pay bribes or "commissions" to the politicians who awarded the contract? Did the legislators who voted in favor of that contract receive any favors from those who benefit from the legislation? Does one of the politicians happen to own a farm which lies along the path of the new road? Is there any evidence to show that the road will actually benefit the constituents who were cited by the politician in his arguments in favor of awarding the contract? Who exactly will obtain concrete benefits from the contract? Were there other companies who could have built a better road, for a lower cost? Was the decision taken purely in the public interest, or were private interests also served? Are there any documents, or other records of negotiations, which might help to shed light on any of these questions?

In this way, we can begin to unravel the web of interests which underlie such a decision, and begin to get at the "truth" of politics. In an important sense, this is the kind of truth that the Documentation Center of Cambodia tries to find. The motto of the Documentation Center is '*Searching for the truth.*' The kind of truth that the Documentation Center searches for is what the Greeks called noesis; it is the same kind of truth that scientists search for using the logic of scientific discovery described by Karl Popper. DC-Cam searches for the truth about politics in, or more precisely, perhaps, about the administration of the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Exactly how did so many people die during the Pol Pot time? What did they die from? How many died from starvation? How many died from disease? How many Cambodians were killed by execution? How were those executions organized and carried out? Who gave the orders? When, where and how were those orders transmitted from the people at the top to the people in the rank and file who carried out the orders? What was the organization and who was in command of the security forces of the Khmer Rouge state? Where were the executions carried out? Who were the victims, and who were the killers? These are the kinds of questions DC-Cam seeks to answer.

DC-Cam relies heavily on scientific methods. Political scientists and other social scientists from Europe, Australia and the United States regularly advise the Documentation Center on how to organize the search for the truth in Cambodia using modern scientific techniques. These methods include such things as using satellites in space to help create maps of the Killing Fields; using modern information technologies to organize the information and build computer databases of the findings; and using a variety of other information technologies to preserve, store and reproduce various forms of raw data discovered in the process of the research. Most of all, perhaps, the Documentation Center's research relies on discovering the bureaucratic paperwork produced by the Khmer Rouge killing machine, paperwork such as memos, notes, orders, execution lists, meeting minutes, and so on. This paperwork describes how the Cambodian genocide was organized, and the Documentation Center has recovered hundreds of thousands of pages of such material. Uncovering and analyzing that information will tell the story of the Cambodian genocide, the stories of its victims, and the stories of its perpetrators. These are stories that Cambodians of present and future generations have a right to know.

Searching for the truth about these questions is the mission of the Documentation Center. As I have suggested in this article, finding the truth and knowing it when we find it is not a simple task. But it is possible to seek the truth, and for Cambodia, it is essential. The Documentation Center will continue to devote itself to Searching for the truth about what happened during the Pol Pot regime, and aims to succeed at the task.

Number 1, January 2000

LEGACY OF THE KHMER ROUGE

By Craig Etcheson

With the disintegration of the Khmer Rouge political organization and the collapse of their military power, Cambodia is nearing the endgame of the epic tragedy of the Khmer Rouge. I have noticed, however, that new expatriates arriving in Cambodia–and indeed, I fear, some who have been here a long while–do not always realize the profound consequences the Khmer Rouge have had on Cambodian society and the Cambodian people. Amid the current debate over how to deal with jailed Khmer Rouge military chief Ta Mok, this seems like an appropriate juncture to discuss the Khmer Rouge legacy and its implications for the future

of Cambodia. It is a complex legacy, to be sure, with dramatic effects across the entire range of Cambodian realities-economic, military, social, political and legal.

Let's first consider the economic legacy of the Khmer Rouge. At today's remove, it is difficult to recall that thirty years ago, the Cambodian economy was strong compared to Cambodia's Vietnamese and Thai neighbors. The Khmer Rouge utterly destroyed the Cambodian economy between 1975 and 1979, which was no mean feat insofar as it was

primarily a barter and subsistence agrarian economy, though with an emerging modern sector in the urban areas.

Even after the Khmer Rouge were driven from power in 1979, however, the threat of their "return" continued to haunt Cambodia in the form of nearly two decades of festering warfare. For these past twenty years, huge portions of the national budget have been devoted to defending against the return of the Khmer Rouge, meaning that those economic resources were not available for rehabilitation and development. This legacy shows in the condition of the country's economy and infrastructure.

Further, to support the seemingly interminable war, all sides resorted to rapacious and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources–gems', forests' and fisheries' products–driving the country to the edge of ecological catastrophe, perhaps over the edge. Time will tell about that, but the environmental rape continues even though the war has ended. The current government has pledged to terminate these disastrous policies, and has made some moves in that direction. But the problem is deeply enmeshed in the socio-



political structure. Elements of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces are involved in deforestation.

The "former" Khmer Rouge of the northwest have recently proposed rather grandiose development projects, and those proposals are currently pending at the CDC in Phnom Penh. Ieng Sary's men wish to attract foreign direct investment for infrastructure development projects-large hydro dams for power and agricultural irrigation - and foreign humanitarian aid for social development projectsschools, clinics, demining and so

forth. The European Union has recently announced a grant of \$5.7 million for this latter category of projects in the northwest. In any event, these Khmer Rouge development proposals amply demonstrate how far from their crude Maoist origins Khmer Rouge economic thinking has come. As do the casinos and Vietnamese prostitutes in Pailin.

In the northern former Khmer Rouge zones, old ways of thinking continue to hold sway. Logging and looting of the ancient pagodas for artifacts still appear to be the main forms of economic activity there.

Searching for the truth — Public Debate

Presumably this will change with time as the pagodas and the forests play out as sources of revenue, and as the northern Khmer Rouge begin to realize the potential for tourism from nearby Thailand, proximate to many important historical sites which have been inaccessible to visitors for decades.

Let's now consider the Khmer Rouge military legacy. The Khmer Rouge military threat no longer exists. International political isolation resulting from the Paris Peace process combined with the government's two-decades-old dual track policy of reconciliation and military pressure led to the final collapse of Khmer Rouge military power. This final collapse was marked by the capture of the last hard-line holdout, the universally feared General Ta Mok, in March of last year.

Fundamentally the policy of the Phnom Penh government toward the Khmer Rouge has remained consistent for the last twenty years. In January 1979, Heng Samrin announced on behalf of the Revolutionary Front which was replacing the Khmer Rouge regime, "Those who have committed crimes, show true repentance and who return to the revolution will be forgiven."

For those who refused to heed this message, there was the fist, but this policy has remained in practice for twenty years with only two exceptions. In 1979 the new regime formally blamed everything on the "Pol Pot - Ieng Sary Clique," condemned those two to death in absentia and sentenced a few captured Pol Pot security cadre to brief stints of political re-education. That first exception was at the beginning of the end of the Khmer Rouge. The second exception is coming now at the end of the end of the Khmer Rouge, when a still-undetermined number of senior cadre face the likelihood of formal condemnation and some kind of punishment to place an historical exclamation point at the end of the Khmer Rouge nightmare.

Ieng Sary's minions in Pailin periodically threaten that they will go to back to war if their old leaders are brought to justice. These threats ring hollow. Many of their fighters have been demobilized, and the remainder are in the process of being integrated into the national armed forces. They all know that a return to war means a return to Khmer killing Khmer, attempting to survive by eating grass and bugs, and death by landmines and mosquitoes. They won't do it. For many, it seems, their highest aspiration now is to get a job at the Pailin casino. They want food for their bellies, and schools for their children. The war is over, though the continuing threats suggest that perhaps the old leaders-warriors for virtually their entire adult lives-may be mentally incapable of adjusting to peace.

Banditry, of course, will remain a chronic problem, as it always has been on the fringes of the country. This is an unavoidable consequence of traditional methods of governing Cambodia. But it will be a manageable problem, whether there are extensive Khmer Rouge trials or not.

Demobilization of the bloated armed forces is now Cambodia's primary military challenge. There is a significant potential for social unrest and increased banditry arising from unemployed former soldiers, Khmer Rouge or otherwise, if demobilization is not properly handled and amply funded. Offers from the People's Republic of China to underwrite a large portion of this process are not entirely reassuring. The Chinese model of civil-military relations is not appropriate for a Cambodia which aims to build a modern liberal democratic system. A World Bank conference on demobilization in May failed to even broach many of the key issues, including disarming exsoldiers, selection of demobilizers, and so on. This will be much harder than it looks.

Another long-lasting military legacy of the Khmer Rouge, of course, is landmines. This scourge will continue to haunt the Cambodian people, and constitute a serious drag on economic productivity, for generations to come. Recent financial scandals at the Cambodian Mine Action Center notwith-standing, humanitarian demining and the strengthening of Cambodia's indigenous capacity for demining should remain a principal concern of the international community.

The social legacy of the Khmer Rouge is complex, and frankly, little understood. Psychiatrists and social psychologists are still studying the impact of decades of war and genocide on the Cambodian population at large. There is no scientific consensus yet as to the incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder and other social and psychological maladies arising from more than a quarter century of conflict.

But very soon after one arrives in Cambodia and begins to have relations with ordinary Cambodians, one notices that the psychological legacy of the Khmer Rouge remains profound among the population.

Traditional Cambodian society was organized communally, around village and clan. Despite their rhetoric of social solidarity, the Khmer Rouge shattered the traditional social mode of organization and atomized society, forcing each individual to fend for himself. The legacy of this insane policy is a nation of strangers, where the old concepts of mutual obligation have been deeply eroded. It is as if the leap from traditional society to modernity was done not over a few generations, but rather forced in a few short days.

Oddly, the current government's development policy appears aimed at doing precisely the opposite of what Pol Pot did, a perfect mirror image. Pol Pot sought to develop through total autarky, severing virtually all external economic relations, isolating internal regions one from the other by enforcing self-sufficiency and isolating people one from another by declaring that Angkar, the Organization, was the only permitted object of attachment.

The current regime has reversed this logic. It seeks to

build webs of economic relationships with countries near and far, to catalyze domestic commerce by linking the internal regions of the country through improved lines of communication and transport, and by providing a significant measure of freedom and autonomy to the individual. Freedom, of course, provided that the people do not attempt to infringe upon what the leadership sees as its own prerogatives.

This strategy is particularly important when it comes to the former Khmer Rouge zones. The recently departed US Ambas-sador, Kenneth Quinn, used to tell me about ten years ago that the best way for the United States to destroy the Khmer Rouge was to keep building roads into Khmer Rouge zones. This, he argued, would contaminate them with alien ideas and commerce, resulting in their disintegration as a cohesive ideological and military force. At the time I thought this was crazy idea, but in the end that's pretty much exactly what happened. I don't know it for a fact, but I would bet that Ambassador Quinn made precisely this same argument to Prime Minister Hun Sen, and he appears to have convinced him.

The long-term social conse-quences of the government's development strategy may well be profound far beyond their impact on the Khmer Rouge legacy, as rural life becomes tied to urban life in a way never before experienced in Cambodia.

Perhaps the most complex of all the Khmer


Rouge legacies is its political legacy. Here, we need only go back to the formative event of the current political scene: July 1997.

In my view, the spark that ignited the July 1997 fighting was singular. Under the influence of a tragically misguided strategy, the royalist forces of the coalition government foolishly attempted to form a military alliance with the Khmer Rouge in an effort to counter the superior strength of Cambodian People's Party (CPP) forces.

Predictably, this was

perceived by the CPP not only as a coup d'etat, but indeed as the return of the Khmer Rouge. So the CPP responded in kind. One effect of these dueling coups in 1997 was that the CPP crushed and eliminated the command elements of the royalist armed forces.

Though it was gratuitously savage, this action had the salutary effect of removing a critical axis of structural instability in Cambodia: compe-ting armed forces. Hun Sen thus accomplished the integration of the armies, which had been a key unfulfilled plank of the Paris Accords. It was probably inevitable that this could not be done without spilling some blood. Furthermore, the forcible unification of the RCAF command under the CPP effectively eliminated the



ability of Khmer Rouge elements to play the royalists and the CPP off one against the other.

At the same time, however, there remain deep factional divisions within CPP. Just a year ago at a June 28 party plenum, Chea Sim said, "The opponents of the Cambodian People's Party persist in their efforts to break our internal solidarity...(and) the unity among the party leadership with a view to destroying the party. Yet they never succeed in their objective thanks to the fact that we know how to unite and mobilize the forces which enable us to solve the problems."

Despite these fine words from the CPP chairman, if party unity were not a problem, the issue would never arise in the first place. The party's quasi-Leninist

internal rules of "democratic centralism" disguise the fissures rather well, but the fissures are there, nonetheless, and probably constitute the single most significant threat to the internal political stability of Cambodia today.

There was serious unrest within the party at the beginning of this year over the issue of how to treat the surrendering top Khmer Rouge leaders. The toasting of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan at the turn of the year was a ritual of dominance and submission to Hun Sen, but the scene revolted

many of those in the party who have struggled for decades to defeat the Pol Potists. This, I suspect, more than international pressure, was what turned Hun Sen from his initial declarations that "the past should be buried."

Within the Khmer Rouge, there was always a policy of total fealty to the party, in the person of the supreme leader. But well before Pol Pot's demise, the party began to disintegrate into mutually suspicious micro-factions based primarily on personal loyalty to local military commanders. Given the ruthless history of internal purges, there was no basis for trust or cohesion, beyond a consensus that there had been too much killing of senior cadre. Violating this unstated

consensus apparently precipitated Pol Pot's final downfall, and that of Mok after him.

The ex-Khmer Rouge leaders fundamentally distrust each other. Thus, despite CPP cleavages, the CPP has the advantage in applying divide and conquer tactics. The former Khmer Rouge all recognize that Hun Sen has no viable challengers, but while they respect his ruthlessness and his ability, they have not yet completely internalized the rules of the new order.

This, in turn, brings us to the legal legacy of the Khmer Rouge, which is really an issue for the future rather than the past. In conformity with Cambodia's 20-year old policy, the second and third tier ex-Khmer Rouge leaders, both those too young to be implicated in

> the genocide and those too unimportant to warrant national judicial attention will be forgiven and continue to be gradually reintegrated into the political life of Cambodia.

> Prospects for the senior Khmer Rouge leaders may not be quite so rosy. Ieng Sary sent a message to Hun Sen when his zone overwhelmingly voted for the Sam Rainsy Party in last year's election. Hun Sen may well send a message back by picking off the most senior of these ungrateful people one by one, until the next generation gets the message. His chosen

weapon will be a new one: the law.

Mok and Duch were arrested with nary a peep from Pailin, though this is really no surprise, since both were reviled within the Khmer Rouge. Nuon Paet was sentenced to life while General Sam Bith and Colonel Chhouk Rin have been charged, and we hear only the faintest bleats of apprehension from their former minions. Now we learn that more will be arrested in the backpacker ransom case.

When Hun Sen was returning home from his son's graduation at the West Point Military Academy in the United States a few months ago, he stopped off in Paris and gave an interview with French journalists. There the Prime Minister announced that the



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investigation of Mok had revealed that the genocide had been carried out by a "regime," by a "political movement," and that therefore the prosecution of Mok and Duch would not be enough to "achieve justice" for the Cambodian people. This certainly doesn't constitute much of a revelation for anyone even vaguely aware of modern Cambodian history. But does this signal something important about Hun Sen's long-term intentions?

Hun Sen has long said that one has to catch the fish before one decides how to fry them. Hun Sen's frying pan is now getting very warm, and he will be able to drop the fish into the bubbling oil, one by one. But he will do this in his own good time, according to his schedule, rather than on any timetable the international community may attempt to impose. Is there a fundamental disconnect between the international community's timetable and the Cambodian government's sense of how quickly to move on the Khmer Rouge issue?

The Chinese have reacted strongly to the possibility of justice for the former Khmer Rouge leadership, pulling out all the stops to defend their former allies. Chinese officials have been actively lobbying both the Cambodian National Assembly and the government in an effort to kill any international role in a Khmer Rouge tribunal, in favor of the Chinese vision of Asian values, where mass slaughter of domestic enemies is nobody's business. Will Cambodia kowtow before Chinese influence, instead of continuing to move forward toward a society based on the rule of law?

France dispatched a crack team of lawyers to advise the Cambodian government on how to handle a Khmer Rouge tribunal. One can only hope that this team does not include the same French Foreign Ministry personnel who continued to ship weapons to Rwanda's Hutu genocidaires during and after 1994 slaughter of the country's Tutsi minority. Does French concern with the matter of genocide justice in Cambodia go beyond attempting to ensure that the official languages of any such tribunal will be Khmer and French?

Meanwhile, the United States, which had devoted significant resources and rhetoric to seeking justice for the Khmer Rouge in recent years, has lately been

Searching for the truth — Public Debate

missing in action, distracted by the war in Kosovo as well as by domestic political concerns. Hopefully, with a new American ambassador in Cambodia and a strong new ambassador at the United Nations, the lackluster and ineffective leadership of the United States on this issue will receive a much-needed boost. But can US-Cambodia relations survive a failure by Cambodia to cooperate with the international community in bringing the Khmer Rouge justice?


Strong, creative and principled leadership on the issue of genocide justice in Cambodia from the international community is sorely needed, because Cambodia's leaders appear to be unable either to come to grips with the challenge on their own or to explain to the world why they continue to dither. Prime Minister Hun Sen has an admirable history of moral rhetoric when it comes to justice for the Khmer Rouge. But lately, according to an emerging consensus in the international community, he appears morally lost on this issue.

Now that the time for action on genocide justice has arrived, Ieng Sary is fighting back, ironically, with the very weapon his Khmer Rouge attempted to abolish: money. And this surprise Khmer Rouge cash counter-attack seems to have caught the government completely off guard. As one of the most experienced CPP cadres wryly told me when I recently asked him why the CPP is failing to act in accordance with its historical position on genocide justice, it may be a problem of "cash flow." Will Hun Sen be able to extract himself from the web of patronage binding his regime ever more tightly to its former nemeses in Pailin?

These are the kinds of questions which are being asked today about the legacy of the Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian people, along with the international community, await the answers with baited breath.

Please send letters or articles to Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) P.O. Box 1110, Phnom Penh, Cambodia Tel: (855) 23-211-875 Fax: (855) 23-210-358 Email: dccam@bigpond.com.kh Homepage: http://welcome.to/dccam

Searching for the truth — Family Tracing



It always reminds me of my older sister who died from starvation in the Khmer Rouge regime every time the traditional Khmer ancestor holiday, commonly known to Cambodians as Pchum Benn, comes to its celebration. My older sister's husband was taken to be executed by the Khmer Rouge solely due to the fact that he was a teacher. Her little daughter also died from starvation under the regime.

It is believed that Pchum Benn is the time when the souls of the dead are set free from the hell and the living relatives must start to make offerings in food and sacramental gifts to their dead ancestors or the spirits. The spirits are usually roaming throughout seven pagodas seeking for the offerings.

I always think that my sister's soul always comes and rests with my family during the days of the festival. I still maintain the same feeling that she is still very hungry, and I want to give enough rice to her to eat. My feeling at the very moment that people go to pagodas in this respect during Pchum Benn gets very agitated, and more deepened as a result of the sympathy I feel toward my sister and the poor. Worse still, what makes me even sadder is that my sister has left to us another daughter who is still alive in present days. She is my niece, named Ung Theavy. She is 29 years old,

Number 1, January 2000

married and has two children. She always asks me why the Khmer Rouge are SO ferocious that they deprive her mother even of sufficient rice for her just to live on. This is no different question that is commonly asked by thousands of Cambodian people whenever I am on my research mission in the villages, collecting evidence and interviewing witnesses of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime that took nearly two million lives of the Cambodian population. In the villages, the people are moving on with their life but the bitterness of the past remains always with them.

They need an answer to what happened to their relatives.

An independent, fair and just tribunal shall be set up to provide the answer to the villagers. Providing the answer means not only healing their feeling of the past and their goal of personal and national reconciliation but also turning Cambodian society into a real state of law. This goal needs to be fulfilled before Cambodia will be able to enjoy stability, happiness and development.

The soul of my sister along with those of my relatives as well as millions of Cambodian people who have survived the Khmer Rouge regime have waited for over twenty years now for a fair trial. The Pchum Benn of this year will be of more special feature as it marks testimony of a Cambodia turning toward national reconciliation and seeking a real justice for the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. The failure to present a court of law, thoroughly unbiased and competent, to the victims to find genocide justice is no difference from offering empty plates to the monks. It is a betrayal. Nearly all of Cambodian people, at home and abroad alike, were the victims of the Khmer Rouge regime, and must have common obligation in helping seek to find a real justice for Cambodia and humanity.

Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)

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TO MY UNCLE

Unfortunately my way of thinking has become somewhat unclear or maybe too clear. The ways I view the world. I believe that every country has it own tragedy. For example the United States of America had slavery, Israel had the Holocaust and Cambodia has this, and I believe that this is the Holocaust just like the Jew's so maybe somehow history does repeat itself, despite the different parts of the world we live in. (Could you imagine: how crowded the world is, if everyone is agreed.) Yes, some times I wonder what it would be like if there was no war and what it would be like if my parents were still alive, as well as my brother and sister. How my life would be different from what it is now. My daughter Jordyn sometimes asks me why I don't have a Mom or a Dad like the rest of her friends' parents. Then I proceed to try to explain to her what happened to her grandparents and that I will never get to see my parents again. You know what the saddest part is? I can only vaguely remember them myself. I was about 5 years old when they died. There is this strange thought as I remember when my parents were buried. I have this thought or maybe imagination that they were pretending that they were dead, so they could be buried and then dig this underground tunnel that would lead them to another world and they would return to retrieve me and my sister.

PS: I don't believe that justice is enough for what had happened to my family. No justice in the world will bring my family back. We should be asking ourselves how we as human beings can prevent this from happening again.

Love always, Your niece, *Theavy*



Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam)

NEW YEAR, NEW RICE FIELD

Compiled by Sayana Ser

A modified song–Bassac Meter (style of Cambodian traditional song with a meter consisting of four feet per stanza and seven syllables per foot)

A cool breeze is blowing gently from the north. Comrades, our rice is ripening, without any grass surrounded. We will feel warm and gratified when once we glance at the fields.

The rice grains are plump, and their clusters are so long. It bends, and this shows that the rice is not fruitless. The rice is under these conditions everywhere, and large amounts of seedlings have been pulled and transplanted.

We should speed up threshing and tramping work. By doing this, the harvest can be finished on time, and the rice grains will not fall, and the benefit will not be lost.

Thousands of workmen have been gathered. So, we should start the work at once with the agricultural instruments readily available, so that we can thresh and tramp and keep the rice yield in its proper place.

The matter of rain will never be a problem, and delayed harvest will never occur. Sickles will be used even though the rain will come eventually. By so doing, delay can be dealt with.

Ties should be made long to support the rice

bunches hanging down, and to prevent rice bundles from being crushed. So, the rice yield can be properly and completely collected. Threshing terraces should be thoroughly cleaned at the end of the harvest operation.

I harvest the rice; the comrades thresh; Aunts winnow the rice; Uncles transport the rice by oxcart, while young children dry the rice grains and their older sisters collect the rice to store in the bins.

All assigned tasks should be done at once for efficiency, so that the harvest can be completed, and rice bins filled up.

We are coming to prepare everything, add more compost and seeds, build dams ponds, so that dry season rice farming can proceed following the final harvest.

Be ready to farm and build up new dikes, high and big, and as many as possible, to reach our target– three tons per hectare–in the upcoming rainy season.

Once we have finished the harvest, we will arrange everything for the new year's new fields, a beautiful scene, showing the state of prosperity of Kampuchea, upon which it foreign countries can model their own.



រូបថតឯកសារៈ មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជានិងសារៈមន្ទីរទក្រិដ្ឋកម្មប្រល័យពូជសាសន៍ទូលស្វែង

ឋវិកានៃការបោះពុម្ពដ្យឈទបត្ថម្ភដោយផ្នែកសិទ្ធិមនុស្សនិងជំនួយមនុស្សធម៌នៃក្រសួងការបរទេសនៃរាជរដ្ឋាភិបាលនរ៉ែវែស ។ មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជាអំពាវនាវដល់រដ្ឋាភិបាល មូលនិធិនានា និង សាធារណជនគ្រប់រុប សូមជួយទបត្ថម្ភការបោះពុម្ពដ្យាយទស្សនាវិដ្តីនេះទៅតាមលទ្ធភាពដែលអាចធ្វើបាន។ ពត៌មានបន្ថែមចំពោះការបោះពុម្ពដ្យាយទស្សនាវិដ្តីស្វែងកេការពិត សូមមេត្តាទាក់ទងមកកាន់នាយកមជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជាតាមទូរស័ព្ទលេខ (៨៩៩) ២៣ ២១១ ៨៧៩ ឬ (៨៩៩) ១២ ៩០៩ ៩៩៩ ។ សូមអតុណ ។

Documentation Center of Cambodia would like to appeal to governments, foundations and individuals for support of the publication of *Searching for the truth*. For contribution, please contact (855) 23 211 875 or (855) 12 90 55 95. Thank you.

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Cyan Magenta